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iABSTRACT
Beyond Dichotomies
The Quest for Justice and Reconciliation and the Politics of
National Identity Building in Post-Genocide Rwanda
Kazuyuki Sasaki
Subject Keywords:
1. Conflict transformation. 2. Peace-building. 3. Reconciliation. 4. Restorative justice.
5. Retributive justice. 6. Rwanda-Ethnic relations. 7. Rwanda-Politics and government.
Justice and reconciliation are both highly complex concepts that are often
described as incompatible alternatives in the aftermath of violent conflicts,
despite the fact that both are fundamental to peacebuilding in societies divided
by the legacies of political violence, oppression and exclusion. This thesis
examines the relationship between justice and reconciliation, pursued as
essential ingredients of peacebuilding. After advancing an inclusive working
conceptual framework in which seemingly competing conceptions regarding
justice and reconciliation are reconceived to work compatibly for building peace,
the thesis presents the results of an in-depth case study of Rwanda’s
post-genocide justice and reconciliation endeavour.
The thesis focuses on Rwanda’s justice and reconciliation efforts and their
relationship to the ongoing challenge of reformulating Rwandans’ social
identities. A field research conducted for this study revealed that issues of
victimhood, justice and reconciliation were highly contested among individuals
and groups with varied experiences of the country’s violent history. Resolving
these conflicting narratives so that each Rwandan’s narrative/identity is
dissociated from the negation of the other’s victimhood emerged as a paramount
challenge in Rwanda’s quest for justice and reconciliation. Rwanda’s approach
to justice and reconciliation can be seen as an innovative both/and approach
that seeks to overcome dichotomous thinking by addressing various justice and
reconciliation concerns in compatible ways. However, by limiting its efforts to the
issues that arose from crimes committed under the former regimes, the justice
and reconciliation endeavour of the Rwandan government fails to reconcile
people’s conflicting narratives of victimhood, which will be essential to transform
the existing racialised and politicised ethnic identities of Rwandan people.
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1PREFACE
My journey of inquiry began about nine years ago during my first visit to Rwanda
in May 2000. The visit was a personal one. After working over nine years in
conflict-stricken Ethiopia as a development worker, I was desperate to see a sign
of hope, that building peace is possible even after a devastatingly violent conflict.
This led me to Rwanda, the land in which the fastest genocidal massacres in the
twentieth century caused hundreds of thousands of innocent people to perish in
a space of merely a hundred days during 1994. I heard that six years after that
horrendous act of extermination, some non-governmental organisations (NGOs)
were beginning peace and reconciliation efforts. During this visit, I knocked on
the door of one faith-based international NGO to get information about its
peacebuilding programme.
There I met Ange, a young Rwandan woman who persuaded the NGO to
launch its first ever peacebuilding programme in the aftermath of the genocide.
While at her office, I asked her the background of the programme. She then told
me her own story as a genocide survivor who lost both of her parents and many
other family members. Her father was a prominent human rights activist who
bravely spoke out against human rights violations by the former regime; he was
not just a Tutsi but a Tutsi who was on the blacklist prepared by the organisers of
the genocide. Because of his background, Ange had no doubt that her parents
were slaughtered by génocidaires, but she did not know where their bodies were
dumped or buried.
When her story came to an end after about two hours, she surprised me by
sharing her hope that one day Rwandans would be united. I asked her how it
2would be possible. She then told me about gacaca – a traditional
community-based system of dispute resolution. ‘Gacaca will make it possible for
Rwandans to tell the truth, forgive each other and reconcile’, she said calmly.
‘This is what my father used to say’.
Nine years later, the gacaca process of justice and reconciliation, which
was officially inaugurated in June 2002, is now coming to an end. Contrary to her
great expectation of the gacaca process at the outset, Ange has not found even
a tiny clue about what happened to her parents. Nobody has acknowledged the
killings or apologised for them. Despite her repeated pleas for the truth over the
last few years, her neighbours have kept complete silence. The so-called
‘participatory’ gacaca courts have utterly let her down as well as her younger
sister who also survived the mayhem in 1994.
This story and many others like it prompted me to ask difficult questions
about the justice and reconciliation process in the aftermath of mass violence,
particularly in post-genocide Rwanda. I believe that the questions addressed in
this thesis are not only mine but are also shared by many others, particularly
those in search of ways to put an end to the cycle of violence in Rwanda and
around the world.
3CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION:
THE CHALLENGE OF JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION
IN POST-VIOLENCE PEACEBUILIDING
1. Justice and Reconciliation in Tension
In the aftermath of violent political conflict, we often hear a desperate call for
justice expressed by victims of atrocities. Many victims, human rights activists,
and others, assert that all the perpetrators must be held accountable for their
crimes and punished if ‘justice’ is to be done, the culture of impunity eradicated,
the rule of law consolidated, and the vicious cycle of violence finally brought to
an end. They may be alarmed by the language of reconciliation, particularly if it
implies forgiveness of those responsible for serious crimes such as murder,
torture and rape. The quest for reconciliation is often considered to be irrelevant
or even counterproductive to the reconstruction of a society ravaged by violent
political conflict, and emphasis tends to be placed on the prosecution and
punishment of criminals.
On the other hand, reconciliation may be a genuine concern for those who
consider it to be the only way to stop the vicious cycle of violence and start a new
life. There are people who, often drawing on their religious convictions, call for
forgiveness and a renewed relationship with their former enemies, including
those who directly inflicted harm on them. Some commentators even insist that
victims must forget what happened in the past and start a new chapter of their
history free from hostility, mistrust and the fear of violence. In their view, a
4demand for absolute justice is counterproductive to the goal of healing and
reconciliation of nation(s) because it is likely to open up old wounds, induce
hatred and resentment against the old enemies, and reinforce divisions within
their society.
While people’s views are usually more complex and diverse than this, these
oppositional views illustrate the way the relationship between justice and
reconciliation is often seen, particularly in the immediate aftermath of mass
violence, where the memories of brutal killings, torture or rape are still fresh.
Certainly this is not the only way to conceptualise and pursue justice and
reconciliation in the context of peacebuilding. However, these sharply conflicting
views point to the possible tensions that may stand between justice and
reconciliation -- two critical challenges faced by societies emerging from
protracted violent conflict. Moreover, the issues of justice and reconciliation are
often further complicated by the existence of structural injustices which
constitute the root cause of violent conflict in the first place.
This study seeks to make a modest contribution to the clarification of the
complex relationship between justice and reconciliation pursued as important
ingredients of peacebuilding in societies deeply divided by the legacies of violent
political conflicts. The central theme of this study boils down to three questions:
 How can justice be pursued in ways that promote reconciliation in
deeply divided societies emerging from violent political conflict?
 Potentially, what tensions may arise in the pursuit of justice and
reconciliation?
 How can these tensions be alleviated or resolved?
This thesis assumes that potential tensions that may arise in the pursuit of
justice and reconciliation can be alleviated, at least in theory, by adopting a
comprehensive framework for understanding these twin goals/processes that
5are fundamental to peacebuilding. A major goal of this study is to propose such
an inclusive framework and then examine its validity with particular reference to
the experience of justice and reconciliation efforts in post-genocide Rwanda. In
this thesis, Rwanda’s experience is presented as an example of endeavour to
overcome dualistic thinking around issues of justice and reconciliation by
conceiving and pursuing them together in a compatible way. The ultimate aim of
the thesis is to draw lessons from Rwanda’s experience with regard to
conceptual understandings of justice and reconciliation in societies struggling to
overcome the legacies of violent conflicts.
2. Justice and Reconciliation in Post-Violence Peacebuilding
This thesis discusses the challenge of justice and reconciliation in the context of
‘post-violence’ peacebuilding. The goal of this section is to explain why this
thesis uses the term ‘post-violence’ peacebuilding instead of the more commonly
used term ‘post-conflict’ peacebuilding. To answer this question, it is crucial to
clarify my basic assumptions about peace, conflict and violence as well as how
justice and reconciliation relate to them. Five major assumptions are outlined as
follows:
Peace is about reducing violence.
Peace is a concept much broader and deeper than the absence of war or armed
conflict. Galtung (1996, 2) says ‘[c]reating peace obviously has to do with
reducing violence (cure) and avoiding violence (prevention)’ and ‘violence
means harming and/or hurting’. If we agree with Galtung’s proposition, peace is
achieved when both symptoms and causes of violence are eliminated. But what
is violence?
Galtung (1990; 1996, 2, 31, 196-210) makes important distinctions between
6three forms of violence: direct violence, structural violence and cultural violence.
Direct violence refers to a physical form of violence such as war, murder, assault,
torture or rape that harms or causes great suffering to the people at its receiving
end. Structural violence refers to forms of indirect violence caused by structural
injustices underlying existing social relationships in societies. Two major forms of
such structural violence are repression (political injustice) and exploitation
(economic injustice). These forms of structural violence are not usually as visible
as various forms of direct, physical violence, but cause great suffering to the
people affected, as seen in extreme but not unusual cases of numerous deaths
caused by hunger, malnutrition or preventable diseases in impoverished
communities. Finally, cultural violence refers to all the factors in human societies
that ‘make direct and structural violence look, even feel, right – or at least not
wrong’ (Galtung 1990, 291). In other words, cultural violence means a range of
cultural, social, political, religious or even scientific assumptions and practices
that legitimise and render direct and structural violence acceptable in society
(292).
Owing much to the work of Galtung (1969, 1985, 1990, 1996), peace and
conflict studies make an important distinction between negative and positive
peace in connection with the above three forms of violence. Negative peace is
understood as the absence of direct violence, whereas positive peace is
generally described as a situation in which various types of violence are
minimised or totally eliminated, and potential causes of future violent conflict –
structural and cultural violence – are also overcome (Pankhurst 1999, 239).1
1 Although negative peace and positive peace are often described in peace and conflict
studies literature as ‘the absence of direct violence’ and ‘the absence of structural and
cultural violence’ respectively, Galtung in his recent writings describes negative peace as
‘the absence of violence of all kinds’ and positive peace as a situation in which violent
conditions of all kinds (direct, structural and cultural) are transformed to or replaced with
positive conditions (1996, 31-2). Most recently, he defined negative and positive peace as
7Conflict can be destructive or constructive.
The second important assumption underlying peace and conflict terminology
used in this thesis is that conflict is not necessarily destructive, although the term
‘conflict’ in different languages has some negative connotations. This thesis
follows a definition of conflict which is fairly common in the field of peace and
conflict studies: ‘the pursuit of incompatible goals by different groups’ (Reycher
2001, 5). According to Galtung’s influential conception of the conflict triangle,
conflict is a ‘triadic construct’ composed of contradiction, attitude and behaviour
(1969, 1996, 71-2). Contradiction refers to the content of conflict or the
‘underlying conflict situation’ that is often characterised by ‘the clash of interests’
between conflicting parties or their relationship based on structural injustices
(Miall et al. 1999, 14). Attitude primarily concerns parties’ perceptions of and
emotions towards each other, whereas behaviour is something which can be
observed in their words or/and actions towards each other. In theory, both
attitude and behaviour can be either positive/constructive or
negative/destructive.
Galtung and many other scholars maintain that having conflict in the sense
of contradiction is problematic, but not necessarily destructive. It becomes
destructive when it develops into violent forms characterised by hostile attitudes
and destructive behaviours, whereas it can be used as a constructive
opportunity to bring about positive social change without resorting to violent
means (Galtung 1996, 70). As Lederach (2003, 15) says, ‘conflict is a normal
and continuous dynamic within human relationships’ and it carries ‘the potential
for constructive change’. Thus, an important challenge for those who seek to
achieve durable peace is not to eliminate conflict per se, but ‘to transform
‘the absence of violence’ and ‘the capacity to deal with conflict nonviolently and creatively’
respectively (2001, 3).
8actually or potentially violent conflict into peaceful (non-violent) processes of
social and political change’ (Miall et al. 1999, 22).
Peacebuilding is about transforming unjust structures and relationships.
The third assumption concerns an understanding of peacebuilding as a
comprehensive concept that encompasses a wide range of efforts to transform
structures and relationships underlying violent conflicts. This thesis considers
that such peacebuilding efforts are relevant not only at a so-called
‘post-settlement’ stage, after the cessation of open hostilities, but also at
‘pre-settlement’ stages in the evolution of conflict.
Although Galtung distinguished peacebuilding from peacemaking and
peacekeeping more than three decades ago (1975, 282-304),2 it was only in
1992 that peacebuilding became part of the UN peace operation terminology, in
addition to the already well-used terms peacekeeping and peacemaking (Mani
2002, 12). In that year, Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali’s Agenda for Peace
defined ‘post-conflict peacebuilding’ as ‘actions to identify and support structures
which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into
conflict’ (1992, 11). Distinguished from ‘pre-conflict’ preventive diplomacy,
peacebuilding was generally understood as a ‘post-conflict’ agenda which was
largely identified with military demobilisation and political transition to democracy
through free elections (Miall et al. 1999, 187). The scope of the concept was
progressively broadened in related UN documents in subsequent years under
Boutros-Ghali to encompass both ‘pre-conflict’ and ‘post-conflict’ aspects (See
Boutros-Ghali 1993, 1995). However, after Annan became the next UN
2 Following the definitions proposed by Miall et al. (1999, 22), this thesis uses the terms
peacemaking and peacekeeping in the sense of ‘moving towards settlement of armed
conflict, where conflict parties are induced to reach agreement voluntarily’ and ‘the
interposition of international armed forces to separate the armed forces of belligerents, […]
associated with civil tasks such as monitoring and policing and supporting humanitarian
intervention’ respectively.
9Secretary-General, the scope of peacebuilding narrowed down again to an
operation restricted to the ‘post-conflict’ stage (See UN 1997b).
This narrow view of peacebuilding as an activity restricted to a
post-settlement stage was challenged by Lederach (1997, 20) who proposed a
much broader view of peacebuilding ‘as a comprehensive concept that
encompasses, generates, and sustains the full array of processes, approaches,
and stages needed to transform conflict toward more sustainable, peaceful
relationships’. His conceptual framework offers ‘a comprehensive approach to
the transformation of conflict that addresses the structural issues, social
dynamics of relationship building, and the development of a supportive
infrastructure for peace’ (21). This thesis discusses peacebuilding along these
lines as a range of efforts that are required, at both ‘pre-conflict’ and
‘post-conflict’ stages, for transforming the unjust structures and relationships
which underlie violent conflicts.
So, how does peacebuilding relate to peacemaking and peacekeeping?
Their relationships are probably best described conceptually with reference to
Galtung’s conflict triangle discussed above. Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse
(1999, 22) suggest that:
peacemaking aims to change the attitudes of the main protagonists,
peacekeeping lowers the level of destructive behaviour, and peacebuilding
tries to overcome the contradictions which lie at the root of the conflict.
(italics by this author)
When peacebuilding is understood in this way, its task is far beyond the
maintenance of negative peace or the avoidance of a relapse into violent conflict.
Its central task lies in the creation of positive peace through addressing
structural and cultural forms of violence, thereby building social relationships and
structures based on social justice.
10
Conflict does not disappear with the end of fighting.
The fourth assumption is that conflict does not disappear when antagonistic
parties lay down their arms. This understanding of conflict underlies the use of
the term ‘post-violence’ in this thesis, which is more accurate than the term
‘post-conflict’ (Bloomfield 2006, 3, n1). When war comes to an end through a
negotiated settlement, antagonistic parties in conflict stop engaging in direct,
physical violence. However, issues of conflict do not suddenly disappear with the
end of fighting. The process of conflict transformation must continue if the goal is
to create a sustainable peace environment based on transformed social
relationships and structures. It is for this reason that the term ‘post-conflict’ is
grossly misleading.
This thesis also avoids using the term ‘post-settlement’ because fighting
can stop without a settlement in the sense of an official peace agreement
between parties involved in a violent conflict, as is the case with Rwanda, in
which civil war and genocide ended by an outright military victory by one of the
parties to the conflict. Defined as the array of efforts to transform unjust
structures and hostile relationships underling violent conflict, peacebuilding is
relevant not only to post-settlement societies but also to post-war societies with
no clear peace settlement.
That said, the limitations of the term ‘post-violence’, must be acknowledged
for two important reasons. First, while the end of armed conflict usually entails
the cessation of fighting between antagonistic parties, it does not mean that
there will be no more physical violence in societies emerging from years of
armed conflict. There are plenty of examples indicating that domestic, and other
forms of physical violence against women, often increase at the end of armed
conflicts (Meintjes et al. 2001; Moser and Clark 2001; Pankhurst 2007). Physical
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violence against children, sexual minorities or other vulnerable groups in
societies may also persist, if not increase, after armed conflicts officially end.
Second, even if physical forms of violence have been largely removed in a
society in question, it may still be characterised by structural and cultural forms
of violence. Therefore, ‘post-violence’ is also an inaccurate term as it may imply
a situation in which all forms of violence have been removed. However, for
simplicity’s sake, ‘post-violence’ is used throughout this thesis in the sense of the
more accurate but long-winded term ‘post-organised-violence’.
Justice and reconciliation are key ingredients of peacebuilding.
How do justice and reconciliation relate to peacebuilding? This thesis considers
justice and reconciliation to be fundamental ingredients of peacebuilding,
particularly in its post-violence stages, as preceding studies on the subject have
suggested (Pankhurst 1999; Abu-Nimer 2001; Lambourne 2002, 2004). As
noted above, justice and reconciliation have often been seen as conflicting
objectives in the process of peacebuilding in the aftermath of armed conflict or
brutal organised violence; they are nevertheless at the heart of the
peacebuilding challenge discussed above: that is, to transform both social
relationships characterised with hostilities, and underlying social structures
characterised with structural forms of violence. In this sense, justice and
reconciliation constitute an essential part of a positive peace agenda in
post-violence peacebuilding that requires a long-term perspective.
3. The Rwandan Quest for Justice and Reconciliation
The world will soon witness a landmark moment in the history of humanity. The
government of Rwanda recently announced that its community-based gacaca
courts would stop taking new cases as of 31 July 2009 and reaffirmed its
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intention to complete the entire gacaca operations by the end of the year.3 Since
it began operation in June 2002, the government claims, the gacaca-based
justice system has completed over 1.5 million genocide cases, leaving only a
small number of trials on appeal and revision to be completed in the coming
months (NT 2009d). Before Rwanda, no nation or international body has ever
tried such a huge number of people accused of having committed gross human
rights violations.
Fifteen years ago, this tiny landlocked country in Central Africa shocked the
world with horrifying images of endless massacres and piles of corpses left along
road sides, in church buildings or in schools. An estimated 800,000 people4 –
more than ten percent of the country’s population – were brutally massacred in
the space of merely 100 days between April and July of 1994. The great majority
of the victims were Tutsi, an ethnic minority, who were labelled as enemies of the
state by extremists from the country’s Hutu ethnic majority. Irrespective of their
ethnic identity, those who stood in the way of the massacres were also killed. It
was a genocide orchestrated by Hutu extremists who seized state power and
then succeeded in ‘secur[ing] the broadest and most public popular participation’
of Hutus in the implementation of the genocidal massacres (Cobban 2007, 32). It
is this mass-participation of ordinary people that distinguishes the Rwandan
genocide from other genocides in the twentieth century.
Drumbl (2000) captured a peculiar challenge posed to post-genocide
3 Reported in Focus on Africa Programme on the BBC World Service, broadcast at
17:00-17:45 GMT (19:00-19:45 Rwandan local time), 24 July 2009. Earlier this year, the
National Service of Gacaca Courts announced that all the gacaca courts would be closed by
the end of June (NT 2009d), but it recently reconsidered its schedule with regard to the
completion of the gacaca process.
4 Although this standard international estimate (UN 1999) is used in this thesis, estimates
regarding the victims of the 1994 genocide vary enormously from around half a million to
over one million. The question of how many and who were killed in the 100 days is at the
heart of the controversy surrounding the 1994 genocide. See Rombouts and Vandeginste
(2005, 310-11), Straus (2006, 51, 53); Hintjens (2008a, 23).
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Rwanda by characterising it as a ‘dualist’ post-genocidal society. Drumbl
classified societies which have experienced genocide into three types:
homogenous, dualist and pluralist (1235-41). The homogenous post-genocidal
society is one in which the oppressor group has eliminated the victim group
either by annihilating (e.g. Latin America and North America ) or driving out of
the society (e.g. Germany and Austria after the Nazi Holocaust). The dualist
post-genocidal society is where the population is largely divided into the victim
group and the oppressor group after mass violence in which a large part of the
former was victimized by the offences of a large part of the latter; and despite
that, both groups coexist in the same territory, sharing the same social, political
and economic institutions. Finally, the pluralist post-genocidal society (e.g. Iraq,
Bosnia) is one in which ‘the oppressor group continues to coexist with a victim
group and a third group’ or ‘there are several victims or oppressors who must
coexist within the same territory or polity’ (1239).
As Drumbl (1241-52) explained, Rwanda complies with all the major
characteristics of a dualist post-genocidal society. Hutus and Tutsis have no
choice but to coexist in the same area as it is almost impossible to have territorial
divisions, given that the country is already too densely populated and that they
have lived in the same geographical areas for generations. However, the deep
Hutu/Tutsi divide is undeniable, given that a large proportion of Tutsis who were
in the country in 1994 were massacred in the genocide which involved the broad
complicity of Hutus at different levels, from enthusiastically slaughtering people
to ‘following orders’ or ‘being coerced to participate’ and to ‘aiding and abetting’
or remaining as passive bystanders (1246). According to Drumbl’s thesis, a
dualist post-genocide society like Rwanda is susceptible to a recurrence of
genocidal violence, and therefore, it is critical to design institutional structures ‘to
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accommodate both groups, allocate responsibility for wrongdoing, and heal the
scars of victims’(1239). The critical challenge here is to strike the right balance
between reconciling the two groups and punishing the perpetrators of violence
with the understanding that the latter may incite more violence in the future.
It was against this backdrop that the post-genocide government of Rwanda
began its search for an innovative approach to transitional justice after pursuing
highly punitive justice for some years after it took power in July 1994. Having
realised, in the late 1990s, the impossibility of coping with the backlog of
120,000 cases of suspected prisoners through its regular courts, the government
set up a system of community-based courts modelled after gacaca - an
institution described by the government as a traditional mechanism of
participatory justice – to reveal the truth about the genocide, to speed up the
judicial process and to reconcile the people of Rwanda. In June 2002, the
gacaca system of ‘reconciliatory justice’ was officially launched with 80 gacaca
courts in pilot areas. In January 2005, the system was developed into a
nationwide system with over 9,000 gacaca courts. Over four years later, the
Rwandan endeavour of gacaca-based justice is now coming to an end.
Because of its uncompromised policy of maximal accountability for those
implicated in the genocide through prosecution and trial, some observers
characterise the Rwandan approach to transitional justice as that of punitive or
retributive justice (Sarkin 2001; E. Daly 2002; Corey and Joireman 2004). In fact,
the Rwandan government ruled out the option of a truth commission as a
mechanism for addressing accountability and any application of amnesty as
used in the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), arguing
that ‘only when the guilty had been punished, would it be possible for the victims,
as well as the non-guilty, to create a joint future together’ (Uvin 2001a, 181).
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However, the Rwandan approach to transitional justice is not another set of war
crime tribunals modelled after the Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials. As discussed in
detail later, Rwanda’s gacaca-based system represents a third way, fitting
neither the non-prosecutorial, truth commission model nor the war crimes
tribunal model; models which were once considered incompatible (Roht-Arriaza
and Mariezcurrena 2006). This thesis considers Rwanda’s gacaca-based
approach to be instead a complementary, ‘multi-faceted approach’ (Schabas
2008, 208), developed to address a broad range of transitional justice concerns
– establishing criminal accountability, truth-telling, reparations for victims,
societal healing and reconciliation – by bringing multiple approaches under one
system.
Although the gacaca system is certainly a centrepiece of the government’s
response to the justice and reconciliation challenge in post-genocide Rwanda, it
is not the only one. This thesis also examines an array of government efforts
implemented under the banner of national unity and reconciliation. Because of
its 15-year quest for justice and reconciliation under extremely difficult
circumstances, Rwanda is an excellent case study country for examining the
threefold thesis question presented at the outset of this chapter.
4. Focus of the Study
In searching for answers to the threefold question presented in the introduction,
this study has two main analytical focuses: first, dichotomies often underlying
conceptual understandings of justice and reconciliation and second, identity
change as a central challenge of justice and reconciliation, particularly in the
context of identity-based conflict.
The first focus is concerned with re-examination of widely held dualistic
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thinking surrounding the issues of justice and reconciliation in post-violence
peacebuilding. As noted above, this thesis assumes that potential tensions
between justice and reconciliation can be alleviated by adopting a
comprehensive framework of peacebuilding in which the twin goals and
processes of justice and reconciliation are defined and pursued in a way which
reinforces them both. However, in proposing such a comprehensive and
compatible framework, there must be vigorous re-examination of the layers of
dichotomies: justice vs. peace; retributive justice vs. restorative justice; and
punishment vs. forgiveness.5 Through an extensive review of related bodies of
literature, this thesis first proposes a working conceptual framework of justice
and reconciliation that indicates the possibility of transcending the layers of
dichotomies. It then presents an in-depth case study of Rwanda’s endeavour to
pursue justice and reconciliation together in a compatible way.
While this first major focus emerged from the extensive review of related
literature, the second major focus of the study emerged from my fieldwork in
Rwanda. As I explored issues of justice and reconciliation with specific reference
to post-genocide Rwanda, a dominant challenge facing Rwanda’s quest for
justice and reconciliation clearly emerged: that of deconstructing the racialised
and politicised collective identities of the Rwandan people. The modern history
of Rwanda, characterised by cycles of deadly conflict, has culminated in a
society sharply divided into two groups with highly politicised ethnic identities,
Hutu and Tutsi. In fact, how to overcome the Hutu/Tutsi duality has been a widely
discussed subject among scholars on Rwanda. Also, replacing the ‘divisive’
ethnic identities with a ‘unified’ national identity has been a central theme of the
post-genocide government’s unity and reconciliation efforts. This study therefore
5 See Chapter 3 for further discussion.
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paid particular attention to the interplay between this issue of identity change
and the issues of justice and reconciliation in post-genocide Rwanda. This thesis
explores the potential role of the justice and reconciliation endeavour in
transforming people’s collective identities, that have not only been shaped by,
but have also significantly shaped, the dynamics of violent political conflict in
Rwanda.
5. Research Methodology and Experience
This study utilised a framework of qualitative research, characterised by an
emergent and flexible research design, purposeful sampling, data collection with
primarily qualitative methods, and inductive data analysis (See Lincoln and
Guba 1985; Patton 1990; Kvale 1996). Through the use of qualitative data
collection methods, I sought to generate a holistic perspective and descriptive
account of the justice and reconciliation processes for the case study.
I began my inquiry with the broadly-defined, open-ended questions
indicated at the outset of this chapter. They gradually crystallised into more
specific questions addressing critical issues that emerged as my fieldwork in
Rwanda proceeded. As compared to a conventional, deductive approach (e.g.
questionnaire survey) that aims to measure only a limited set of predetermined
outcome variables, the inductive approach used in this research is considered
more suitable for studies where important but unknown categories, dimensions
and interrelations are likely to exist and thus need to be explored vigorously. This
was exactly the case in this study.
5.1. Data Collection
This study is based on three interconnected components of research that
correspond with the structure of this thesis: Part I (Chapters 2 and 3) on the
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conceptual framework of justice and reconciliation, Part II (Chapters 5 and 6)6
on grassroots conceptions of justice and reconciliation in Rwanda, and Part III
(Chapters 7 and 8) on the government’s strategy for justice and reconciliation.
Part I is based on research from theoretical literature relating to: identification of
various conceptions of justice and reconciliation that are relevant to
post-violence peacebuilding, examination of competing views on the relationship
between justice and reconciliation and development of a working conceptual
framework for exploring the relationship between justice and reconciliation in
post-violence peacebuilding. For this, I tried to synthesise literature on justice
and reconciliation from a wide range of academic fields, including peace and
conflict studies, political philosophy and ethics, criminal justice, international law
and human rights and social psychology.
5.1.1. Grassroots Study
Part II of this thesis is based on fieldwork I conducted in two rural communities
which I call by their pseudonyms ‘Gitera’ and ‘Kiberama’ sectors during two
separate periods of 2002 (April – June and September – December). At the time
of my fieldwork, Rwanda was divided into 12 provinces which were further
divided into 106 districts, 1,545 sectors and 9,013 cells at the lower levels of its
territorial administration.7 Gitera and Kiberama were two of 1,545 sectors in the
country.
I chose these two fieldwork sites for two main reasons. First, they are
located in the former Gitarama Province and the former Gisenyi Province in the
6 Chapter 4 is a chapter on the background of violent conflict and genocide in Rwanda.
7 Prior to the adoption of this particular administrative structure, provinces and districts were
called préfectures and communes respectively, whereas the names of administrative units
lower than commune/district remained the same. In January 2006, there were major
mergers of administrative units in Rwanda. Since then, the territory of Rwanda has been
divided into five provinces: Eastern Province, Western Province, Southern Province,
Northern Province and Kigali City. These five existing provinces are further divided into 30
districts, 416 sectors and 2,148 cells.
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central and north-western parts of Rwanda respectively. These two regions of
Rwanda are distinct from each other in their demographic composition with
regard to ethnic groups and their experience with political violence in the past,
which have significant implications for peacebuilding processes, particularly
those aimed at achieving justice and reconciliation. Second, they were among a
few areas in which I had established personal connections through preliminary
visits in 2000 and 2001. To gain access to Rwandan informants at the grassroots
level, it was crucial to establish relationships with intermediaries who were well
connected with local people and were capable of playing the role of research
assistants as well as Kinyarwanda – English interpreters. With consideration for
these methodological and practical issues, Gitera and Kiberama were judged to
be the best fieldwork sites for this study.
The grassroots study focused on local accounts of past political violence
and various expectations, intentions and concerns held by a cross section of the
local population around issues and processes concerning justice and
reconciliation. Major data collection activities conducted were: semi-structured
interviews, focus groups and direct observations of related activities.
I conducted semi-structured interviews which involved 48 individuals from a
cross section of the local communities (See Appendix 1 for the list of
interviewees). The strategy I used for choosing my informants was one of
purposeful sampling to address two particular concerns:8 The first concern was
to maximise the diversity of informants with regard to their experience of the
genocide. Focusing on this first factor, at the outset of the grassroots study, I
created five categories: 1) genocide survivors; 2) prisoners accused of
genocide-related crimes; 3) families of prisoners; 4) so-called ‘old caseload’
8 See Patton (1990, 169-183) for the description of the logic and various strategies of
purposeful sampling.
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refugees;9 and 5) those who fall in none of the first four categories, in other
words, local residents who were neither directly involved in the genocide nor
associated as family members with the people suspected or convicted of
genocide-related crimes. To identify informants who fit each of these categories,
I made lists of people falling in the first four categories based on the information I
obtained from local administrative authorities and representatives of genocide
survivors’ associations. Since these categories are more or less in line with
‘politically correct’ ways of identifying Rwandans in post-genocide Rwanda
(Mamdani 2001, 266-7), I faced no major problem in identifying informants who
fell in each specific group.
However, as I continued my fieldwork, it became apparent that this
particular way of categorising Rwandan people has serious limitations, primarily
due to two profound reasons. First, there were hidden victims of the 1994
atrocities committed under the auspices of the former genocidal regime; they
were victims of so-called ‘massacres’ or killings of non-Tutsi dissidents and their
existence is under-recognised in Rwandan society. Second, I came across a
significant number of local residents who identified themselves as collective
victims of atrocities allegedly committed by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF),
as well as the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA), the national army created after the
RPF took power. Thus, in the latter stages of fieldwork, I carried out data
collection to capture the views of these two categories of people, even though
they overlapped with each other and with some of other categories discussed
above.
The second concern was to seek information from a network of people who
9 Tutsi refugees who had fled to neighbouring countries between the late 1950s and the
early 1970s and came back to Rwanda after the RPF victory in July 1994. In the two
fieldwork sites, I identified only two families which fell into this category.
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were connected with each other around issues of justice and reconciliation. This
was to gain an organic view of the issues in relation to the specific
inter-personal/group context involved through, for example, interviewing one
genocide survivor first, then actual or suspected perpetrators who killed his
family, and then their family members. Inputs from my research assistants with
insider’s knowledge about social relationships within the local population were
essential in order to gain a general view of who was linked with whom, and in
which particular way, in each sector.
The semi-structured interview format was flexible with regard to the number
of informants (one individual or a few members of the same family together), the
number of times a person was interviewed and the length of each interview (60
to 90 min). Most of the interviews were done inside the house of the informant(s)
without the presence of anybody outside his/her household members, myself
and my interpreter. Interviews with prisoners were conducted at secluded places,
prepared by prison authorities. I conducted follow-up interviews with 16
informants – as many as five interviews with some of them - to expand upon
and/or verify information given during the first or subsequent interviews. The
interviews were conducted with interview guides prepared beforehand to provide
a framework within which I could develop questions to explore their views in
depth.
I also conducted four focus groups (90 min. each) with lay judges of local
gacaca courts (a group of eight for Gitera and a group of nine for Kiberama) and
with community mediators (a group of eight for each sector), the people who
were elected by local residents to help them resolve various kinds of disputes in
their daily lives (a group of eight for each sector). Settings of focus groups varied.
I relied on the conseiller of each sector to invite the participants of each focus
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group. We met in the backyard of the sector office for three of the four focus
groups, while for the remaining one, we met in the classroom of a local
elementary school. During each of the focus groups, I asked the participants to
discuss how they understood their roles either as lay judges or as community
mediators and to outline the various challenges or concerns they faced in their
roles.
I assured my informants in the grassroots study that I would treat
information confidentially and would not reveal their identities in any materials I
would produce based on my fieldwork. I did not tape-record interviews and focus
groups out of concern that attempting to record their voices would make them
taciturn, given the sensitive nature of the research subject. Throughout this
thesis, I use pseudonyms for names of most places below the province level and
for all the grassroots informants and research assistants/interpreters to protect
their identities.
5.1.2. Government Policy Study
Part III is an outcome of the preliminary fieldwork of August – October 2001 and
the primary fieldwork in 2002 (April – June and September – December) as well
as persistent follow-up research on the evolution of the government’s efforts at
justice and reconciliation in subsequent years up to August 2009. The analysis
of Part III covers a 15-year period from the time the RPF-led transitional
government was formed after the 1994 genocide. The focus of the fieldwork in
2002 was to explore the conceptual framework of the government’s efforts at
justice and reconciliation, particularly the process of ‘reconciliatory justice’
through gacaca courts and an array of efforts under the banner of ‘national unity
and reconciliation’.
There are five different types of data I used for my description and analysis
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in the chapters constituting Part III. First, I conducted semi-structured interviews
with a total of 22 officials of various government institutions (See Appendix 2):
the National Service of Gacaca Jurisdictions (currently called National Service of
Gacaca Courts or NSGC), the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission
(NURC), the Ministry of Justice, the Office of the Prosecutor General, the
National Executive Secretariat of Community Service (SETIG), the Ministry of
Local Government and Social Affairs (MINALOC) and the National Commission
for Human Rights (NCHR). I interviewed 18 officials during the primary fieldwork
of 2002 and four officials in the follow-up research in January 2009.
The focus of the interview was to explore the conceptual underpinning of
the government’s justice and reconciliation efforts as well as perceived
challenges or tensions in the pursuit of justice and reconciliation. I used a similar
flexible interview format as outlined above. Most of the interviews with the
government officials at the national level were done in English, while at the
provincial level, it was necessary to use an interpreter as informants preferred to
speak in Kinyarwanda. Most of the government official’s interviews were tape
recorded and transcribed later. The average interview length was an hour.
Second, I carried out an extensive review of official documents such as
relevant laws, policy and planning documents of concerned government
institutions, official addresses, media reports, monitoring reports on the gacaca
process by judicial/penal reform NGOs working in Rwanda, reports written by
human rights bodies and academic articles. To capture the evolution of the
government approach to justice and reconciliation over the years, it was
necessary to research sources from an extended period from the mid-1990s to
the present time.
Third, even though the focus of this study is not on the outcomes or
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processes of the gacaca system, I carried out some direct observations of
gacaca-related activities. These included an election of lay judges of gacaca
courts in October 2001, two three-day training programmes for lay judges in May
2002, two pre-trial hearings of gacaca courts during a pilot phase in December
2002, and four gacaca proceedings at three different locations after the
nationwide trial phase was finally launched in July 2006.10
Fourth, to investigate specifically the government’s effort to induce
suspected prisoners to confess to their crimes, during the primary fieldwork of
2002, I conducted semi-structured interviews with 20 prisoners (nine who had
confessed and eleven who had not confessed) at three different prisons in the
country, namely, Kigali Central Prison, Gitarama Central Prison and Gisenyi
Central Prison.
Fifth, besides these data collection activities, the analysis in Part III includes
my direct observations of various events in Rwanda, particularly genocide
commemoration events for six consecutive years, from the tenth
commemoration in April 2004. Since October 2005, I have been working in
Rwanda for a local NGO that is engaged in grassroots ‘healing and
reconciliation’ projects aimed at rebuilding the lives and relationships of people
deeply affected by the genocide and civil war. My work experience in the NGO,
and day to day conversations and interactions with Rwandans for the last four
years, have augmented my interpretations of the data presented in Part III and
throughout the thesis.
5.2. Challenges and Difficulties during the Fieldwork
In the course of the fieldwork for the grassroots study, I remained attentive to
10 August 2006 and August 2007 in Muhanga district, November 2007 in Kicukiro district
and February 2008 in Nyarugenge district.
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how I was perceived by the local population in general and my informants in
particular. In both Gitera and Kiberama, some informants initially suspected me
of investigating genocide-related cases for the ICTR. In Kiberama, at our first
meeting in her house, one informant gave me a list of her relatives who she
claimed had been abducted by security forces of the post-genocide RPF regime.
She appeared to have taken me for an investigator who was concerned with
human rights violations not limited to those related to the genocide. I tried to
dispel such suspicions and misunderstandings by telling interviewees that I was
a student doing research for my PhD degree and that the purpose of the
research was neither judicial nor human rights investigation.
Many informants asked me what would be the use of my research for them
personally. Whenever I came across such a question, I tried to be honest and
sincere with my informant, telling him or her the following: After the completion of
my research, I will start working in Rwanda as a peace worker, and doing this
research is crucial for me personally, and probably for many other practitioners,
to develop an understanding of the challenge of justice and reconciliation in
Rwanda. As I, and my research assistants, established a certain degree of trust
by talking about ourselves and asking interviewees about their lives, as well as
assuring them of the research’s confidentiality and anonymity,11 many of them
began to tell their stories, quite often passionately. As I continued my fieldwork, it
became apparent that many people I met had a strong unfulfilled desire to tell
their stories to others.
Of course, this does not mean that they disclosed any information which
was useful for this research. Nor does it mean that they shared their views
11 Here I use ‘anonymity’ as the separation of the identity of an informant from the
information he/she provided and ‘confidentiality’ as the assurance of not identifying an
informant publicly (See Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias 1996, 88-90).
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without reluctance from the outset. As I anticipated, many pieces of sensitive
information emerged during the grassroots study. Most of the genocide-related
crimes committed in and around the fieldwork areas had not been tried at the
time of fieldwork. None of RPF/A soldiers and commanders responsible for
atrocities allegedly committed against the local civilian population had been
brought to justice at the time I conducted my fieldwork. In August 2009, this is
still the case. In post-genocide Rwanda, talking about the past has been a
dangerous act for many Rwandans, which could cause them to be imprisoned,
incur neighbours’ enmity or revenge, or cause irreparable damage to their
relationships with their families. Revealing one’s views about post-genocide
justice and reconciliation is dangerous too, particularly for those with views that
are not in conformity with the official line. Thus, many of my informants appeared
to have good reason to withhold some information from us, or even to lie to us,
although I do not consider this an insurmountable problem for methodological
reasons discussed shortly. Also, it was not unusual to see my informants
significantly changing what they told us in the course of fieldwork, or even during
the same interview. Several informants, for example, first outlined their views of
gacaca courts completely in accordance with the official line, but later revealed
more personal perspectives, which totally contradicted their earlier description.
Another critical challenge during the fieldwork emanated from the use of
research assistants/interpreters. It was critical to be attentive to how they were
perceived by different categories of grassroots informants, which would have
significant effects on the data generated through interviews interpreted by them.
For each of the fieldwork sites, I worked with two different research assistants
with different ethno-political backgrounds. In Gitera, I worked with ‘Alexis’ and
‘Daniel’. Being a Hutu who grew up in Gitera, Alexis was well connected with
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local Hutu families. He also had a few Tutsi friends who survived the genocide in
Gitera. His father was known to have hid some Tutsis at his home during the
genocide. Daniel grew up as the son of Hutu parents in a rural village located in
Gitarama. Due to his ‘Tutsi-looking’ physical appearance, according to the ethnic
stereotypes of Rwanda, he was hunted by génocidaires in 1994, while he was a
teacher at a school in Gitarama. I asked Alexis to be my interpreter for interviews
with Hutu informants and a few Tutsi informants. I worked with Daniel for
interviews with other Tutsi informants. It was Alexis who advised me to do so,
based on the concern that some Tutsi informants might not be comfortable with
expressing their views in Alexis’s presence. It was clear that the local community
was polarised along ethnic lines, due to the history of ethno-political conflict.
In Kiberama, I worked mostly with ‘Emile’ but also with ‘Joseph’ for several
interviews. Emile grew up as the son of Hutu parents in Ruhengeri Province. At
the time of fieldwork, he lived in Gisenyi town. Emile was not an insider in the
community of Kiberama, however, through his close relatives living there, Emile
managed to get us connected to other local residents. Joseph was a Tutsi
resident in Gisenyi town at the time of fieldwork. He grew up in a rural village in
Butare Province. Due to serious harassment against Tutsi students in the early
1990s, he gave up his education at the National University in Butare and fled to
Uganda. He returned to Rwanda after the genocide.
At the time of my entry to Kiberama, I was concerned that local genocide
survivors might hesitate to express their views during interviews if I used Emile
as my interpreter. I thought they would be reluctant to comment on the role of
local Hutu residents in the genocide because they were likely to know of Emile’s
connection to his relatives there. This was a major reason why I decided to do
several interviews using Joseph as my interpreter. I thought genocide survivors’
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responses were likely to be different depending on which interpreter I used.
Contrary to my expectations, I did not notice any significant difference in the way
genocide survivors responded, dependent on interpreter, including to questions
concerning the implication of the local Hutu population in the genocide and
insurgency of 1997-1999.
Instead, I observed significant interpreter’s effects on the ways my
informants expressed their views concerning the issue of human rights violations
committed by the RPF/A. During the interviews I conducted with the help of
Joseph, my informants literally shut up when they were asked about the issue.
However, when I returned with Emile to the same informants, some of them
spoke loudly about the issue. This striking difference, presumably caused by the
involvement of different interpreters in the interview process, led me to believe
the following: that some of my informants were afraid of speaking about RPF/A
violence in Joseph’s presence because they suspected he may have a
connection with the RPF regime.
These observations I made with regard to interpreters’ effects generated
valuable data that were incorporated into the analysis of this study. Conducting
interviews with the help of interpreters was a great challenge to my fieldwork, but
the process helped me to deepen my understanding of the inter-subjective
aspect of the act of interviewing, and to confirm the polarisation over the issues
of victimhood, justice and reconciliation along ethno-political lines which exist in
post-genocide Rwandan society.
5.3. Data Analysis
I began inductive data analysis as an iterative process during the early stages of
the fieldwork in 2002. Data collection in later stages focused on the recurring
themes that emerged during the earlier stages. Accordingly, the original,
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broadly-defined research questions began to focus on more specific substantive
issues that emerged, based on on-going field-based analysis. I began deeper
analysis after the completion of the primary fieldwork in December 2002. I
organised transcriptions of field notes, taped interviews and other secondary
data according to their themes. These different data sets were studied all
together to examine recurring themes and their interrelationships. This
qualitative data analysis process began with coding the data --- that is, an
iterative process in which topics or themes were identified and labelled so that
they became the basis for category definition.
With regard to the data generated through the grassroots study, major
themes around which the data were analysed and coded included: 1) narratives
of victimhood, 2) desires for justice and 3) views of reconciliation. In this study, I
did not aim to determine factual accounts of what happened or was happening in
the selected fieldwork areas. Nor was it my aim to determine which rival
accounts advanced by different categories of informants were more plausible
than others. Instead, by comparing one set of narratives with other narratives I
first identified areas of convergence, divergence or contention. Then, by
interpreting them in relation to both local and broader contexts, I tried to uncover
‘patterns of meaning’ underlying what people shared with me about the research
subject. As Fujii (2009, 42) writes, ‘[h]ow people talk about the world – whether
true or not – gives clues as to how they make sense of that world – how it is and
how it ought to be’. By conducting a comparative analysis of the competing
narratives advanced by different categories of informants, this study has yielded
valuable insights about some fundamental assumptions underlying how people
perceive the issues of victimhood, justice and reconciliation, and their
interrelations in post-genocide Rwanda.
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With regard to the study of the government programmes, the data was
analysed around the following themes: 1) the government’s logic of
‘reconciliatory justice’ through the gacaca system, 2) key aspects of the
government’s conception of ‘national unity and reconciliation’, 3) key
components of the government’s national identity building effort and 4)
constraints and tensions within the government’s effort at justice and
reconciliation. The evolution of the Rwandan approach to justice and
reconciliation caused by changes in the government’s conceptions was also
examined. Data coded with identified themes was further classified into
sub-themes, thereby developing a hierarchical category system – a classification
system of the data, based on themes that emerged. It was this category system
that formed the basis of descriptions and interpretations in Parts II and III.
6. The Structure of the Thesis
This introductory chapter is followed by the remaining part of Part I (Chapters 2
and 3), then Part II (Chapters 4, 5 and 6), Part III (Chapters 7 and 8) and Part IV
(Chapter 9). Part I is devoted to developing a working conceptual framework
which shows how we might transcend the layers of dichotomies which
characterise the dualistic thinking regarding justice and reconciliation in
post-violence peacebuilding. Chapter 2 undertakes the task of conceptualising
reconciliation in post-violence peacebuilding. Chapter 3 discusses various
conceptions of justice that are deemed relevant to our analysis in this study and
examines a spectrum of views on the justice – reconciliation relationship.
Chapter 3 then proposes a working conceptual framework which is used in this
study.
Part II is the first part of a case study of Rwanda’s quest for justice and
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reconciliation. Chapter 4 is a background chapter which presents an overview of
the history of ethno-political conflict in Rwanda. Chapter 5 presents conflicting
narratives of victimhood that were advanced by adversarial ethno-political
identity groups, identified in the fieldwork communities. Chapter 5 goes on to
examine the nature of contestation over the issues of victimhood and how they
interplay with issues of ethnicity in the communities. Chapter 6 presents the
grassroots study’s results detailing the conceptions of justice and reconciliation,
and their relationship, as expressed by people with varied experiences of the
genocide and other types of political violence.
Part III constitutes the second part of the case study focusing on
government-led justice and reconciliation efforts in post-genocide Rwanda.
Chapter 7 outlines a significant policy shift from a punitive approach to a
reconciliatory one to post-genocide justice, with particular reference to the
gacaca system. The chapter discusses gacaca’s unique, potentially
reconciliatory features but points out a huge discrepancy between reconciliatory
gacaca justice in theory and in practice. Chapter 8 examines the government’s
efforts for national unity and reconciliation, focusing on the overarching theme of
national identity building. The chapter reveals fundamental tensions within the
efforts.
Part IV (Chapter 9) is a closing chapter that synthesises key findings and
arguments of the preceding chapters and discusses lessons from Rwanda’s
experience examined in this study.
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PART I
THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR
EXPLORING JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION
IN POST-VIOLENCE PEACEBUILDING
33
CHAPTER TWO
CONCEPTUALISING RECONCILIATION
IN POST-VIOLENCE PEACEBUILDING
1. Introduction
Reconciliation is not only a highly elusive, but also a vigorously contested,
concept. Schreiter (1998, 13) writes, ‘[t]here is no agreed upon definition of
reconciliation in human societies’. There are a few major reasons why this is the
case. One reason concerns a wide variation in the contexts in which
reconciliation takes place. Schreiter observes:
[T]he specific circumstances for which reconciliation is needed have a
profound effect on the very meaning of reconciliation itself. Who needs to
be involved, what needs to be overcome or undone, what will count for truth
and justice in the new situation, and what is deemed to be the end of the
process: all of these affect what reconciliation means. (ibid)
Bloomfield (2006, 10) identifies this ‘contextual variance’ as a major source of
terminological confusion surrounding reconciliation. The nature and meaning of
reconciliation varies significantly according to which level of reconciliation we
talk about: intra-personal, interpersonal, intra-group/communal,
inter-groups/communal, national or international.
The lack of a universal definition of reconciliation may also be attributed to
the existence of diverse cultures in human societies, each of which shapes
people’s understanding, attitude and behaviour. Different religious and cultural
traditions provide different conceptions of reconciliation (See Augsburger 1992,
Gort et al. 2002). Furthermore, there may be a wide variation in how
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reconciliation is conceived even within each cultural or religious tradition.1
The lack of consensus about what reconciliation means is a notable
problem among scholars and practitioners of post-violence peacebuilding. A
decade ago, Pankhurst (1999, 240-1) pointed out that at least five different
meanings of reconciliation – all associated with English linguistic definitions -
were being used in different contexts of peacebuilding, with no clear distinction
from each other and often in combination:
1) Restoration of friendly relations between the parties to conflict;
2) Settlement of a dispute;
3) Cessation of opposition to, or hostilities against, the other;
4) Acceptance of an unpleasant situation or decision, which requires a
certain sacrifice or compromise; and
5) Harmonisation of two things in conflict, for example, different versions of
truth.
This confused use of the term ‘reconciliation’ is still apparent today despite the
fact that in the last decade it has gained much greater recognition among
national governments and international organisations alike, as a crucial element
of post-violence peacebuilding and reconstruction (Bloomfield 2006, 5).
In the last several years, a number of authors, including international legal
scholars, philosophers, psychologists and conflict resolution and peacebuilding
scholars, have attempted to provide greater clarity to the concept of
reconciliation in the context of post-violence peacebuilding (e.g. Kriesberg 1999,
2001, 2004; Digeser 2001; Govier and Verwoerd 2002; Lambourne 2002; Dwyer
2002; Bloomfield et al. 2003; Bar-Tal and Bennink 2004; Hermann 2004;
Villa-Vicencio and Doxtader 2004; Bloomfield 2006; Govier 2006; Daly and
Sarkin 2007). These authors have strived to clarify the concept of reconciliation,
1 See, for example, Schreiter who describes differences between Protestant and Catholic
conceptions of reconciliation (1998, 13-4).
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but remain divided over which particular conception of reconciliation should be
promoted in societies emerging from protracted violent conflict and/or the
legacies of political oppression and human rights abuses. Some advocate a
‘pragmatic’ conception of reconciliation, which rejects such notions as
psychological healing and forgiveness. Others maintain that, although idealistic,
significant psychological and attitudinal changes within the concerned population
are essential to reconciliation, if it is to serve as a solid foundation for sustainable
peace.
The goal of this chapter is to offer a conceptual framework that is useful for
discussing the complex challenge of post-violence reconciliation in this thesis.
The chapter first identifies and explains three analytical dimensions that are
deemed useful for clarifying various conceptions of reconciliation. Then, the
chapter introduces different conceptions of reconciliation from the growing body
of reconciliation literature. The purpose of this examining these different
conceptions of reconciliation is not to produce a single ‘best’ definition of
reconciliation but rather to highlight the complex nature of reconciliation. The
chapter also examines the complex relationship between the distinct, and yet
interconnected, concepts of reconciliation and forgiveness. At the end, the
chapter presents a conceptual framework of reconciliation which properly
recognises its dynamic, multi-dimensional and multi-level nature.
2. Three Analytical Dimensions that Clarify Reconciliation
An examination of the reconciliation literature shows some disagreement
regarding the basic vision of reconciliation and other surrounding conceptual
issues. However, it is still possible to identify key analytical dimensions that help
conceptualise post-violence reconciliation more precisely. The following sections
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describe three such analytical dimensions; namely, the level of reconciliation, the
degree of reconciliation and reconciliation as a process and/or goal.
2.1. Levels of Reconciliation
Reconciliation may take place in a wide range of contexts. Several authors have
stressed the need for distinctions between different levels or units of
reconciliation (Kriesberg 1999; Govier and Verwoerd 2002; Hermann 2004;
Amstutz 2005; Bloomfield 2006; Govier 2006; Daly and Sarkin 2007). The notion
of reconciliation, albeit with different meanings, can be applied to various levels
of human societies, from individual to communal, and to national or international.
Daly and Sarkin (2007, 41-2) discuss ‘reconciliation at the level of the individual
who strives to reconcile himself or herself to an event’, ‘interpersonal
reconciliation, as between a victim and a perpetrator of political violence’,
communal reconciliation ‘within or among communities that constitute civil
society’ and reconciliation at national and international levels. The nature and
meaning of reconciliation significantly varies according to the level at which it is
sought.
Interpersonal reconciliation is probably most frequently encountered in daily
life between, for example, members of the same family (marital partners, siblings,
parents and offspring) after a period of estrangement. Examples of such
interpersonal reconciliation appear in the parable of the prodigal son in Luke’s
Gospel and in the Old Testament account of Joseph reconciling with his
brothers.2 As both of these stories vividly demonstrate, interpersonal
reconciliation is often accompanied by richly emotional exchanges between the
parties, expressed by apologies, forgiveness, passionate embraces, kisses and
2 See Luke 15: 11-32 in the New Testament and Genesis 45: 1-15 in the Old Testament of the
Bible.
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tears.
Some authors rightly point out the importance of not conflating this familiar
form of interpersonal reconciliation with reconciliation between large groups of
people at the national or international levels (Govier and Verwoerd 2002; Govier
2006; Bloomfield 2006). While intimate emotional exchanges may characterise
interpersonal reconciliation, it does not seem plausible to expect similar
psychological ingredients (at least with the same intensity), from reconciliation at
the large-group level.
Such reflection led some to consider that ‘rich’ psychological and attitudinal
elements such as mutual acceptance, mutual trust and shared values should be
detached from the notion of reconciliation at the macro level. However, this kind
of dichotomous understanding of micro versus macro reconciliation seems to be
misleading on certain grounds. First, emotions and attitudes are also relevant to
large-group reconciliation (Govier and Verwoerd 2002, 198; Govier 2006, 17).
Second, reconciliation occurs at various levels which are interconnected and
often complementary (Rigby 2001; Govier and Verwoerd 2002; Bloomfield 2006;
Govier 2006; Daly and Sarkin 2007). Thus, psychological and attitudinal
dimensions remain in analysis of communal and national reconciliation in this
thesis.
2.2. Degrees of Reconciliation
The process of reconciliation can be seen as a continuum in the sense that
‘there can be degrees of reconciliation rather than just its presence or absence’
and that ‘there are strong and weak versions of reconciliation (Ross 2004, 200).
Crocker (1999, 60) describes reconciliation as a continuum from ‘thin’ to ‘thick’
while others prefer the terms ‘maximalist’, ‘intermediary’ and ‘minimalist’ to
distinguish between different degrees of reconciliation (Amstutz 2005;
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Bloomfield 2006). No matter which specific terms are used, the degree of
reconciliation refers to the extent to which the emotions, attitudes and values of
conflicting parties change from enmity to friendship or harmony. Thus, ‘strong’ or
‘thick’ reconciliation is psychologically more demanding than a ‘weak’ or ‘thin’
reconciliation.
Crocker (1999, 60) describes three different forms of reconciliation ranging
from ‘thinner’ to ‘thicker’. The least demanding ‘thin’ form of reconciliation in a
post-violence context is non-violent coexistence ‘in the sense that former
enemies comply with the law instead of killing each other’. Amstutz (2005, 99)
says that this minimalist conception is ‘a thin, undemanding ethic that involves
an end to fighting but not necessarily the resolution of the issues that led to war’.
According to Crocker, at the ‘thick’ end of the continuum, is a form of
reconciliation characterised by notions like ‘forgiveness, mercy, a shared
comprehensive vision, mutual healing, or harmony’ (ibid). Amstutz (2005, 99)
says that this maximalist version of reconciliation represents ‘a demanding
process that involves the ending of enmity and the restoration of friendship
through the reformation of people’s cultural values and political attitudes’. What
matters is not merely behavioural change underlying the cessation of hostility
but a profound psychological, attitudinal and moral transformation in a
post-violence society towards greater mutual acceptance, trust, shared values
and increased cooperation.
Crocker writes of intermediary reconciliation lying between minimalist and
maximalist reconciliation, conceived as ‘democratic reciprocity’ which ‘implies a
willingness to hear each other out, to enter into a give-and-take about matters of
public policy, to build on areas of common concern, and to forge principled
compromises with which all can live’ (ibid). Amstutz (2005, 100) maintains that
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this contrasts with the maximalist conception, which seeks to build a harmonious
relationship through the fostering of friendship and shared values. This moderate
form of reconciliation seeks peace primarily through enhancing ‘commitment to
democratic virtues, including civility, tolerance, and respect for all people,
regardless of their political beliefs and interests’ (ibid). Thus, compared to the
maximalist conception, it can be seen as an ‘undemanding approach to
community order, seeking only a humane, peaceful environment where conflicts
are resolved through democratic procedures and where opponents continue
respecting each other’s human rights’ (ibid).
Understanding reconciliation as a continuum (from the least demanding thin
end to the most demanding thick end) usefully conveys the many different
possibilities of reconciliation in various contexts.
2.3. Reconciliation as a Process and Goal
Reconciliation can be defined as either a process or a goal. Whether it should be
seen as the former or the latter, or even both, is an ‘unresolved dilemma’
(Hermann 2004, 46). Many authors define reconciliation as a process, albeit
from different perspectives. Staub (2000, 376) defines reconciliation as a
social-psychological process of ‘coming to accept each other and to develop
mutual trust’. Lederach (1997, 151) understands reconciliation primarily as a
‘process of relationship building’ central to every stage of peacebuilding. Govier
(2006, 18) defines it similarly as ‘the building or rebuilding of relationships’ in
which the development of trust is a fundamental component. Galtung (2001, 3)
defines reconciliation primarily as ‘the process of healing the traumas of both
victims and perpetrators after violence, providing a closure of the bad relations’.
However, reconciliation is often described as a goal or end-state, something to
be achieved, for example, harmonious relationships between individuals or
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groups characterised by mutual acceptance, respect, trust or even love (Bar-Tal
and Bennink 2004, 14-22)3, a state of non-violent coexistence based on
tolerance or political compromise to secure a cessation of violence.
Bloomfield, observing that the muddling of these two ideas (reconciliation
as a process or a goal) is a major cause of confusion surrounding the term
‘reconciliation’, proposes a conception of reconciliation with particular emphasis
on its process side as relationship-building. He argues that emphasising
reconciliation as a goal like ‘harmonious existence’ creates not only ‘unreal
expectations of harmony and perfect peace’ but also the problem of ‘putting
pressure, especially on victims, to forgive for the sake of peace’ (2006, 28).
Govier (2006, 21) rejects the notion of reconciliation as a goal, stating that ‘lives
and histories do not simply reach a positive goal and remain static’ but ‘evolve
and develop… with further disagreements and ruptures’. She maintains that
‘what is crucial for sustainable peace is not that there be no conflicts between
individuals and groups but, rather, that within these relationships, people
develop the capacity to handle the conflicts that do arise’ (ibid). Daly and Sarkin
(2007, 258) endorse Govier’s view by stating that ‘[r]econciliation is never
achieved but is an ongoing process that nurtures itself’.
The authors who consider reconciliation primarily as a process rightly stress
the importance of promoting it as a long-term, and even open-ended, process.
Bloomfield (2006, 7) suggests that by doing so, reconciliation as an aspect of
post-violence peacebuilding would meet less resistance from stakeholders,
especially victim groups who ‘rightly suspect a process that might compel them
into an end-state which they do not necessarily, or for now, want’.
3 Bar-Tal and Bennink (2004) discuss reconciliation as a psychological process and outcome.
Reconciliation as an outcome, in their writing, ‘consists of mutual recognition and acceptance,
invested interests and goals in developing peaceful relations, mutual trust, positive attitudes, as
well as sensitivity and consideration for the other party’s needs and interests’ (15).
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However, as Bloomfield notes, the conception of reconciliation as a goal
may have utility as ‘a motivating ideal’ or a long-term vision for those striving to
overcome the legacies of violent conflict or oppressive regimes (6). Furthermore,
as discussed earlier, reconciliation as a goal can be defined without excessive
emphasis on social harmony or communal solidarity. Therefore, reconciliation
can be discussed as both a process and a goal, provided the long-term and
complex nature of the former is rightly recognised and excessive emphasis on
the maximalist version of the latter is avoided. The challenge is to avoid
conflating these two aspects of reconciliation in analysis of post-violence
reconciliation.
This thesis addresses reconciliation primarily as a process of
relationship-building underpinned by genuine efforts at transforming unjust
structures that often underlie existing relationships between/among parties in
conflict. It is important to capture the dynamism and evolution of reconciliation as
a gradual process of relationship-building with structural transformation over
years, decades or even generations. Rigby (2001, 183) writes:
The necessary conditions for reconciliation between formerly antagonistic
parties can only be realized over time. Moving beyond the divisions of the
past is a multidimensional process that can take generations, and the
different constitutive elements involved in the journey toward reconciliation
can rarely be pursued all at the same time.
As Rigby stresses, time is an important dimension of reconciliation.
Understanding reconciliation as a long-term, evolutionary process, this study
pays attention to the dimension of time as well as those of level and degree of
reconciliation.
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3. Many Aspects of Reconciliation
In the literature on reconciliation, different authors approach the concept of
reconciliation from various theoretical and cultural/religious perspectives. Some
discuss reconciliation from an overtly Christian perspective while others attempt
to describe it in secular terms. Some discuss reconciliation with a strong
emphasis on its psychological aspect while others discuss it primarily in political
terms. This section discusses various aspects of reconciliation which are
particularly relevant to the case study of the justice and reconciliation in
post-genocide Rwanda.
3.1. Reconciliation as Inner Healing
Reconciliation is often described through the therapeutic metaphor of healing. As
already noted, Galtung (2001, 3) uses the term ‘the process of healing the
traumas’ in his definition of reconciliation. Assefa (1997, 46-9) uses the term
‘reconciliation with the self’ to depict the psychological aspect of reconciliation,
that is, the healing process through which the survivor of violence regains inner
peace and harmony within him/herself. The process of reconciliation in question
here is the one at ‘the individual level, the smallest unit recognized in society’
(Daly and Sarkin 2007, 43).
In the midst or aftermath of traumatic violent experiences, people
demonstrate various reactions to stresses caused by violence, which may
‘include self-blame, vivid re-expression of the event, fear, nightmares, feelings of
helplessness, hypervigilance, depression, relationship difficulties, feelings of
social disconnectedness [and] anxiety’ (Hamber 2003, 79). Psychologists
highlight the need for psychosocial interventions that are geared toward the
healing needs of trauma survivors as they undergo related, but distinctive stages,
of recovery; namely, establishing safety, addressing needs of acknowledgement
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(especially through remembrance, mourning and truth-telling) and reconnecting
with the community (Herman 1992; Yoder 2005).
This psychological aspect of reconciliation primarily concerns positive
psychological changes at the level of each individual affected by violence, as the
phrase ‘reconciliation with the self’ implies. However, this intra-personal
reconciliation is also interrelated with much higher levels of reconciliation in two
profound ways. First, efforts at addressing individuals’ needs for healing are
likely to be more effective if they are linked to much broader efforts at justice and
reconciliation at interpersonal, inter-group/communal and national levels.4
Hamber (2003, 81) puts a strong emphasis on this very point:
Psychosocial interventions which operate in a vacuum are less effective
than, and cannot in themselves replace the need for, truth,
acknowledgment and justice. Bringing perpetrators to justice is an
important, legitimate and sometimes essential component of a victim’s
recovery and psychological healing.
Second, the absence of intra-personal reconciliation through psychological
healing may affect negatively much broader or higher levels of reconciliation.
Daly and Sarkin (2007, 44-5) write:
Because individuals are the fundamental elements of society, pervasive
trauma throughout a population can impede the reconstruction of the nation
at every other level. … It is incumbent on new governments, then, to foster
individual reconciliation when personal trauma is widespread; failure to do
so can impede national reconciliation and reconstruction.
Thus, intra-personal reconciliation is arguably the foundation of reconciliation at
every other level in a post-violence society.
4 See Hamber (2003) and Yoder (2005) for descriptions of such psychosocial approaches to
healing.
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3.2. Reconciliation as Relationship-Building
In the most common usage, ‘reconciliation’ refers to the restoration of ‘friendly’ or
‘normal’ relations between individuals, groups, organisations or nations after a
period of estrangement, dispute or war. The conception of reconciliation
underlying this common usage primarily concerns the process of rebuilding
relationships between parties (individuals or groups)who are in conflict with each
other.
Many authors in the field of conflict and peace studies have adopted
definitions of reconciliation somewhat in line with this common usage. Lederach
(1997, 24) proposed, more than a decade ago, a conceptual framework of
peacebuilding that ‘address[es] and engage[s] the relational aspects of
reconciliation as the central component of peacebuilding’. Defining reconciliation
as a ‘process of relationship building’, Lederach stresses its centrality not only at
the post-settlement stage but also at every stage of peacebuilding, ‘providing
space and opportunity for encounters at various levels, bringing together people
from opposing sides and encouraging them to articulate their past pain and to
envision an interdependent future’ (151). Kriesberg (2001, 48) also defines
reconciliation as ‘the processes by which parties that have experienced an
oppressive relationship or a destructive conflict with each other move to attain or
to restore a relationship that they believe to be minimally acceptable’. Under the
leadership of Bloomfield (2003, 12), the International Institute for Democracy
and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA) also proposed a conceptual
framework of reconciliation that articulated the relational aspect of reconciliation
as ‘a process that redesigns the relationship’.
Although many other thinkers have adopted, broadly speaking,
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relationship-oriented definitions,5 there is no agreement among them on the
nature of the relationship to be envisaged in post-violence settings. Two different
versions of the relationship-oriented conception of reconciliation, one centred on
forgiveness and the other focusing on trust, are explored next.
3.2.1. Reconciliation Centred on Forgiveness
The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), which was
instrumental in the non-violent transition from the apartheid regime, is probably
the best known transitional justice endeavour, which explicitly pursued the goal
of national reconciliation. Its legacy has had a significant influence on how the
term reconciliation is currently understood around the world (Bloomfield 2006,
23). Through the work of the TRC which he chaired, Tutu (1999, 2001)
vigorously championed the centrality of forgiveness in reconciliation. The
reconciliation he envisioned was primarily a transaction of remorse and apology
on the part of the perpetrator and forgiveness for the perpetrator’s wrongdoing
on the part of the victim. In his view, the TRC served the nation of South Africa in
providing the time and space ‘where people told their heart-rending stories –
victims expressing their willingness to forgive, and perpetrators telling their
stories of sordid atrocities while also asking for forgiveness from those they had
wronged so grievously’ (Tutu 1999, 209-10). Underlying Tutu’s vision of
reconciliation is fundamental moral and attitudinal transformation on both sides,
for both the perpetrator and the victim. It is for this reason that the
forgiveness-centred conception is considered as a ‘thick’, if not the ‘thickest’,
notion of reconciliation (Crocker 1999, 60).
There is no doubt that Tutu’s conception of reconciliation (and to some
5 See Love 1995, 9-10; Assefa 1997, 46-7; Govier and Verwoerd 2002, 185; Staub 2000, 376;
McCandless 2001, 213; Chapman 2002, 1; Lambourne 2002, 203; Bar-Tal and Bennink 2004,
37; Kelman 2004, 120; Amstutz 2005, 98; Govier 2006, 18.
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extent the work of the TRC itself) was informed by the Christian notion of
reconciliation in which interpersonal forgiveness is heavily emphasised. It is now
known that there was an unresolved disagreement among TRC members
concerning its mandate to promote such interpersonal forgiveness (Chapman
2001, 252). Forgiveness-centred reconciliation, however, is not just a
preoccupation of those who speak from a religious perspective. Writing from a
secular perspective, Jeong (2005, 156) says:
Reconciliation can be generally defined as a process of mutual
accommodation comprised of acknowledgement of past wrongdoing and
contrition from the perpetrators in exchange for forgiveness offered by the
victims.
Scholars discussing reconciliation from perspectives of social psychology tend to
focus on the transaction of remorse/apology and forgiveness in their descriptions
of reconciliation processes. Montville (1993, 120), for example, stresses the
necessity of ‘a process of transactional contrition and forgiveness between
aggressors and victims’ in order for enemy groups in identity conflicts to move
towards healing and reconciliation. Fisher (1999, 85) identifies
acknowledgement, apology, forgiveness and assurance of non-recurrence of
violation as sequenced, essential elements of reconciliation at different levels of
society.
Forgiveness-centred reconciliation is often presented in what Govier (2006,
105) calls ‘a dichotomized and polarized framework in which one person or
group occupies only the role of perpetrator and another occupies only the role of
victim’. Since conflicts often involve wrongs committed on both or all sides,
forgiveness-centred reconciliation may require mutual forgiveness followed by
mutual acknowledgment of the wrongs committed in the course of the conflict.
There has been much debate about whether forgiveness, a concept which,
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particularly in Western ethics, has long been considered as a private ethic
applicable only to individuals, can be applied to large groups or political
communities (See Shriver 1995, Appleby 2000, Digeser 2001, Govier 2002,
Amstutz 2005). The core question of the debate is whether the collective, as
individuals, can feel remorse, admit culpability as well as give up revenge and
accept offenders as human beings with dignity (Amstutz 2005, 74-5). More
fundamentally, can attitudes and emotions be attributed to the collective? It is
notable that many of those who advocate forgiveness-centred reconciliation hold
affirmative views to these questions. Accordingly, they believe that the notion of
forgiveness is relevant to reconciliation not only between individuals but also
between large groups.
3.2.2. Reconciliation as Trust-Building
Govier and Verwoerd (2002) focus on trust in their relationship-oriented
conception of reconciliation. They define reconciliation in terms of ‘the building or
rebuilding of trust’ between parties whose relationships are damaged for various
reasons such as wrongdoing committed by one party to the other or by both
parties against each other. They argue that trust-building is central to the
process of reconciliation because trust is ‘essential to viable relationships and
conspicuously lacking in alienated or tense relationships’ (185). For individuals
or groups to maintain healthy relationships and engage in different sorts of
undertakings together, there must be adequate trust between the parties. A kind
of trust required varies in range and depth ‘depending on the context and type of
relationship involved’ (Govier 2006, 20).
Govier and Verwoerd (2002) present three kinds of reconciliation
characterised by the degree of trust in the restored relationship after a rift;
namely, friendship, cooperation, and non-violent coexistence. The deepest or
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thickest end of the continuum is reconciliation as friendship. This maximalist
notion of reconciliation involves the rebuilding of deep trust required for an
intimate relationship such as one of close friends or partners. After an act of
betrayal or disloyalty, reconciliation is likely to entail ‘emotional coming together,
apologies expressive of sorrow, and forgiveness’ (193). The deep psychological
process of reconciliation involved here corresponds to the transaction of
remorse/apology and forgiveness discussed earlier.
Intermediary reconciliation requires the depth of trust for cooperation, which
‘involves the rebuilding of the kind of trust needed to work together’ (194). This
may be pertinent to a variety of contexts involving individuals or/and groups who
need to rebuild ‘enough trust to be able to work together effectively’(ibid).
Reconciliation as non-violent coexistence, which is located at the
shallowest/thinnest end of the continuum, is ‘the rebuilding of a minimal trust
between parties’ (195). This minimalist notion of reconciliation sounds plausible
in the immediate aftermath of protracted violent conflict. The trust characterising
non-violent coexistence is minimal, yet significant given the deep-seated,
intense animosity and fear prevailing after most periods of violent confrontation
between rival groups. When the inter-group relationship is characterised by this
kind of minimal trust, the groups in question are not able to work towards
common goals. However, they are able to ‘coexist without fear of intergroup
violence’ based on a fair degree of confidence that ‘the other’ will not attack them
(ibid).
Which kind of reconciliation can we pursue in the context of protracted
identity-based conflict? Govier and Verwood note that the maximalist notion,
reconciliation as friendship, cannot be plausibly applied to reconciliation at the
large-group level. Large group relationships cannot be characterised by the
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same deep trust that is required for an intimate, interpersonal relationship (196).
Accordingly they argue that either non-violent coexistence or cooperation is a
more plausible notion of reconciliation at the large-group level. Amstutz (2005,
99), on the other hand, presents a more optimistic view on the possibilities of
thicker/deeper reconciliation even between large groups:
Indeed, as groups pursue actions and demonstrate attitudes that are
conducive to the rebuilding of mutual trust and cooperation, alienation,
enmity, and distrust among groups are likely to be replaced by cooperation,
friendship, and trust, leading to a more peaceful and productive society.
As demonstrated above, the trust-centred conception of reconciliation
proposed by Govier and Verwoerd accommodates reconciliation of different
degrees of ‘thickness’, which are applicable to a wide spectrum of human
relationships at various levels of society. Building on their work, Amstutz (2005)
has proposed a useful conceptual model that integrates the two analytical
dimensions of degree and level. He uses the terms ‘breadth’ and ‘depth’ instead
of level and degree which he defines as ‘the number of people involved in
reconciliation’ and ‘the degree to which trust and cooperation have been
restored’ (98). Amstutz’s bi-dimensional model clearly shows conceptions of
reconciliation from micro (interpersonal, small group) to intermediary
(communal) and macro (national, international) levels with different degrees of
depth/thickness in terms of trust, cooperation and shared values among the
parties involved in the process of relationship-building after violent conflict.
3.3. Reconciliation as Identity Change
Many contemporary violent conflicts have significant overtones of social identity
--- ethnic, racial, religious or regional (Conteh-Morgan 2004, 193). Some of the
protracted, deep-rooted conflicts in the world (for example, in Palestine, Sri
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Lanka, the Balkans and Northern Ireland) are between identity groups. Even
though this is not yet widely recognised in the reconciliation literature, issues of
identity are central to the process of building or rebuilding relationships between
social groups that had developed deep-seated, intense animosity and fear
toward each other (Schirch 2001, 152).
Kelman, with more than three decades experience in applying ‘interactive
problem solving’ to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (1996, 2001, 2005a), is the first
scholar who advanced a conception of reconciliation with a particular focus on
identity change (specifically, transforming the collective identities of conflicting
parties).6 Kelman (2004, 113) explains his identity-focused conception of
reconciliation in a ‘conceptual model based on three qualitatively distinct
processes of peacemaking: conflict settlement, conflict resolution and
reconciliation’. Conflict settlement is ‘a process yielding an agreement that
meets the interests of both parties to the extent that their respective power
positions enable them to prevail’ (117). Whether the settlement is respected or
not ‘depends on surveillance – by the parties themselves, in keeping with their
deterrent capacities, by outside powers, and by international organizations’ (118).
This is largely because the settlement may not be adequately underpinned by a
change in public attitude that is often characterised by intense animosity and
fear towards the adversary. From the perspective of far-reaching peacebuilding,
interest-based settlement of the conflict is just the first step towards sustainable
peace, even though it is a necessary step for the cessation of physical violence.
Conflict resolution, according to Kelman, is ‘the process of achieving a
mutually satisfactory and hence durable agreement between the two societies’
6 It may be possible to discuss Kelman’s identity-focused conception as one of the
relationship-oriented conceptions of reconciliation discussed above because he sees identity
change in the context of relationship-building between conflicting parties. However, this thesis
examines his conception separately because of its great relevance to the challenge of
post-genocide reconciliation in Rwanda.
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(113). While conflict settlement focuses on interests, conflict resolution
‘addresses the parties’ basic needs and fears and therefore has a greater
capacity to sustain itself overtime’ (118). Kelman maintains that conflict
resolution in the interactive problem solving framework is designed to build
‘working trust between the parties – a pragmatic trust in the other’s interest in
achieving and maintaining peace’ (ibid), which provides the foundation of parties’
lasting commitment to the agreement. In other words, in contrast to the
interest-based conflict settlement which does not address attitudinal and
relational aspects of peacemaking, conflict resolution aims to build ‘a new
relationship between the parties, best described as a partnership, in which the
parties are responsive to each other’s needs and constraints and are committed
to reciprocity’ (ibid).
Reconciliation, according to Kelman, ‘goes beyond conflict resolution in that
it moves past the level of pragmatic partnership’ and ‘enables the parties to
internalize the new relationship, integrating it into their own identities’ (120). He
argues that the attitudinal change induced by the process of conflict resolution is
not deep enough to bring about a fundamental transformation of the relationship
required for sustainable, peaceful interaction between the conflicting parties.
This is primarily because:
[t]he new attitudes are not necessarily integrated with one’s preexisting
value structure and belief-system – with one’s worldview. This means that
the old attitudes – including attitudes of fundamental distrust and negation
of the other – remain intact even as new attitudes, associated with the new
relationship, take shape. (118-9)
At the heart of the process of identity change proposed by Kelman is the
process of removing ‘the negation of the other’s identity as an element of its own
identity’ (2001, 196). Kelman (2004, 119) elaborates this crucial aspect of
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reconciliation as follows:
Changing one’s collective identity by removing the negation of the other
from it implies a degree of acceptance of the other’s identity – at least in the
sense of acknowledging the legitimacy of the other’s narrative without
necessarily fully agreeing with that narrative. The change in each party’s
identity may go further by moving toward the development of a common,
transcendent identity – not in lieu of, but alongside of each group’s
particularistic identity. […] What is essential to reconciliation, in my view, is
that each party revise its own identity just enough to accommodate the
identity of the other.
In the context of protracted identity-based conflicts, discarding the negation of
the other from one’s collective identity cannot be done easily because it
constitutes a central element of each party’s identity. As Staub (2001, 170) notes,
after decades or even centuries of violent exchanges, each group in conflict
comes to define its identity around enmity towards the other (‘the other is our
enemy, and we are the enemy of the other’). Similarly, the identity of each group
may come to be defined around victimhood; ‘we are the victim of the other group,
and they are our victimizers, not victims’. The negation of the other group’s
identity as victims or the narrative of their victimhood is deeply entrenched in
each group’s own victim identity or their own narrative of victimhood.
Therefore, working towards reconciliation as identity change in the context
of protracted identity-based conflicts is dealing with ‘the dilemma of abandoning
some elements of identity without threatening the core of their identity’ (Kelman
2004, 121). Kelman (2001, 197) suggests that such a difficult process may be
facilitated by helping the conflicting parties to engage in ‘negotiation of identity’,
a process in which ‘members of the conflicting parties explore and invent ways of
accommodating their group identities to one another’. He has identified five
conditions for reconciliation that may help groups in conflict ‘negotiate’ or
reformulate ‘their identity so as to accommodate to the identity of the other’:
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mutual acknowledgement of the other’s narrative and humanity, development of
a common moral basis for peace, confrontation of history, acknowledgement of
responsibility and establishment of patterns, and institutional mechanisms for
cooperation (2004, 122-4).
Kelman’s conception of reconciliation as identity change is an important
addition to the reconciliation literature, highlighting the critical importance of the
challenge of identity transformation in the process of relationship-building
between conflicting parties, particularly those divided by identity-based conflicts.
Describing identity change as the process of integrating new attitudes into ‘one’s
preexisting value structure and belief-system’ (119), his work strongly suggests
that reconciliation as identity change is a very ‘deep’ process which must take
place in the psyche of each identity group who has a stake in post-violence
peacebuilding.
3.4. Reconciliation as Construction of New Social Structures
As explained above, those promoting different versions of relationship-oriented
reconciliation focus on changes in emotions, attitudes, values and identities that
contribute to cooperative or harmonious relationships between formerly
conflicting parties. Some authors disagree with this understanding of
reconciliation. They argue that reconciliation should be identified with the
structures and institutions required for establishing a sustainable peace
environment in the aftermath of violent conflict.
Gutmann and Thompson (2000) as well as Crocker (2000) caution against
excessive emphasis on notions like social harmony and communal solidarity in
the process of reconstructing society after political violence. Gutmann and
Thompson (2000, 36) advance the notion of ‘democratic reciprocity’, which can
be seen as a realistic form of political reconciliation where citizens ‘try to justify
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their political views to one another, and to treat with respect those who make
good-faith efforts to engage in this mutual enterprise even when they cannot
resolve their disagreements’. According to Crocker (2000), in democratic
reciprocity,
former enemies or former perpetrators, victims, and bystanders are
reconciled insofar as they respect each other as fellow citizens. Further, all
parties play a role in deliberations concerning the past, present, and future
of their country.
According to these authors’ views, the greatest challenge for post-violence
societies is to reconstruct, or construct for the first time, structures for managing
disputes through deliberation and democratic decision making. They caution
against an attempt to unduly seek consensus which may result in undermining
individual rights and freedoms.
Daly and Sarkin (2007, 187-99) call for redirecting the way reconciliation is
conceptualised from emphasising its relational, attitudinal and emotional aspects
to emphasising its structural aspects. According to them, the latter
structure-oriented conception has some important advantages over the former
relationship-oriented conception in the context of national reconciliation. The
structure-oriented reconciliation requires less interpersonal confrontation
between former enemies or perpetrators and victims because the emphasis on
psychological and relational aspects is reduced. Daly and Sarkin maintain that
this form of reconciliation does not require ‘either that victims forgive or that
perpetrators atone or be punished or that beneficiaries of prior injustices provide
restitution for their ill-gotten gains’ (ibid). Instead, it focuses on ‘how the society
can be structured to promote the values common to an inclusive democratic
state’ (ibid). Thus, what matters is not the relationship between the individuals,
but the relationship between the individual and the nation.
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According to Daly and Sarkin, another advantage in the structure-oriented
reconciliation stems from its broader focus and forward-looking nature. They
maintain that reconciliation in this structure-oriented conception ‘does not
demand agreement on specific aspects of the past; rather, it forges agreement
on a broad vision of the future’ (189). Thus, ‘[i]nstead of insisting on change for
the sake of reconciliation, broadening the focus achieves reconciliation for the
sake of change in the future’ (ibid).
The structure-oriented reconciliation process advocated by these authors is
concerned with reconciliation at the large-group level, national or beyond.
Looking at reconciliation in terms of structures and institutions, as they advocate,
provides some important insights into the multi-dimensional challenge of
post-violence reconciliation at the broader societal or political level. The
challenge of reconciliation in post-violence societies is clearly much more than
attitudinal change among conflicting parties. As Jeong (2005, 157) says, in
addition to alleviating social division, ‘the greatest challenge is to reconstruct the
social and moral systems that have been devastated by violence’.
3.5. Christian Conceptions of Reconciliation
The Judeo-Christian heritage of the West has played a significant role in the
evolution of notions of reconciliation and forgiveness today. As Christianity
spread throughout the world, including a large portion of Africa, during the
colonial era, it shaped the cultural context in which many people around the
world conceive of reconciliation. Christianity has been the predominant religion
in Rwandan society for nearly a century. Christian churches, especially the
Roman Catholic Church, have had an enormous influence in different spheres of
society: political, social, cultural, economic and spiritual.7 Thus, it is crucial to
7 Melvern (2000, 20) sums up the Church’s powerful influence in Rwandan society at the time of
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have some understanding of Christian notions of reconciliation to make sense of
how Rwandans understand the concept.
Although reconciliation is a prevalent theme in both the Old and New
Testaments of the Bible, it is St. Paul’s writings that articulated reconciliation
most clearly as the central theme of gospel and the essence of Christian faith
(WCC 2005, 96-8). Paul portrays reconciliation primarily as God’s divine
initiative, through the redemptive death of Jesus Christ, to mend the broken
relationship with human beings who were alienated from God because of human
sin and disobedience (de Gruchy 2002, 45-6).8 In their alienation from God,
humans became alienated from each other.
In Christian theology, spiritual reconciliation or reconciliation with God is
considered to be fundamental to reconciliation at different interconnected levels
of human society (Van der Kooi 2002, 106). Assefa (1997, 46-9) discusses
interconnections between four dimensions of the Christian notion of
reconciliation: spiritual, personal-psychological, social and ecological. The
second or psychological dimension of reconciliation (reconciliation with the self )
is, according to Assefa, ‘a consequence of, or spillover from’ the spiritual
dimension of reconciliation that allows a person to regain inner peace and
harmony within him/herself. Assefa maintains that these first two dimensions of
1994 genocide as follows:
The second largest employer after the state, was the Church. Around the churches there
grew schools, health clinics and printing presses for religious tracts. Church attendance
was high […]. Not less than 90 % of the population was Christian, and more than half of
those were Catholic’. The leadership of many Christian denominations were largely
discredited by their implication in the genocide. However, Churches as institutions still
register the great majority of the Rwanda population as their followers even in
post-genocide Rwanda.
8 ‘But God demonstrates his own love for us in this: While we were still sinners, Christ died for us.
Since we have now been justified by his blood, how much more shall we be saved from God’s
wrath through him! For if, when we were God’s enemies, we were reconciled to him through the
death of his Son, how much more, having been reconciled, shall we be saved through his life!
Not only is this so, but we also rejoice in God through our Lord Jesus Christ, through whom we
have now received reconciliation’ (Romans 5: 8-11). Also see other Biblical texts which deal with
the notion of reconciliation, particularly, Ephesians 2: 11-22 and Colossians 1: 19-21.
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reconciliation are fundamental to the third and social dimension of reconciliation
--- reconciliation of human beings and that of different human groups. Those who
have been reconciled with God, and thereby acquire inner peace and harmony,
are led to share with their fellow human beings the mercy and forgiveness they
have been given so that their relationships are also restored. Finally, the fourth
and ecological dimension of reconciliation concerns the relationship between
humans and the non-human creation of God. This kind of reconciliation is
required, says Assefa, for the early three dimensions of reconciliation to be fully
realised. First, ‘humans cannot be fully reconciled with God while living in
conflictual, disrespectful and abusive relationships with His creation’. Second, to
fully reconcile with the self and acquire inner peace and harmony s/he has to
maintain ‘a relationship of respect and care for nature and ecological systems’
on which material being depends (48).
The World Council of Churches’ Statements on Mission (1980-2005) point
out that the Christian notion of reconciliation ‘presupposes the experience of
broken communion […] in the form of estrangement, separation, enmity, hatred,
exclusion, fragmentation [and] distorted relationships’ (WCC 2005, 98). What is
considered to be essential for the Christian conception of reconciliation,
therefore, is ‘a very deep-rooted renewal’ and a fundamental ‘transformation of
human relationships’ to God, to fellow human beings and to the natural world
(ibid). It is not just ‘a superficial fixing of distortions’ (ibid) or ‘a restoration of the
status quo ante’ (Schreiter 1998, 18). Schreiter (1992, 60) stresses this
transformative nature of Christian reconciliation:9
Reconciliation is about more than righting wrongs and repenting of
evildoing. These are surely included, but the understanding of reconciliation
9 See 2 Corinthians 5:16 – 21 for the Christian notion of a new creation based on spiritual
reconciliation through Christ.
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in the Christian Scriptures sees that we are indeed taken to a new place, a
new creation. Reconciliation is not just restoration. It brings us to a place
where we have not been before.
When applied to post-violence contexts, this Christian notion of
reconciliation seeks a profound psychological, moral and spiritual transformation
among individuals and groups who live in estrangement from each other so that
they may live in friendship, love and harmony.10 Christian accounts of
reconciliation are usually full of notions that are described by Crocker as
ingredients of a ‘thick’ ethically demanding version of reconciliation: forgiveness,
repentance, healing, love and harmony.11 It may be said, therefore, that the
Christian conception of reconciliation is one of the most demanding on the ‘thick’
end of the reconciliation continuum discussed earlier in this chapter.
4. Forgiveness and Reconciliation
Forgiveness can hold a wide variety of meanings, particularly that different
religious and cultural traditions provide different conceptions of forgiveness.12
Writing on cultural variations in forgiveness, Augsburger (1992, 262) observes:
Each culture shapes its understanding of forgiveness from its central values.
Harmony calls for a forgiveness of overlooking; justice for a forgiveness of
repentance; solidarity for a forgiveness of ostracism; honor for a
forgiveness of repayment; dignity for a forgiveness of principled sacrifice.
This thesis uses a secular definition of forgiveness. Deutsch (2000, 58) defines
forgiveness as:
[G]iving up rage, the desire for vengeance, and a grudge toward those who
have inflicted grievous harm on you, your loved ones, or the groups with
whom you identify. It also implies willingness to accept the other into one’s
10 See Isaiah 11: 6-10 which is often quoted by Christians as a vision of ‘reconciled world’.
11 See, for example, Assefa (1997), Tutu (1999) and WCC (2005).
12 See, for example, Augsburger (1992) and Boleyn-Fitzgerald (2002).
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moral community so that he or she is entitled to care and justice.13
Forgiving is a conscious process by the offended party who wishes to overcome
emotions like anger, resentment and hatred as well as to acknowledge a shared
humanity with the offender. It does not require forgetting the wrongdoing; rather
it requires the offended to remember not ‘in a bitter, grudging, and
grievance-cultivating way’ (Govier 2006, 99) but in a liberating way in which
pains, horrors and resentment caused by the wrongdoing no longer haunt
him/her. Forgiving therefore entails transformed memories that ‘exclude
resentment and allow us to “let go” while retaining the knowledge that these
things were done, and they were wrong’ (Govier 2002, 61).
Forgiving requires neither condoning nor excusing. Condoning what the
person did implies that it was not bad or possibly right. On the contrary, acts of
offering and receiving forgiveness ‘presuppose that wrongs were committed and
the person to be forgiven is accountable for doing these things’ (Govier, 2006,
97). Similarly, we cannot excuse and forgive people at the same time because
we excuse ‘when we no longer hold them accountable’ while we forgive ‘when
we hold them accountable but do not excuse’ (Augsburger 1996, 28).
If forgiveness of the offender does not preclude ‘personal accountability for
wrongdoing’ and responsibility for assuming ‘forgivee obligations’ (Little 1999,
79), arguably, it does not even preclude punishment which may be seen as a
necessary condition for receiving forgiveness from victims and being
reintegrated into the community. Therefore, forgiving the offender does not mean
13 Similarly from a secular perspective, Govier (2006, 96) identifies the following as the
‘fundamental elements of forgiveness’:
1) one overcomes any anger, resentment, and vindictiveness that one has felt in response
to being wronged;
2) one relinquishes any sense of grievance and injury resulting from that wrong;
3) one locates the wrong in the past, as distinct from the present and the future;
4) one allows to the wrongdoer a fresh start; and
5) one comes to accept the wrongdoer as a human being with positive potential, capable
of entering with oneself into a relationship of moral equality.
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that the offended must give up the right to justice through legal systems or other
means. Deutsch (2000, 59) notes that it does not contradict with punishment so
long as the punishment conforms to ‘the canons of justice and be directed
toward the goal of reforming the harmdoer so that he or she can become a moral
participant in the community’. Govier (2002, 175, n9) also maintains that,
‘forgiveness is not incompatible with punishment; what forgiveness rules out is
enduring resentment and hostility against an offender’.
4.1. Competing Views about Forgiveness and Reconciliation
As noted earlier, forgiveness and reconciliation are considered by many
(especially those from societies with a Judeo-Christian history) as closely
associated concepts. This does not mean that those who see a close connection
between the two concepts support the idea of forgiving a perpetrator who
committed a horrible crime for the sake of reconciliation. For example, partly
because of a strong influence of Christianity in society, many Rwandans think
that reconciliation cannot be completed without the victim’s offering forgiveness.
This does not mean that all of them support the idea of forgiving perpetrators of
serious crimes like genocidal massacres. Instead, those who cannot conceive of
forgiving genocide perpetrators equally cannot conceive of the possibility of
reconciliation between the victim and the perpetrator because they believe
forgiveness is a precondition of reconciliation.
Authors writing about reconciliation are divided in their views on its
relationship to forgiveness. Broadly, they adopt three positions. The first position
stresses the centrality of forgiveness in reconciliation (described in relation to the
forgiveness-centred and Christian conceptions of reconciliation). According to
this view, forgiveness is necessary for reconciliation at both the micro and macro
levels.
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The second position considers forgiveness as only relevant to interpersonal
reconciliation but not applicable to reconciliation between large groups or
political communities. Bloomfield (2006, 29) argues:
At the broader societal or political level, what is required is a more
pragmatic, and less ambitious, process involving the development of
effective working relations: “political reconciliation.” This does not require
forgiveness or mutual love.
As indicated in this statement, those taking the second position caution against
what they see as the erroneous tendency to consider an emotional element like
forgiveness as a condition of reconciliation at the macro level.
Those who take the third position argue that reconciliation should not be
dependent on forgiveness at either the micro or macro levels. Dwyer (2003, 108)
forcefully rejects both the first and second positions as ‘unrealistic’:
It seems to me that any conception of reconciliation – at either the micro- or
macro-level – that makes reconciliation dependent on forgiveness, or that
emphasizes interpersonal harmony and positive fellow-feeling, will fail to be
a realistic model of reconciliation for most creatures like us.
Govier (2006) argues that forgiveness and reconciliation are conceptually
independent and therefore, the latter does not depend on the former. According
to her trust-centred conception of reconciliation, forgiveness is not necessary for
reconciliation (89). Conflicting parties may live in a state of non-violent
coexistence without forgiving each other, but they must develop trust enough
that each party is confident that the other party will not attack them. As Govier
argues, then, ‘there is reconciliation in the absence of forgiveness’ (ibid), if the
notion of reconciliation in question is relatively thin. She also argues that
‘forgiveness is not a sufficient condition of reconciliation’ (ibid). To illustrate her
position, Govier gives the following example:
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For example, an abused woman may forgive her ex-husband and yet be
unwilling to reconcile with him to the extent of living with him again and
re-establishing their relationship. Such unwillingness could be predicated
on the fear that he might lapse and abuse her again. Thus, she could
forgive him for injuring her, and yet not trust him to the point of being willing
to reconcile. (ibid)
On these grounds, Govier concludes that ‘it is possible for people to reconcile
without forgiving and to forgive without reconciling’ and therefore, ‘[f]orgiveness
is neither necessary nor sufficient for reconciliation’ (ibid).
4.2. Forgiveness in Reconciliation at Different Levels
The above accounts show that reconciliation can be conceived in ways that do
not require forgiveness as a condition. However, as Govier (2006, 89) points out,
it would be a mistake to conclude that ‘there is no connection at all between
forgiveness and reconciliation’. In various social and cultural contexts,
forgiveness plays an important role in reconciliation at different levels. First, at
the level of the individual victim, forgiveness may provide psychological healing
and liberation from emotions such as rage, grudge and the desire for revenge
towards one’s victimizer (intra-personal reconciliation as inner healing).
Second, forgiveness may also be helpful for reconciliation at the
interpersonal level as mitigation or removal of negative emotions towards the
other is likely to help build or rebuild positive relationships between the victim
and the perpetrator, or the parties in conflict. Forgiveness, in the sense of
coming to ‘accept the other into one’s moral community’ (one of the key
elements in Deutsch’s definition quoted above) is also very significant for
interpersonal reconciliation as relationship-building, since it implies
preparedness to enter into the process of reconciliation with an adversary so as
to build or rebuild ‘a relationship of moral equality’ (Govier 2006, 96).
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Third, forgiveness may facilitate reconciliation even at the inter-group or
broader societal level. As noted earlier, there is a widely held view, especially in
western societies, which considers forgiveness merely ‘as a private ethic,
appropriate for confronting personal moral wrongdoing’ (Amstutz 2005, 74).
Those sceptical about the notion of inter-group forgiveness ask whether it is
possible to apply such a seemingly personal process like forgiveness to
inter-group relations, not least because unlike individuals, groups have neither a
mind or a conscience.14 Nevertheless, transactions of remorse/apology and
forgiveness by either ordinary members, or representatives, of the conflicting
groups may help mitigate psychological barriers which inhibit the building of trust
needed in cooperative group relationships.
4.3. The Danger of Obligatory Forgiveness
As discussed above, reconciliation and forgiveness may be seen as
independent processes and the former can be conceived in a way that does not
require the latter as a condition. Forgiveness may come as the fruit of a
long-term process of reconciliation. Bloomfield (2006, 24) argues that
‘forgiveness must be a later-stage component of reconciliation that may come at
a victim-defined point’, whereas Daly and Sarkin (2007, 156) suggest that it is
‘the last step’ in the process of reconciliation. Both seem to agree that
forgiveness is not something that others can demand or even expect from
victims.
As also pointed out earlier, although it is neither a necessary nor sufficient
condition of reconciliation, forgiveness may play a positive role in the process of
reconciliation at different levels. If this is the case, the promotion of forgiveness
14 Responses to key questions raised by those sceptical about inter-group forgiveness are
discussed in Appendix 3, primarily based on the work of Govier (2002).
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can be an important aspect of the reconciliation process as the case of the South
African TRC illustrates. However, it must be noted that the promotion of
forgiveness can also undermine the process of reconciliation. When it is done
improperly, resistance to the notion of reconciliation is likely to be augmented in
some sections of the population, particularly by groups of victims who vigorously
demand retribution, or even vengeance.
Crocker (2000, 7) speaks of ‘the freedom to withhold forgiveness’ in his
critique of Tutu’s forgiveness-centred reconciliation. If forgiveness is the victims’
prerogative, as noted above, surely they have the freedom or the right to
withhold forgiveness. However, in practice this freedom is often infringed in
many post-violence contexts. Govier (2006, 105) speaks of ‘the problem of
directed forgiveness’ where influential religious or/and political leaders urge
victims to forgive by giving them directives when they are not ready to do so.
Nobody, of course, can be forced to forgive because it is ultimately a personal
decision. However, it is often difficult for victims to speak against forgiveness,
particularly, when those leaders with authority over them present forgiveness as
their duty, based on religious commandment or government directive. Govier
observes:
A directive to forgive may be felt by many as a harsh and authoritative order.
In their crudest form, such directives may threaten people, insisting that
their salvation depends on forgiving. Victims, who may be in the mood to
undertake furious acts of vengeance, are asked – or even directed – to
forgive because it is their religious obligation to do so. (107)
Govier seems to have Christianity in mind when she speaks of the danger
of this extreme form of directed forgiveness.15 Whether forgiveness should be
15 See Govier (2002, 158-163) for her analysis of how different religions, namely Christianity,
Judaism, Islam and Buddhism understand forgiveness. Also see Wiesenthal’s volume The
Sunflower, which vividly illustrates different conceptions of forgiveness according to different
religious traditions (Wiesenthal 1997).
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considered an obligation or not is debatable even within the Christian tradition.
For example, Zehr (1990, 46) speaks of forgiveness as a gift which ‘cannot
simply be willed or forced, but must come in its own time, with God’s help’.
However, the conception of forgiveness as an obligation – (a view which can be
illustrated in a common saying ‘We Christians must forgive because we have
been forgiven by God!’) seems to be widespread among Christians worldwide.
Wink (1998) testifies to one such example from South Africa. In 1988, he led a
workshop on non-violence for a group of local church leaders, including both
Africans and those of European descent. He found that all of the African
participants had an experience of being tortured and then had forgiven their
torturers. On the way, those participants described how they had come to forgive
their torturers, Wink (1998, 15) reports:
The summons to forgive came, as it were, from outside them, as a
command of the gospel that they could not avoid. Much as they wanted to
hold on to the desire for “sweet revenge,” they felt constrained by their
commitment to the gospel to forgive. They could not not forgive, because
they saw forgiveness as their fundamental obligation to God. They forgave,
not for their own sakes, but for the sake of the other. They had to forgive the
torturers because God had already done so, and was calling them to do the
same.
These African Christian leaders probably did not consider the idea, Christians’
obligation of forgiveness, as problematic. From their perspective, it was not
something they were forced to do by somebody else but something they felt
compelled to do out of their own faith. Some victims may come to forgive
perpetrators not because they were told to do so but based on free will coming
out of their faith or the interests of their own mental health. However, the practice
of directed, obligatory forgiveness may cause a fierce resentment in others.16
16 The following statement of one South African quoted by Montville (2001, 135) vividly illustrates
the point:
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Furthermore, the notion of obligatory forgiveness may even mean to some
victims - particularly those who, out of their religious belief, feel they must but
cannot forgive - nothing but a cruel torture in the name of religion.17
5. A Synthesis
Reconciliation has many faces; depending on one’s perspective, it can be
conceived of in many different ways. The challenge is to come up with a
conception that captures its complexities and yet at the same time, gives focus
and clarity. Now, as a synthesis of the discussion above, a conceptual
framework of reconciliation is proposed.
5.1. Four Emphases
This conceptual framework has four emphases. First, reconciliation is addressed
primarily as a process, not an end-state. In this thesis, reconciliation is defined
as a process of transforming the relationships of parties (victim, offender, identity
groups, nations, a state and the victims of its oppression,) to a conflict, which has
involved distinctive yet interrelated types of violence (direct, structural and
cultural).
The second emphasis is that post-violence reconciliation is a complex,
multi-dimensional process with political, emotive, social-psychological, cultural
and spiritual dimensions. Building cooperative relationships between conflicting
parties cannot be realised or sustained without significant changes in many
What really makes me angry about the TRC and Tutu is that they are putting pressure on us
to forgive…. I don’t know if I will ever be ready to forgive. I carry this ball of anger inside me
and I don’t even know where to begin dealing with it. The oppression was bad, but what is
much worse, what makes me even more angry, is that they are trying to dictate my
forgiveness.
17 The following statement of one Rwandan Roman Catholic priest, a genocide survivor,
indicates that this is a real problem in Rwanda:
Everywhere priests are preaching in favour of a superficial, senseless, unilateral and thus
impossible act of forgiveness. I think it is a form of torture for the poor genocide survivors.
(quoted in AR/REDRESS 2008, 126)
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aspects of society. These include positive psychological changes constituting
inner healing of the wounded population, changes in perceptions of, and
attitudes towards, the other, changes in values and social identities and changes
in the political, social and economic structures underlying unjust social
relationships. This proposed framework synthesises the relationship-oriented
and structure-oriented conceptions of reconciliation discussed earlier.
Third, reconciliation is a multi-level process concerned with different levels
of societies from individual to communal, national and international. It is
important not to conflate interpersonal reconciliation and political reconciliation
as if the exchanges between/among the parties involved were similarly intimate.
However, analysis of reconciliation at the larger societal level should not
disregard psychological and attitudinal dimensions because reconciliation at
different social levels is interconnected and often complementary. The challenge
is to pay attention to the interconnected nature of reconciliation at different social
levels without conflating them.
Fourth, post-violence reconciliation as a complex, multi-dimensional and
multi-level process is inevitably long-term or even open-ended. One of the
greatest challenges to post-violence reconciliation is how to engage the sceptics,
especially victims who resist the idea of reconciliation as something imposed by
others. This legitimate resistance is to be anticipated in the course of a
reconciliation effort. It may be tackled by de-emphasising reconciliation as the
end-state of an ideal harmonious relationship but instead, by emphasising it as a
long-term, gradual process evolving from a ‘thin’ notion of reconciliation as
non-violent coexistence towards ‘thicker’ notions of cooperation and beyond
(Bloomfield 2006, 28).
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5.2. Integrating the Three Analytical Dimensions
One coherent conceptual framework can accommodate the above four
emphases of post-violence reconciliation by integrating the three analytical
dimensions of reconciliation of level, degree and time. As discussed above,
Amstutz’s bi-dimensional model integrates the two dimensions of level and
degree, thereby demonstrating the possibilities of various forms of reconciliation
from micro to macro levels with different degrees of depth/thickness in terms of
trust, cooperation and shared values among the parties involved in the process
of post-violence reconciliation (2005, 98). Involving much smaller numbers of
people than inter-group reconciliation, interpersonal reconciliation can be seen
as a ‘narrower’ form of reconciliation. Interpersonal reconciliation is also more
likely to be ‘deeper’ or ‘thicker’ than inter-group reconciliation in terms of
psychological, attitudinal and moral transformation as ‘individuals can
communicate their values, attitudes, and loyalties with greater ease and
directness’ compared to collectives (ibid). However, it is still possible to conceive
of ‘broad’ reconciliation at the large-group level, which is also modestly ‘deep’,
involving significant psychological, attitudinal and moral changes crucial for
mending relationships between social, political or ethnic groups in conflict.
To more fully capture the dynamism of reconciliation as a gradual,
incremental process from a ‘thinner’ to a ‘thicker’ conception, the dimension of
time must be added to Amstutz’s bi-dimensional model. This proposed
tri-dimensional model considers the continuum of reconciliation from the
minimalist conception to the maximalist conception alongside a timeline that
stresses a long-term, gradual process of reconciliation. The model does not
suggest that a process of reconciliation must start with the ‘thinnest’ or least
demanding form (such as non-violent coexistence). Rather, it suggests that a
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reconciliation process may start with a relatively ‘thin’ conception deemed
‘realistic’ in its local socio-political and cultural context. Over years or decades,
the same process may evolve into one with a ‘thicker’, more ambitious
conception. This tri-dimensional model can be operationalized through an
incremental programme which first addresses shorter-term reconciliation
objectives that are realistic for different levels of society and gradually shifts to
longer-term, more ambitious reconciliation objectives set for different levels of
society.18
5.3. Reconciliation as a Differentiated Process
This review of the rapidly growing literature on reconciliation has attempted to
synthesise those aspects that are particularly relevant to analysis of the
challenge of justice and reconciliation in post-genocide Rwanda. There can be
no prescribed formula for post-violence reconciliation. It has to be accepted that,
as Patterson (2002) argues, it is ‘a highly differentiated process’:
Localized and context-specific attempts must reflect the particular needs
and resources of specific communities. Instead of looking for "the best"
form of reconciliation possible, we should look for as many forms of
reconciliation as possible, with attention to both immediate and long-term
possibilities, practical and idealistic goals.
Context-specific voices and the ideas of members of a concerned society should
never be confined to a rigid, narrow-focused framework of reconciliation even if it
might be convenient for policy makers or external analysts. After all, the process
and content of reconciliation must be determined through deliberations by
members of the society in question, which is indeed a crucial part of the
18 I borrowed the notion of an ‘incremental programme’ from Mani’s discussion about
‘incremental maximalism’ as a ‘conceptual and practical framework for rule of law restoration in
post-conflict societies’ (2002, 170). See Chapter 3 of this thesis for description of ‘incremental
maximalism’.
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long-term process of post-violence reconciliation.
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CHAPTER THREE
CONCEPTUALISING THE RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION
IN POST-VIOLENCE PEACEBUILDING
1. Introduction
In the widely acclaimed book, A Theory of Justice, Rawls (1971, 1999) states:
Justice is the first virtue of social institutions, as truth is of systems of
thought. A theory however elegant and economical must be rejected or
revised if it is unjust; likewise laws and institutions no matter how efficient
and well-arranged must be reformed or abolished if they are unjust. Each
person possesses an inviolability founded on justice that even the welfare
of society as a whole cannot override. […] [T]he rights secured by justice
are not subject to political bargaining or to the calculus of social interests.
[…] Being first virtues of human activities, truth and justice are
uncompromising. (1999, 3-4)
As Rawls’ statement suggests, justice is often discussed as a fundamental virtue
of human society. For centuries, philosophers as diverse as Aristotle, Plato, Kant,
Hegel and Rawls have attempted to articulate objective moral principles for
guiding this ‘uncompromising’ virtue. While it is often portrayed as firm, stable or
universal in philosophical discourses, justice in reality is an elusive,
context-sensitive and intrinsically contested concept (Opotow 2002, 207). The
contested nature of justice becomes especially salient under conflict situations.
In most conflict situations, ‘different sides have different conceptions of what
would constitute a just outcome, even if they share an understanding of just
principles’ (Pankhurst 1999, 241). Moreover, conceptions of justice may change
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over time as a conflict evolves, which makes the task of conceptualising justice
very problematic (Abu-Nimer et al. 2001, 345). Thus, addressing issues of
justice in post-violence peacebuilding is inevitably a difficult and complex
process. And yet, justice is a crucial element of post-violence peacebuilding.
The goal of this chapter is twofold: to set out various conceptions of justice
that are deemed relevant to our analysis of post-violence justice and to explore
its relationship with post-violence reconciliation as discussed in Chapter 2. This
chapter first sketches an overview of different dimensions of justice, primarily
based on a tri-dimensional framework proposed by Mani (2002): legal justice,
rectificatory justice and distributive or social justice. The overview is followed by
a discussion of what this thesis proposes to call the three ‘R’s of rectificatory
justice - Retribution, Reparation and Restoration. These are distinctive and yet
interrelated components of rectificatory justice. The chapter next describes key
aspects of the psychology of justice, primarily based on the framework proposed
by Opotow (2002).
The final part of this chapter first presents a range of views on the
relationship between justice and reconciliation. As stated at the outset of this
thesis, justice and reconciliation are often described as incompatible alternatives.
This thesis challenges this view by demonstrating that, whether justice and
reconciliation can stand together in post-violence peacebuilding or not, depends
largely on how each of them is defined. Some of the seemingly competing
conceptions concerning post-violence justice and reconciliation are not
necessarily contradictory if they are reconceived in the light of a more inclusive
and compatible perspective. At the end, the chapter presents a working
conceptual framework which is used in this study for exploring the complex
relationship between justice and reconciliation in post-genocide Rwanda.
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2. The Three Dimensions of Justice in Post-Violence Peacebuilding
Mani (2002, 3) argues that ‘it is as much a political imperative as a social
necessity to address issues of justice’ in the wake of violent conflicts.
Politically, it is difficult if not impossible for rival sides to agree to terminate
hostilities and conclude peace until their major grievances are addressed.
Socially, the causes, ramifications and effects of conflict on the daily lives
and experiences of citizens make it imperative to address their claims for
justice. (3-4)
This thesis focuses on the dimension of rectificatory justice – a process to
rectify the wrongs committed in the past – and its relation to reconciliation.
Before narrowing down our discussion to one on the relationship between
rectificatory justice and reconciliation, it is important to present an overview of
the different dimensions of justice that are relevant to post-violence
peacebuilding. Mani (2002, 5) argues that it is crucial to address three distinctive
yet interdependent dimensions of justice – legal, rectificatory and distributive –
as an integral part of peacebuilding, to address not only consequences but also
symptoms and causes of conflict. Mani’s tri-dimensional model of justice is
derived from Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. In Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle
first makes a distinction between general and particular justice and then further
subdivides the latter into two distinctive forms of justice – rectificatory and
distributive justice. Each of the three dimensions of justice in Mani’s conceptual
framework corresponds to Aristotle’s general, rectificatory and distributive justice
respectively. The aim of this section is to situate rectificatory justice in a
comprehensive framework of post-violence justice and highlight its
interdependence with the other two dimensions.
2.1. Legal Justice/The Rule of Law
Legal justice is a concept of justice usually referred to as the rule of law. Often
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contrasted with the term ‘the rule of man’, the rule of law is considered as a very
if not the most important principle of political thought in western traditions
(Shinoda 2003, 30). Crocker (1999, 56) says that it constitutes ‘respect for due
process, in the sense of procedural fairness, publicity, and impartiality’. While in
recent years restoring the rule of law is widely considered as a key objective of
reconstruction efforts in post-violence societies, there is currently no consensus
among scholars and practitioners about what it actually means (Mani 2002, 25).
Mani observes that despite persistent confusion in the use of the term, one
can discern ‘two predominant conceptions’ that may be called minimalist and
maximalist versions of the rule of law. The minimalist conception is close to the
position of legal positivism which values ‘the source and formal criteria of law
rather than its content’ (ibid). She writes:
Traced back to the writings of Aristotle and Plato and, more recently, to the
Magna Carta, the concept of the rule of law was devised as a means of
protection from the arbitrariness of ‘rule by man’ and from the abuse of
power by the state. Its main purpose was to subject human conduct to rules
and consequently guarantee predictability in legal relationships and all
interactions within the frame of law. (26)
From a minimalist perspective, what matters is not that the law is morally just but
that a government ‘is subject to and operates within the law’, thereby ensuring
‘the protection of the individual from the state’ (ibid). This implies that, according
to the minimalist conception, the rule of law is maintained as long as the
established laws are observed according to regular procedures, even if that
entails violations of human rights or other morally unjustifiable consequences. It
does not mean that they are necessarily indifferent to values such as equality
and human rights. Rather, they consider these values as ‘distinctive ideals that
are independent of the rule of law’ (ibid). In other words, they maintain the
value-neutral position (Shinoda 2003, 31) with regard to the substance of the
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law.
The maximalist conception, on the other hand, is in line with the position of
those adhering to the natural law tradition drawing on Thomas Aquinas who
declared that ‘a Law, properly speaking, regards first and foremost the order to
the common good’ (quoted in Mani 2002, 25). Insisting that ‘the law has a
necessary correlation to morality’ (Mani 2002, 25), maximalists consider the rule
of law as ’more than mere rule by law, and requires more than a mechanistic
series of structures and procedures for its realization’ (27). In their view,
substantive justice is inseparable from formal justice (ibid). Following the
maximalist conception, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE) defines the rule of law as more than ‘formal legality which assures
regularity and consistency in the achievement and enforcement of democratic
order, but justice based on the recognition and full acceptance of the supreme
value of the human personality and guaranteed by institutions providing a
framework for its fullest expression’ (quoted in Mani 2002, 28).
Mani argues that the minimalist conception of the rule of law which, in her
view, underpins mainstream international rule of law reform efforts, rarely
suffices in post-violence societies striving to overcome the legacies of
‘systematic and sustained violations of justice, dignity and rights’ because it is
‘more readily susceptible to manipulation in vulnerable political situations, and is
more easily infused with the intent and content that suit ruling regimes’ (170).
She also suggests that rule of law reforms, which focus on the form and
institutions without addressing the actual substance of the laws, would hardly be
adequate to consolidate positive peace or peace underpinned by justice, in a
comprehensive sense of the term (86).
However, Mani acknowledges that pursuing maximalist rule of law may be a
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tall order in the contexts of societies emerging from violent conflicts. It is much
more ambitious in scope and aspiration than its minimalist counterpart and
consequently, a maximalist rule of law reform is deemed less achievable or more
susceptible to failure, particularly in a relatively short timeframe. To address this
concern, Mani proposes ‘incremental maximalism’ as a conceptual and practical
framework for guiding rule of law reform programmes in post-violence societies.
Incremental maximalism, in Mani’s words, is:
a framework which embeds the rule of law in justice, human rights and
values, and which concerns itself with both its form and its substance, with
both its institutions and its ethos. This conceptual framework would be
accompanied by an incremental programme for its realization, which sets
realistic, long-term targets for the gradual achievement of its more
ambitious goals. (170)
In short, Mani’s incremental maximalism calls for a more robust approach to the
rule of law through a long-term, incremental programme through which
demanding goals of maximalist conception are pursued gradually.
2.2. Rectificatory Justice
Rectificatory justice concerns the process of ‘righting wrongs’ committed in the
past (Mani 2002, 31). It is, in other words, about responses to the past wrong in
order to ‘undo’ the harm it has caused to a society in general and individual
victims in particular. It is therefore a central dimension of justice in post-violence
societies that are struggling to come to terms with the legacy of gross human
rights violations, war crimes and crimes against humanity.
Rectificatory responses to a wrongdoing vary significantly depending on the
context (social, political and cultural), the nature of the wrong and the
relationship of the offender and the offended. For example, a father who finds his
son having caused damage to his car after driving it without his permission
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would probably not bring the case to court, even though he may oblige his son to
compensate him for the damage done. However, if the same thing was done by
a stranger, the father would probably consider prosecution of the offender.
Similarly, a teenage pregnancy from an extra-marital relationship is likely to
invite strikingly different social responses in different cultural contexts: in some
countries where Islamic laws are strictly observed, the person(s) involved are
likely to incur severe physical punishments, whereas in most western countries,
they might be censured verbally or suffer social sanctions, but they would rarely
be penalised physically.
While people’s responses to the wrongdoing may differ significantly, as
these examples indicate, it is possible to identify key rectificatory justice
concerns that are applicable to various post-violence contexts. They may be
summarised as the three ‘R’s of rectificatory justice: Retribution; Reparation and
Restoration. Retribution may be defined as a theory of, or a justification for,
punishment based on the following ontological reasoning: ‘wrongdoing must be
punished simply because the wrongful act merits condemnation and
punishment’ (Mani 2002, 33). An approach to rectificatory justice which puts a
particular emphasis on this idea of retribution is referred to as retributive justice.
Retributive justice is often considered as a predominant approach used in formal
criminal justice systems whose primary aim is to identify guilt and impose
appropriate punishment on the guilty individual through adversarial judicial
processes. Reparation concerns the repair of the injuries and losses which were
incurred as a result of violations (Vandeginste 2003a, 145). According to this
broad definition, reparation encompasses many similar concepts such as
restitution, redress, compensation, rehabilitation and satisfaction. Reparation
may take either a material or symbolic form even though material reparation
78
often carries symbolic significance (146-7). Restoration is a central concept of
restorative justice – an approach to rectificatory justice which focuses on the
restoration of relationships damaged by crime and the reparation of the injuries
caused by crime to victims, communities and even offenders (Van Ness 1996,
23). Although restoration and reparation are often conflated in the writings of
many authors, restoration in a strict sense as the ‘re-instatement of status quo
ante’ can be understood as much more than reparation, which generally means
making up for loss or damage which cannot be re-established in a strict sense
(Duff 2002, 84).
2.3. Distributive Justice
According to Aristotle’s original stipulation in Nicomachean Ethics, distributive
justice is concerned with ‘the distribution of honours, of material goods, or of
anything else that can be divided among those who share in a political system’
(quoted in Mani 2002, 24). Contemporary scholars have extensively explored
different approaches to, and principles of, distributive justice (Mani 2002, 38-46;
Folger, et al. 1995, 261). The description of distributive justice in this section
relies primarily on the writings of Deutsch, a leading scholar on issues of conflict,
cooperation and justice.
Deutsch (1985, 1) describes distributive justice as a concept of justice
concerning ‘the fairness of the distribution of the conditions and goods that affect
individual well-being’. These goods and conditions can either be considered to
be benefits (e.g. services, pay, resources, rights, political power) or costs (e.g.
tax, labour, penalty and other social obligations). Deutsch (2000, 42) stresses
three principles that are important in distributing benefits and costs at the
societal level or the interpersonal level: equity (receiving benefits in proportion to
one’s contribution); equality (sharing benefits equally among all the group
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members); and need (benefits being allocated in proportion to the level of a
person’s need).
Which particular principle(s) is, or are considered as, more salient than
others depends on different individuals, groups, social classes, ideologies as
well as different social contexts (43). For example, in a collectivist community
like an Israeli kibbutz, its members get the same pay and standard of living
irrespective of their individual work productivity, whereas in an individualistic
society like the United States, it is considered to be legitimate for the Chief
Executive Officer (CEO) of a private company to earn a thousand times more
payment than what its ordinary worker does (ibid). The Israeli case may be seen
as an example of the equality principle favoured, whereas the American case
may be considered as an example of the equity principle favoured so long as
there is a consensus among the employees of the company that the CEO is
making a far greater contribution to the company’s productivity than its ordinary
individual worker. Deutsch observers:
Equity is most prominent in situations in which economic productivity is the
primary goal; equality is dominant when social harmony, cohesiveness, or
fostering enjoyable social relations is the primary emphasis; and need is
most salient in situations where encouraging personal development and
personal welfare is the major goal. (ibid)
These distributive principles are potentially contradictory. For example, the
equality principle may be stressed to the extent that it totally neglects unique
contributions or the needs of some individual members, consequently
undermining the group’s productivity and social cohesion. In contrast, the equity
principle may be pursued narrow-mindedly in a way that erodes the sense of the
equal moral value of every individual constituting the group, consequently
undermining social harmony and cohesiveness. On the other hand, these
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potentially contradictory principles may be applied in a mutually supportive way:
individual differences in terms of contributions and needs can be recognised
through a socially harmonious honouring or caring for a specific individual which
at the same time affirms the equal moral value of every individual member of the
group (ibid).
These distributive principles are important criteria for people to judge the
fairness of a distributed outcome. However, they are by no means the only
parameters on which people judge whether what they have received is fair or
not; they make that judgment in consideration of how their outcome compares
with the outcome of other people with similar qualifications in similar situations
(ibid). People’s sense of fairness, or of deprivation, is based not only on their
objective circumstances, but also on subjective psychological factors which
include, for example, a perceived gap between one’s sense of entitlement and
one’s actual benefits (ibid).
As Mani (2002, 8) points out, in the context of post-violence peacebuilding,
the dimension of distributive justice entails tackling the underlying causes of
violent conflict that are often rooted in substantial or perceived injustices with
socio-economic, political and cultural dimensions. More concretely, it is
concerned with addressing the issues of ‘inequitable distributions of and access
to political and economic resources’ underlying violent conflict (9). Mani argues
that the rationale for dealing with distributive justice in post-violence
peacebuilding is twofold: averting a relapse into violence and building the
foundations of peace, each of which corresponds to the imperative of securing
negative peace and consolidating positive peace in societies emerging from
years or even decades of violent conflict.
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2.4. The Interrelatedness of the Three Dimensions of Justice
The three dimensions of justice briefly discussed above reflect the
multi-dimensional demands of justice in the aftermath of protracted violent
conflict. It is crucial for those formulating the policies of post-violence
peacebuilding to clearly understand the interdependence of the three
dimensions of justice. The pursuit of rectificatory justice through various
mechanisms (e.g. criminal justice system, truth commission or other
reparation-focused mechanisms) largely depends on the establishment of the
rule of law. This is because it is the latter which provides the backdrop of law
enforcement mechanisms to pursue the former, for example, to prosecute, arrest
and try suspects of human rights violations and incarcerate those found guilty as
well as to administer a compensation scheme for victims.
The achievement of rectificatory justice also depends on distributive justice.
In cases where one section of the population has suffered institutionalised
discrimination and human rights violations for a long period of time, some
distributive justice measure may be necessary to enable the disadvantaged
group to overcome poverty among its members (Lambourne 2001, 313).
Furthermore, rectificatory justice through mechanisms like a criminal justice
system and a truth commission is not likely to achieve the goal of restoration
unless it is accompanied by systematic measures to eliminate deep-rooted
socio-economic inequalities created by unjust structures sustained over
generations (Mani 2002, 10).
There are also interrelations between distributive justice and the rule of law.
The former depends on the latter since equitable distribution of resources and
equal political rights ‘cannot be meaningfully instituted unless the normative and
institutional framework of a rule of law regime is put in place to safeguard
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equitable distributions’ (ibid).
The intrinsically interdependent relationships of the three dimensions of
justice strongly suggest the need for a multi-dimensional and integrated
approach to post-violence justice. Which dimension must be prioritised over the
others at what particular stage of the long-term peacebuilding process may vary
according to the exigencies of different social, economic and political contexts of
the particular post-violence society (11). The failure to address any of the three
dimensions is likely to cause efforts to fall short of attaining sustainable, positive
peace.
3. The Three ‘R’s of Rectificatory Justice
The three ‘R’s of rectificatory justice – Retribution, Reparation and Restoration -
are distinctive and yet interrelated concepts that are all important in
understanding the rectificatory dimension of post-violence justice.
3.1. Retribution
Retribution may be defined as a theory of punishment, based on the following
ontological reasoning: ‘someone who has done wrong should suffer some
penalty as a result of what he has done because that suffering is the appropriate
consequence to him of the wrongdoing for which he is responsible’ (Govier 2002,
15). The retributive justification for punishment, says Brunk (2001, 36), ‘is
probably the oldest theory of criminal punishment’. It can be attributed to
religious ideas about divine retribution for humans who committed moral wrongs
or ‘sins’. More recently, Kant’s deontological philosophy, which considered the
punishment of the wrongdoer both society’s right and its duty, provided an
important theoretical basis of the retributive theory (Mani 2002, 34). For Kant
and many other retributivists, punishment is an end in itself, as ‘it is a moral
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obligation to inflict suffering on a wrongdoer’ (Mani ibid, 33). Retribution may
also be defined as a process of inflicting suffering or harm on a wrongdoer based
on deontological reasoning, as well as on the principle of proportionality. The
principle of proportionality asserts that the severity of the punishment must be
proportionate to the seriousness of the wrong committed (Banks 2004, 113).
Retribution is not a synonym for punishment, even though they are often
used interchangeably. Retribution is only one predominant theory of, or
justification for punishment (Banks 2004; Brunk 2001).1 Another predominant
theory for punishment is the utilitarian deterrence approach which was
popularised by influential utilitarian philosophers such as Jeremy Bentham and
John Stuart Mill (Brunk 2001, 39). In marked contrast to the view of most
retributivists, considering punishment ‘only as a means to an end, and not as an
end itself’, utilitarians justify punishment ‘in terms of its ability to reduce crime
and do not focus on the punishment that “ought” to be imposed on offenders’
(Banks 2004, 107).
In addition to the ontological justification, some theorists consider retributive
punishment as a kind of communicative action which is necessary for society to
reassert its moral norms violated by the wrongful act of the offender. For
example, Hampton (1992, 8) argues that retributive punishment is required to
revalidate the victim’s worth which was negated by the offender’s act. This sent a
false message that the victim was less worthy than the offender. In this view, the
community must ‘reasserts the truth of the victim’s value by inflicting a publicly
visible defeat on the wrongdoer’ (Minow 1998, 12). Falls (cited in Govier 2002,
18) also writes that retributive punishment is justified primarily because of its
1 Banks (2004) discusses four theoretical approaches to punishment apart from retribution,
namely, just desserts, rehabilitation, incapacitation and restorative justice, while Brunk (2001)
also discusses four theoretical approaches to punishment other than the retributive approach,
namely, the utilitarian deterrence approach, the rehabilitation approach, the restitution approach
and the restorative approach.
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communicative function to convey a moral message to the offender that what he
did was wrong and blameworthy. Von Hirsch (cited in Banks 2004, 110)
understands retributive punishment as censure of the offender to convey the
message of society’s disapproval of his wrongful act. This censure through
criminal law plays the role of communicating to members of society reasons why
they should not commit acts defined as criminal. In summary, the central function
of retribution is ‘to reassert the continuing strength and validity of the moral rule
that has been violated’ by the criminal act, thereby restoring it among the
members of a moral community (Deutsch 2000, 48-9).
3.2. Reparation
Reparation may be best understood as encompassing a range of concepts and
measures geared towards repairing damage – not only physical and economic,
but also emotional or psychological – which was inflicted by the wrongdoer on
the victims and the community at large (Vandeginste 2003a, 145). The
importance of reparation is often stressed in connection with the limitations of
retributive punishment as a means to redress wrongs done to victims. As
discussed above, retribution has an important function of restoring the validity of
moral rules that were violated by crime. It may also serve other functions –
having, for example, a cathartic effect for members of the moral community
affected by the wrongdoing, and/or a reformative or rehabilitative effect on the
offender, (particularly when it takes the form of a compulsory reform programme)
as well as a deterrent effect. However, the needs of victims are usually far
beyond the scope of retribution. Zehr (2003, 69) writes:
Victims have many needs. They need chances to speak their feelings. They
need to receive restitution. They need to experience justice: victims need
some kind of moral statement of their blamelessness, of who is at fault, that
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this thing should not have happened to them. They need answers to the
questions that plague them. They need a restoration of power because the
offender has taken power away from them.
Most of these victims’ needs outlined by Zehr – the need for truth-telling,
restitution, vindication, information and empowerment – fall into the category of
reparative needs that require different measures of reparation.
There are different forms of reparation. In the legal and social sciences
literature, many different terms are used to refer to similar or identical forms of
reparation. Authors including Mani (2002, 113-5), Vandeginste (2003a, 145-6)
and Govier (2006, 178-80) seek terminological clarification of reparation-related
concepts. This thesis follows the conceptual framework proposed by Govier, to
which we now turn.
3.2.1. Restitution and Redress
As the first step to clarification of terms referring to various forms of reparation, it
is useful to make a distinction between restitution and redress. Restitution, a
term often considered almost a synonym of reparation, is generally referred to as
the act of giving back to a person something that was lost or stolen. In
international law, the term restitution has been used in the sense of
‘re-establishment of the situation which existed before the wrongful act was
committed’ and is considered an important form of reparation ‘as it relates to
essential “belongings”, such as the return of property, the restoration of liberty,
citizenship and other legal rights, the return to place of residence and the
restoration of employment’ (Vandeginste 2003a, 145).
Since there are many things that can never be given back or restored, there
are many cases in which restitution is impossible: for example, loved ones who
were killed; a watch with strong sentimental value destroyed by somebody; and
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the ‘lost childhood’ of a young boy who was forced to be a child soldier. If we
understand restitution strictly as the re-establishment of status quo ante,
rendering it to victims is impossible in the wake of serious violent crimes. For
example, a victim of torture may recover from bodily injuries inflicted on her or
even from psychological traumas, but she cannot erase the memories
associated with the torture she suffered and carry on with her life as if the torture
had never taken place.
When restitution is impossible, redress may be considered to be an
important form of reparation. Redress is ‘an attempt to do something to right the
wrong, even though restitution, in the strict sense, is impossible’ (Govier 2006,
179).
3.2.2. Symbolic, Rehabilitative and Compensatory Forms of Redress
According to Govier (2006, 179), redress may take three distinctive forms:
symbolic, rehabilitative and compensatory. Symbolic redress is ‘fundamentally a
matter of expressing recognition that what was done was wrong and that it
should not have happened’ (ibid). What is at the centre of this symbolic redress
is the acknowledgement of wrongdoing and of the human beings injured by it.
This acknowledgement, for the victims, is of paramount importance in
addressing their fundamental needs discussed above.2 Symbolic redress may
take a variety of forms (including measures that are referred to as satisfaction in
international law terminology): efforts to establish the truth; apologies; sanctions
against offenders; and various forms of commemoration such as building
memorials, establishing museums and observing a day of remembrance to pay
tribute to victims (Vandeginste 2003a, 146; Mani 2002, 115).
2 Govier (2006, 48-9) argues that these aversive and existential forms of acknowledgement are
closely connected and of paramount importance in reconciliation.
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Rehabilitative redress is geared towards the improvement of the physical
and mental health of victims (Vandeginste 2003a, 146). It may entail a range of
measures to provide victims with medical and psychological care, as well as
legal and social services that can help them recover from their physical and
psychological wounds (ibid).
Compensatory redress may be understood as a response to recognise and
mitigate the negative effects of damage done to victims. Although compensation
usually takes the form of monetary payment to victims, some of the things it
attempts to ‘compensate’ cannot be translated into monetary value, particularly
in the wake of serious crimes, as they usually entail irreparable damage which
money can never remedy (Govier 2006, 179). Thus, the value of compensatory
redress often lies more with the symbolic significance of acknowledging the
injuries and losses suffered by victims, and in effect, the wrongs which caused
them, than with its actual capability to reduce their negative effects (Minow 1998,
93-4).
3.3. Restoration
Restoration is a central concept of restorative justice – an approach to criminal
justice that focuses on the restoration of relationships damaged by crime and the
reparation of the damage caused by crime to victims, communities as well as
offenders (Van Ness 1996, 23). According to Marshall (2003, 30), restorative
justice focuses on restoration: ‘restoration of the victim, restoration of the
offender to a law-abiding life, restoration of the damage caused by crime to the
community’. Braithwaite (2003, 86) also writes: ‘Restorative justice means
restoring victims, a more victim-centred criminal justice system, as well as
restoring offenders and restoring community’.
The accounts of the above authors suggest that restoration is a central
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concept of restorative justice. But what does ‘restoration’ actually mean in the
wake of serious wrongdoing? With regard to the restoration of victims,
Braithwaite speaks of the restoration of things such as property loss, personal
injury, dignity, a sense of security and empowerment and social support (86-7).
With regard to the restoration of offenders, he discusses the restoration of dignity,
a sense of security and empowerment as well as social support (88) while the
restoration of community is described as the restoration of ‘harmony between
victim and offender’ (87) as well as social support available for specific victims
and offenders (89).
The main problem with the accounts of Braithwaite and many other
proponents of restorative justice is that they tend to conflate restoration with
reparation. Both terms may mean the act of mending, rebuilding or giving back
something damaged, lost or removed and in some contexts, they are almost
synonymous. But restoration is usually understood as a term which, compared to
reparation, has more emphasis on a sense of bringing something back to the
status quo ante. Duff (2002, 84) argues that restoration in a strict sense ‘must
thus be distinguished from such concepts as reparation and compensation’. He
writes:
Restoration requires the reinstatement of the status quo ante. A harm was
caused, a wrong was done, and its memory might remain: but when
restoration is achieved, it is now (apart from memory) as if the harm or
wrong had never occurred. Reparation and compensation, by contrast,
seek to make up for the loss of what cannot thus be restored. (84-5)
There are indeed significant overlaps between restoration as defined by Duff and
restitution defined above as one of the two components of reparation. However,
restoration as it is used in the restorative justice literature is a much broader
concept than restitution. Restoration encompasses things which are not usually
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considered to be issues of restitution: most notably, the restoration of the
offender’s humanity and the restoration of social relationships damaged by
his/her wrongdoing. These include relationships between the offender and his
direct victim(s) and between the offender and the community to which he and his
victim(s) belong.
Duff argues that the restoration needed after a criminal wrongdoing is not
so much related to the material or psychological harm as it is to the normative
relationships – relationships defined by normative values such as mutual respect
and concern - damaged by the wrongdoing (93). It is indeed inconceivable to
restore many of the material things destroyed, damaged or removed by serious
crimes such as genocide and other gross human rights violations (for example,
lives lost and human bodies disabled). Reparation in the sense of redress might
be possible for some of these things, but never restoration in a strict sense. To
have greater clarity in our discussion, this thesis adopts a conception of
restoration which is clearly distinguished from reparation: restoration that is
primarily concerned with the aim of healing social relationships damaged by
violations.
3.4. Exploring the Interrelatedness of the Three ‘R’s
As stated above, the three ‘R’s of rectificatory justice are considered in this
thesis as distinctive and yet interconnected concepts. They are key components
of rectificatory justice which warrant due consideration in our analysis of
post-violence justice and reconciliation. This does not mean, however, that they
are important to the same extent in every context. Rather, different social,
political and cultural contexts would require different approaches to rectificatory
justice with a varied emphasis on each of the components.
The proposition that the three ‘R’s are key interconnected components of
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rectificatory justice is deeply controversial among scholars and practitioners in
the field of criminal justice. While being less concerned with reparation than
retribution, many proponents of retributive justice, who demand the imposition of
punishment based primarily on the deontological justification, would not reject
various reparative measures discussed above so long as such measures remain
secondary to retributive punishment. However, they would fervently reject the
restoration of a victim-offender relationship, as they believe it is acutely
incompatible with their pursuit of retributive punishment. For example, Ashworth
(cited in Duff 2002, 83) once argued that we must choose the ‘punishment
paradigm’ over the ‘restorative paradigm’ based on the premise that ‘the pursuit
of restorative aims is incompatible with the demands of penal justice’ which is
understood in retributive terms.
On the other hand, many proponents of restorative justice, especially in
their early writings, have stressed the need for rejecting retributive punishment in
their endeavour to achieve ‘restoration’, claiming that ‘punitive retribution cannot
serve the aim of restoration’ (Duff 2002, 83). As Johnstone (2002) and Roche
(2007, 82-3) point out, based on their critical review of the restorative justice
literature, the tendency to portray retribution and restoration in a crude
dichotomy owes much to the writings of some leading scholars of restorative
justice who advocated it as an alternative justice paradigm that must replace the
conventional retributive paradigm (See Zehr 1990; Braithwaite 2002; Walgrave
2002). Johnstone (2002, 109) summarises key features of the
retributive/restorative dichotomy assumed by restorative justice proponents as
follows:
Restorative justice is presented as an alternative to punishment; an
alternative which eschews any intentional imposition of pain. Hence,
restorative justice is distinguished sharply from even the most constructive
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versions of retributive justice.
Consequently, these proponents reject retributive punishment or intentional
infliction of suffering on the offender as counterproductive to the goals of
establishing accountability, repairing material and emotional damage inflicted on
victims, and restoring the social relationships ruptured by criminal wrongdoing.
3.4.1. Beyond the Retributive/Restorative Dichotomy
In recent years, there has been an increasing awareness in the field of
restorative justice that the way retributive and restorative approaches are
contrasted as a dichotomy of incompatible alternatives is too simplistic and
misleading (Johnstone 2002, 106-10; Roche 2007, 82-5). One significant
example of this is Zehr (2002, 58), an influential restorative justice thinker, who
shifted ground to acknowledge that his polarised representation of the two
approaches was misleading, obscuring substantial areas of common ground.
Noting that retribution and restoration ‘are not the polar opposites’ but ‘have
much in common’, Zehr writes:
Both retributive and restorative theories of justice acknowledge a basic
moral intuition that a balance has been thrown off by a wrongdoing.
Consequently, the victim deserves something and the offender owes
something. (59)
If Zehr’s observation is correct, not only restoration, but also retribution, is
essentially about the righting of the relationship between the victim and the
offender which was ruptured by the wrongdoing. Amstutz (2005, 106) explains
this clearly as follows:
According to retributive justice theory, when perpetrators commit an offense
against other people, they destroy the fundamental moral and legal equality
among human beings. To repair ruptured relationships between victims and
victimizers and restore their moral equality, offenders must be diminished
through public condemnation, and victims must regain the former moral
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status.
As Amstutz argues, if ‘retribution is the process by which this fundamental
equality is restored’ (ibid), it may be conceived as an integral part of restoration.
Increased recognition of the important overlaps between retributive and
restorative theories of justice has not settled all the controversies about their
relationship. The most prominent controversy seems to be over the role of
punishment in the restoration of victims and offenders. In his relative recent
writing, Zehr (2002, 59) maintains:
Retributive theory believes that pain will vindicate, but in practice that is
often counterproductive for both victim and offender. Restorative justice
theory, on the other hand, argues that what truly vindicates is
acknowledgement of victims’ harms and needs, combined with an active
effort to encourage offenders to take responsibility, make right the wrongs,
and address the causes of their behavior.
In Zehr’s view, therefore, retributive punishment, or the intentional infliction of
pain on the offender, is a negative and often counterproductive way of
addressing the victims’ fundamental need for vindication, whereas reparative
measures employed in restorative justice constitute a positive and productive
way of doing it. Many other proponents of restorative justice seem to have
maintained a similar view (Johnstone 2002, 109).
This negative view of retributive punishment among restorative justice
proponents has been challenged by retributive theorists who are concerned with
restorative aims of criminal justice (Duff 2002, 2003; K. Daly 2002; Miller and
Blackler 2000). Duff (2002, 2003) argues for the compatibility between retribution
and restoration, as well as on the essential role of retribution for the achievement
of restoration. Conceiving of restoration primarily in terms of healing normative
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relationships ruptured by the wrongdoing,3 Duff argues that ‘restoration is not
only compatible with retribution and punishment, but requires it’ (2002, 83), as
the former is best achieved through the latter, in which the offender is ‘burdened
by criticism, by remorse, and by the need to make apologetic reparation’ (97).
Duff explains that while there can be different ways of repairing the
normative harm, what is commonly called for in reparation is a sincere apology
by the offender, one which expresses his recognition of the wrong he has
committed, his remorse and his desire to reconcile with those harmed by the
wrongdoing (87-8). However, the offender’s verbal apology alone often does not
suffice, especially in the wake of serious wrongdoing; his apology needs to be
‘made forceful’ by some kind of moral reparation that is necessarily burdensome
– ‘something that symbolizes the burden of moral injury’ imposed on his victims
which now he desires to carry himself (90).
Duff (1999, 51-2) argues that this moral reparation can be best achieved
through imposing censure on the offender for inducing his moral reform. As a
form of such communicative censure, which is best suited for pursuing
restorative goals, Duff (2003, 53-4) describes what he calls ‘criminal mediation’:
It focuses on the offender to be suffered for the crime: on what he must do
to repair the moral damage wrought by his crime. It is intended to be painful
or burdensome, and the pain or burden is to be suffered for the crime. The
mediation process itself aims to confront the offender with the fact and
implications of what he had done, and to bring him to repent it as a wrong: a
process which must be painful. The reparation that he is then to undertake
must be burdensome if it is to serve its proper purpose. The aim is not to
‘make the offender suffer’ just for its own sake: but it is to induce an
appropriate kind of suffering – the suffering intrinsic to confronting and
3 Duff (2002, 93) writes:
The offender’s crime damaged his relationships both with his victim, as a fellow citizen, and
with his fellow citizens more generally, by denying those values – of mutual respect and
concern – that are supposed to define their civic relations, and that make civic life possible;
it is that damage that must be repaired, to restore those relationships.
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repenting one’s own wrongdoing and to making reparation for it.
The kind of retributive punishment advocated by Duff is very different from that
being practiced in regular criminal justice systems that, in his view, are ‘neither
designed nor apt to serve the properly restorative ends’ (2002, 98). For
punishment to properly serve the restorative aims, he acknowledges the need
for major changes to the current mode of punishment towards one ‘with less
emphasis on highly coercive and exclusionary sanctions such as imprisonment,
and more on community-based communicative sanctions, involving reparation,
of the kind which proponents of restorative justice recommend’ (Johnstone 2002,
108).
3.4.2. The Possibility of an Integrated Conception of the Three ‘R’s
Duff’s theory of restoration through retribution shows that it is possible to
conceive of retribution, reparation and restoration as compatible and closely
interconnected components of rectificatory justice. The above discussion
suggests that the retributive/restorative dichotomy as described earlier is a false
one which is simplistic and misleading, obscuring important similarities and
intrinsic relationships between them. Retribution can be conceived of as a
means to restoration, particularly when it takes a form which induces moral
reparation. As for the relationship between reparation and restoration,
distinctions can be made between reparation as a comprehensive concept
concerning the repair of the damage caused by the wrongdoing, and restoration
as a concept which signifies the re-establishment of the status quo ante and
which primarily concerns the healing of social relationships ruptured by the
wrongdoing. Various forms of reparation discussed above can be seen as an
essential means to restoration. These observations suggest that both retribution
and reparation can be an integral part of the rectificatory justice process towards
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restoration.
4. The Three Contingencies of the Psychology of Justice
This thesis pays special attention to the psychological dimension of justice and
its relation to reconciliation. As stated earlier, justice is a context-sensitive,
contested concept that is contingent on people’s subjective judgments, rather
than a certain set of universal moral principles that can be applied to varied
socio-economic, political and cultural contexts. Opotow (2002, 207) writes that
‘while it is a comfortable convention to describe justice as firm, stable, and
unwavering, in reality justice is sensitive to contextual contingencies’. She
suggests that these contingencies have been addressed in three lines of
psychological research examining ‘justice as what, how and who’.
4.1. Justice as What – Distributive Justice
A set of contingencies concerning ‘justice as what’ is addressed in distributive
justice, which, as outlined above, is concerned with ‘the distribution of the
conditions and goods that affect individual well-being’ (Deutsch 1985, 1).
Conditions and goods that are the objects of distribution can be either those
considered to be benefits or those considered as costs. They can also be either
concrete or abstract. From a psychological perspective, distributive justice
occurs when people in a certain context perceive that the distribution of what is
owed and paid is fair. For people to make a judgment about whether or not a
distributed outcome is fair, a set of principles are employed consciously or
unconsciously for allocating benefits and costs, most prominent of which are, as
discussed above, equity, equality and need. These principles are not fixed and
are not always deemed to be fair. They are considered ‘fair and appropriate
when they are attuned to the type, quantity, and quality of goods being
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distributed as well as to the social context in which these distributions occur’
(Opotow 2002, 207).
4.2. Justice as How – Procedural Justice
Factors concerning ‘justice as how’ relate to procedural justice. Procedural
justice is concerned with the fairness of the procedures followed to determine
outcomes (Deutsch 2000, 44). Key criteria of procedural fairness include:
consistency or consistent application of procedures across persons and over
time; bias suppression or avoidance of self-interest or ideological
preconceptions; accuracy or use of good, accurate information; correctability or
provision of opportunities for correcting errors; representativeness or
participation of all parties in decision making; and ethicality or compatibility with
basic moral and ethical values (Leventhal 1980 cited in Tyler, et al. 1997, 90-1).
Which, amongst these criteria, are considered the most important depends on
different social contexts as well as different social goals (Tyler, et al. 1997, 91-2).
This suggests that there is no universally fair procedure.
While fair procedures are, in a sense, a means to produce fair outcomes,
procedures are psychologically important in their own right (Opotow 2002, 207).
The application of fair procedures is known to be an important contributor in
building trust in the fairness of outcomes, particularly in situations where it is not
clear what fair outcomes actually are (Deutsch 2000, 44). An outcome resulting
from procedures that are deemed fair, respectful and allow the voices of
participants to be heard, is more likely to be accepted by people even if it is a
negative one from their viewpoint (Opotow 2002, 207-8).
4.3. Justice as Who – The Scope of Justice
The scope of justice addresses a set of contingencies concerning ‘justice as
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who’. It is concerned with who is included in the scope of justice (Deutsch 2000,
49). The scope of justice refers to ‘who is inside or outside our psychological
boundary for justice’ (Opotow 2002, 208). Opotow describes a startling contrast
in how we human beings respond differently to injustices affecting those
included and excluded from our moral community:
For those inside, concerns about fairness, rights, entitlements, and
well-being govern our conduct. For those outside, concerns about fairness,
rights, entitlements, and well-being are deemed irrelevant; instead, people
who are morally excluded from our scope of justice are seen as
undeserving, expendable nonentities, or as hated enemies deserving
extermination (2002, 208).
Human history is full of cases of oppressed groups who have been
excluded from the scope of justice by dominant groups, consequently suffering
from inhumane treatment by others: slaves by their owners, indigenous people
by colonisers, Jews by Nazis, women by men, children by adults, the physically
handicapped by those who are not, sexual minorities by heterosexuals, political
dissidents by political authorities, and one ethnic or religious group by another
(Deutsch 2000, 50). As Opotow (1995, 348) notes, the bases of social exclusion
are diverse, including: ideology, skin colour, gender, age, physical or mental
disability, sexual orientation, and ethnic or religious identity.
Opotow (2002, 208) points out that exclusion from the scope of justice
becomes particularly salient in the context of violent conflict ‘characterized by
extreme violence, violations of human rights, and impunity’. As for the
consequences of moral exclusion, Opotow explains:
Targets of violence are viewed as outside the scope of justice and eligible
for harm; indeed, harm visited upon them can be cause for celebration.
Further, because considerations of fairness do not apply to them, their
resources can be usurped or destroyed and their family can share their fate.
Moral exclusion not only denigrates victims and normalizes and glorifies
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violence, but it also justifies impunity. (ibid)
In situations of protracted violent conflict, perpetrating atrocities with impunity
against ‘enemies’ or those outside one’s moral community may become norms
shared by those inside.
4.4. The Relevance of Justice as What, How and Who in Post-Violence
Justice
The analytical framework of the three psychology of justice contingencies offers
useful insights into our analysis of different approaches to rectificatory justice in
post-violence peacebuilding. As noted earlier, even though they are often
portrayed as incompatible alternatives, both retributive and restorative
approaches to rectificatory justice are concerned with righting the wrongs
committed in the past. In order to achieve the common goal of righting past
wrongs, both retributive and restorative approaches to justice address ‘justice as
what’ and ‘justice as how’, albeit in significantly different manners.
Retributive justice strives for ‘justice as what’ by producing distributive
outcomes in terms of just or fair punishments to ‘reestablish equity such that the
harm offenders have caused will be balanced by harm done to those offenders’
(Estrada-Hollenbeck 2001, 68). In order to attain fair outcomes in these terms,
retributive justice strives to achieve ‘justice as how’ thorough strict observance of
what is known as due process. Restorative justice, on the other hand, strives for
‘justice as what’ primarily in terms of repaired damage and restored social
relationships through reparative measures such as acknowledgment of the
wrong and the suffering of victims, or community service and monetary payment
as compensation (ibid). From a perspective of restorative justice, ‘justice as how’
is best attained through ‘active participation by victims, offenders, and their
communities’ (74).
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When we choose from various models of post-violence justice, such as a
retributive model like a trial, a restorative model like a truth-commission or a
hybrid model which involves both, we make explicit choices about what and how.
However, as Opotow warns (2002, 212), choices about who should be involved
in the scope of justice can remain less explicit, particularly in the contexts of
deeply divided societies emerging from violent conflicts. Consequently, no
matter how retributive or restorative its approach seems, a post-violence justice
effort may end up reinforcing impunity concerning the crimes committed against
those excluded from the scope of justice, unless the issue of who is explicitly
addressed and the scope of justice is made fully inclusive. ‘Without moral
inclusion’, argues Opotow, ‘procedural and distributive justice may remain
inapplicable to victims of violence and may continue to advantage those who
were perpetrators of direct and structural violence during conflict’ (215).
5. Conceptualising the Relationship between Justice and Reconciliation
As illustrated, both justice and reconciliation are complex concepts with many
faces. Thus, it is not easy to examine the relationships between them without
clarifying what we mean by each term and which particular aspects of each we
focus on in our exploration. Now that key concepts have been clarified regarding
reconciliation and justice, the relationship between justice and reconciliation is
explored at the conceptual level.
5.1. Competing Views on the Justice – Reconciliation Relationship
In the still limited, but growing body of literature on this complex subject, there
are three competing views on the relationship between justice and reconciliation
in peacebuilding: justice and reconciliation as competing alternatives, justice as
a precondition of reconciliation, and justice as a component of reconciliation.
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5.1.1. Justice and Reconciliation as Competing Alternatives
As discussed earlier, in the immediate aftermath of extreme violence or brutal
political oppression, justice and reconciliation are often conceived to be
competing alternatives, one of which must be prioritised over the other in the
process of reconstructing societies. This kind of dichotomous view on justice and
reconciliation seems to underlie some of the recent transitional justice efforts in
different parts of the world. The first case in point is the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), established in 1993. According to
accounts provided by Boraine (2000, 389-400), many of those who held key
positions in the Hague-based tribunal consistently opposed, or even actively
obstructed, the proposal of a joint truth commission put forward by leaders of
three ethnic groups on the grounds that such an effort would undermine the work
of the tribunal. Hayner (2001, 207-8) also reports that in late 1998, the then Chief
Prosecutor, Justice Louis Arbour, lobbied donor countries not to support the
Bosnian initiative, or any other reconciliation mechanisms that could interfere
with the pursuit of justice through the ICTY, which consequently set back the
inception of a truth and reconciliation commission there. These accounts do not
necessarily indicate that those opposed to the inception of a TRC in Bosnia
assumed that justice and reconciliation were incompatible alternatives. It
suggests, however, that they preferred to maintain the ICTY as the only formal
rectificatory justice response, at least by the time it completes its work, to the war
crimes and other human rights violations committed in the former Yugoslavian
republics. They failed to see that the TRC and other possible restorative justice
responses could actually complement the work of the tribunal; rather, they saw
such non-prosecutional approaches as something that would undermine or
compete with the ICTY’s criminal prosecution and trial – the model they believed
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to be the best approach to post-violence justice.
Drumbl (2000, 1312-4) criticises this kind of narrow-minded attitude
demonstrated by many international lawyers and activists as a symptom of what
he calls ‘the globalitarianism of retributive retroactive justice’ – the ideological
trend to advocate a universal, legalistic response to genocide and crimes
against humanity. According to Drumbl (2002, 7), in the 1990s, ‘[t]here has
emerged a dominant (although not watertight) consensus’ within the
communities of international lawyers and activists ‘that trials of selected
individuals, preferably undertaken at the international level, constitutes the
favored and often exclusive remedy to respond to all situations of genocide and
crimes against humanity’. This consensus, says Drumbl, entailed the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), the ICTY and the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), all of which followed a uniform retributive
approach to rectificatory justice after mass atrocities. For those considering the
prosecution and trial model as the exclusive remedy for various post-violence
situations, the pursuit of justice, in their eyes, is ‘reduced to’ retributive justice. A
truth-seeking and reconciliatory mechanism such as a TRC is then considered to
be incompatible with their version of justice.
The second case in point comes from post-genocide Rwanda. As will be
discussed later, Rwanda’s response to the 1994 genocide was once described
by some commentators as ‘justice without reconciliation’ not least because of its
firm commitment to prosecute numerous suspects accused of being implicated
in the genocide, despite severe criticism from the international community about
prolonged detentions without formal charges and trials (Pankhurst 1999, 252;
Sarkin 2001, 146). In the immediate aftermath of the genocide, the term ‘justice’
was used with overtones of vengeance on those who shared responsibility for
102
the mass murder in which approximately 800,000 Rwandans perished. The term
‘reconciliation’ was considered to be a dirty word with a negative connotation of
‘forgive and forget’ about a crime which should never be forgotten.
Dichotomous understanding of justice and reconciliation as illustrated by
the above examples can be, in many cases, attributable to narrow definitions of
each of the concepts employed in such a discourse: justice as retributive
punishment of perpetrators of horrible atrocities, and reconciliation as a hasty
attempt to make negative peace by turning a blind eye to those atrocities
committed and their consequences.
5.1.2. Justice as a Precondition of Reconciliation
The literature review of this thesis reveals an emerging consensus in the field of
peace and conflict studies that it is difficult to reach authentic reconciliation
unless issues of justice are adequately addressed (Assefa 1999, 2001;
Estrada-Hollenbeck 2001; van der Merwe 2001; McCandless 2001; Lambourne
2001, 2002, 2004; Bloomfield 2006). Few scholars in the field explicitly support
the justice/reconciliation dichotomy discussed above; rather, many scholars
acknowledge the central importance of justice to reconciliation.
Among those who agree on the centrality of justice to reconciliation, one
prominent view is to understand justice as a precondition of reconciliation.
Advocates of criminal prosecution and trial as a primary mechanism of
transitional justice in particular, tend to claim that establishing individual criminal
accountability for perpetrators of human rights violations is a necessary
condition of sustainable peace and reconciliation. There seem to be at least
three key elements in their argument. First, in the wake of violent crimes, it is
important to address the victims’ need to see the perpetrators punished, which
‘will bring satisfaction and a sense of closure to the victims, presumably offering
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them vindication, acknowledgement, and a sense that “justice has been done”’
(Govier 2006, 135). Second, it is crucial for a post-violence society to reassert
legal norms, which will contribute to eradicating a culture of impunity and to
facilitating the emergence of a society based on the rule of law (ibid). Third, it is
crucial to establish individual accountability for acts of violence committed in
order to alleviate the problem of collective guilt by differentiating between the
individuals criminally responsible and those who are not (Fletcher and Weinstein
2002, 598). Without establishing such individual accountability, ‘the entire group
of those in whose name atrocities were committed will be deemed collectively
accountable’ (589), which would contribute to maintaining, or further entrenching,
existing social divisions.
Based on these grounds, the notion of ‘justice as a precondition of
reconciliation’ might sound plausible to many people. Few well-intentioned
observers dare to argue that reconciliation can be achieved without justice in the
midst of a public outcry for justice. However, if the notion is understood in a strict
sense, it becomes far more problematic, given that no complete justice can be
realised under most circumstances, not only in retributive but also in reparative
terms, as discussed above.4 The problematic nature of the notion becomes
more evident when it is turned into the idea that we must first achieve justice and
only then start pursuing reconciliation. Amstutz (2004, 104) argues that this ‘first
justice, then reconciliation’ approach cannot be a viable strategy for
post-violence peacebuilding because:
the conditions of strict justice – that is, the provisions that insist that
punishment should be commensurate with the nature of the offences – can
never be fully fulfilled. In effect, by making reconciliation conditional on the
prior fulfilment of justice, this approach relegates community healing and
4 Govier (2006, 134-5) discusses the problem of a similar notion ‘justice as a necessary
condition of peace’ by focusing on the impossibility of complete justice in retributive terms.
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the promotion of national unity to a subsidiary role.
Daly and Sarkin (2007, 179) make a more forceful argument against the notion
of justice as a necessary condition of reconciliation by maintaining that
reconciliation, in many cases, must be ‘emerging out of a climate of injustice’.
They go on to argue:
In many instances of transitional “justice,” there is no justice – either
because there are no trials, or the trials don’t produce convictions, or
perhaps because there can be no justice for some of the most horrendous
crimes that attend political transitions. Yet it is nonetheless necessary for
reconciliation to rise up out of the ashes. People must learn to live with
each other even though (or because) the state is not accepting the
responsibility of ensuring peace. In these cases, reconciliation and justice
cannot be interdependent; reconciliation must evolve even in the absence
of justice.
As Daly and Sarkin note, what we can consider as a requirement for
reconciliation is at best ‘some form of partial justice’ (ibid) and even such partial
justice cannot be guaranteed in many contexts of post-violence peacebuilding as
a strict condition for initiating the process of reconciliation.
5.1.3. Beyond Truth vs. Justice
Amstutz (2004, 104) claims that the ‘first justice, then reconciliation’ approach
has been ‘the prevailing worldview on transitional justice’. However, there seems
to have been a remarkable shift in international responses to post-violence
justice in the last ten or more years. As Drumbl pointed out, the rise of the
‘globalitarianism’ of retributive justice yielded the establishment of ad hoc
international criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda and then
the permanent International Criminal Court (ICC). However, during the same
period, the world witnessed the well-publicised work of the South African TRC
whose architectures and supporters presented it as a promising restorative
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alternative to the criminal justice approach. During most of the 1990s, central
debates among scholars and activists of transitional justice were more or less
characterised by the dichotomous thinking of ‘justice versus truth’ or ‘justice
versus peace’ (Lutz 2006, 327). However, towards the beginning of the new
century, the mode of international responses to post-violence justice has
significantly shifted from an either/or approach to a both/and approach which
attempts to address multiple, interdependent goals of justice, truth and
reconciliation through a combination of different transitional justice mechanisms,
as exemplified in a ‘hybrid model’ – a TRC coexisting with criminal trials of the
most serious perpetrators - adopted in Sierra Leone and East Timor
(Roht-Arriaza and Mariezcurrena 2006).
Roht-Arriaza (2006, 8) describes the shift:
The debate about truth versus justice seemed to be resolving in favor of an
approach that recognized them as complementary. Even those who had
argued strenuously in favor of a non-prosecutorial, “truth-centered”
approach recognized exceptions for crimes against humanity, while
advocates of prosecution recognized that a truth-seeking and truth-telling
exercise could serve as a valuable precursor or complement, even if not a
substitute, for prosecutions. This mutual recognition combined with
increasing attention at the international level to issues of reparations and
structural reform. […]
This shift is quite significant as a step forward in the direction of a
complementary approach to post-violence justice and reconciliation. However,
there seems to be a strong need for a sound conceptual framework which
underpins the approach.
5.1.4. Justice as a Component of Reconciliation
Over the last ten or more years, several scholars of peace and conflict studies
have made a significant contribution to advancing the conceptual understanding
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of positive interrelations between justice and reconciliation by promoting the
view that justice is a central component of a much broader process of
reconciliation. Prominent proponents of this view include Lederach (1997, 23-35),
Kriesberg (1998, 1999, 2001) and Bloomfield (2003, 2006).
According to Lederach’s conception of reconciliation, justice (in terms of
equality, right relationships, making things right and restitution) can be
understood as one of the four components of reconciliation, along with truth (in
terms of acknowledgement, transparency, revelation and clarity), mercy (in
terms of acceptance, forgiveness, support, compassion and healing) and peace
(in terms of harmony, unity, well-being, security, and respect). Lederach (1997,
31) recognises ‘three specific paradoxes’ involved in the pursuit of reconciliation
as the overarching process of justice, truth, mercy and peace. The first paradox
is concerned particularly with the tension between ‘the open expression of the
painful past’ (the element of truth) and ‘the search for the articulation of a
long-term interdependent future’ (the elements of peace and mercy). The second
paradox lies between the act of ‘exposing what has happened’ (the element of
truth) and that of ‘letting go in favor of renewed relationship’ (the element of
mercy). Finally, the third paradox is concerned with the tension between
‘redressing wrong’ (the element of justice) and ‘the envisioning of a common,
connected future’ (the element of peace). In Lederach’s conception, therefore,
justice is a component of reconciliation which is in tension with the component of
peace, even though, he suggests, they are interdependent and mutually
reinforcing ingredients of reconciliation.
Kriesberg (2001, 60) also presents a similar view in his discussion about
the four major dimensions of reconciliation: the recognition of the truth; the
advancement of peace in terms of individual and group safety and security; the
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attainment of justice; and the expression of remorse and forgiveness.
McCandless (2001, 214), on the other hand, proposes a justice-reconciliation
conceptual framework that ‘prioritizes justice concerns in a process of
constructive intergroup relationship building’ and ‘recognizes that the two share
a dynamic interdependent relationship, mutually informing and benefiting each
other‘. More recently, International IDEA’s handbook on reconciliation has
proposed the use of reconciliation as an umbrella term for the ‘over-arching
process which includes the search for truth, justice, forgiveness, healing and so
on’ (Bloomfield 2003, 12). According to this conceptual framework, justice is an
integral part of the ‘complementary and interdependent instruments of the overall
relationship-building process of reconciliation’ (Bloomfield 2006, 11).
Underlying these authors’ views of the justice-reconciliation relationship is a
conception of justice that is much broader than a singular notion of retributive
justice. Lederach’s conception of justice in his framework of reconciliation
stresses both relational and restorative aspects of justice: equal rights of
individuals and groups; relationships based on social justice; righting the wrongs
committed; and making redress and restitution (1997, 29-30). McCandless
(2001, 212-3) considers three categories of justice: justice of ‘ends’ or outcomes
(distributive justice); justice of ‘means’ or ‘the ways in which justice processes
are undertaken’ (procedural justice); and ‘relational justice’ which seeks ‘the
restoration of the relationship between the victim(s) and the offender(s)’.
Bloomfield (2006, 21) proposes a multi-dimensional conception of justice which
encompasses notions of retributive justice, restorative justice, ‘regulatory justice’
or the rule of law, and social or distributive justice. He writes:
Reconciliation and justice are not oppositional. Rather, justice is a core –
perhaps, even the core – dimension of reconciliation, along with
truth-seeking, healing, reparations and development. If justice is defined
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multidimensionally, to include not only crime-and-punishment but also the
restoration of broken relationships and the underpinning of equality of
treatment, of fairness of access, of the rule of consensual law – in short, as
the basis of a fair society – then it is possible to relocate the so-called
trade-off between reconciliation and justice as a less problematic calculus
between different (and complementary) aspects of justice. (29)
By adopting a multi-dimensional definition of justice and conceiving it as a critical
component of reconciliation, the tension between justice and peace – two
important goals in peacebuilding that are often mistakenly described as
competing alternatives – can be alleviated.
6. Beyond the Dichotomies: The Working Conceptual Framework
The following conceptual framework has emerged as a synthesis of the
discussions of Chapter 2 and the present chapter. The framework advances an
inclusive and compatible approach to post-violence justice and reconciliation by
re-considering the dichotomous thinking of the relationships between some of
the key related concepts addressed in the two chapters. It has the following four
emphases.
6.1. Justice as a Component of Reconciliation, not a Precondition
Justice is a component of reconciliation defined as a long-term/gradual,
multi-dimensional and multi-level process of relationship-building in societies
deeply divided by the legacies of violent conflicts. While justice is a critical
component of reconciliation, the framework does not consider justice a
necessary precondition for reconciliation in the sense that no reconciliation effort
can be initiated before full justice is achieved. It is clear that there is no authentic
reconciliation without the achievement of an optimal degree of justice. However,
justice should not and in fact cannot be seen as a strict precondition for
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reconciliation, because, as discussed above, the requirements for full justice
cannot be fulfilled in most, if not all, post-violence situations.
6.2. A Multi-dimensional Conception of Justice
In the context of post-violence peacebuilding, justice is better understood as a
multi-dimensional process towards the realisation of, not only retribution, but
also reparation and restoration in the domain of rectificatory justice and the rule
of law, and distributive or social justice in societies struggling to overcome the
legacies of armed conflicts, political oppression and exclusion. These multiple
dimensions of justice are intrinsically interdependent in post-violence
peacebuilding. Consequently, an effort at post-violence justice requires a
multi-dimensional, integrated approach with a long-term perspective.
6.3. A Relationship of Dynamic Interaction
The proposed conceptual framework considers justice and reconciliation to be in
a relationship of dynamic interaction, which is not to suggest that the two are
always mutually reinforcing in positive ways. The framework rejects this notion
as well as the notion of ‘justice and reconciliation as incompatible alternatives’.
Rather, it recognises the need to pay attention to the complex interactions
between justice and reconciliation, either potentially reinforcing, or
undermining/competing with each other in different socio-economic, political and
cultural contexts.
The pursuit of justice influences the process of reconciliation, and at the
same time, the process of reconciliation influences the process of pursuing
justice. As Abu-Nimer et al. (2001, 345) rightly point out, parties who have been
in conflict often ‘redefine their sense of justice’ in reaching reconciliation. On the
other hand, a particular conception of justice pursued as part of national
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reconstruction policies would partly determine the nature of reconciliation in a
given post-violence society. Thus, it is important to conceptualise the justice –
reconciliation relationship in terms of dynamic interactions.
6.4. Beyond Dichotomous Thinking
The proposed framework recognises potential tensions which may arise in the
pursuit of justice and reconciliation in post-violence peacebuilding. However, it
postulates that such potential tensions can be alleviated to a significant extent,
or overcome, by re-considering the dichotomous thinking of the relationships
between some of the key concepts addressed in Chapter 2 and the present
chapter.
First, we addressed the peace/justice dichotomy. While the tension
between justice and peace in the reconciliation process is a real concern for
many people in different post-violence contexts, it is not a fundamental
contradiction. As discussed above, this particular kind of tension can be largely
alleviated by defining and then pursuing justice as a multi-dimensional concept
encompassing the notions of retribution, reparation and restoration in the
domain of rectificatory justice as well as the rule of law and social or distributive
justice.
Second, we also addressed the retributive/restorative dichotomy, which is,
as indicated above, still pervasive among proponents of the restorative justice
movement. However, as Duff maintains, retribution and restoration are not
necessarily incompatible concepts. The working conceptual framework for this
thesis rejects the simplistic retributive/restorative dichotomy and instead,
recognises the possibility of integrating retribution, reparation and restoration
into a long-term gradual process of post-violence reconciliation.
Third, as an issue closely related to the retribution/restoration dichotomy,
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we addressed the punishment/forgiveness dichotomy, which is often presented
as the basis of the dichotomous view of justice and reconciliation. Chapter 2
demonstrated that forgiveness and reconciliation are conceptually independent
and in a strict sense, the former is not a necessary condition of the latter, even
though the two are closely interconnected and often mutually reinforcing
processes. There is a common perception that one cannot punish and forgive a
wrongdoer at the same time, and thus there is no reconciliation unless the victim
gives up the right to see the victimizer punished. However, forgiving someone
does not necessarily mean that one has to abandon the need for retributive
punishment which, according to Duff, is fundamental for restoring relationships
that were damaged by the wrongdoing.
In the following chapters, this working conceptual framework will guide our
exploration of a case study of the post-genocide Rwandan effort at justice and
reconciliation. At the same time, the validity of the framework will be assessed in
the light of specific challenges that emerged during field research in Rwanda.
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PART II
GRASSROOTS VIEWS OF JUSTICE AND
RECONCILIATION
IN POST-GENOCIDE RWANDA
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CHAPTER FOUR
BACKGROUND:
ETHNO-POLITICAL CONFLICT AND GENOCIDE IN RWANDA
1. Introduction - Genocide, not Tribal Violence
In 1994, Rwanda, a tiny landlocked country in Central Africa, became the scene
of unspeakable horrors of human cruelty. In the space of merely 100 days after
the shooting down of the aircraft carrying President Juvénal Habyarimana on 6
April 1994, some 800,000 people,1 more than ten percent of the country’s
national population, were brutally slaughtered. The victims were mostly from the
country’s Tutsi minority, the prime target of the genocide. However, tens of
thousands of people, at the very least, from the country’s Hutu majority and a
tiny minority of Twa were also murdered for various reasons, including not
participating in the genocide and/or being members of the political opposition
which were inclined to share power with the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), a
Tutsi-dominated armed political movement at war with the Hutu-dominated
government. Perpetrators of the brutal killings, torture, rapes and destruction of
victims’ properties during the genocide were almost exclusively Hutus and the
vast majority of them were ‘ordinary people’ with no prior records of violent crime
(Straus 2006). The number of the perpetrators has not been established to date,
but the number of those convicted for genocide-related crimes seems likely to be
at least several hundred thousand by the time the gacaca courts complete their
1 As mentioned in Chapter 1, there is no consensus over how many people were killed in the
genocide (See footnote 4 of Chapter 1).
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operations.2
Many of the perpetrators committed brutal killings in labour intensive ways
using low-tech methods such as machetes, nailed clubs or knives. The killings
took place, not in concealed places like remote concentration camps, but in
schools, churches, hospitals, by the road side or on hilltops, in front of the eyes
of the public (Mamdani 2001, 5-6). These gruesome images of seemingly
endless massacres led many outside observers to think that the horrifying
violence was being driven by ‘ancient tribal hatred’ (Straus 2006, 18-9). But this
‘tribal version of events’ was actually one which Hutu hard-line political elites,
then orchestrating the genocidal massacres, were trying to disseminate in order
to ‘diminish their own responsibility’ (19). What happened in 1994 was not a
spontaneous outburst of tribal violence based on primordial animosities triggered
by the murder of the Hutu President. Rather, it was a genocide organised by
radicalised Hutu elites as their desperate measure to cling to power in the face of
a deepening, multi-faceted crisis.
2. The Evolution of Ethno-political Conflict in Rwanda
The 1994 Rwandan genocide has a complex historical, social, economic and
political background. Instead of addressing all the factors which led to the
genocide, this chapter focuses on an analysis of the nature of the Rwandan
conflict which culminated in the genocide. This thesis considers the history of
political violence in Rwanda as a process of deepening ethno-political conflict.
When referring to the term ‘ethno-political’, this thesis puts an emphasis on
2 Many academics estimate the number of Hutu perpetrators of the genocide as something
between tens of thousands and a few hundred thousand, for example: Prunier 80,000–100,000
(1995, 342 n60); Jefremovas 75,000–150,000 (1995, 28); Straus 175,000–210,000 (2006, 117).
The highest academic estimate comes from René Lemarchand who suggests about 10 percent
of the Hutu population of 6.5 million participated in the genocide in one way or another (cited in
Eltringham 2004, 69).
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‘political’ rather than ‘ethnic’, since ethnic difference by itself does not cause a
conflict. As Conteh-Morgan (2004, 194) notes, ethnic conflict, as such, arguably
does not exist: ‘What does exist is political, socioeconomic, and other sources of
conflict between groups that manifest themselves along ethnic or identity lines’.
At the same time, however, due attention to the ethnic dimension of conflict is
critical because ethnicity is often used as a ‘powerful mobilizing symbol’, thereby
making ethnic discrimination ‘a significant factor in the scope, intensity, and even
duration of the conflict’ (ibid).
2.1. Primordialist vs. Constructivist Views of Ethnicity
Before setting out our discussion on how ethno-political conflict developed in
Rwanda, two opposed views of ethnicity are briefly addressed: primordialism
and constructivism. Primordialists consider ethnicity as something given and
rooted in common biological and/or cultural heritages shared by the group.
According to their view, the group identity is determined by ‘factors and
endowments held in common by the group, which keep resurfacing to reassert
the common emotional bond of the group vis-à-vis other groups’
(Conteh-Morgan 2004, 197). Smith, for example, focuses on the following five
factors as traits characterising an ethnic group: ‘a group name, a believed
common descent, common historical memories, elements of shared culture such
as language or religion, and either actual, historical, or sentimental attachment to
a specific territory’ (Smith 1981 cited in Conteh-Morgan 2004, 198).
On the other hand, constructivists consider ethnicity a social construct.
Ethnic identities, in the view of constructivists, are not given and fixed but
‘formed and re-formed only as instruments to achieve a specific goal’ (199).
Constructivists maintain that origins of ethnic identities can be often attributed to
the consequence of ethnic manipulation by political elites seeking their political
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and/or economic objectives. Elites often ‘ethnicize’ politics to the extent that they
‘redefine even nonethnic issues in ethnic terms’ (198). Thus, it is ‘ethnic elites
who play the critical role in influencing the nature of ethnic identities’ (ibid).
Although they seem to be totally conflicting analytical perspectives, both
primordialism and constructivism may provide useful insights into understanding
the complexities of some ethno-political conflicts. For example, constructivism is
a useful theoretical framework for analysing the changing nature of ethnicity, its
relation to political processes, and its manipulation by elites; primordialism, by
focusing on psychological sources of ethnic identity, provides a useful insight
into understanding why masses respond to such manipulation by elites, as well
as why some people demonstrate strong and durable attachments to their ethnic
group (ibid).
2.2. The Emergence of the Hutu/Tutsi Divide
How can we understand the nature of ethnicity in Rwanda? What are Hutu and
Tutsi? Is it correct to use them as terms representing ethnic categories? If so, in
what sense? There is a great deal of literature on the origins of the terms Hutu
and Tutsi, and it is beyond the scope of this thesis to fully examine it.3 Only key
aspects of the debate over these terms are outlined here, which is necessary to
understand the formation and evolution of the ethno-political conflict in Rwanda.
According to the official discourse of the current Rwandan government,
there is, and was, no ethnic difference between Hutus, Tutsis and Twas. They all
belong(ed) to one ethnic group, Banyarwanda. In pre-colonial times, these social
categories of Rwandans were differentiated in terms of occupation and social
status. Hutus were farmers; Tutsis were herders; and Twas were
3 See for example, Vansina (2004), Chrétien (2003), Newbury (1988, 1998) and Mamdani
(2001).
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hunter-gatherers living in forests. Since, in Rwanda, one’s social status and
wealth was generally measured by the number of cows one owns, Tutsis, who
were herders, had higher social status than the other two groups.
Vansina (2004, 134-5), prominent scholar of Rwandan history, explains the
background of how ‘Hutu’ and ‘Tutsi’ developed into the words indicating farmers
and herders respectively. The word ‘Tutsi’ was first used by a small group of
Rwandan herders to distinguish themselves from others. By the time the
Nyiginya Kingdom was founded in the seventeenth century it had become a
word to indicate the political elite. On the other hand, the term ‘Hutu’ was first
used by Tutsi aristocrats in the court – those calling themselves ‘Tutsi’ in the
sense of political elite - as a name for their servants, with a connotation of people
who are ‘rough’ or ‘rude’ (134, n35). Then, after the mid-eighteenth century,
under Rujugiro’s rule, ‘Tutsi’ and ‘Hutu’ began to signify ‘combatant’ and
‘noncombatant’ in the army respectively. Vansina writes, ‘As most
noncombatants happened to stem from lineages of farmers, the elite eventually
began to call all farmers “Hutu” and to contrast this word with “Tutsi,” now
applied to all herders, whether they were of Tutsi origin or not’ (135). This
particular understanding of ‘Hutu’ as farmers and ‘Tutsi’ as herders gained
greater prominence as the kingdom, controlled by Tutsi aristocrats, was
enlarged and the influence of the central court increased.
By the latter half of the nineteenth century, however, Hutu and Tutsi as
occupational or class categories were transformed into ‘hierarchized social
categories’ through the introduction of exploitative institutions by the central
court. Vansina stresses uburetwa, the system of obligatory labour that the chief
imposed on his tenants, because of its divisive impact on the Rwandan society.
The problem with uburetwa lies in its discriminatory nature: only Hutu farmers
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were ‘obliged to perform the menial work required by the chief of the land, in
contrast to the less humiliating obligations of his Tutsi clients’. This system
‘seems to have provoked a new awareness across the whole society that
resulted in the emergence of the two hierarchized social categories’ (135-6). To
what extent this ‘new awareness’ over the Hutu/Tutsi distinctions had gained
social and political significance vis-à-vis other social identities by the end of the
nineteenth century (before the European colonisation) is contested. Newbury
(1998, 10), for example, says that ‘[c]lan, lineage, and family ties were more
important for political interaction’, particularly in some regions in which the
control of the state had not been fully established. She also maintains that in
some areas, it was difficult to differentiate Hutus and Tutsis in terms of their life
styles or occupations in pre-colonial Rwanda.
Whatever the origin of the two words is, Hutus and Tutsis do not constitute
different ethnic groups in the strict primordialist’s sense discussed earlier. Hutus
and Tutsis have many social and cultural characteristics in common: They speak
the same language, share the same cultural practices and myths, live in the
same geographical location and, in most areas, form integrated communities;
share the same religions, and belong to the same clans. Moreover, Hutus and
Tutsis intermarry even though in most cases such intermarriages take place
between Hutu men and Tutsi women (Prunier 1995, 36).4 Arguably, in
pre-colonial Rwanda, they were not even different class categories in a strict
sense. As the previously mentioned explanation by Vansina indicates, not all
Tutsis were wealthy aristocrats, while not all Hutus were poor farmers. In some
areas, many Hutus owned cows, while many Tutsis cultivated their land
4 In pre-colonial and early colonial periods, Taylor notes (1999, 167), ‘taking a Tutsi wife was
often perceived as a sign of social advancement on the part of a Hutu man’ for, to obtain a wife
from a Tutsi lineage, which was generally considered to have a high social status, ‘one had to
become wealthy in bovine capital’.
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(Newbury 1998, 10). There was significant variation in social status and wealth
within each of the categories. Furthermore, the identities of Hutu and Tutsi were
not fixed but fluid. It was possible for a Hutu to obtain the higher socio-political
status of Tutsi or for a Tutsi to lose that status by losing his property (Mamdani
2001, 70). Also, by marrying a Tutsi woman after accumulating cattle, a Hutu
man could have his children become Tutsis (Taylor 1999, 167-8). In summary,
two important observations can be noted. First, Hutu and Tutsi are complex,
socially constructed identities, whose social and political salience and meaning
changed over time, even during pre-colonial times. Second, Hutu and Tutsi were
not fixed social categories with rigid boundaries.
2.3. Racialisation of Ethnicity under the European Colonial Rule
Few scholars dispute the significance of colonial rule in Rwandan politics and
society, particularly, on the polarisation between Hutus and Tutsis. Rwanda was
first colonised by Germans (1897-1916) and then by Belgians (1916-1962). The
Germans exercised indirect rule without interfering with the authority of the king
and the existing ruling elites (Gasana et al. 1999, 146). By providing military
assistance, German authorities helped the king to conquer the people in
peripheral regions, particularly in the north, where there had been many
rebellions. The central court had attempted to subjugate people in the north by
taking away control over land from local lineages, demanding rents for the use of
land and imposing uburetwa as a condition for access to the land. This ‘created
a situation of hatred against Tutsi chiefs and their attendants, and war was
avoided only through the fear of German guns’ (ibid).
The Belgian colonial administration in Rwanda also adopted the system of
indirect rule using the authority of the king and his chiefs. Underlying this indirect
rule policy was the shared European understanding of Rwandan society: ‘the
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Tutsi’, a ‘superior’ minority race originally from north-east Africa was ruling over
‘the Hutu’, an ‘inferior’ majority race of native Bantu (Prunier 1995, 10-1). Belgian
and German colonisers, missionaries and colonial administrators alike, were
under the strong influence of a racial, social evolutionary theory of the time, the
Hamitic Hypothesis which attributed all signs of civilisation in Bantu Africa to the
Hamite, a ‘superior Caucasoid race’ (Gatwa 2005; Mamdani 2001; Chrétien
2003). This racist ideology was, in fact, the ideological underpinning of the
Europeans’ colonial enterprise. It offered a justification for colonial rule in the
name of civilising Africa, the land of an ‘inferior’ race.
In contrast with Germans, who did not interfere with the existing
administrative structures established by the Rwandan monarchy, Belgians
carried out a number of administrative reforms ‘to structure social order, to
rationalize and standardize heterogeneous social relations, and to reinforce the
powers of the “natural rulers”’ (Newbury 1998, 11).5 In 1926, the Belgian
authorities initiated a reform to streamline the existing complex administrative
structures of the kingdom by collapsing three separate types of chieftaincy (over
land, cattle and the military) into a single chieftain position, assisted by
sub-chiefs (Gasana et al. 1999, 149). In effecting this reform, the Belgian
authorities not only reduced the number of chiefs, but also eliminated all the
existing Hutu chiefs by giving the posts of chiefs and sub-chiefs exclusively to
Tutsis. This system of discriminatory governance necessitated that the Belgian
authorities determined exactly who belonged to a ‘race to rule’ and who did not
(Takeuchi 2009, 154). Accordingly, in 1933, the Belgian authorities introduced
identity cards that specified a person’s ‘racial’ category. This became a tool for
discriminative treatment of Rwandans, based on ‘racial’ identities. The colonial
5 Needless to say, this was not out of goodwill toward the ruling elites of the Rwandan kingdom,
but in order to pursue exploitative colonial policies efficiently.
121
authority favoured Tutsis over Hutus and Twas in formal education, particularly
post-primary education. It also disseminated the racial ideology in schools and
seminaries, and through official documents (Hintjens 2001, 30).
Consequently, the Belgian colonial rule, which lasted over 40 years,
transformed the nature of ethnicity in Rwanda: it racialised the meaning of ‘Hutu’
and ‘Tutsi’ as distinctive racial groups; institutionalised these identities through
the introduction of ethnic identity cards and in turn rigidified the two categories
which had previously been rather fluid; and politicised them by ‘intensify[ing] the
connection between race and power’ (Straus 2006, 22). Newbury (1998, 11)
describes these effects of colonial rule as ‘the propagation of a corporate vision
of ethnic groups’:
Tutsi, Hutu, and Twa came to be viewed as internally homogeneous groups,
and their members came to be treated in distinctive ways by the state. This
made groups that had previously shown more internal flexibility appear
more like biological groups.
In other words, this transformation of ethnicity in Rwanda can be seen as a
process through which Hutu, Tutsi and Twa as primarily social constructs
(ethnicity in a constructivist’s sense) came to be defined as racial categories or
ethnic groups in a primordialist’s sense. European colonial rulers neither
invented these social categories nor created inequalities between them in the
first place. However, their rule over 60 years in Rwanda deepened and racialised
the inequalities in Rwandan society.
2.4. The ‘Hutu Revolution’ - The Rise of Ethno-Political Violence
After World War II, the Belgian administration made a major policy shift to
increase political representation of the majority Hutus, partly due to mounting
pressure from the newly created United Nations (Straus 2006, 21). By the
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mid-1950s, with support from a new generation of Catholic missionaries with
‘social catholicism’, a Hutu counter-elite emerged from within Catholic Church
circles (Linden 1977, 240). The most prominent figure in this newly emerged
Hutu political elite was Grégoire Kayibanda, then the editor-in-chief of an
influential Catholic newspaper Kinyamateka, who later became the President of
the First Republic. The late 1950s was characterised by fierce political
competition between the ruling Tutsi monarchists who called for independence
through ‘a rapid transfer of power to the king and his council’ and the Hutu
counter-elite led by Kayibanda, who demanded democratic change before
independence, although there were moderates on both sides (Mamdani 2001,
116-22). Racially provocative language used by both sides inflamed the
politically charged situation.
In 1957, Kayibanda and eight other Hutu intellectuals issued a Bahutu
Manifesto, the original title of which was ‘Notes on the Social Aspect of the
Racial Native Problem in Rwanda’ (116). The Bahutu Manifesto was essentially
a denunciation of the ‘political monopoly which is held by one race, the Tutsi’ and
a call for the redistribution of power and privilege (ibid). Anticipating the
upcoming national elections as part of the process of decolonisation, different
political parties were formed in the late 1950s. By late 1959, there were four
dominant parties: Parti du Mouvement et de l’Emancipation Hutu
(PARMEHUTU) established by Kayibanda as a radical political party oriented
towards a Hutu revolution, Association pour la Promotion Sociale de la Masse
(APROSOMA), a Hutu-dominated party which sought a multi-ethnic constituency,
Union Nationale Rwandaise (UNAR), a party representing the interests of Tutsi
monarchists, and Rassemblement Démocratique Rwandais (RADER), a
reformist Tutsi party (120-3).
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With the volatile political atmosphere of the day, in November 1959,
violence broke out between the militants of UNAR and those of PARMEHUTU;
UNAR militants attacked a Hutu sub-chief who was a leader of PARMEHUTU in
Gitarama territory and then local Hutu militants assaulted Tutsi notables in
retaliation (Newbury 1988, 194-5). This incident rapidly developed into a major
Hutu uprising in several parts of the country (ibid). The violence was directed
mainly at those Tutsis in administrative posts and in many cases, limited to the
destruction of their properties. As a result, hundreds lost their lives in Hutu
attacks and Tutsi reprisals (Prunier 1995, 49). Mamdani (2001, 105) stresses the
significance of the 1959 violence as a historic event which divided Hutus and
Tutsis into two opposing sides of violent conflict for the first time in Rwandan
society.
The Belgian colonial administration managed to restore calm by
dispatching Colonel Logiest. Siding with the Hutu political movement, the
administration appointed ‘over 300 Hutu chiefs and subchiefs, in late 1959 and
early 1960, to occupy the posts which the Tutsi authorities had left’ even though
the new Hutu appointees were ill-equipped for their new responsibilities
(Lemarchand 1970, 173). Then, the revolutionary force spearheaded by
PARMEHUTU achieved an overwhelming victory in both the communal election
held in June/July of 1960 and the parliamentary elections held in September of
1961 (Mamdani 2001, 128-9). Political violence primarily targeting Tutsi notables
forced them and their families to flee to neighbouring countries. By early 1962,
Tutsi refugees amounted to around 120,000 (Prunier 1995, 61). In subsequent
years, a faction of this first wave of refugees would carry out armed cross-border
incursions into Rwandan territory.
Following the ‘Hutu Revolution’, Rwanda gained independence on 1 July
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1962. Before independence, in May 1962, Kayibanda’s PARMEHUTU formed a
coalition government with three other parties, including a moderate faction of
UNAR. However, this coalition government was short-lived. By the end of 1963,
the First Republic under the leadership of Kayibanda had evolved into a
dictatorial regime which upheld the supremacy of Hutus in the politics of Rwanda
as a single native race (Mamdani 2001, 134). Mamdani asserts that the racial
ideology of the First Republic is a mirror image of the ideology of the colonial
rulers: ‘the Hutu were indigenous, the Tutsi were alien. Whereas the Tutsi had
been treated preferentially by the colonial state as a nonindigenous civilizing
influence, the First Republic considered this claim reason enough to treat them
as politically illegitimate’ (ibid). The same racial ideology which once justified the
rule through Tutsi as a ‘superior foreign race’ was turned around to justify the
domination of Hutu as a ‘native legitimate race’ and the exclusion of Tutsis from
political life. In short, the racialisation of ethnicity was further entrenched by
Rwandans themselves in post-colonial Rwanda.
Ethno-political conflict along the Hutu/Tutsi divide was further deepened by
cross-border incursions by Tutsi guerrilla fighters, which took place several times
between March 1961 and November 1966 (Lemarchand 1970, 218). This armed
group called themselves Inyenzi, or ‘cockroaches’, and was composed of Tutsi
refugees who went into exile in the first exodus in 1959/1960. They targeted the
Hutu officials of local authorities loyal to the new regime. Each armed raid was
followed by arrests and killings of Tutsi civilians, including women and children,
under the authorisation of local government officials or leaders of PARMEHUTU.
The killings were mostly committed by members of ‘self-defence’ groups
organised by local administrative authorities. The massacres which were
committed in the name of defending the Hutu nation had a genocidal character
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(Lemarchand 1970, 223-36). Scholars estimate that between 10,000 and 20,000
Tutsis were murdered in reprisal killings (Mamdani 2001, 130). The massacres
and the repression which followed instigated the second mass exodus of Tutsi
refugees – over 200,000 people - into neighbouring countries.6 Three decades
later, the descendents of the first and second waves of refugees living in Uganda
formed the RPF in 1987 and invaded Rwanda in October 1990, seeking an
armed return to their mother land.
2.5. Intra-Hutu Conflict and Scapegoating of the Tutsi Minority
The Kayibanda regime soon faced growing discontent within the Hutu population,
who accused his government of indulging in corruption, nepotism and failing to
realise the promises of the ‘revolution‘. There were at least two major groups of
Hutus who were particularly frustrated and began to challenge the regime. The
first group consisted of Hutu elites from the north who were marginalised by
Kayibanda and his entourage from the centre/south who monopolised the
benefits of power during the First Republic (Gasana et al. 1999, 157). The
second group consisted of newly emerging Hutu intellectuals, particularly junior
civil servants, primary school teachers and students who had serious grievances
concerning low salaries or lack of employment opportunities (Lemarchand 1970,
238-9). In the view of this second group, although Tutsis had been ousted from
political power, their representation in higher education and employment,
particularly in the private sector, was much higher than they deserved.7
Anti-Tutsi sentiments were also heightened in the general Hutu public because
of the massacre of around 200,000 Hutus in neighbouring Burundi, by their
6 Prunier (1995, 61-2) notes that the refugee figure had increased from 120,000 in early 1962 to
336,000 by late 1964.
7 In the middle and late 1960s, Tutsis comprised nearly 90 percent of university enrollment,
despite the government policy to limit the ratio to 10 percent (Mamdani 2001, 136).
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Tutsi-dominated army in 1972.
It was under these volatile circumstances that, in 1973, severe anti-Tutsi
persecution broke out in Rwanda. A group of educated ‘angry young men’ was
the driving force behind persecution which was directed at Tutsi students,
teachers and workers, particularly in the private sector (238). Lists of Tutsis to be
expelled were posted on the notice boards of educational institutions, which
forced many Tutsi students and teachers to leave their schools. Tens of
thousands of them went into exile (Gasana et al. 1999, 158). Many Tutsi workers
were also expelled from their work places. The Kayibanda regime was very slow
to respond to the crisis which resulted in the death of between five and six
hundred Tutsis (Mamdani 2001, 137). Some observers suggest that the regime,
dominated by southerners, let the situation worsen for several weeks in order to
‘minimize differences with northerners by reminding them of the common enemy’
(Des Forges 1999, 40). Other observers suggest a northern conspiracy to create
social disorder in order to justify a coup d’état by the army dominated by
northerners, which actually took place later in the same year (ibid). Whatever the
case, innocent Tutsis were scapegoated to resolve intra-Hutu differences (41).
Essentially the same tactic of ethnic manipulation and mobilisation would be
used about 20 years later to unite Hutus during the deepening crisis of the early
1990s.
2.6. Personalisation of Power under the Guise of One Party System
On 5 July 1973, Juvénal Habyarimana, the Minister of Defence and the Army
Chief of Staff, seized power through a bloodless coup. Some scholars note that
this regime change was welcomed by a broad range of Rwandan people who
hoped for an end to insecurity based on factional politics (Prunier 1995, 75;
Mamdani 2001, 138). Habyarimana’s Second Republic favoured Hutus from the
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northern region, in the distribution of education and employment opportunities,
by adding a regional dimension to a quota system introduced during the First
Republic (Mamdani 2001, 139). Institutional discrimination against Tutsis was
maintained, restricting Tutsi representation in education and employment,
through the use of the quota system, which served the function of uniting the
Hutu majority against the Tutsi minority (ibid), another tactic of ethnic
manipulation by those in power. The lives of Tutsis continued to be difficult
because of this ethnic discrimination, but there was no major physical violence
targeting Tutsis under Habyarimana’s regime until 1990.
Immediately after seizing power, Habyarimana banned political parties and
formed the Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le Développement
(MRND) in 1974, the only party in the country. The MRND imposed a dictatorial
rule on the population, defining all Rwandans as its members, putting all the
administrative posts under its control and intervening in all spheres of people’s
lives (Prunier 1995, 76-7).8 ‘Administrative control was probably the tightest in
the world among non-communist countries’ (77). Under the guise of the one
party system, Habyarimana personalised state power. After eliminating his
political allies based in the army in 1980, he established an oligarchy with those
from his home region, particularly his wife’s family members who were from an
influential lineage (Gasana et al. 1999, 159). Habyarimana’s informal council,
which came to be known as the akazu, concentrated political power and the
country’s wealth in their hands and later played a central role in orchestrating the
genocide.
8 MRND’s rule reached into the religious sphere of people’s lives by integrating the Church
institutions, Catholic and Protestant alike, into its structures. See Gatwa (1998, 135-57) for a
detailed analysis of the role of the churches as supporting organs of the ruling party.
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3. Deepening Crisis in the Early 1990s, Civil War and Genocide
For over a decade after Habyarimana took power, Rwanda enjoyed political
stability, significant economic growth and a modest improvement in the
availability of social services (Uvin 1998, 47-8). Rwanda established a positive
reputation among the international donor community for its ‘political stability’, ‘the
government’s concern for the rural population, its effective administration, and its
prudent, sound, realistic management’ (World Bank cited in Uvin 1998, 44). This
enabled the country to become a major recipient of international aid in East and
Central Africa.9
3.1. Multi-faceted Crisis
From the mid-1980s on, however, relative stability and a positive economic
outlook under the Habyarimana regime began to erode in the face of a
deepening, multi-faceted crisis with economic, military and political dimensions,
which were closely interwoven. With regard to the economic crisis, the collapse
of the mining sector and the sharp fall in world coffee prices caused a huge
decrease in the foreign exchange earnings of the state which had persistently
faced a balance-of-payment deficit since the early 1980s (Uvin 1998, 57). This
forced the government to significantly tighten its expenditure by, for example,
lowering the producer price of coffee and reducing the number of civil servants.
Moreover, in November 1990, due to pressure from the IMF, the World Bank and
donor countries, the government was compelled to accept - as part of a
structural adjustment programme - the devaluation of the Rwandese franc,
which resulted in high inflation (58). All of this hit the urban and rural population
very hard.
9 See Uvin (1998, Ch3) for Rwanda’s economic development indicators in the 1980s and a
detailed account of the highly positive image of the country in the eyes of the development
community.
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In the midst of this economic crisis, on 1 October 1990, the RPF invaded
Rwanda from Uganda, seeking a return to their mother country by force to
‘liberate Rwandans’ from decades of military dictatorship. As mentioned earlier,
the rebels were primarily descendants of Tutsi families in exile who had fled the
country after the ‘revolution’.10 This was the beginning of a civil war between the
Hutu-dominated government and the Tutsi-dominated rebel movement, which
lasted until the latter defeated the former militarily in July 1994, although there
were periods of ceasefire during the four-year war.
The civil war prompted mass displacement of the population – around one
seventh of the country’s population - from the war-affected region in the north;
from around 80,000 following the first attack in late 1990, to 350,000 after the
offensive in 1992, then approximately 950,000 following the resumed offensive
in February 1993 (Mamdani 2001, 187).11 Many of these northerners who were
pushed southward as internally displaced persons (IDPs) would later join
genocidal massacres in the southern regions (AR 1995, 708; Des Forges 1999,
275, 559). The civil war deepened the economic crisis, having a devastating
impact on the production of food crops, coffee and tea, which reduced
government revenue, at the same time as there was a huge demand for
resources to be allocated to the war effort (Uvin 1998, 56).12
To Tutsis in Rwanda, the beginning of the civil war meant the end of the
relative tranquillity which had been maintained since Habyarimana came to
power in 1973. After the October attack, the government arrested 13,000 mainly
10 See Mamdani (2001, Ch 6) for the social and political background as to why and how Tutsi
refugees launched their armed struggle by forming the RPF.
11 Human rights organisations accuse the RPF of widespread human rights violations, including
massacres of civilians, during the period of October 1990 to April 1994 (AI 1994, 2; Des Forges
1999, 701-2). See also Umutesi (2004, 23-8) who provides detailed accounts of RPF massacres
which victimized her relatives and friends in Byumba.
12 Consequently, the number of soldiers in the Rwanda army increased nearly ten times from
3,000 – 5,000 to 30,000 – 40,000, and ‘military expenditure rose from 1.6 percent of the GNP
between 1985 and 1990 to 7.6 percent in 1993’ (Uvin 1998, 56).
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Tutsi citizens without formal charge; many of them were tortured and dozens
murdered (Des Forges 1999, 49). Calling Tutsis inside the country ibyitso or
‘accomplices’ of the Tutsi-dominated rebels, Hutu extremists intensified their
anti-Tutsi persecution. For three and a half years, between the RPF invasion in
October 1990 and the onset of genocide in April 1994, there were four major
massacres that were ‘carefully timed and deliberately organized’ by Hutu
extremists (Mamdani 2001, 192).
The year 1990 also marked the beginning of democratisation in Rwanda,
which was induced by strong pressure from Western donor countries, in the
wake of the end of the cold war. Domestically too, in the face of the dramatic
economic downturn, coupled with evidence of rampant corruption in the regime,
the government was under increasing criticism from politicians, intellectuals and
journalists who unanimously called for political reforms (Des Forges 1999, 47).
In July 1990, Habyarimana announced his decision to create a national
commission for studying the possibility of democratisation (ibid). Prompted by
increasing pressure, both internally and externally, particularly from Rwanda’s
principal international backer France, Habyarimana accepted the end of
one-party dictatorship. After adopting a new constitution in June 1991, Rwanda
formally returned to a multi-party system (Mamdani 2001, 154). Immediately
after the introduction of the multi-party democracy, opposition parties quickly
established themselves to challenge the one-party rule of MRND. There were
four major opposition parties created in 1991, which formed a coalition in July:
the Mouvement Démocratique Républicain (MDR); the Parti Social Démocrate
(PSD); the Parti Libéral (PL) and Parti Démocrate-Chrétien (PDC).13 These
opposition parties launched vigorous campaigns to recruit members and the
13 See Mamdani (2001, 154-5) for descriptions of these opposition parties.
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MRND responded by reactivating its political activities in order not to lose its
members. While the opposition pressed Habyarimana hard for power-sharing, a
group of Hutu extremists formed a radical Hutu nationalist party, the Coalition
pour la Défense de la République (CDR), which began to denounce
Habyarimana for yielding too much to the demands of the internal opposition and
the RPF (Des Forges 1999, 52-3). Political competition among these parties
became increasingly violent. Youth wings of the parties often used violence as a
means to exert influence on the local population and dominate its political rivals
(55-6). In some parts of the country, particularly in the central and southern
regions, the opposition parties expanded their influence rapidly, undermining the
MRND/government’s authority over the local populations.
In April 1992, Habyarimana reluctantly formed a coalition government with
the parties forming the internal opposition. In July 1992, through UN-mediated
peace negotiations in Arusha, Tanzania, the coalition government and the RPF
reached a ceasefire agreement.14 In February 1993, while the Arusha talks were
going on, the RPF broke the agreement and launched a massive offensive along
the northern front, causing a major setback for government troops.15 In August
1993, both sides signed an agreement known as the Arusha Agreement which
stipulated a power sharing arrangement of transitional government, the
deployment of a UN peacekeeping force during the period of transition, the
repatriation of refugees, the resettlement of internally displaced persons, the
integration of government army and rebel forces and so forth. The RPF gained
the most from the Agreement, securing 50 percent of commander positions and
40 percent of the regular personnel in the integrated national army, five of
14 For a detailed account of Arusha negations, see Jones (2001).
15 The RPF claimed that it was an intervention to stop the massacres against Tutsi civilians in
early 1993, but some observers suggest that the real motive behind the RPF’s military advance
was to gain the upper hand in the on-going negotiations (Des Forges 1999, 109; Jones 2001,
82-3).
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twenty-one ministerial positions, including the crucial Ministry of the Interior in
charge of police forces, and eleven of seventy parliamentary seats (Mamdani
2001, 210-1). The internal opposition (MDR, PL, PSD and PDC) also made
moderate gains by securing the posts of nine ministries and the post of prime
minister (Des Forges 1999, 124). The ruling MRND was clearly the loser since it
reduced its representation in the army, cabinet and parliament. Crucially
however, the radical Hutu nationalist party CDR was totally excluded, both from
the negotiation table and from the transitional government proposed in the
Arusha Agreement (Mamdani 2001, 211).
3.2. Extremists’ Responses and the Groundwork of Genocide
For the MRND leadership and Habyarimana’s informal council, the akazu, as
well as radical Hutu nationalists based in the CDR, the implementation of the
Arusha Agreement meant the loss of power and all sorts of vested interests.
Their fear of losing power was augmented by an event which took place in
neighbouring Burundi in October 1993: the democratically elected first Hutu
president was assassinated by Tutsi military officials. This was followed by the
killing of thousands of civilians in violent clashes between Hutus and Tutsis (Des
Forges 1999, 134-5). It was under these extremely volatile circumstances that
the increasingly desperate and radicalised ruling elites began to fight back more
intensely.
Straus (2006, 25-30) identified six types of extremists’ responses to the
threat of the RPF’s military challenge coupled with the expansion of the internal
political opposition. Each of the responses underscores the radicalisation of
ethno-political violence which paved the way for the 1994 genocide. First, the
extremists explicitly identified the Tutsi-dominated RPF rebels with Tutsi
residents of Rwanda. As already noted, immediately after the first RPF attack in
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October 1990, the government carried out mass arrest of Tutsis, claiming that
they were connected with the rebels. In December 1991, a military commission
chaired by Colonel Théoneste Bagosora, a person widely considered as the
principal organiser of the genocide, issued a document which defined the
‘principal enemy’ of the county as ‘Tutsi inside or outside the country’ (25). The
extremists disseminated propaganda that all Tutsis, inside and outside, were
united in bringing back Tutsi rule over the Hutu population.
Second, efforts at military defence were strengthened by expanding the
national army from 7,000 to 31,000, and launching a civilian defence programme
which consisted of neighbourhood patrols, the distribution of firearms to
administrative officials and the army, and training in firearms use for some
officials. It is through this civilian defence programme that ordinary Hutus were
effectively mobilised into the war against the rebels, which, Straus notes, ‘set the
stage for civilian participation in the genocide’ (26).
Third, in 1992 and 1993, extremists in the MRND and the military formed
and trained a militia which drew members from the MRND’s youth wing called
Interahamwe. As noted above, youth wings of other parties often used violence
in their political campaigns. However, the Interahamwe became distinct from its
competitors as it received special military training funded by the extremists. The
number of the Interahamwe militias grew to several thousand by early 1994 in
various parts of the country and spearheaded numerous attacks against Tutsis
and so-called moderate Hutus during the genocide.
Fourth, extremists prepared for assassinations of leading Hutu opposition
politicians and RPF supporters. The lists of these ‘accomplices’ who were
considered to be a threat to the Hutu regime had been prepared well before the
genocide started; in fact, they were the people who were massacred before
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anybody else during the first days of the genocide. Along with the ‘death lists’,
extremists in the military formed ‘death squads’ apart from the Interahamwe
militias.
Fifth, a racist propaganda campaign was intensified through various means
including the print media and the radio station controlled by extremists.16 A
weekly magazine, Kangura, and the private radio station Radio Télévision Libre
des Mille Collines (RTLM), are known as the most notorious sources of racist
propaganda closely linked to the akazu, even though there were also many other
magazines/newspapers that spread racial hate messages during the years
before the genocide.17 Soon after the 1990 RPF invasion, Kangura published
‘what is perhaps the most succinct statement of Hutu extremist ideology’ (Taylor
1999, 174), the ‘Hutu Ten Commandments’, calling for Hutus to break off
relationships with Tutsis in all spheres of life and to defend what Hutus acquired
through the ‘revolution’ in 1959.18 The RTLM began airing its programme in
August 1993, soon after the Arusha Agreement was signed (Des Forges 2007,
44). It reiterated the same elements of racist propaganda developed by the
extremist print media: for example, ‘the inherent differences between Hutu and
Tutsi, the foreign origin of Tutsi and, hence, their lack of rights to claim to be
Rwandan, the disproportionate share of wealth and power held by Tutsi and the
horrors of past Tutsi rule’ (45). Having acquired many listeners across the
country, this extremist radio station became an effective tool for the extremists ‘to
incite and mobilize, then to give specific directions for carrying out killings’ (47-8).
Sixth, in November 1993, a cross-party Hutu coalition called ‘Hutu Power’
was created. In the context of this extremely volatile atmosphere, due to the
16 On the crucial role played by the media in the 1994 genocide, see a recent volume of essays
edited by Thompson (2007).
17 For example, among 42 new magazines/newspapers founded in 1991, eleven of them were
associated with the akazu (Chrétien et al. 1995, 45 cited in Des Forges 1999, 67).
18 See AR (1995, 42-3) for the texts of the ‘Ten Commandments’.
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defeat in Arusha and the massacres of Hutus in Burundi, extremists of the
MRND and the CDR succeeded in forming this broad coalition of Hutus
espousing a radical Hutu nationalist ideology across pre-existing regional and
political divisions, drawing support from members of opposition parties such as
the MDR and the PL (Des Forges 1999, 137-40; Mamdani 2001, 191-6). The
formation of Hutu Power meant that a much broader spectrum of Hutus across
the country became mobilised in the war against Tutsis as a common enemy of
Hutus. There was also a feeling of defending the Hutu nation as established in
the 1959 ‘Hutu Revolution’.
3.3. Racial Ideology and the Genocide
A few hours after the aircraft carrying Habyarimana was shot down by still
unidentified assailants on 6 April 1994,19 Hutu extremists seized control of the
Rwandan government and military. Then, a massive campaign for exterminating
all ‘the enemies of the Hutu nation’ began, beginning with leading Hutu
opposition politicians and RPF supporters already on the ‘death lists’, then
ordinary Tutsis and others (Hutus and Twas) seen as standing in the way of
genocide. Because all the groundwork had already been done, as discussed
above, the genocidal killings quickly gained momentum, spreading from Kigali to
some rural areas, which reacted spontaneously to the call for extermination. In
other areas, particularly in the southern region where opposition parties were
strong, it took some weeks for extremists to get the local population under
control and initiate the killings.
From the outset this chapter stressed that what happened in 1994 was not
19 There are currently two competing theories about the assassination of Habyarimana which
have not been resolved. The first theory blames Hutu extremists who allegedly eliminated the
former president due to his concessions to the RPF in the Arusha Accords. The second theory
blames the RPF who allegedly chose a military solution rather than negotiated settlement. See
Eltringham (2004, 111-8) and Straus (2006, 44).
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a spontaneous outburst of ‘ancient tribal hatred’, but systematic political violence
organised by Hutu extremists who seized control of the state. As noted in the
above sections, ethnicity has been repeatedly exploited by political elites for
their political gains, particularly after the racialisation of ethnicity under the
Belgium colonial rule. Leaders of the ‘Hutu Revolution’ and extremists behind the
genocide both espoused the ideology of radical ethno-nationalism based on the
construction of a racialised ethnicity, portraying Tutsi as a ‘foreign race’ which
has no legitimacy in public life and Hutu as a ‘native race’ which is exclusively
entitled to power in Rwanda. During the period leading to the genocide, the
extremists projected their power struggle in racial terms as a zero-sum battle of
‘Tutsi versus Hutu’. This ethnicization of politics helped them achieve two things.
First, it helped them to broaden their political alliance to transcend the
pre-existing intra-Hutu divisions. Second, it helped them to exacerbate the
profound fear among the Hutu population that losing the battle would mean the
return of Tutsi rule and the confiscation of their lands (Mamdani 2001, 191).
This particular explanation of the Rwandan genocide, which is in line with
the constructivist’s view of ethno-nationalist conflict discussed above, is in fact a
primary argument adopted by many authors in their efforts to account for the
genocide (Uvin 2001b, 80). This is an important explanation of the genocide
because, first, as Straus (2006, 33) notes, it corrects the misleading, yet widely
held, understanding of the genocide based on ‘ancient tribal hatred’ and second,
as Uvin (2001b, 80) notes, it is crucial to account for the critical roles played by
the state actors, since ‘[a]ll genocides in history have been instigated, organized,
and legitimized by the state’. However, elite manipulation of ethnicity alone, of
course, cannot explain the complex dynamics of genocide and leaves us with
many unanswered questions, including the question of why numerous ordinary
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Rwandans participated in the genocide (Uvin 2001b, 80-1; Straus 2006, 33-5).
Many of those who adopt the argument centred on elite manipulation of
ethnicity emphasise the role of racial ideology in driving the genocidal killings in
1994 (Prunier 1995; Des Forges 1995; Gourevitch 1998; Mamdani 2001).
However, recent studies indicate that it was not as significant as it was widely
believed in causing ordinary Hutus to take part in the massacres (Longman and
Rutagengwa 2004; Mironko 2006; Straus 2006; Fujii 2009). Straus (2006)
demonstrates that neither inter-ethnic relations nor racial ideology were major
factors in leading ordinary Rwandans to participate in the genocide. Through his
research, which involved systematic interviews with more than 200 perpetrators
of the genocide, Straus found within almost all, or most, of his respondents: 1) no
indication of ethnic distance with, or antipathy towards, Tutsis; 2) fairly limited
knowledge about the contents of the racist propaganda during the genocide; and
3) little commitment to the cause of Hutu nationalism (127-34). Straus maintains:
Most Rwandans did not participate in the genocide because they hated
Tutsis as despicable “others,” because they adhered to an ethnic nationalist
vision of society, or because racist propaganda had instilled racism in them.
The perpetrators had an awareness of different ethnic categories, but that
awareness did not create ethnic hatred or directly lead to violence. (134)
Importantly, the study also revealed that ‘the better-educated respondents
demonstrate greater awareness, understanding, and belief in racial ideology
than the less-educated respondents’ (ibid), and the former group consisted of
local authorities or other rural elites who directed the killings at the local level
(114).
Straus’s study gives us two important insights that are relevant to our
discussion. First, it shows the limitation of the explanation of the Rwandan
genocide, particularly its aspect of mass participation, based solely on ethnic
138
manipulation by elites and their racist ideology. A sound explanation of the
genocide and its mass participatory aspect requires a multi-dimensional analysis
which also takes various other factors into account: power struggles at different
levels of society, fears, not only caused by civil war, but also fears of being
harassed or penalised by local power holders, the pursuit of personal economic
gain, state machinery, social networks and media as mechanisms for
mobilisation and memories of past violent conflict (See Uvin 2001b; Straus 2006;
Takeuchi 2009). Second, Straus’s study confirms that though it is not a primary
factor in causing the genocide, the history of racialised ethnicity played an
important role in making genocide possible in Rwanda. It was the
ethno-nationalist ideology with which Hutu elites, at the national and local levels,
justified, organised and instigated genocidal violence. Moreover, it can be said
that socially constructed racial categories ‘underpinned the premise of genocide
in Rwanda’. As Straus maintains, ‘[w]ithout those preexisting categories and
without a history of ethnic or racial political ideologies, the call to attack Tutsis
would not have resonated, and genocide would not likely have happened’ (226).
4. Revelation of RPF Atrocities and Violence in Post-Genocide Rwanda
The seemingly endless genocidal killing was finally halted by the RPF forces
which put the entire country under its military control by July 1994. The genocidal
government forces were either crushed or chased out of Rwanda to
neighbouring countries. After achieving an outright victory by military means, on
19 July 1994, the RPF formed a coalition government with the opposition parties
who had signed the Arusha Agreement. However, the end of the war and the
genocide was also the beginning of a refugee crisis of unprecedented scale. The
defeated genocidal government, its armed forces Forces Armées Rwandaises
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(FAR) and militias, fled to neighbouring countries, mainly Zaire (the current
Democratic Republic of Congo/DRC) and Tanzania, taking with them around two
million Rwandans. The militarisation of the refugee camps, particularly those
located near the Zaire - Rwanda border, posed a serious security threat to the
newly created government. These UN-assisted refugee camps in eastern Zaire,
especially those in North Kivu, became well ‘nourished’ and ‘shielded’ bases for
extremist elements of the former government ‘to regroup, rearm and launch
incursions into Rwanda’ (HRW 1998).20
Inside Rwanda, after the RPF’s takeover, the dynamics of violence shifted
to one which put the Hutu population who chose to stay in the country under
extremely adverse circumstances due to mass arrests of persons accused of
genocide-related crimes and unknown numbers of revenge killings or summary
executions at the hands of RPF soldiers (Des Forges 1999, 724-35; Prunier
2009, 11-22; Eltringham 2004, 101-8). A part of the picture of the RPF atrocities
against the civilian population, both during and after the genocide, was brought
to light by the Gersony Report, a leaked unpublished report commissioned by
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Based on around
200 interviews in 41 of Rwanda’s 145 communes conducted in August and
September of 1994, the author of the report Robert Gersony, estimated that
between 25,000 and 45,000 people, mostly Hutus but also Tutsis, were killed by
the RPF in the space of less than six months between early April and
mid-September 1994 (Prunier 2009, 15-6). It is difficult not only to judge the
accuracy of this estimation but also to establish how many of them were killed as
a result of military engagement against the RPF forces (Des Forges 1999, 734).
However, many observers, including the UN Commission of Experts established
20 On the problems associated with these militarised refugee camps, see African Rights (1995,
1088-100), Prunier (1995, 312-21) and Prunier (2009, 24-9).
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for investigating various grave violations of international humanitarian law in
Rwanda, believe that most of the massacres were not ‘provoked by individuals
suspected of participation in the massacres of Tutsis’ (UN 1994, para 44; also
see Des Forges 1999, 734; Prunier 2009, 16-7).
According to Prunier (2009, 20), RPF killings in the hills in different parts of
the country ceased for a few months after September 1994, but they resumed in
January 1995, targeting those associated with genocide perpetrators, such as
family or friends, educated people, those who used to be PARMEHUTU
members and those considered to be dissidents. Later in 1995, massacres took
place at the IDP camps in the ‘Safe Humanitarian Zone’ created in southwestern
Rwanda by the controversial Opération Turquoise, a so-called ‘humanitarian
operation’ by the French military whose real intention was suspected to be one
of supporting the genocidal regime.21 Considering these IDP camps, which
sheltered around 350,000 people, a security threat, the RPF-led government
decided to close them down. However, the IDPs refused to return to their home
areas due to fears of widespread RPF killings. Then, in April 1995, as the
government dismantled the camps, its army massacred thousands of IDPs,
including women and children, at Kibeho Camp in Gikongoro Prefecture (Prunier
2009, 38-42).22
The war and genocide in Rwanda, and the subsequent influx of Rwandan
refugees into eastern Zaire had a huge impact on the dynamics of violent conflict
there, which had persisted since 1993, involving local Kinyarwanda speakers23
21 On the controversial nature of Opération Turquoise, see Des Forges (1999, 668-91).
22 The number of IDPs killed has never been established, even though the government’s ‘official’
account claims that it is only 338 (Prunier 2009, 42).However, Prunier estimates over 5,000
casualties, based on the account of the Australian Medical Corps of the UN peacekeeping force,
which counted up to 4,200 victims’ bodies and estimated that there were still between 400 and
500 uncounted bodies on the site, and that the government army had already buried the bodies
of further victims (41). See also Pottier (2000).
23 The Kivu region of the DRC has a large proportion of Kinyarwanda speakers – those in the
North Kivu region are called Banyarwanda, whereas those in the South Kivu are called
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and other ethnic groups. One of its effects was to carry over the Hutu/Tutsi
dimension of conflict into eastern Zaire. In the North Kivu region, for example,
local Kinyarwanda speakers called Banyarwanda (both Hutu and Tutsi), who had
been the common target of local Zairian militia since 1993, became divided
along ethnic lines; Zairian Hutu militia from the Banyarwanda community formed
a ‘new interahamwe’ militia with Rwandan Hutu refugees and began attacking
both Zairian Tutsis (Banyarwanda) and Rwandan Tutsi refugees who had been
in exile since the 1960s/70s (HRW 1996 cited in Eltringham 2004, 122).24
In September 1996, the RPA invaded Zaire and attacked the armed refugee
camps in collaboration with RPF-backed Zairian rebel forces, the most
well-known of which was the Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la
Libération (AFDL) which later ousted Zaire’s dictator Mobutu Sese Seko from
power.25 Tens of thousands of Rwandan refugees were killed in a series of
attacks in late 1996 (Kisangani 2000). In November 1996, the violent dismantling
of the camps triggered a mass repatriation of over 500,000 refugees back to
Rwanda.26 Hundreds of thousands of other refugees who remained in Zaire are
believed to have died, either from military attacks by the RPA/AFDL alliance, or
from a combination of hunger and disease on their flight west, or northwestwards,
deep into the country.27
Banyamulenge) whose ancestors migrated from the current territory of Rwanda in different
historical periods, the first of which was as early as the seventeenth century (Eltringham 2004,
119).
24 See Prunier (2009) for the role of Kinyarwanda speakers in violent conflicts in both Rwanda
and the Congo.
25 While the role of Laurent Kabila’s AFDL has been much highlighted in the attacks on
refugee-related targets such as camps and hospitals in eastern Zaire/Congo, in many reports, ‘a
complex mixture of forces’ backed by Kigali were involved in some of the attacks, particularly in
North Kivu (Prunier 1997, 384-5). For more detailed accounts of the Kivu crisis and the attacks
on refugees which triggered the mass repatriation in late 1996, see UN (1997, para. 38-48),
Prunier (1997, 379-87; 2009 Ch 4); AI (1997), Mamdani (2001, 253-63) and Eltringham (2004,
124-42).
26 Human Rights Watch’s 1998 report (HRW 1998) indicates that about 600,000 refugees
returned while Amnesty International (AI 1997) estimates the number to be 500,000.
27 Human Rights Watch (1998) made a serious allegation against the Rwandan government and
its allies in Congo: ‘For the next six months, AFDL forces, often led by Rwandans, hunted down
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After the massive influx of Hutu refugees in late 1996, the security situation
in Rwanda’s northwest region rapidly deteriorated because of what is known as
the Hutu insurgency of rebel fighters who infiltrated Rwandan territory and
carried out attacks against local government officials and Tutsi civilians. These
Hutu rebel fighters were under the command of Gen. Augustin Bizimungu,
former commander in chief of the FAR. The rebel attacks and the RPA’s
counter-insurgency offensives turned the region in a war zone, causing the
deaths of at least several thousand civilians from 1997 –1999 (AR 1998; UN
1998b).
After the pacification of the region by military means, Rwanda secured
negative peace in its territory by 2000.28 However, the Rwandan government
and its armed forces continued to be deeply involved in the conflict in the DRC
(UN 2008; Lemarchand 2009; Prunier 2009), and Hutu rebels, including the
remnants of the genocidal forces of 1994, are still active in Kivu today (HRW
2009d), despite a joint DRC/Rwandan military operation to disarm them from
December 2008 – January 2009.
5. Conclusion
As stated, Hutu and Tutsi were not, and are not, ethnic groups with rigid
boundaries in the primordialist sense. Rather, they are social constructs whose
meanings and inter-relations have been shaped by the politics and policies of
those in power. Ethno-political violence along the Hutu/Tutsi divide is a relatively
modern phenomena, which became apparent only after the racialisation of
those in flight, killing civilians as well as armed elements and preventing humanitarian agencies
from delivering the food, water and medicine needed to keep them alive’. Also see related UN
investigation reports (UN 1997a, 1998a), Eltringham (2004, 124-42), Prunier (2009) as well as
Umutesi (2004), who gives an account of her own ordeal as a Rwandan Hutu refugee in
Zaire/Congo.
28 See Chapter 1 for the distinction between negative peace and positive peace first proposed
by Galtung.
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ethnicity through Belgian colonial rule in the twentieth century. Van Hoyweghen
and Vlassenroot (2000, 111) argue that ‘ethnic conflict is, in origin, not a conflict
between ethnic groups’ but rather, that ‘ethnic groups with rigid boundaries are
the outcome of violence’. If they are right, the cycles of brutal ethno-political
violence that the Rwandan people have experienced since the late 1950s should
have made the ethnic identities of many Rwandans more salient and rigid than
before. The next two chapters will examine how this ethnic polarisation
overshadowed people’s perceptions of victimhood, justice and reconciliation in
the two fieldwork communities.
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CHAPTER FIVE
CONTESTED VICTIMHOOD AND THE FILTER OF ETHNICITY
1. Introduction
In societies emerging from years of violent conflict, there is usually a complex
web of victims whose lives have been torn apart through atrocities, abuses and
criminal acts. In such situations, who should be acknowledged as victims is a
central but often highly controversial issue in the quest for justice and
reconciliation (Huyse 2003).1 Even victims of the same atrocity often compete
with each other for greater recognition and restitution for their suffering.2 Such
‘victim competition’ may be further intensified where there are mutual
accusations of atrocities between adversarial identity groups who often deny the
victimhood of members of the opposing group.
After decades of ethno-political violence, civil war and genocide, Rwanda is
certainly one of those deeply divided societies where competing claims for
victimhood do exist. In the words of Van Hoyweghen (2000, 212) who carried out
field research in the country in 1998, ‘Rwanda remains a highly fragmented
society in which there is no agreement as to who is justified in claiming to have
been a “victim” of the events since 1994’. This observation was found to remain
valid at the time of the primary fieldwork for this study in 2002.
This chapter describes the nature of contestation over the issue of
1 Analysis in this chapter owes much to the analytical framework delineated by Huyse (2003,
54-66).
2 On this complex issue, Huyse (2003, 64) states:
[V]ictims frequently compete fiercely with each other for recognition, for material resources
such as compensation and positive discrimination in the areas of housing and education,
and for symbolic goods such as monuments, medals, memorial days and other types of
commemoration.
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victimhood in two rural communities, one in the central and the other in the
north-western part of the country - where I conducted a grassroots study for
exploring various expectations, intentions and concerns held by different
categories of Rwandan people at the grassroots level around issues and
processes concerning justice and reconciliation. The fieldwork revealed close
connections between the people’s sense of victimhood shaped by their
experiences during periods of violent conflict in the past years and the ways they
perceived issues of justice and reconciliation. This chapter, therefore, lays a
foundation for our discussion on contested views of justice and reconciliation at
the grassroots level in the next chapter.
After brief descriptions of the two fieldwork communities, the chapter
presents an overview of the local history of ethno-political violence since the
social and political upheaval on the eve of Rwandan independence. The
overview highlights principal areas of dispute as well as key features of the
local-level ethno-political violence in the past decades. The chapter then
explores the nature of contestation over the issue of victimhood within the
communities and how issues of ethnicity are interwoven with the issue of
victimhood.
2. Fieldwork Communities
The fieldwork for the grassroots study were conducted in two rural communities:3
the sector of ‘Gitera’, part of ’Rukundo’ district of Gitarama Province (currently a
3 As stated in Chapter 1, at the time of my fieldwork in 2002, Rwanda was divided into 12
provinces which were further divided into 106 districts, 1,545 sectors, and 9,013 cells at the
lower levels of its territorial administration. Each cell included dozens of nyumba kumi or a unit of
ten households depending on the size of its population. In January 2006, there were major
mergers of administrative units in Rwanda. Since then, the territory of Rwanda is divided into five
provinces: Eastern Province, Western Province, Southern Province, Northern Province and
Kigali City. As also stated in Chapter 1, pseudonyms are used for indicating the two sectors to
protect identities of grassroots informants interviewed during the fieldwork.
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part of the Southern Province) and the sector of ‘Kiberama’, part of ‘Mahoro’
district of Gisenyi Province (currently a part of the Western Province). Located in
the central and north-western parts of the country, the two former provinces in
which the sectors under study are situated are distinct from each other in their
demographic composition with regard to ethnic groups and their experience of
political violence in the past decades. Gitarama was the centre of the Tutsi
kingdom until it was abolished in 1961 after the ‘revolution’. The people in this
region were incorporated into the kingdom for centuries before the European
colonisation began in the late nineteenth century. With a relatively high
concentration of Tutsis, intermarriages between Hutus and Tutsis were more
common in this region than the northern regions (Jefremovas 1997, 101).
Even after the abolition of the Tutsi monarchy, the region continued to be
the centre of political power where most of the Hutu elites who dominated the
First Republic came from. In the early 1990s, together with the most southern
region of Butare, Gitarama formed the centre of the political opposition to the
government led by Habyarimana. During the 1994 genocide, the major violence
there ended by early June as the RPF established its military control in the
region.
On the other hand, the region of Gisenyi along with Ruhengeri, was brought
under central rule relatively recently in the late nineteenth century – only after the
arrival of the colonialists whose support enabled the Tutsi king to accomplish his
military conquest. United under indigenous Hutu elites who used to control
access to land, the local people repeatedly revolted against the Tutsi chiefs.
Even during the colonial period, the degree of control by the central authority
remained less prominent in the region. Compared with the central and southern
regions, there were fewer Tutsis concentrated in a few enclaves surrounded by
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predominantly Hutu areas (Newbury 1988, 290).4 Also, Hutus and Tutsis in this
region were less integrated with each other (Jefremovas 1997, 101). In 1973, the
north-western region became the home of new power holders with the coup led
by Habyarimana and other northern Hutu elites who dominated the leadership of
the Second Republic. It was also known as the home of Hutu extremists who
masterminded the genocide. Even though the violence associated with the 1994
genocide ended there by July of that year with the military victory of the RPF, the
region became a war zone for the period of 1997–1999 due to the insurgency by
Hutu rebel fighters under the command of the former General of the Forces
Armées Rwandaises (FAR) based in eastern Congo.
2.1. Profiles of Gitera and Kiberama
The sector of Gitera is in a rural area not far from the outskirts of Gitarama town.
At the time of fieldwork in 2002, the sector comprised 627 households scattered
across three hills, each of which represented a lower administrative unit called
‘cell’ or ‘cellule’.5 The locally registered population of the sector was 3,006.
While a great majority of the local households earn their livelihood from
subsistence agriculture, there was also a small but significant minority whose
members were engaged in occupations other than farming such as government
workers, teachers, and those employed by a medical institution and schools
established by the Catholic Church. More than 80 percent of the local population
were Catholic while the remaining people were associated with various
Protestant denominations.
The Kiberama sector is also in a rural part of Gisenyi Province where a
4 Based on the work of d’Hertefelt (1971), Newbury (1988, 290 n5, n7) notes that in 1960 Tutsis
accounted for 6.06 percent of the population in Gisenyi –much lower than a national average of
15.91 percent. Also see Gasana, et al. 1999.
5 Following many other authors writing on Rwanda, this thesis uses the term ‘hill’ to describe a
residential unit in which ‘families are often linked by historical ties and common residence’
(Newbury 1988, 219).
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great majority of the local households depend for their livelihood largely on
subsistence agriculture, but significant proportions of the local population work
as temporary labourers at a large-scale tea plantation as well as workers for
small-scale, privately owned brick-making enterprises. At the time of my
fieldwork, the sector comprised 862 households residing on five different hills.
The total population was 3,776. The entire local population belonged to Christian
churches with the Catholic Church as the largest denomination but also
significant minorities of Protestant denominations.
2.2. Ethnic Types of the Local Households
In post-genocide Rwanda, the identification of its citizens with ethnic labels of
Hutu, Tutsi and Twa is prohibited by law. The assumption is that these ethnic
identities have been used as a tool for discrimination, exclusion and genocide
and therefore must be replaced by a national identity for all – ‘Rwandans’.
Rwanda’s National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (NURC) listed in its
evaluation report ‘no more ethnic mention in identity card’ as one of the signs of
peaceful coexistence achieved between the people of Rwanda since the new
government came to power (2002a,13). In the official language of the
post-genocide government, people are classified by ‘politically correct’
categories (i.e. ‘survivors’, ‘new caseload’ returnees, ‘old caseload’ returnees)
that are derived from what Eltringham and Van Hoyweghen (2000) called the
‘genocide framework’. Despite the government’s effort at forging a unified
national identity among its citizens, most of the informants in the two sectors
were conscious of their own ethnic identities and those of residents around them.
During individual interviews or private conversations, they often used the ethnic
labels.
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Table 1 Local households classified by ethnic types in fieldwork communities
Gitera Kiberama
Ethnic Type
No. of HHs Percentage No. of HHs Percentage
Hutu 595 94.9% 859 99.7%
Tutsi 13 2.1% 1 0.1%
Mixed 19 3.0% 2 0.2%
Total 627 100% 862 100%
Source: produced by the author based on the information collected from key grassroots
informants including conseillers of Gitera and Kiberama and representative of
local genocide survivors’ associations.
The table above shows the number of households in each of the three
‘ethnic types’ identified in the two sectors. The first type (labelled as ‘Hutu’)
refers primarily to households with Hutu husband – Hutu wife union, but those
households headed either by a Hutu widow whose spouse was a Hutu or a Hutu
person not married yet are also included. The second type (labelled as ‘Tutsi’)
refers to households with Tutsi husband – Tutsi wife union as well as those
headed either by a Tutsi widow whose spouse was a Tutsi or a Tutsi never
married. Finally, the third type (labelled as ‘mixed’) refers to households with an
ethnically mixed union, including both Hutu husband – Tutsi wife and Tutsi
husband – Hutu wife. There was no household involving Twa in either of the
sectors.
In both Gitera and Kiberama, the overwhelming majority of the local
households were ‘Hutu’ (94.9% and 99.7%) whereas those classified as ‘Tutsi’
(2.1% and 0.1%) and ‘mixed’ (3.0% and 0.2%) were small minorities, although
the percentages of ‘Tutsi’ and ‘mixed’ were much smaller in Kiberama. In Gitera,
of the 13 ‘Tutsi’ households, those in 12 had been in the country at the time of
the genocide while those in the remaining one household were ‘returnees’ -
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former Tutsi exiles who returned to the country – in this case from Uganda - after
the RPF military victory/the end of the genocide in July 1994. In Kiberama, on
the other hand, the only ‘Tutsi’ household was that of two Tutsi returnees (a
father and his daughter) who came back from exile in eastern Congo (the former
Zaire) in 2000, after the Insurgency in north-western Rwanda died down. In
Kiberama, these two Tutsi returnees and two Tutsi wives who belonged to
ethnically mixed families – only four individuals out of the total population of
approximately 4,000 – constituted the entire Tutsi population residing in the
sector.
As for the ‘mixed’ households, most of them (17 out of 19 in Gitera and two
out of two in Kiberama) had a Hutu husband – Tutsi wife combination as
opposed to that of Tutsi husband – Hutu wife.6 Persons of mixed parentage are
called ibyimanyi or ‘hybrids’, but according to the principle of patrilineal descent,
like others they are considered either Hutus or Tutsis, depending on their fathers’
identity. Thus, most of the ibyimanyi from the concerned ethnically mixed
families in both sectors were Hutus, reflecting the predominant pattern of
intermarriages in Rwanda.
There is one more clarification regarding ethnic composition of the local
households found in the two sectors. As already noted, the number of ethnically
mixed households was 19 and two in Gitera and Kiberama respectively.
However, this explanation alone is somehow misleading, giving an impression
that they were the only households with ethnically mixed background in the
sectors. On the contrary, it is possible for even those households classified as
6 This pattern is actually a nation-wide phenomena, not limited to this particular sector. Taylor
(1999) notes that in pre-colonial and early colonial eras, ‘taking a Tutsi wife was often perceived
as a sign of social advancement on the part of a Hutu man’ (167) while ‘Tutsi hypogamy was
justified on their part for they would often absorb rich Hutu into their lineages in this way’ (168).
Taylor also examines possible reasons why the same intermarriage pattern continued even after
the revolution which completely altered power relation between Hutus and Tutsis (168-70).
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‘Hutu’ or ‘Tutsi’ to have members with an ethnically mixed background. In fact, in
Kiberama there were nine ‘Hutu’ households with members who were known to
be ibyimanyi having parents composed of a Hutu father and a Tutsi mother.
Although the fieldwork did not confirm any household like these in Gitera, it does
not mean that there was no such case there. It seems to suggest that compared
with the people of Kiberama, the people of Gitera give less attention to the
category of ibyimanyi. As noted above, inter-ethnic marriages between Hutus
and Tutsis have been more common in the centre and the south than the north.
Given the fact that inter-ethnic marriage has been practised for centuries, there
were likely to be many more ‘children of generations of intermarriage’, although
many of them seemed not to be recognised as such in the local community.
3. Accounts of Ethno-Political Violence
There are ‘contested histories’ of Rwanda with conflicting interpretations of
events, statehood, identities of various social groups and their interrelations, and
the cause and nature of violent conflict in the past (Newbury, 1998). This section
describes local people’s perceptions of the contested Rwandan history, focusing
on specific periods of the recent past that grassroots informants of each sector
described as the most turbulent ones. In order to place them in regional and
national contexts, informants’ accounts of local-level violence are occasionally
supplemented by those documented in academic sources and human rights
reports.
3.1. Political Violence on the Eve of Independence
At the time of the fieldwork, there were only a few Tutsi residents in Gitera sector
who could give first hand accounts of the events during the period of political
turmoil in the last years of Belgian colonial rule in the late 1950s and early
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1960s.7 According to these Tutsi informants, sporadic violence against Tutsis
began in some parts of Gitarama in 1957 – the year the Bahutu Manifesto was
issued. The violence escalated in November 1959 due to confrontations
between supporters of PARMEHUTU led by Kayibanda and those of the UNAR
championed by Tutsi chiefs. Houses of Tutsi chiefs were burnt down, which
consequently led them and their families to flee the country.
According to the Tutsi informants, however, local hills within the boundary of
Gitera sector were not directly affected by the political violence in 1959. Violent
attacks against Tutsis were carried out by local Hutus for the first time in Gitera
after communal elections organised by the Belgian colonial authorities in 1960.
‘After the voting ended’, said an elderly Tutsi man, ‘people started to attack us’.8
He accused his neighbours of launching an attack on his house and looting his
property. Subsequently, he fled to Uganda with his family and stayed there until
1963. Another Tutsi survivor who was a-six-year-old boy at the time of the 1960
violence said that its primary target was Tutsi notables – those who were
associated with the central court. In his own hill, there were two families of such
high-lineage Tutsi and houses of both were set on fire by local Hutus. By
contrast, his family was not attacked because – according to his perception – his
father was on good terms with his Hutu neighbours. Although several Tutsi
houses were destroyed and looted in the local hills, no one was killed or severely
injured during this period.
In November 1959, the Hutu uprising started first in a limited part of
Gitarama region but spread rapidly to other areas of Gitarama and then to the
north-western regions, including Gisenyi within five days after the first violence
(Newbury 1988, 194). The fieldwork confirmed that Kiberama was one of the
7 The eldest informant interviewed in Kiberama sector was 72 years old at the time of interview.
8 Interview with Felix, Gitera, 14 Nov 2002.
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areas in Gisenyi which was seriously affected by the wave of violence. According
to four local residents – two Tutsis and two Hutus – who were old enough to
provide first hand accounts of violent events during the upheaval on the eve of
Rwanda’s independence, in Kiberama and surrounding areas, at least several
Tutsi houses were set on fire and their properties pillaged by local Hutu militants.
An elderly Tutsi man interviewed, a returnee from the Congo, said that his house
was burnt down while he and his family were hiding in a house of Hutu
neighbours.9 He and his family fled to the Congo to evade further attacks. A
Tutsi genocide survivor who had been living in one of the neighbouring sectors
with her parents at the time said that several houses of Tutsis in her locality were
pillaged and set on fire, even though her family’s house was left intact because,
in her view, her father was on good terms with his Hutu neighbours.10 None of
her immediate family members were forced to go into exile.
In Kiberama, the November violence did not die down with these attacks on
individual Tutsi families. According to grassroots informants, a Tutsi chief in
charge of the area dispatched troops based in Gisenyi town to suppress the
uprising in Kiberama and surrounding areas, and a confrontation between the
two sides developed into a violent crash - ‘war between soldiers of umwami
(king) and soldiers of Kayibanda (armed peasants supporting PARMEHUTU)’ in
which several people on both sides were killed.11 By the end of 1959, many local
Tutsis fled to Congo; those Tutsis who remained in the local hills of Kiberama
after the period of upheaval were only Tutsi women who had married local Hutu
men.
As noted earlier, Hutu inhabitants of the north-western regions of Rwanda
9 Interview with Aimable, Kiberama, 5 Dec 2002.
10 Interview with Alice, Kiberama, 7 Dec 2002.
11 Interview with Muze, Kiberama, 7 Dec 2002.
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were brought under control of the Tutsi central court only after the arrival of
colonialists who extended military support to the Tutsi king. Among the local
Hutu population in general and indigenous Hutu elites who used to control
access to land in particular, there was strong animosity against Tutsi chiefs and
their Tutsi clients who were brought into the predominantly Hutu areas. An
elderly Hutu man interviewed in Kiberama showed this anti-Tutsi sentiment when
he portrayed pre-independence Rwanda as a period of absolute oppression over
the Hutu population, characterised by confiscation of crops, bananas and
chickens, heavy taxes and forced labour. He said, ‘If people couldn’t pay taxes,
they were beaten and got jailed till their relatives paid them […] They often gave
people impossible tasks, for example, ordering one person to cultivate two
hectares of land within three days. Sometimes people had to work late at night’.12
During the political upheaval on the eve of independence, violence was
directed primarily at Tutsi power holders or those closely linked with them; most
ordinary Tutsis were not targeted, and even those targeted were not killed but
chased out of the country.13
3.2. Escalated Persecution against Tutsis in 1973
The next tide of violence hit local hills in Gitera in 1973. As noted in Chapter 4,
the First Republic led by Kayibanda and other Hutu elites from the centre and
the south was facing a political crisis due to the increasing discontent among
Hutus in the north who complained about the monopoly of the benefits of power
enjoyed by their rivals in the centre/south. In early 1973, a campaign of anti-Tutsi
violence was instigated by Hutu political leaders in different parts of the country.
Branded as the common enemy of ‘the Hutu nation’, people suspected of Tutsi
12 Interview with Muze, Kiberama, 5 December 2002.
13 These characteristics of the violence against Tutsis during the revolutionary period are
supported by Newbury (1988, 195) and Des Forges (1995, 45; 1999, 39).
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ancestry were used as a scapegoat to ‘resolve differences among Hutu’ (Des
Forges 1999, 41). While violence on the eve of independence was directed
primarily at Tutsi power holders and those closely linked with them, during the
anti-Tutsi campaign in 1973, all the ordinary Tutsis became potential targets of
violent attacks.14 It is estimated that across the country up to 600 Tutsis were
massacred by Hutus who were incited by broadcast on a public radio
programme ‘to rise up and avenge themselves’ (Mamdani 2001, 137).
The persecution of Tutsis in 1973 most seriously affected those working in
institutions such as government offices, churches, schools and cooperatives.15
For example, all the Tutsi employees were dismissed from TRAFIPRO (Travail,
Fidélité, Progrès), an influential cooperative based in Gitarama. Also, about ten
Tutsi Catholic brothers and seminary students based in Kabgayi were killed by
secondary school students from two rural areas (Shyogwe and Byimana) who
were armed with machetes. The students were mobilised by one
Gitarama-based politician who was also the most influential leader of the
TRAFIPRO.
Being anxious about possible assaults, many Tutsis in Gitera stayed
outside over-night during the period of violence while some were hidden by local
Hutu families. The violence continued for about two weeks. During this period,
no one was killed but a Tutsi man was injured in an attack by local Hutu
residents, his house destroyed and several other houses of Tutsis looted.
According to one genocide survivor, some of the perpetrators of the Tutsi man’s
assault were jailed but released after three months. Although the court ordered
them to repair the damage they had inflicted on the property of the man, the
14 Although neither Gitera nor Kiberama was directly affected, massacres of ordinary Tutsis had
already begun in the early 1960s as reprisals against a series of cross-border attacks by guerrilla
groups of Tutsi exiles (Des Forges 1995, 45; Des Forges 1999, 39; Mamdani 2001, 129).
15 Interview with Bosco, Gitera, 13 Nov 2002.
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decision was never enforced.
Unlike the situation in Gitera described above, Kiberama was not affected
much by the anti-Tutsi campaign in early 1973, not least because there were no
longer any Tutsis in the local hills except those women married to Hutu men.
Grassroots informants, including a Tutsi widow, confirmed there was no political
violence in 1973 in the local hills; as she put it, ‘the fighting was between
students or intellectuals, so it didn’t affect the areas dominated by peasants like
this one’.16
Under the rule of Habyarimana who ousted Kayibanda from power through
a bloodless coup on 5 July 1973, local hills in Gitera and Kiberama witnessed no
major violence for more than a decade.
3.3. The RPF Invasion in 1990 and the Prelude to Genocide
Years of relative calm in Gitera and Kiberama were finally brought to an end with
the RPF invasion in October 1990. As the civil war intensified in the northern
region, Tutsis in both Gitera and Kiberama were increasingly castigated for their
presumed connection with the RPF. In Gitera, houses of local Tutsi families were
often searched by local Hutus mobilised for a system of civil defense to make
sure that no Inkotanyi (RPF fighters) were hiding.17 Although both communities
were affected by the rise of ethno-political violence in the period leading up to
the genocide, there were notable regional differences in the intensity of violence.
According to several Tutsi genocide survivors in Gitera, no Tutsi was assaulted
physically in the local hills during the period between October 1990 and April
1994 – the period separating the RPF invasion and the onset of a full-scale
genocide. Kiberama, by contrast, witnessed a series of violent attacks against
16 Interview with Alice, Kiberama, 7 Dec 2002.
17 Interview with Pierre, Gitera, 23 Nov 2002.
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those ‘internal enemies’ in the same period. Local Hutus began to seize the
lands of some of Tutsi women who had been widowed or divorced and verbally
abused them as well as their children, calling them ibyitso18 or ‘accomplices’ of
the RPF.19
In early 1993, Hutu militant MRND supporters physically assaulted those
suspected of Tutsi ancestry as well as Hutu members of the opposition.20 Those
targeted by Hutu perpetrators based on their ethnicity consisted of two groups:
Tutsi women married to Hutu men and the offspring of such intermarriages
between Hutu men and Tutsi women (thus considered as Hutu, according to the
principle of patrilineal descent discussed earlier). As noted above, the latter
category of people – those of mixed parentage are called ibyimanyi or imvange
which means ‘hybrids’. In other words, all the local people who were known to
have connection with Tutsi ancestry were considered as ‘internal enemies’,
consequently becoming prime targets of political violence. In Kiberama, this was
the first time for these categories of people to be subjected to anti-Tutsi violence.
During the same period of early 1993, the political opposition in the
north-western regions received a fatal blow. In Gisenyi Prefecture, members of
the opposition were crushed by Hutu militants in February 1993, leaving about
300 people dead (Mamdani 2001, 192). In Kiberama, at least several members
of the PSD were assaulted by local MRND supporters; one of them, a teacher at
a local elementary school, was beaten to death and his house was destroyed.21
3.4. The Genocide in 1994
The genocidal violence in 1994 hit both Gitera and Kiberama, but there are
18 Ibyitso (icyitso in singular) is a label used to blame Tutsis living in Rwanda as collaborators of
the RPF.
19 Interview with Pascal, Kiberama, 5 June 2002.
20 Interview with Alice, Kiberama, 7 Dec 2002.
21 Interview with Alice, Kiberama, 7 Dec 2002.
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notable differences in how the violence unfolded, its intensity and its targets.
These differences reflected regional differences between the central and
southern regions and the north-western regions in terms of demography and
political affiliation of the local population. At the time of the genocide (and
historically as well), there was high concentration of Tutsis in the centre/south,
whereas in post-1990 Rwanda, only a small number of Tutsi residents remained
in rural parts of the north-west because many had been killed or forced to leave
by the preceding attacks discussed above. Another important difference
between the two is the presence of political opposition within the local population.
The central and southern regions, particularly Gitarama and Butare, constituted
the base of the strong political opposition to the Habyarimana regime dominated
by the northern elites.
In the case of Gitarama, members of the opposition, especially those of the
MDR, occupied key positions in the local government at different levels. In
contrast, as stated above, in the north-western regions, the political opposition
had been eliminated by the end of 1993. Consequently, genocidal killings began
in the north-west a very short time after the plane crash on 6 April 1994, in the
centre/south, the onset of genocide was much later – 18 April in Gitarama -
because of notable local resistance to the orders to hunt down and kill Tutsis.22
In the centre/south, the Hutu extremists now controlling the transitional
government had to first replace ‘moderate’ local government leaders – many of
them affiliated with the opposition - with those conforming to the order of
22 In her discussion about regional differences in the genocide, based on the information
reported by various scholars and human rights organisations, Jefremovas (1997, 99) points out
that the prefectures in the centre and south, namely, ‘Butare and Gitarama were effectively left
alone between 1991-93 and resisted the call for genocide the longest’. African Rights (1995,
153) also reported: ‘More than in any other region except Butare, the people in Gitarama,
including administrative officers, initially resisted participation in the killing. ... However the
geographical position of the préfecture made it easy for killers to be imported from elsewhere’.
See also Des Forges (1999, 270-8).
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genocide. Then, in order to instigate genocidal violence, the Interahamwe and
the FAR were brought in from outside the regions (Jefremovas 1997, 101).
3.4.1. Genocidal Killings in Gitera
The genocidal orders reached to local administrative leaders of Gitera sector
only after the governor (préfet) of Gitarama Prefecture and some of his
subordinates at the commune level (bourgmestres) were replaced, resulting in a
significant shift in power because the local administrative leadership had been
dominated by opposition members with moderate views on the Hutu – Tutsi
relationship.23 The conseiller (sector head) of Gitera, who was reluctant to give
the orders to the local population,24 was also replaced with a new one, a fervent
MRND supporter. On 26 April 1994, the first genocidal attack inside Gitera was
carried out on one of the three local hills by a gang of local unemployed youths
led by two members of Interahamwe; they set fire to the houses of Tutsis and
plundered their cattle. At least two separate gangs composed of unemployed
youths authorised by extremists now fully in charge of the local leadership
played an instrumental role in not only hunting down Tutsis but also intimidating
or actually beating up Hutus who refused to follow the genocidal orders.
On the day the genocidal attack was launched in Gitera, Bosco, the
representative of a local genocide survivors’ association but then a leader of the
youth wing of PSD, a party supported by local Tutsis, approached Eric, a local
leader of MDR, a party drawing the support of many local Hutus, to urge them to
fight against the genocidal gangs. Eric had command over the party’s youth wing
23 According to multiple Hutu informants, the MDR was the most influential in Gitera, enjoying
support from more than half of the population, followed by the ruling party MRND, whose
supporters constituted approximately a quarter of the population. Although less influential than
these two parties, the PL and the PSD also constituted significant minorities. For descriptions of
political tendencies of opposition parties, see Prunier (1995, 122-6) and Mamdani (2001, 154).
24 This person is known to have hidden his son-in-law and grandchildren who are all Tutsis,
during the genocide.
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armed with machetes, spears and even some grenades.25 For the next two days,
a fierce battle took place between these two allied groups of opposition and the
genocidal gangs. The battle ended with total defeat of the allied groups because
the genocidal gangs drew support from FAR soldiers from their base in Kabgayi.
The genocidal gangs, which by then had grown to the size of about 60 people,
demolished Eric’s house.
Many of the local Tutsis had sensed imminent danger long before the
killings actually began in their hills; thus some, particularly women and children,
had tried to find a place to hide with local Hutu families they trusted or had taken
refuge at one of the ‘refugee camps’ developed in different compounds of the
Catholic Church facilities located in Kabgayi.26 Many Tutsi men stayed at their
homes, some of them with a few of their children, until the genocide started. As a
relentless search for Tutsis continued, many of these Tutsis who had managed
to survive ended up in one of the ‘refugee camps’.
One male genocide survivor, who lost his wife, a son and three other close
relatives in the genocide, said that there were at least 50,000 displaced people
taking refuge in the compounds of the Catholic Church facilities (schools, a
health centre and a dormitory of Catholic brothers).27 They had turned into
massive camps for terrified Tutsis (the overwhelming majority) but also smaller
numbers of Hutus (i.e. those associated with the opposition as well as those
married with Tutsis) from hills all over Gitarama as well as other provinces. The
people came to these places desperately searching for safety, but ‘[i]nstead they
became prisoners at the mercy of soldiers who were often drunk, interahamwe,
and thugs among the people from Byumba who had been displaced by the war
25 Interview with Eric, Gitera, 23 Nov 2002.
26 There were four such camps in Kabgayi at the time of the genocide. See AR (1995, 708-18).
27 Interview with Pierre, Gitera, 24 May 2002.
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in 1993 [...]’ (AR 1995, 708). The genocide survivors said that FAR soldiers and
Interahamwe came almost every day to pick some Tutsis up and took them away.
These soldiers often took girls and women away to rape them or keep them as
sex slaves (ibid). On several occasions - when buildings the people used as
shelters were locked from inside – soldiers climbed up to the top of the roof and
shot downwards to the people inside.28
It is hard to estimate how many people died in these camps due to
genocidal killings, hunger and disease. What is known is that approximately
30,000 people survived when they were finally liberated by the RPF forces on 2
June 1994 (717). In late May, the camps were surrounded by FAR soldiers,
Interahamwe and Hutus displaced from Byumba who aimed to mount a massive
attack on those already exhausted people inside the camps. However, with the
RPF’s imminent advancement, all of them fled in fear, leaving tens of thousands
of their de facto hostages behind. Many local genocide survivors said they could
have all perished at the hands of génocidaires if the RPF forces had arrived
even a few days late. ‘I survived by chance’ said one genocide survivor.29
Victims of Genocide in Gitera
Bosco, the representative of local genocide survivors’ association, estimated
that at least 18 people were killed in Gitera in the genocide: 17 Tutsis and one
person of mixed parentage (in this case, a Hutu father and a Tutsi mother).30 All
of these people counted as victims of genocide by Bosco are those who were
killed because perpetrators considered them as ‘Tutsi’. On the other hand,
according to the information obtained from Hutu residents,31 there were at least
28 Interview with Bosco, Gitera, 17 May 2002.
29 Interview with Bosco, Gitera, 17 May 2002.
30 Interview with Bosco, Gitera, 13 Nov 2002.
31 Information compiled by Alexis/research assistant
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five local Hutus who were killed in the genocide and yet not recognised by the
local genocide survivors’ association. Reasons for their being killed as
understood by the Hutu informants were: 1) refusing to give money to a gang of
perpetrators (three persons); 2) trying to protect a wife suspected of being a
Tutsi (one person); and 3) quarreling with perpetrators (one person). This shows
that the genocide perpetrators in Gitera massacred Rwandans who were
perceived to stand in the way of the genocide, irrespective of their ethnic
identity.32
With regard to the people who survived the genocide in Gitera, Bosco said
that he had registered members of 11 households headed by Tutsis, including
widows whose Tutsi husbands were killed during the genocide.33 According to
the Hutu informants, however, at least seven local Hutu households suffered
physical and/or financial damage inflicted by genocide perpetrators, although
they were not recognised as genocide survivors. Types of and reasons for the
victimizations include: 1) a house demolished in retaliation for putting up armed
resistance to genocide (one case); 2) family members beaten up for sheltering
Tutsis (two cases); 3) property looted or money confiscated in a struggle to
protect family members or relatives (i.e. Tutsi wife, Tutsi grandchildren, a
godchild who is Tutsi) (three cases); 4) property looted as a harassment
because of their ‘Tutsi-looking physical appearances’ (one case).
Perpetrators of Genocide in Gitera
At the time of fieldwork, no single trial had been held concerning genocide cases
32 Mamdani (2001, 219) writes:
The predicament of ordinary Hutu is clear from a single fact: it is not only the political
opposition that got massacred in the days that followed the president’s assassination. As
they grew in scope, the massacres targeted anyone, peasant or professional, who refused
to join in the melée.
33 Five other households of genocide survivors left Gitera sector and settled in other areas after
the genocide.
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directly related to the killings that took place in Gitera sector, and given that
situation, there was no consensus within the local population about who
participated in the genocide at the local level. However, accounts provided by
three different groups of grassroots informants, namely, Tutsi genocide survivors,
Hutus also attacked in the genocide but not recognised as survivors, and Hutu
prisoners (including one prisoner who had confessed his involvement in the
genocide) strongly suggest the following three points about the perpetrators of
genocide in Gitera sector:
Perpetrators from the local hills: The first point is the central role played by
people from within the local hills. At the time of fieldwork, there were 19 so-called
‘genocide prisoners’ (prison detainees suspected of participation in genocide) –
18 men and one woman - from Gitera sector. Most of them were the members of
the two separate gangs of unemployed youths, one led by two local members of
Interahamwe and the other led by Fabien who had been engaged in various
criminal activities (for example, stealing and robbery) prior to the genocide.
According to Fabien and several local genocide survivors, dozens more Hutu
residents were ‘walking freely’ in the local hills at the time of the fieldwork despite
their participation in the genocide.34
Elements within local administrative leadership: Second, there seems to be
no doubt about the organising role played by local administrative leaders.
According to some allegations, some local administrative leaders at both sector
and cell levels at the time of the genocide did play a vital role in mobilising the
local population into carrying out the genocide, setting up roadblocks to catch
Tutsis trying to flee, appointing or recruiting people for tasks such as overseeing
the roadblocks and taking part in patrols searching for Tutsis in hiding. Those
34 Interview with Fabien, Gitarama Central Prison, 21 May 2002.
164
leaders who were reluctant to give the genocidal orders to the local population
were either replaced with more enthusiastic ones or marginalised as the
extremists took power. Before the assault on local Tutsis started, there was a
public meeting led by a newly appointed bourgmestre at a sector office where
local level leaders were appointed specifically for accomplishing the genocidal
task according to instructions given by higher authorities.35
Links with external militias and FAR soldiers: Finally, these local
perpetrators were linked with external Interahamwe militias and FAR soldiers
who were based in Kabgayi and Gitarama town. When needed, the former called
for support of the latter to crush active resistance as indicated above. Also, both
parties collaborated at the main roadblock in the sector where unknown numbers
of Tutsis were brought down and slaughtered. Soldiers often came with a truck
fully loaded with terrified Tutsis and displayed killings in front of local
perpetrators so that they would follow the examples.36
3.4.2. Genocidal Killings in Kiberama
The orders to wipe out all of those ‘left to kill’ were immediately put into action at
the local level in Gisenyi Prefecture; genocidal killings in Gisenyi began on 7
April, the day following the airplane crash which caused the death of
Habyarimana.37 In Kiberama sector, there were only three Tutsi residents before
the genocide began: a wife of a Hutu man, a widow whose Hutu husband had
died before and a woman divorced from a Hutu man. However, those hunted
down during the 1994 genocide were not limited to these Tutsi women; they
35 Interview with Fabien, Gitarama Central Prison, 22 May 2002.
36 Interview with Fabien, Gitarama Central Prison, 23 May 2002.
37 One of the major massacres in the prefecture took place in Nyundo - the centre of Catholic
Diocese of Nyundo – not very far from Kiberama. During the period between 7 April and 1 May,
more than 500 Tutsis were brutally massacred in and around a large complex of church facilities
which belonged to the diocese. Detailed accounts of the massacre in Nyundo are documented
by AR (1995, 543-55).
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involved those categorised as ibyimanyi. As noted above, all of these ibyimanyi
were Hutu according to the principle of patrilineal descent, having Hutu fathers
(and Tutsi mothers). At the time of the genocide, there were ten such people of
mixed parentage in Kiberama. At the time of the fieldwork, nine of them were
residential members of the local genocide survivors’ association while the
remaining one was living outside the sector. As noted above, these people had
already been subjected to anti-Tutsi violence well before the onset of full-scale
genocide in 1994.
The order to wipe out all the Tutsis and their accomplices reached the local
administrative authorities of Kiberama sector from the bourgmestre of ‘Mahoro’
commune by 8 April. According to Olivier, a confessed genocide prisoner
interviewed in Gisenyi Central Prison, the local authorities – a conseiller (sector
head) and responsables (cell-level representatives) began the sensitisation of
the local population on 8 April, telling him – a 24-year-old unemployed man at
the time of the genocide – and his fellow villagers to ‘kill all the Tutsis because
they killed our President’.38
Many of the local residents in Kiberama heard the news of Habyarimana’s
death announced in a public radio broadcast as early as 7 April and the rumors
of the massive attack on Tutsis in Nyundo (the centre of Catholic Diocese of
Nyundo which was not very far from Kiberama) as it unfolded. So did those Tutsi
women and ibyimanyi, who, sensing danger, went into hiding in the houses of
Hutu families they trusted. Unlike Gitera, there was no overt local people’s
resistance to genocide occurred in Kiberama, not lease because the already
weak opposition had been destroyed by the supporters of MRND in 1993.
Nevertheless, thanks to an unknown number of Hutu individuals and families,
38 Interview with Olivier, Gisenyi Central Prison, 8 June 2002.
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including their own relatives, who hid them and/or gave warning to them about
when and where a house-to-house search was likely to be made, most of the
local Tutsi women and ibyimanyi, managed to keep themselves out of the sight
of the genocide perpetrators.
In the case of Odette, one of those ibyimanyi who had survived the
genocide in Kiberama, all family members except her husband went into hiding,
first on her own hill and then in one of the nearby sectors.39 Her husband did not
face any direct threat, but was beaten by those who came searching for her
because he refused to tell them her whereabouts. She and her three daughters
took refuge at the house of a long-time family friend, while her four sons
managed to find a place to hide by themselves. Odette continued hiding for
about three months until she fled to the Congo with hundreds of other Kiberama
residents – Hutu, Tutsi and ibyimanyi alike - in mid-July 1994 as the RPF forces
made a rapid advance towards the north-western part of the country.40 Except
one person who was in Kigali when the genocide started, all of the local
genocide survivors interviewed for this study went through a similar experience;
they perceived danger before the genocidal attacks began on their hills and went
into hiding with the help of their relatives, neighbours and/or friends and stayed
in hiding until mid-July when the genocidal forces in the north-western part of the
country finally ran away from the RPF’s advance.
Victims of the Genocide in Kiberama
At the time of the fieldwork, no official record existed concerning the number of
local residents killed during the 1994 genocide in Kiberama, and some
39 Interview in Kiberama, 4 June 2002.
40 Ruhengeri and Gisenyi were put under the control of the RPF on 13 and 18 July respectively
and over a million people crossed the border to Congo (then Zaire) in one-week period of
mid-July (Prunier 1995, 298-9).
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divergence of opinion was expected on this issue among grassroots informants,
particularly between genocide survivors and the rest of the grassroots informants,
as was the case in Gitera. However, all the grassroots informants were
unanimous on this issue: over 35 informants interviewed in Kiberama, including
genocide survivors, genocide prisoners, their families, and other local
residents,41 all said that only one local resident was killed in the genocide in
Kiberama. The person was a Tutsi woman who had been deserted by her Hutu
husband a few years before the 1994 genocide.42
To be sure, the above unanimous account does not suggest that the murder
of the Tutsi woman was the only killing that took place inside Kiberama sector
during the 1994 genocide; rather, it merely suggests that she could be the only
Kiberama resident murdered inside Kiberama during the genocide. While most
of the grassroots informants were reluctant to talk about killings other than this
widely known case, two separate eye-witness accounts collected during the
fieldwork suggest that at least several other people – not Kiberama residents –
were killed inside the sector in the period between April and July 1994. One of
the two accounts was provided by Olivier, the prisoner quoted above. He
testified in his confession statement that he witnessed killings of three people at
the main roadblock which was set up near the former sector office.43 Another
eye-witness account was provided by Chantal, a Hutu widow who lost her
married son, a daughter-in-law who was a Tutsi, and two grandchildren in the
genocide. After escaping from massacres in their residential area of Gisenyi
town, they were taking refuge at Chantal’s house in Kiberama, but hunted down
by local militia (a discharged government soldier and his entourage) and brutally
41 Including 18 participants of two focus groups and 19 interviewees of semi-structured
interviews.
42 She was a mother of Pascal, the representative of the local genocide survivors’ association.
43 Interview at Gisenyi Central Prison, 7 June 2002.
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massacred in July 1994.44 According to Chantal, she reported the massacre to
local authorities after the new government was established, but no investigation
had been made of it.
Perpetrators of the Genocide in Kiberama
While informants were unanimous on the number of local residents killed in the
genocide, they had two sharply contradicting views regarding local people’s
participation in the genocide. A majority of them – more specifically, most of the
‘non-genocide survivors’ interviewed advanced a view that only a handful of local
residents were implicated in the genocide. At the time of fieldwork, there were
three former Kiberama residents who had been convicted of the crime of
genocide – including Olivier - specifically related to the murder of the Tutsi
woman.45 According to the majority view, these convicts were disgraceful
anomalies to the local population who refused to participate in the genocide. By
contrast, a minority of the grassroots informants – three genocide survivors and
another convict along with Olivier – asserted that a considerable number of
Kiberama residents were implicated in the genocide. Although it is difficult to
draw a definitive conclusion from available evidence, the minority view seems to
be more plausible, not least because it was supported by two different
categories of informants who consistently indicated the following three points.
These points are, in fact, very similar to those identified in Gitera concerning the
perpetrators of genocide.
44 Interview in Kiberama, 4 June 2002. According to this informant, her son and his family had
escaped from systematic massacres of Tutsis taking place in Gisenyi town and had taken refuge
at his parents’ home in Kiberama. But the presence of the family with a Tutsi wife came to be
known to the discharged government soldier who became a local militia leader. The whole family
were shot dead by the man and his entourage. The informant’s husband was also severely
beaten by those who came to search for the family because he refused to tell them anything
about the family hiding somewhere on the local hill. He survived the violence but became
crippled, and died two years later.
45 The confessed prisoner was serving a 12-year sentence while others who had not confessed
were serving life sentences. These prisoners had been tried by the formal justice system.
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Perpetrators from the local hills: Genocide perpetrators from the local hills
of Kiberama seem to be more than just a handful of disgraceful anomalies. At
the time of fieldwork, there were five genocide prisoners from Kiberama detained
in Gisenyi Central Prison, including the three convicts mentioned above.
According to two of these prisoners convicted of the murder of the Tutsi woman,
up to 15 of their fellow villagers constituted an attack group that was responsible
for her death but only three had been convicted. The group was led by an
ex-prisoner with a full criminal record prior to the genocide. Some of its members
had fled to Zaire and never came back while others died in exile.46 Another
prisoner said that he looted cattle owned by an ethnically mixed family with eight
fellow villagers but all of them managed to evade arrest and later settled the
matter privately with the family.47 According to Pascal, the representative of the
local genocide survivors’ association (who actually happened to be a son of the
Tutsi woman murdered) and two other genocide survivors, many of the killers
were still ‘moving around freely’ on their hill.48 Synthesising all of these accounts,
it seems likely that at least dozens or more of ordinary local residents actively
took part in killings, assaults, and lootings in the genocide.
Mobilisation by local administrative leaders: As already noted above, the
testimony of the confessed prisoner called Olivier clearly indicates that, having
received the order from the bourgmestre of ’Mahoro’ commune, the local
administrative authorities of Kiberama played an active role in mobilising local
people into the genocidal campaign. According to Olivier and another convict
interviewed, these local leaders were responsible for setting up roadblocks,
allocating about eight local residents to each roadblock, and forming the attack
46 Interview with Olivier, Gisenyi Central Prison, 7 June 2002; interview with Damien, Gisenyi
Central Prison, 6 Dec 2002.
47 Interview with Gaspard, Gisenyi Central Prison, 3 June 2002.
48 Interview with Pascal, Kiberama, 5 June 2002.
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group that killed the Tutsi woman. All of the three genocide survivors also made
a strong accusation against these former local leaders.
Perpetrators from outside: Accounts provided by different categories of
grassroots informants all pointed to the involvement of external actors in the
atrocities perpetrated in Kiberama between April and July 1994. Many of the
accounts collected strongly suggest that several FAR soldiers and Interahamwe
members either from Gisenyi town or Nyundo occasionally visited the main
roadblock and killed an unknown number of civilians who were brought from
different places around Kiberama. Apart from these well-armed perpetrators,
several informants asserted, at least two separate groups of perpetrators from
neighbouring sectors were engaged in pillaging in the local hills.
3.5. The RPF’s Violence During and After the Genocide
The pattern of local-level violence changed dramatically as the RPF achieved a
military victory over the genocidal forces. The alleged RPF killings after the
genocide halted only took place in Gitera as described below. The absence of
RPF violence in the aftermath of the genocide in Kiberama seems to be partly
attributable to the fact that most of the local residents, not only those who were
possibly implicated in the genocide at different levels, but also all the genocide
survivors interviewed, joined the massive exodus of people crossing the border
into Zaire after the RPF forces captured the town of Ruhengeri on 13 July. Thus,
the following accounts of violence are all concerned with what grassroots
informants testified actually happened in Gitera.
The RPF forces captured Kabgayi on 2 June 1994, chased genocidal
military and militia out of the area, and put the surrounding areas, including
Gitera, under its control. Not only Hutus but also a Tutsi genocide survivor in
Gitera, reported two types of killings committed by RPF soldiers: 1) killings in the
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course of military action; and 2) massacres after combat ended in local areas.
3.5.1. Killings in the Course of Military Advance
On 2 June 1994, the day the RPF forces captured Kabgayi area and liberated
approximately 30,000 or more Tutsis, sounds of gun shots grew closer to the
local hills in Gitera. As some areas in Gitera were caught under fire as the RPF
forces advanced on one of the hills that was strategically important, many local
residents fled to a mountainous area in the region and stayed there for nearly
one and a half months.49 One Hutu informant testified that when he returned
home on 13 July 1994, he saw many decomposed bodies - those of the victims
of the RPF shooting - on the ground on his hill. According to the information
obtained from several Hutu residents, at least 34 people – 33 Hutus and one
Tutsi – were killed during the RPF’s military advance. Although these victims
have not been officially acknowledged, different groups (Tutsi genocide survivors,
Hutus who or whose families were attacked by genocide perpetrators, Hutu
families of prisoners and others) confirmed that at least dozens of local residents
died for this reason.
3.5.2. Massacres after Combat Came to an End
There was a striking discrepancy between Hutu and Tutsi accounts on violent
incidents that took place after Kabgayi and the local hills were brought under the
RPF’s control. Three different versions of the truth were asserted by different
parties:
49 Some Hutu families fled to Gishwati forest in Gisenyi and stayed there for nearly two months.
They returned home sometime after the RRF declared the end of the war (18 July) and the
establishment of the transitional government (19 July).
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No RPF Violence after Combat Ceased
Except Bosco, the representative of the local genocide survivors’ association, all
of the genocide survivors interviewed as well as some Hutus who were attacked
by genocide perpetrators categorically denied any type of violence committed by
the RPF after combat ceased, even though they did not deny that some people
lost their lives in the course of its military advance. According to this version,
RPF soldiers were described as ‘liberators’ who ‘killed those who obstructed
their advance to Kabgayi for liberating people at refugee camps’.50
Summary Execution of Génocidaires
The second version of the truth claims that only killers were picked up from
hiding places and executed by RPF soldiers. This version was advanced by
Bosco and several Hutu informants. Having admitted that six Hutus were killed
by RPF soldiers on his own hill, Bosco remarked, ‘They were very well known
killers hiding in their homes’ and portrayed the killings as a justifiable
retribution.51 They were shot dead where they were caught by the soldiers. Hutu
residents of another hill reported, though they admitted they were not
eyewitnesses themselves, that one day in June 1994, ten people on their hill
were taken to a ‘secret place’ by RPF soldiers, with ‘their hands tied at the back
of their bodies’, and ‘they never came back’.52
Revenge on the Local Hutu Population
According to the accounts provided by Hutu informants, Hutus who did not
participate in genocidal killings were also massacred: Some Hutu residents,
including the former MDR leader at the local level who led the resistance against
50 Interview with Bosco, Gitera, 15 Nov 2002.
51 Interview with Bosco, Gitera, 13 Nov 2002.
52 Interview with Cyprien’s family, Gitera, 24 May 2002.
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the genocidal attacks in Gitera, made a strong allegation against RPF soldiers
for massacring unarmed Hutus after combat ceased locally, especially during the
period between June and August 1994. These informants described the
massacres as ‘revenge on the Hutu’ for their presumed involvement in the
genocide. According to their accounts, up to 30 Hutus, including five visitors from
another area, were either massacred or ‘disappeared’ after being abducted by
RPF soldiers.53
3.5.3. Genocide Survivors’ Complicity
Another controversial issue in relation to the RPF violence is the role of genocide
survivors in it.54 Eric, the former MDR leader quoted above, and many other
local Hutu residents seemed to believe that some of the local genocide survivors
‘pointed the finger’ at the people subsequently killed by the RPF soldiers. Eric
accused two local genocide survivors including Bosco for guiding RPF soldiers
to the homes or other places where some Hutus were hiding, knowing the
soldiers would execute those Hutus. On the other hand, Bosco totally denied the
accusation, saying ‘It’s not survivors but others who informed the soldiers about
them’.55
3.6. Exodus to Zaire and Mass Return of Refugees
Many local residents in the sectors, particularly those of Kiberama but also some
of Gitera, fled to Zaire (the current DRC). Several informants in Kiberama said
that local hills were nearly deserted by the time Gisenyi town was captured by
the RPF on 18 July 1994.56 After the fall of Ruhengeri at the hand of the RPF on
53 Information compiled by Alexis/research assistant.
54 Des Forges (1999, 717) documented accounts of RPF soldiers using genocide survivors as
well as Hutu residents ‘to guide them to the homes of supposed perpetrators’, ‘to name killers’ or
‘to denounce supposed killers among the crowds grouped at camps for displaced persons’.
55 Interview in Gitera, 13 Nov 2002.
56 Prunier (1995, 298) notes the RPF captured Ruhengeri and Gisenyi on 13 and 18 July
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13 July, most of the local residents, including genocide survivors, were on the
run and joined the massive exodus of people crossing the border into the former
Zaire (approximately 20 kilometers from Kiberama). While it is reported that
government authorities in Ruhengeri and Gisenyi used intimidation and coercion
to have the people in the region flee with them before the arrival of RPF troops,
many people in Kiberama seem to have fled by their own choice based on the
profound fear they had of Inkotanyi (RPF fighters), as a result of the decades of
government propaganda which had portrayed them as brutal warriors who would
kill people indiscriminately.57 The local genocide survivors interviewed in
Kiberama unanimously said that they had hardly any choice but to flee with their
Hutu family members. Some of them also said that they themselves were very
much afraid of Inkotanyi.
These 1994 refugees came back home at different times. In the case of
Kiberama residents, many of the genocide survivors returned home after staying
in Goma for only a few weeks because they felt threatened by the large
presence of ex-FAR soldiers and Interahamwe militia men in refugee camps.58
While those who returned to Kiberama at an early stage were not limited to those
genocide survivors,59 a majority of the Kiberama people returned home as part
of the massive repatriation of around 550,000 refugees in the mid-November
1996 after their camps were attacked by the alliance of RPA and Laurent Kabila’s
AFDL.
The experience of Kiberama people in exile in Zaire/Congo is beyond the
respectively while one of the charts on the advance of the RPF between April and July 1994
which appeared in Des Forges (1998) indicates 14 and 17 July as the dates on which the towns
fell to the RPF respectively.
57 Interview with Pascal, Kiberama, 6 June 2002.
58 Interview with Odette, 4 June 2002; interview with Pascal, Kiberama, 6 June 2002.
59 For example, one Hutu informant said that he stayed in Goma only for a week and he found
the situation in Kiberama safe when he was back in late July 1994. Interview with Anastase, 30
May 2002.
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scope of this study. However, one item of note is that most of the grassroots
informants said that they lost their families or relatives while they were in exile
due to various reasons ranging from the combination of disease, hunger and
exhaustion,60 to violence at the hands of ex-FAR soldiers and Interahamwe
militias in the refugee camps,61 to attacks by Zairian rebels and the RPA forces
while they were either in and around the refugee camps or their flight deeper into
Congo after the initial attacks in late 1996.
3.7. Hutu Insurgents’ Attacks and Counter-Insurgency Violence, 1997-99
Attacks by Hutu rebels from eastern Congo and the government’s
counter-insurgency offensives severely affected a large part of the north-west –
Kiberama and its neighbouring sectors and districts included - which caused the
deaths of at least several thousand civilians in 1997 – 99 (AR 1998). According
to grassroots informants who spoke about their experiences during the
Insurgency,62 the security of the local population was undermined most seriously
in 1997-1998, the period in which most of the insurgency attacks and
counter-insurgency offensives by the RPA took place in and around Kiberama
sector. All of these grassroots informants agreed that the magnitude of violence
in this period was totally unprecedented in local history and many lives of local
residents were lost as a consequence. However, there was a striking
discrepancy in their claims about the nature of violence during the Insurgency.
They were particularly divided over two issues: 1) which party (the Hutu rebels
60 Eriksson (1996, 27) estimated the death toll due to the combination of the causes to be
approximately 50,000 within the first month of the 1994 Goma influx alone.
61 The level of violence within the camps has been reported to be very high. For example,
Eriksson (1996, 29) cited a result of a ‘retrospective survey’ carried out in one camp which
estimated deaths of 4,000 refugees (one camp alone) due to ‘violence at the hands of the militia,
undisciplined Zairian soldiers and other refugees’.
62 This and following paragraphs are based on the information collected from 11 individuals and
one focus group of eight lay judges of local gacaca courts. They included four genocide survivors
(two Tutsis /two ibyimanyi Hutus), 13 local residents who are not genocide survivors (all Hutus),
and two former rebel fighters (Hutus).
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behind the Insurgency or the RPA) should be blamed for the civilian killings; and
2) whether or not the local population supported or collaborated with the rebels.
Two polarised views emerged: one advanced by genocide survivors (Tutsi
women and ibyimanyi) and the other by those who are not (all Hutus).
3.7.1. Patterns of Civilian Killings
Three different patterns of civilian killings were reported by the grassroots
informants: 1) deliberate killings of civilian targets by the rebels; 2) killings in
crossfire between Hutu rebels and RPA forces; and 3) summary executions and
reprisal killings of civilians by RPA soldiers. While the first two types of killings
were largely accepted in the local population, the last one was found to be highly
controversial – asserted by non-genocide survivors and yet categorically denied
by genocide survivors.
Rebels’ Killings of Civilian Targets
The grassroots informants almost unanimously testified that the Hutu rebels
targeted local administrative officials such as a sector-level conseiller and
cell-level responsables whom the rebels castigated for collaborating with the
RPF regime, portrayed in their intense propaganda campaign as ‘the enemy of
the Hutu’.63 According to the conseiller of Kiberama, 15 civilians, including four
local administrative officials, were killed at the hands of rebels in their attacks on
the sector office or the houses of individual officials.64 No local genocide survivor
was killed, although one of them, Odette, narrowly escaped with her life from the
hands of rebels on her hill.65 According to some genocide survivors, the
63 AR (1998, 115) writes that local officials, unless they collaborated with the insurgents, were
‘the first to die at the hands of the insurgents’. See also a section on a propaganda campaign by
the Hutu rebels (98-108).
64 Interview in Kiberama, 30 May 2002.
65 According to Odette’s testimony, one afternoon rebels jumped into her house, dragged her out
and said, ‘We’ll kill you because you are a member of Inkotanyi’. They also gagged and tied up
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community of local survivors would have been eliminated if the government had
not tightened security on the local hills by establishing military posts.
Killings in Crossfire during the RPA’s Counter-Insurgency Offensive
Attacks by the Hutu rebels were usually followed by counter-insurgency
offensives by the RPA. Grassroots informants’ estimates of the numbers of
civilian casualties in the context of such military operations vary significantly from
only several to a few hundred. While all the informants seemed to agree that
these victims had been killed during combat situations, there were indeed
remarkable differences in their views concerning who should be blamed for the
killings. The informants who were genocide survivors ascribed the blame largely
to the rebels for launching attacks in the first place or hiding amongst the local
population. Three of them even blamed the victims as well for harbouring the
rebels and even fleeing with them. On the other hand, a great majority of the
informants who were non-genocide survivors blamed the RPA soldiers, claiming
that they made no attempt to distinguish unarmed civilians from the armed
rebels.
Summary Executions and Reprisal Killings by the RPA
As already noted, whether the RPA soldiers deliberately killed unarmed civilians
in circumstances other than combat situations was one of the most controversial
issues that emerged during the fieldwork in Kiberama. The first thing to be
stressed here is that there has been no official acknowledgment about any sort
of civilian killings committed by the RPA forces in Kiberama. However, the great
majority of non-genocide survivors who spoke about their experiences during the
her Hutu husband, though they did not threaten to kill him. When she was murmuring a few
words of prayer, another group of insurgents called them and suggested they should move on for
attacking somewhere else. She said, ‘I knew I was going to die but it’s God who saved me’.
(Interview in Kiberama, 4 June 2002).
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Insurgency (all but two of them including the conseiller) made an allegation
against the RPA for their killing of dozens, if not over a hundred, civilians in
Kiberama.
For example, Esther, a Hutu widow, made a strong allegation about a brutal
civilian killing perpetrated by the RPA forces in 1998.66 According to her
allegation, at around 8 p.m. a group of RPA soldiers ambushed five households
in her neighbourhood and killed (shot or bayoneted) 14 people, including three
women and three children. Only one woman escaped the killing among the
members of the five families attacked. These families were suspected by the
RPA of being collaborators with the Hutu rebels, who, according to Esther’s
son,67 had killed about 40 RPA soldiers in an ambush carried out on the same hill
earlier in the same year. Esther also reported that four young men, including one
of her sons, had been arrested by the government because they were also
wrongly suspected of their collaboration with the rebels. These kinds of serious
allegations against the RPA forces were usually made during individual
interviews where strict confidentiality was assured for informants. However, on
one occasion, a similar allegation was made even in a semi-public setting, when
a focus group interview was underway with eight lay judges elected for local
gacaca courts. None of these lay judges who turned up for the focus group
session were genocide survivors. During the session, strikingly, seven of the
participants claimed that they had lost one or more family members by the
alleged RPA atrocities in 1997-98.68 They did not deny the killings by the rebels,
but unanimously insisted that victims of the rebels were far outnumbered by
those of the RPA forces in Kiberama. On the other hand, all the genocide
66 Interview in Kiberama, 6 June 2002.
67 Interview with Antoine, Kiberama, 6 June 2002.
68 Focus group with lay gacaca court judges, Kiberama, 1 June 2002.
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survivors interviewed as well as the conseiller categorically denied any sort of
civilian killing by the RPA outside crossfire situations in Kiberama, although
Pascal, the representative of local genocide survivors’ association, admitted that
at one public meeting, the bourgmestre of ‘Mahoro’ commune had suggested a
possible reprisal against the local Hutu population if they continued to support
the rebels.69
3.7.2. Local Support for the Hutu Rebels
The issue of local support for the Hutu rebels emerged as another controversial
and sensitive issue over which the grassroots informants were sharply divided.
The division was again largely between genocide survivors who accused the
local Hutu population of complicity and the great majority of non-genocide
survivors who categorically denied a collaborative relationship with the rebels.
Three out of the four genocide survivors who commented on the issue asserted
that a large section of the local population had given strong support to the rebels
in the form of food, shelter, and information vital for their military operations.70 As
the basis of their assertion, they argued that many of the rebels who had
operated on the local hills were former Kiberama residents, thus drawing support
from their families and relatives without much difficulty. In fact, the presence of
three demobilised Hutu rebels was confirmed in Kiberama during the fieldwork.
These former rebels had been reintegrated into their own community in
Kiberama after going through a re-education programme implemented by the
National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (NURC). According to one of
them, at least 20 local young men had joined the rebel movement and some of
69 Interview in Kiberama, 7 June 2002.
70 Interviews with genocide survivors: Alice, Kiberama, 1 June 2002; Jean, Kiberama, 4 June
2002; Pascal, Kiberama, 7 June 2002.
180
them were involved in military actions in Kiberama.71 He claimed that he and
many of his fellow fighters had no choice but to join the rebels for their own
safety because of the government’s mass arrest of young Hutus in the
north-western regions in 1998.
In the political context of the north-west, it was and still is even today almost
unthinkable for Kiberama residents – except some genocide survivors who
positioned themselves unambiguously on the side of the RPF regime - to admit
any sort of local support for the rebels in public. However, such highly sensitive
information emerged on one occasion. While walking on a hill to visit one
informant, our local guide unwittingly revealed that the very path we were taking
at the time had been used by the rebels to come down to a village to receive
food from its residents.72 Given all the accounts presented in this section, it
seems likely that a significant proportion of the local population took sides in
favour of the Hutu rebels, although it is difficult to know the precise nature and
level of local support for them.
3.7.3. Accusations against Local Collaborators with the RPA
As indicated above, in Kiberama local administrative officials were the main
targets of rebels’ attacks in 1997-99. They were accused of collaborating with
the RPF-led ‘Tutsi regime’ whose aim was described as the restoration of
oppressive rule over the Hutu population. Some of the grassroots informants did
not hide their deep animosity against the present conseiller due to his alleged
complicity in some of the atrocities committed by the RPA forces. For example,
Esther, the Hutu widow quoted above, asserted that it was the conseiller who
71 Interview with Claude, Kiberama, 6 June 2002. This person testified that after joining the
rebels in July 1998, he took part in military operations in different parts of Gisenyi and Ruhengeri
as well as in the North Kivu until finally being captured in Ruhengeri in August 2001.
72 Conversation with Antoine, Kiberama, 6 June 2002.
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guided the RPA soldiers to the houses of the victims. One of the genocide
survivors interviewed was also accused of working as a driver of a government
vehicle which was often used to transport soldiers stationed in military posts
established in the sector.
4. Competing Narratives on Victimhood
Some of the controversial accounts presented above indicate the contested
nature of the issue of victimhood in the two communities. In both Gitera and
Kiberama, the dispute over the issue of victimhood was polarised along similar
ethno-political lines dividing the local population into the two groups: those
officially recognised as survivors of the genocide (the great majority of those
residents having Tutsi ancestry) and those who identified themselves primarily
as direct or indirect victims of RPF/A violence (the great majority of
Hutus/non-genocide survivors).73 By highlighting key elements of the competing
narratives advanced by the two sides, this section discusses how people’s sense
of victimhood was closely interwoven with their sense of ethnicity in the two
communities.
Before engaging in a comparative analysis of the competing narratives, two
caveats should be noted:
First, although each of the competing narratives is presented as that of one
group or the other, this does not mean that all the informants in the same
category of people exactly shared a particular set of perceptions of, or attitudes
towards and claims about the issue of victimhood. Rather, each narrative
presented below must be understood as a commonly shared perception of the
73 This thesis follows Huyse’s definitions of direct and indirect victims: the former refers to ‘those
who have suffered the direct effects of violence’ while the latter signifies ‘those who are linked to
direct victims in such a way that they too suffer because of that link (2003, 54).
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issue of victimhood, which was articulated by many, if not most, of the grassroots
informants falling in one group or the other in each sector. Second, there were
small numbers of local residents who shared neither of the competing narratives
identified in each community; thus the analysis in this section is by no means
exhaustive. The intention is not to try to represent the whole spectrum of existing
views, but to highlight the nature of contested victimhood along ethno-political
lines dividing each of the two communities.
4.1. The Narrative Advanced by Genocide Survivors
The main thrust of the narrative on victimhood advanced by genocide survivors
may be summarised as follows: they must be entitled to a special, if not
exclusive, victim status in the local population because they are the only
surviving victims of the genocide. The following are key elements of the
narrative:
4.1.1. Victimhood Bound to Ethnic Identity and the Notion of Genocide
Genocide survivors in Gitera portrayed their victimhood as something
inextricably bound to their Tutsi identity. As noted above, among the genocide
survivors, there was a shared perception that they had been persistently
targeted because they were Tutsis in what they described as the history of Tutsi
genocide which, in their view, had began with the Hutu uprising in 1959,
reaching its climax during the 1994 genocide. In other words, they portrayed
themselves as collective victims – those victimized due to their association with
an identifiable collective (Huyse 2003, 54), and the identifiable collective they
had in mind may be put in words as ‘the Tutsi’ – an imagined community
composed of people with rigid Tutsi identity. This sense of collective victimhood
as members of ‘the Tutsi’ is grounded in their lived experiences during the 1994
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genocide, which is captured in what one of the local survivors said:
I hid in the bush for seven days. While I was hiding, I heard people saying
'We'll finish all the Tutsis in our country except one for displaying in a
museum so that people would know how a Tutsi looked like’. ...74
Many of them were hunted down by local Hutu genocidal gangs just because of
their Tutsi identity. Most or all of them heard their right to existence totally denied
on radio broadcasts, during public meetings or conversations between their Hutu
neighbours. They also knew that the perpetrators of genocide really meant what
they had declared, as seemingly endless slaughters of Tutsis continued until
they were finally liberated by the RPF on 2 June 1994.
Closely connected with the centrality of ethnicity in their sense of
victimhood was the notion of ‘genocide’. The narrative of genocide survivors in
Gitera asserts that they deserve a special victim status in the local population
because of the single fact that they were survivors of genocide. Many of them
tended to represent their own suffering as much greater than any other parties’
suffering. This was most clearly demonstrated in the way they distinguished
themselves and their Tutsi relatives who had been massacred in 1994 from Hutu
victims who had also fallen at the hands of the same génocidaires. Most of the
local Tutsi genocide survivors interviewed insisted that their suffering and that of
Hutu victims in the atrocity unleashed in 1994 were totally different in nature.
Underpinning their argument was the distinction between the Kinyarwanda
notions of itsembabwoko and itsembatsemba, the terms coined by the RPF-led
post-genocide government in order to describe genocidal violence in 1994.
Itsembabwoko is a compound Kinyarwanda word that is made of two
components: itsemba and ubwoko. Itsemba comes from a verb gutsemba that
means ‘to wipe out’ or ‘to decimate’ and thus itsemba, as a noun form of
74 Interview with Bosco, Gitera, 17 May 2002.
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gutsemba, can be interpreted as ‘massacre’ or even ‘extermination’. Then,
ubwoko (pl. amoko) is a term which refers to ‘clan’ or a certain ‘group’ or
‘category’ (Prunier 1995, 370).75 Importantly, ubwoko was once used as the
term which refers to the racialised ethnic category of Hutu, Tutsi or Twa by which
each and every Rwandan had been classified and which was indicated on the
compulsory identity card introduced by the Belgian colonial administration (ibid).
Putting these two words together, itsembabwoko generally means ‘decimating
an ethnic group’ (Longman and Rutagengwa 2004, 170). Considered in relation
to the specific context of Rwandan genocide, it means mass killings carried out
with the intent to exterminate ‘the Tutsi’ as a racial group. Itsembabwoko
(Itsemba-(u)bwoko) points to the very kernel of the crime of genocide
perpetrated by the former regime. On the other hand, itsembatsemba
(itsemba-(i)tsemba) is a reiterated form of itsemba and can be interpreted as
‘extensive massacres’. In contrast to the notion of itsembabwoko,
itsembatsemba refers to the massacres of those individuals victimized in the
genocide not because of their real or imagined connection to the Tutsi identity
but because of their or their relatives’ views and/or acts that were not in
conformity with the ideology and policies of the genocidal regime.
According to the explanation made by the genocide survivors interviewed,
the Hutus killed during the genocide are victims of itsembatsemba (massacres),
not itsembabwoko (genocide); they have never been hunted down simply
because of who they were; nor have they faced the danger of themselves and
their entire families being exterminated. This distinction seems to have stemmed
from the unique and extreme form of suffering which survivors of Rwanda
75 In modern Kinyarwanda, the term is used with a range of meanings from human categories
such as ‘race’, ‘ethnic group’ or ‘clan’ to non-human classifications such as ‘species’ or ‘types’ of
animals or plants.
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genocide have gone through. Staub and Pearlman (2001, 99), psychologists
who have been involved in trauma healing work and research in post-genocide
Rwanda, observe that ‘[s]urvivors of genocide endure extreme harm and
tremendous losses, including the murder of loved ones and others in the group
in which survivors’ identity is rooted and the attempt to eliminate their entire
culture and community’. Thus, in the view of genocide survivors, their form of
victimhood should not and cannot be compared with any other forms of
victimhood.
Pottier (2002, 126) points out ‘an implied moral hierarchy’ between the two
interrelated notions of genocidal violence in the political discourse of
post-genocide Rwanda. Although he does not pay attention to how the
distinctions are made in Kinyarwanda, Pottier argues that the moral hierarchy
implied lies between Tutsi victims of genocide and Hutu victims of ‘politicide who
died in massacres’ (ibid). The Rwandan government officially abolished the use
of the two Kinyarwanda terms in 2003 with its adoption of new constitution in
which they were replaced by a single term jenoside.76
Like their counterparts in Gitera, genocide survivors in Kiberama asserted
the primacy of their own victimhood as survivors of the 1994 genocide, stressing
the same notion of itsembabwoko (genocide) as the kernel of their victimhood.
This was demonstrated most evidently in their way of distinguishing themselves
from other categories of people also laying claim to victimhood in their
community. When he was asked whether members of the opposition party
assaulted by Hutu militants could be considered as ‘survivors’ like him, Pascal, a
genocide survivor with a mixed ethnic background - emphatically denied it:
There is no reason to consider those people as survivors. They were
76 Chapter 8 addresses the politics behind this change in the terminology of genocide.
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attacked because of political reasons. But I was targeted because of my
ethnicity (ubwoko) since the time I was in the primary school.77
For the genocide survivors in Kiberama, whether the person was killed or
injured on the basis of his/her ethnic identity was an essential criterion for being
counted as a victim/survivor of itsembabwoko (genocide). This is the same logic
as the one employed by genocide survivors in Gitera in their assertion that their
victimhood should take precedence over those of Hutus who survived the
attacks perpetrated by the same genocidal forces.
Despite this fundamental similarity in their views on the centrality of ethnic
identity as the criterion of authentic victimhood, genocide survivors in the two
communities differ from each other on the criteria for determining the very ethnic
category of Tutsi who had suffered collective victimization. In Gitera, for one to
be unequivocally considered a genocide victim/survivor, he must be a Tutsi who
belonged to a Tutsi lineage (umuryango) while people categorised as Tutsi
women married to Hutu men (and integrated into their Hutu lineages) and
ibyimanyi were excluded from the membership of the local genocide survivors’
association. To be precise, being ibyimanyi or the offspring of ethnically-mixed
parents does not necessarily make any person excluded from the membership
of the local genocide survivors’ association in Gitera. Ibyimanyi who were found
totally excluded from the membership were those with Hutu fathers. As noted
above, most of the ibyimanyi identified in Gitera were Hutus, reflecting the
predominant pattern of inter-ethnic marriage in the local population, which is
between a Hutu man and a Tutsi woman.
By contrast, in Kiberama, for a person to be considered as a victim/survivor
of genocide, he did not have to be a ‘Tutsi’ in the same strict or racial sense as
generally understood in Gitera. On the contrary, the membership of the genocide
77 Interview in Kiberama, 7 Dec 2002.
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survivors’ association in Kiberama was entirely comprised of the very category of
people who were excluded from Gitera’s group of genocide survivors. Pascal,
the president of the local genocide survivors’ association himself appeared to
have an ambiguous sense of ethnic identity. He had vaguely considered himself
to be a Hutu inheriting his father’s identity until people around him, including his
teachers and school mates, began to harass him because of his Tutsi mother.
‘I’ve never been sure about my ethnicity, but the people began to call me an
accomplice of Inkotanyi’, he one day recalled.78 Accordingly, most of other
survivors of genocide in Kiberama did not stress the strict definition of ‘Tutsi’ as
an essential criterion of genuine victimhood in their narrative.
4.1.2. The Tendency to Minimise the Victimhood of Hutus
Genocide survivors’ claims concerning the primacy of their own victimhood were
usually interwoven with a range of assertions that disregard, negate or minimise
the victimhood of Hutu neighbours caused by various acts of violence described
above. This tendency was observed among genocide survivors in both Gitera
and Kiberama, although it was more salient in Gitera. In Gitera, the fact that
some of the local Hutu residents were also killed or attacked by genocide
perpetrators is ignored. As mentioned above, Bosco, the Tutsi leader of local
genocide survivors, completely disregarded five Hutu victims of
itsembatsemba.79 According to multiple Hutu informants, they had been killed by
genocide perpetrators but in Bosco’s account, they were not even mentioned.
Furthermore, some of the other Tutsi survivors denied even the possibility that
Hutus might have been attacked by genocide perpetrators. Asked whether he
was aware of any Hutus attacked during the genocide, one of them stated that
78 Interview in Kiberama, 6 June 2002.
79 See Genocide Victims in Gitera in Section 3.4.1. of this chapter.
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none of the local Hutus ‘were killed because they were all united in the aim of
wiping out Batutsi’80.
Concerning those Hutus who had survived itsembatsemba, two local Tutsi
survivors of genocide, including Bosco, personally acknowledged the existence
of three Hutus who had been attacked because they opposed the killings of
Tutsis. This did not mean, however, that they felt that the suffering of these
Hutus deserved the same recognition and compensation as their own suffering.
In fact, at the time of fieldwork, there was not even a single Hutu beneficiary of a
governmental programme designed for assisting ‘needy survivors of genocide
and massacres’ in education, health and housing, whereas all the Tutsi genocide
survivors were on the list of beneficiaries. According to the law on a national
assistance fund for needy victims of genocide and massacres, Hutu victims of
this category were entitled to the same assistance, provided that they were
considered as ‘needy’ by a local committee composed of leaders of genocide
survivors.81 Even though the law does not make any reference to ethnic
categories, the problem seems to be that the term ‘survivor’ or ‘uwacitse ku
icumu’ (pl. abacitse ku icumu) – a Kinyarwanda term which literally means ‘a
person who escaped a spear’ – is used in post-genocide Rwanda for living
victims of itsembabwoko or genocide in the sense of ‘decimating an ethnic
group’, particularly (but not exclusively)82 those with unequivocal Tutsi identity.
The local Tutsi genocide survivors issued a blanket denial with regard to the
Hutus allegedly killed by the RPF soldiers. As reported earlier, apart from Bosco,
all the genocide survivors interviewed in Gitera rejected the local Hutus’
80 Interview with Pierre, Gitera, 23 Nov 2002.
81 See Article 15, Law N° 02/98 of 22/01/1998 – Establishing a national assistance fund for
needy victims of genocide and massacres committed in Rwanda between 1, 1990, and
December 31, 1994. The law does not make any reference to the ethnic categories. It says the
fund is meant for needy survivors of genocide (itsembabwoko) and massacres (itsembatsemba).
82 A case in point is a group of genocide survivors with ethnically mixed parentage in Kiberama.
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accusation as to the alleged RPF atrocities. In the words of one Tutsi informant,
Nothing like that took place. If that had happened, those who are in prison
now would have been all killed.83
Even Bosco justified the alleged killings as a legitimate retribution for those
notorious killers of Tutsis. Having admitted the killing of six Hutus by RPF
soldiers on his own hill, he remarked: ‘They were well known killers hiding in
their homes’.84
In contrast to their counterparts in Gitera who disregarded or emphatically
denied the victimhood of local Hutu population, the genocide survivors
interviewed in Kiberama drew a distinction between the Hutus whose victimhood
should be recognised and the Hutus whose claim to victimhood should be
rejected. The Hutus categorised as the former were those attacked/killed by the
genocidal forces at different times in the recent past (both the former regime
before and during the genocide and the Hutu rebels in 1997-9) while the Hutus
categorised as the latter were those attacked/killed by the RPA in their
counter-offensives against the rebels.
The Hutus whose victimhood were recognised, at least partially, by the
genocide survivors in Kiberama consisted of two groups of victims. The first
were the members of the political opposition attacked by supporters of the ruling
party MRND in 1993. As noted above, the genocide survivors in Kiberama
asserted that their own victimhood must take precedence over that of these Hutu
victims. Nevertheless, their recognition of the victimhood of these people should
be noted, especially given that it was largely neglected in the narrative of
genocide survivors in Gitera. The second category of Hutu victims recognised by
the Kiberama genocide survivors were those Hutus killed by the rebels during
83 Interview with Pierre, Gitera, 23 Nov 2002.
84 Interview in Gitera, 13 Nov 2002.
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the Insurgency.
In apparent contrast, the genocide survivors in Kiberama categorically
denied the suffering of many Hutus caused by the RPA, that of the families of 14
people allegedly massacred as they were suspected of supporting the rebels in
1998. Asked about this, one genocide survivor said:
The government soldiers came to save people. No one was killed by them
in this sector. Those people (making allegation against the government
soldiers) are deceiving you.85
Concerning the deaths of local Hutus who were caught in the crossfire during the
RPA’s counter-offensive, as was noted above, the local genocide survivors
ascribed the blame to the Hutu rebels for hiding amongst the local population as
well as to the victims themselves for harbouring the rebels or fleeing with them.
4.1.3. Presuming Collective Guilt of Hutus
The tendency to minimise the victimhood of Hutu neighbours may be understood
as the flip side of genocide survivors’ tendency to represent their victimhood as
something very unique and greater than that of others. As noted at the outset of
this chapter, this is in fact quite a common phenomenon in societies ravaged by
violence where there is fierce ‘victim competition’ over various forms of
reparation. Another reason behind their negation of Hutus’ victimhood can be a
profound fear that they themselves might be accused of having been complicit in
the genocide, or of taking an anti-government position if they show an
understanding attitude towards the victimhood of Hutus. Human rights violations
allegedly committed by RPF/A forces against Hutu civilians were and still are, a
taboo subject that people were/are frightened to talk openly about. Thus, the fact
of the matter is that not only genocide survivors but also most people living in
85 Interview with Jean, Kiberama, 4 June 2002.
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Rwanda, including expatriates, are inclined to keep silent over this controversy.
Towards the end of the fieldwork, it became increasingly apparent that there
was another profound reason for minimising the victimhood of Hutus in
post-genocide Rwanda: that is, the problem of presumed guilt assigned to the
whole group of people with Hutu identity. This problem is particularly salient in
the genocide survivors’ narratives in Gitera. For example, one genocide survivor
stated:
The number of people massacred during the genocide in 1994 was one and
a half million, and from this figure it’s estimated at least four and a half
million people were implicated in the genocide. So it’s impossible to punish
all of them. [...]86
Considering the estimated population of seven and a half million before the
onset of the genocide, what is assumed in this accusation is that nearly every
Hutu, excluding very young children, were implicated in the genocide one way or
another. Not all the genocide survivors in Gitera made the same assumption; in
fact, as presented above, at least a few of them acknowledged the existence of
Hutu victims who had risked their lives for saving some Tutsi neighbours.
However, the portrayal of Hutu as a people collectively responsible for the
genocide in 1994 emerged as a common theme in genocide survivors’ narrative
of the local history of violence in Gitera.
With this tendency to presume collective guilt of Hutus in genocide
survivors’ narratives, there was in fact a sharp contrast between the two
communities. Unlike their counterparts in Gitera, the genocide survivors
interviewed in Kiberama did not portray the local Hutu population as a
homogeneous collective responsible for the genocide. Quite significantly, all of
them acknowledged the existence of Hutu individuals and families – including
86 Interview with Emmanuel, Gitarama, 25 May 2002.
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their spouses, relatives, and neighbours – who had sheltered them and/or
assisted their escape from genocide perpetrators. For example, one female
genocide survivor expressed her gratitude to several Hutu families in her
neighbourhood for ‘taking a great risk’ in hiding herself and her children for an
extended period of time in 1993-4.87 This woman and others reported several
other stories about the ‘goodness’ demonstrated by some local Hutus of integrity
during the genocide.88 In short, the genocide survivors in Kiberama seem
disinclined to generalise guilt to the entire local Hutu population.
However, they appeared to presume a crude dichotomy in the present local
population: those who are anti-genocidal forces/pro-RPF government vs. those
who are pro-genocidal forces/anti-RPF government. According to this
dichotomous framework, there is no individual who is anti-genocide and
anti-RPF government at the same time. Most of the local genocide survivors
interviewed put themselves unequivocally into the former category by portraying
the RPA as the protector of the local population from the aggression of the
genocidal forces. They not only refuted the local Hutus’ allegations against the
RPA forces but also accused those making such allegations of being
pro-genocide, thereby categorically denying the victimhood of local Hutus that
could be attributed to the RPA violence during the Insurgency.
4.2. The Narrative Advanced by the Hutu Informants
Both in Gitera and Kiberama, the great majority of Hutu informants advanced a
counter narrative sharply conflicting with the narrative of genocide survivors.
87 However, this informant told me that she and other genocide survivors who had managed to
hide themselves in the are during the genocide were forced to seek refuge outside Kiberama
during the Insurgency, which might be interpreted as a sign of aggravated polarization along
ethno-political lines with the local population after the genocide.(Interview with Alice, Kiberama, 1
June 2002)
88 For example, they spoke of an elderly Tutsi widow who had been kept alive until she passed
away naturally and an influential Hutu resident known as a ‘man of faith’ who had attempted to
persuade the local population not to participate in the genocide.
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Although these two groups of Hutu residents emphatically laid claim to
victimhood, the way they did it was remarkably different from that of the
genocide survivors.
4.2.1. Attributing the Victimhood of Hutus to the Atrocities of Tutsis
In both Gitera and Kiberama, Hutu informants’ narratives of political violence in
their localities put a strong emphasis on the victimhood of Hutus, although there
are some notable differences in the ways in which they did it. Most of the Hutu
informants in Gitera affirmed that many Tutsis, including local Tutsi residents,
had been massacred by Hutu perpetrators in 1994.89 Some of them even
admitted to some extent - directly or indirectly - the implication of local Hutus in
the genocidal killings.90
No Hutu informant in Gitera denied outright the victimhood of local Tutsi
genocide survivors, particularly when it is compared with the almost blanket
denial of local genocide survivors’ victimhood observed among Hutu informants
in Kiberama. What the Hutu informants in Gitera emphasised instead was
mutual victimization between ‘the Hutu’ and ‘the Tutsi’. Their admission of local
Tutsis’ victimhood was almost always followed by the assertion that they had
also been victimized by ‘the Tutsi’. One of the Hutu informants said:
Bahutu killed Batutsi and then Batutsi killed Bahutu for revenge. The two
parties have to accept that lives were lost on both sides and forgive each
other.91
By portraying Bahutu and Batutsi92 as two enemy groups who have inflicted
89 It is important to understand that, as Lemarchand (1998, 7) observed, what many Hutus tend
to deny is not that Tutsis were massacred by Hutus but that the killings ‘were systematically
planned and executed’ for the annihilation of Tutsis.
90 There were several exceptional Hutu residents who admitted the local Hutus’ implication in the
genocide. They include five confessed prisoners from Gitera, some of their families, and Hutus
attacked by genocide perpetrators.
91 Interview with Rose, Gitera, 23 May 2002.
92 Bahutu and Batutsi are Kinyarwanda words that can be translated as ‘Hutus’ or ‘the people of
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injuries on each other in the past, the notion of equal culpability appears to be
advanced here: ‘the Tutsi’ are equally as culpable as ‘the Hutu’ thus, ‘the Tutsi’
are also to blame. What seems to be taking place here may be seen as the
denial of full responsibility for the genocide on the part of Hutus through what
Ignatieff (1996, 118) calls ‘complex strategies of relativisation’. He writes: ‘Here
one accepts the facts but argues that the enemy was equally culpable or that the
accusing party is also to blame or that such ‘excesses’ are regrettable
necessities in time of war. To relativise is to have it both ways: to admit the facts
while denying full responsibility for them’.
According to this mutual victimization framework, the victimhood of Hutus is
attributed to the atrocities of Tutsis – primarily through the alleged civilian killings
by RPF soldiers in the aftermath of the genocide and secondarily through
prolonged imprisonment of innocent Hutus based on false accusations by Tutsi
genocide survivors. Those Hutus who had been killed at the hands of Hutu
perpetrators were rarely mentioned by the local Hutu informants.
With regard to the alleged RPF killings, the Hutu informants accounted for it
primarily in terms of ‘revenge’ by ‘the Tutsi’ who had lost their members all over
the country by the brutal murders ‘the Hutu’ perpetrated. As noted earlier,
according to the majority of the local Hutu informants, not only those implicated
in the genocide but also innocent Hutus were massacred in the alleged reprisal
killings by the RPF forces. Underlying this accusation appears to be a perception
shared by most of the local Hutu informants and probably many more local Hutu
residents: the revenge by ‘the Tutsi’ was exacted on the local Hutu population
because they – as members of ‘the Hutu’ - were collectively held responsible for
the attempted annihilation of ‘the Tutsi’.
Hutu’ and ‘Tutsis’ or ‘the people of Tutsi’ respectively.
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The Hutu informants in Kiberama presented their victimhood differently.
They portrayed themselves as ‘innocent victims’ who, despite their ‘innocence’
during the genocide, had lost so many loved ones at the hands of RPA soldiers
particularly at the height of its counter-insurgency operation in 1997-98. As noted
above, evidence collected during the fieldwork suggests that a considerable
number of local Hutus were implicated in the genocide even though they were
probably not a majority. However, most of the local Hutu informants asserted
otherwise: except a handful of disgraceful individuals, they stood firm against the
genocidal forces who came from outside the local hills.
During a focus group session with nine gacaca judges who happened to be
all Hutus, one of them asserted:
We tried our best to protect them. That’s why only one Tutsi was killed in
Kiberama, and all the three offenders are in jail, serving the sentences
given to them.93
They asserted that despite their innocence, numerous Hutus had been brutally
massacred or ‘disappeared’ after arbitrary arrests by the RPA soldiers in their act
of revenge because ‘the Hutu’ were collectively held responsible for the ‘Tutsi
genocide’. They even depicted what happened locally and in other parts of the
north-western regions in 1997-99 as the ‘Hutu genocide’ by the Tutsi-dominated
RPF regime. The same gacaca judge quoted above made the following
allegation:
In 1997 and 1998, thousands of people were slaughtered like animals. In
Kiberama, Inkotanyi selectively killed the most educated Hutus in the area.
[...] That was itsembabwoko (genocide) because they targeted only Hutus.
93 Focus group with lay judges of gacaca courts, Kiberama, 1 June 2002. To be sure, the
assertion made by the lay judges and several other Hutu residents is not without foundation.
Rather, it is built on factual elements widely acknowledged in the local hills – even accepted by
most, if not all, of the genocide survivors: 1) Many of local Tutsis and ibyimanyi were hidden by
local Hutu families during the genocide; 2) Only one local resident is widely known to have been
killed during the genocide; and 3) Three former residents involved in the killing have been
convicted.
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The notion of itsembabwoko was employed in this accusation to describe the
atrocity against the local Hutu population perpetrated by the RPA. In Gitera, no
one made this kind of explicit charge of ‘Hutu genocide’ by the RPF/A forces.
While most of the local Hutu informants blamed the RPA for the brutal
atrocities against the local Hutu population, they appeared to be less
condemning of the Hutu rebels, although they admitted that several Hutus’ lives
had been claimed by those attackers. During the focus group with the lay judges
of local gacaca courts, the rebels were even portrayed as armed insurgents
fighting the RPA for protecting the local Hutu population from its aggression.
After condemning the atrocities allegedly committed by the RPA, one of the lay
judges expressed his sympathetic attitude towards the rebels:
It was good to have those fighters because otherwise many more people
would have been killed. They protected us from the aggression of
Inkotanyi.94
4.2.2. Negating Genocide Survivors’ Victimhood
As indicated above, there was not much outright denial of the victimhood of local
genocide survivors in the narrative advanced by Hutu informants in Gitera. The
fact that a significant number of Tutsis were attacked and only some of them
survived seemed to be generally accepted by the local population at large.
However, the situation in Kiberama was totally different. As noted above,
according to the dominant Hutu narrative in Kiberama, the local residents who
were identified with Tutsi (Tutsi women married to Hutu men and children of
mixed parentage) were well protected by the local Hutus during the genocide;
hence there is no ‘real’ genocide survivor in Kiberama. Among the local Hutu
informants, there was a strong denial of local genocide survivors’ victimhood.
94 Focus group with lay judges of gacaca courts, Kiberama, 1 June 2002.
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Esther, the Hutu widow quoted earlier asserted: ‘Those who are called survivors
in this area are not real survivors because they were never attacked’.95 She
went on to claim that the local survivors were just pretending to have been
harmed during the genocide in order to get special assistance which only those
considered to be survivors were entitled. Esther then complained: ‘They are well
assisted [by the government]. Their children are studying free. If they become ill,
they get medication free. But we don’t get anything despite the fact that we also
lost our families’.
4.2.3. Condemning the Culpabilities of Genocide Survivors
In Gitera, the Hutu informants accused some of the local genocide survivors of
being complicit in the atrocities committed against Hutus. As already noted, the
specific party accused of the Hutu killings in question was the Inkotanyi, RPF
soldiers. No survivor of genocide was accused of any direct violence against the
local Hutu population but this does not mean that local Tutsi survivors were
considered blameless. On the contrary, they were accused of indirect
involvement in the atrocities against the local Hutu population. For example,
after describing the role of Tutsi survivors in ‘guiding soldiers to places where
Hutus were hiding’, one Hutu informant asserted: ‘It was revenge. Those who
were hated by survivors were picked up and killed by the soldiers’.96 The
assumption seems to be that the local Tutsi residents were intimately connected
with the RPF. They did not kill Hutus but they were implicated in a range of
atrocities against local Hutus: ‘pointing a finger at those hiding’ who were then
massacred by the RPF soldiers; ‘making false accusations against innocent
Hutus’ who were then unlawfully put into jail; and supporting the RPF since its
95 Interview in Kiberama, 5 Dec 2002.
96 Interview with Eric, Gitera, 23 Nov 2002.
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formation.
In Kiberama, antipathy towards the local genocide survivors appeared to be
quite widespread and intense among the Hutu residents, except those of some
ethnically mixed families. Those Hutu informants who expressed such antipathy
towards them during the fieldwork included even some of those who were known
to have taken personal risks for hiding some genocide survivors in 1994. As their
counterparts in Gitera did, they portrayed the local genocide survivors generally
as ibyitso or collaborators of their victimizers. Some of them even warned me not
to trust the words of genocide survivors. Again, none of the local genocide
survivors was accused of direct involvement in the alleged RPA violence, but
they were condemned for their presumed association with the RPA soldiers as
they were generally considered by the local Hutu population as supporters of the
RPF regime.
5. Perceiving Victimhood through the Filter of Ethnicity
Some of the claims and perspectives advanced by the adversarial groups in
each fieldwork community are in stark conflict. However, a comparative analysis
of the competing narratives has yielded an insight about a fundamental
commonality between them; that is, both of the adversarial groups in the two
communities seemed to interpret violent events in the past primarily in ethnic
terms or through the filter of ethnicity, thereby reducing the complex history of
violent conflict to the simplistic version of ‘the Hutu’ vs. ‘the Tutsi’ conflict. The
term ‘filter of ethnicity’ is used here to denote the widespread tendency observed
among the informants in the two communities to interpret social or political
events and their experiences of them in connection with the Hutu/Tutsi divide in
Rwandan society.
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5.1. Perceived Connection between Victimhood and Ethnicity
In each of the narratives presented above, political violence inflicted on group
members is attributed to ethnic identity; it is explained that they were targeted
not because of what they did but because of who they were in terms of their
ethnicity.
As for the narratives advanced by the two groups of genocide survivors with
distinctive senses of ethnic identity (those in Gitera with a strong sense of Tutsi
identity and those in Kiberama with a rather ambiguous sense of ethnic identity
because of their mixed ethnic background), central to the sense of their
victimhood is the notion of itsembabwoko that signifies the extermination of a
specific ethnic group. In both of the narratives advanced by these groups, it is
stressed that genocide survivors themselves and their deceased relatives were
targeted and attacked primarily because of their ethnic identity – either being
Tutsi (Gitera) or being identified with Tutsi due to mixed ethnic background
(Kiberama).
As for the narratives advanced by the Hutu residents in Gitera and
Kiberama, the atrocities committed against them by the RPF/A is explained as
‘revenge’ by ‘the Tutsi’ for the genocide perpetrated by ‘the Hutu’. It is
emphasised in their narratives that all Hutus were held collectively responsible
for the ‘Tutsi genocide’. In the case of Kiberama, the local Hutu residents even
portrayed themselves as collective victims of ‘Hutu genocide’.
As discussed in Chapter 4, violent conflicts in Rwanda since the late 1950s
emanated from a power struggle between political elites. It was neither
primordial ethnic hatred nor a hostile relationship between ‘the Hutu’ and ‘the
Tutsi’ that caused violence in the first place; rather, it was political violence based
on the divisive racial ideology that exacerbated cleavages between those with
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Hutu identity and those with Tutsi identity. Despite the political roots of the
Rwandan conflict, a great majority of ordinary residents in the two communities
perceived the violent conflict in Rwanda primarily in ethnic/racial terms as
something attributable to the centuries-old antagonistic relationship between the
two rival groups.
5.2. The Hutu/The Tutsi Dichotomy
The analysis of the two competing narratives identified in the two fieldwork
communities suggests that, apart from the narrative advanced by genocide
survivors with mixed ethnic background in Kiberama, all of them presuppose a
crude dichotomy of ‘the Hutu’ vs. ‘the Tutsi’ – an essentialist construction of
Rwanda as a society comprised mainly of the two ethnic/racial groups in
conflict.97 As Eltringham (2004) stresses, this is in fact the very construction of
Rwandan society which perpetrators of the genocide espoused and tried to
impose on society. In other words this is the ideological underpinning of
Rwandan genocide. The problematic, dichotomous construction of Rwandan
society has been profoundly internalised not only by genocide perpetrators but
also by different sections of the local populations, including genocide survivors.
According to this fictional construction as identified in the narratives,
anybody in the local population (and in Rwandan society at large) is, without any
ambiguity, either on the side of ‘the Hutu’ or ‘the Tutsi’, demonstrating
unshakable loyalty to the group to which he/she belongs. No one crosses the
boundaries dividing the two groups. Underlying the dichotomous construction is
‘a corporate view of ethnicity’ discussed in Chapter 4, which considers Hutu and
Tutsi (as well as Twa) to be internally homogeneous and yet mutually exclusive
97 Eltringham (2004, 69-99) discusses in detail a ‘binary framework of Rwandan society’ and a
problematic notion of collective guilt based on ethnic identity.
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groups with distinctive racial, cultural and historical origins. This particular view
of ethnicity was developed and propagated largely as a consequence of the
Belgian colonial rule characterised with discriminatory policies based on these
racialised ethnic categories, and in the more recent history of Rwanda, it has
been further consolidated in the society due to its manipulative use by political
elites as a tool for political mobilisation.
The problematic nature of this dichotomous construction manifests itself in
two closely interconnected ways: first, generalisation of guilt to those identified
with the opposing ethnic category and second, disregard for the victimhood of
those who do not conform to the dichotomous framework.
5.2.1. Generalisation of Guilt based on Ethnic Identity
The generalisation of guilt based on ethnic identity has been a pervasive
problem in Rwanda at least since the late 1950s (Newbury 1998, 14). Many
observers have noted that in post-genocide Rwanda, people with Hutu identity
have been blamed collectively for the 1994 genocide.98 Des Forges (1999, 736)
states: ‘[t]he unexamined and incorrect assumptions that all Hutu killed Tutsi, or
at least actively participated in the genocide in some way, has become
increasingly common both among Rwandans and outsiders’. Mamdani (2001,
267) describes the assumption of such collective Hutu guilt underlying the official
political discourse:
The assumption is that every Hutu who opposed the genocide was killed.
The flip side of this assumption is that every living Hutu was either an active
participant or a passive onlooker in the genocide. Morally, if not legally, both
are culpable. The dilemma is that to be a Hutu in contemporary Rwanda is
to be presumed a perpetrator.
98 See for example: Eltringham 2004; Des Forges 1999, 736; Newbury 1998, 8; Mamdani 2001,
267; Eltringham and Van Hoyweghen 2001, 226; Pottier 2002, 148-50; Wagner 1998, 26-9;
Lemarchand 1998; Jefremovas 1995, 28; Sibomana 1999; Prunier 1997.
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As noted above, such generalisation of guilt based on ethnic identity – not
only to Hutu but also Tutsi - was found to be particularly salient in Gitera. The
Tutsi genocide survivors interviewed in Gitera demonstrated the tendency to
describe local Hutu residents as actual or potential genocide perpetrators,
whereas many of the Hutu informants labelled the local Tutsi genocide survivors
as the accomplices of the RPF. In either case, the collective other is depicted as
the victimizer of the collective self. Similar ethnicity-based generalisation of
blame also featuring the dominant Hutu narrative in Kiberama where, despite
their ambiguous ethnic status and close connections with local Hutu families, all
the local survivors were labelled as ‘Tutsi’ and condemned for their presumed
association with the RPF/A. In all of these cases, those individuals identified with
the opposing category were held responsible and blamed for the atrocities
committed against one’s group despite the fact that each act of violence was
committed by specific individuals.
5.2.2. Disregarded Victims/Survivors
If one assumes that the local population is comprised only of ‘the Hutu’ and ‘the
Tutsi’ - two internally homogeneous and yet mutually exclusive groups in conflict,
then part of the logically inevitable consequence would be disregard for those
who do not conform to the dichotomous construction. There are particularly two
categories of victims/survivors who were neglected in the competing narratives
identified in the two communities (all but the one given by the genocide survivors
with mixed ethnic background in Kiberama).
The first category of victims/survivors is that of those with mixed ethnic
background, many of whom had an ambiguous sense of ethnic identity.99 By
99 Eltringham (2004, 24) observes that according to the genocide perpetrators’ construction of
Rwandan society, the existence of ibyimanyi or ‘hybrids’ is considered as ‘a nonsensical
aberration’.
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requiring a person to be classified as either Hutu or Tutsi, the dichotomous
construction leaves no place for those people with ambiguous ethnic status;
consequently, they are either ignored or labelled as one or the other. In the case
of Gitera, it is hard to tell the exact gravity of violence inflicted on them.100
However, it is known that Tutsi women married to Hutu men received death
threats from local perpetrators of genocide, which led them to go into hiding with
their children for several weeks. Some of their Hutu husbands were also forced
to hide in order to avoid a confrontation with the perpetrators searching for their
wives. Despite this kind of traumatic experience that these ethnically mixed
families went through, neither of the competing narratives identified in Gitera
recognises their suffering. In fact, most of these Tutsi women identified in Gitera
were not officially considered as genocide survivors.101 Interestingly, most of the
grassroots informants – Tutsis and Hutus alike – expressed a view that these
Tutsi wives were rather considered as members of local Hutu lineages. For Tutsi
genocide survivors, they were neither ‘genuine’ victims nor ‘innocent’ bystanders
of the Tutsi genocide because they could not escape the guilt collectively
assigned to all Hutus. For many Hutu residents (not those with ethnically mixed
background), these individuals were a few negligible exceptions to the general
patterns of violence according to the framework of mutual victimization, that is,
either Hutus victimized by Tutsis or Tutsis victimized by Hutus.
In the case of Kiberama, local residents with ambiguous ethnic status were
targeted both in the anti-Tutsi violence in the early 1990s and the 1994 genocide
because they were the only people identified with Tutsi in the local population.
100 African Rights suggests that attacks on such families of mixed-ethnic marriage were
extensively carried out during the genocide. It reports (1995, 1001):
[T]he extremists were determined to destroy families that crossed the Hutu-Tutsi divide.
They were determined to destroy the very idea of such marriage too.
101 There was only one exception to this: a Tutsi woman who was physically injured by an attack
of genocide perpetrators. Her Hutu husband was also injured during the genocide because he
did not tell genocide perpetrators about his wife’s hiding place.
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While the unique nature of their victimhood is to some extent captured in the
narrative advanced by the local genocide survivors with ambiguous ethnic status,
it is totally neglected in the dominant Hutu narrative of local-level political
violence. For the Hutus who described themselves primarily as victims of the
RPA violence, these people with mixed ethnic background were on the enemy
side, having been complicit in the RPA’s atrocities committed against the local
Hutu population.
The second category concerns the Hutus attacked/killed by genocide
perpetrators (victims/survivors of itsembatsemba/massacres). In the case of
Gitera, some of the accounts presented earlier clearly point to local Hutu
residents who were killed, beaten up or deprived of their property by genocide
perpetrators for various reasons, including opposing the genocide either overtly
or covertly. However, neither of the competing narratives identified in Gitera pays
attention to this category of Hutu victims/survivors. An illuminating case in point
was a Hutu family who sheltered two Tutsi children and were consequently
attacked by local Hutu perpetrators. This family of Hutu survivors were totally
isolated from the rest of the local population due to their peculiar position in it.
They were ‘in the middle of nowhere’ in the post-genocide community, sharply
divided along ethno-political lines.102 In other words, they were invisible
survivors of the 1994 violence whose victimhood is obliterated in either of the
competing narratives so blinded by the assumption of ‘the Hutu’ vs. ‘the Tutsi’
conflict. On the one hand, many local Tutsi genocide survivors seemed to negate
the victimhood of Hutus like this family based on the notion that all Hutus were
‘united in the aim of wiping out Tutsis’,103 thus no Hutu was harmed by Hutus
during the genocide. On the other hand, many local Hutus seemed to feel bitter
102 Interview with Caliste, Gitera, 15 Nov 2002.
103 Interview with Pierre, Gitera, 23 Nov 2002
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about these Hutu survivors whom they considered as those taking sides with
Tutsis - their victimizers.
In the case of Kiberama, as already reported above, accounts provided by
local genocide survivors indicate that at least several local Hutus affiliated with
the opposition political party were attacked by local MRND militants in 1993,
including a local school teacher who was beaten to death. However, the
memories of these victims are totally obscured in the narrative shared by Hutu
informants who portrayed the entire Hutu population as ‘innocent victims’ of Tutsi
atrocities. Hutu members of the opposition – particularly those who openly
denounced the human rights abuses by the former Hutu regime – were labelled
as ibyitso and eliminated well before the onset of the genocide.104 From the
perspective of genocide perpetrators, these Hutu dissidents had to be eliminated
because, as Eltringham notes, their existence would have undermined ‘the
construction of Rwandan society on which the genocide perpetrators depended’
(2004, 99). And the very construction they depended was the one based on the
crude racial dichotomy of ‘the Hutu’ vs. ‘the Tutsi’. Eltringham observers (2004,
94):
When the commitment of Hutu politicians to the Arusha process
demonstrated the absurdity of a simple, ethnic/racial dichotomy of ‘the Hutu
vs the Tutsi’, those who were to perpetrate the genocide shifted these
anomalous individuals into the ibyitso category in order to maintain the
simple binary segmentation they required. This demonstrates, again, that
when ‘matters out-of-category disturb the entire structure [they] must be
either corrected or effaced’ (Geertz 1983: 180).
Similarly, the narrative of the Hutu teacher beaten to death by Hutu militants has
to be obliterated in order to maintain the notion of the local Hutu population as
104 Prunier (1995, 231) notes that these Hutus were eliminated as ‘objective’ ibyitso because
they opposed ‘the democratic majority’, whereas Tutsis were eliminated as ‘ontological’ ibyitso
due to their ethnicity identified as the one of the RPF.
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‘innocent victims’ of Tutsi atrocities and – probably more fundamentally – the
dichotomous framework of ‘the Hutu’ vs. ‘the Tutsi’ that underlies their
‘ethnicized’ narrative of victimhood.
5.3. The Illusion of a Dichotomous Construction
As demonstrated above, the assumption of the Hutu/the Tutsi dichotomy
appears to have taken root deeply in the minds of many people in the two
communities. Nonetheless, the data collected during the fieldwork clearly
suggest the illusive nature of this construction, despite its strong social influence
observed in the two communities. The following part of this section makes two
particularly important points based on some of the findings presented above.
First, the particularities of local people’s experience of political violence
described in this chapter cannot be reduced to ‘the Hutu’ vs. ‘the Tutsi’ conflict –
whether violence was inflicted by one side to the other or by both sides to each
other. Things are clearly more complicated. Newbury and Newbury (1999, 295)
make a similar point as follows:
[D]espite the official propaganda, this cannot easily be reduced to a simple
conflict of “Hutu” versus “Tutsi.” In fact, the first victims were political
opponents of the Habyarimana regime; many were Hutu. Furthermore,
significant numbers of Hutu resisted the genocide, often by hiding and
protecting those at risk. In addition, Rwandan society was much more
complex than such a bipolar vision would imply: there was significant
interaction among individuals and families of different social categories, at
all levels, including “intermarriage.”
Contrary to the notion that all Hutus were united for the cause of genocide, there
were certainly Hutus who resisted the killings of their Tutsi neighbours (Gitera) or
those with mixed ethnic background whom perpetrators of the genocide
identified as Tutsi (Kiberama). They resisted the genocidal massacres for
various reasons such as family ties or friendship with those targeted or religious
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belief and/or political ideology against the genocidal regime. Also, contrary to
what many Hutu informants asserted, the suffering of Hutus in the past decades
was not necessarily caused by Tutsis; significant numbers of Hutus in both
communities were injured or killed by Hutu perpetrators at different times in the
recent past. These pieces of evidence clearly indicate that despite its strong
influence on how the people of the two communities interpreted the history of
violent conflict and their victimhood, the dichotomous construction did not match
actual experiences of the people on the ground.
Second, the existence of diverse and often competing interpretations of
what ‘Hutu’ and ‘Tutsi’ really are casts a serious doubt on the validity of the
dichotomous construction that implies rigid, clear-cut boundaries between the
two categories. While there was a general understanding among the people in
the two communities that one inherits the ethnic identity of his/her father through
patrilineal descent, how local people actually perceived each other’s identity was
not necessarily based on the same principle. In Gitera, people unequivocally
considered Tutsis to be only those individuals who belonged to Tutsi patrilineage.
Tutsi women married to Hutu men appeared to be identified more as members of
the Hutu lineage of their husbands than as descendants of Tutsi ancestors.
Persons of mixed parentage or ibyimanyi were considered as either Hutus or
Tutsis depending on their fathers’ identity, although most of the ibyimanyi
identified in Gitera were Hutus, reflecting the predominant pattern of
intermarriage in the local population, which is between a Hutu man and a Tutsi
woman, not vice versa. In the case of Kiberama, however, Tutsi women married
to Hutu men and their children – the categories of people considered to be more
Hutu than Tutsi in Gitera - were branded as Tutsis by many local residents at the
time of fieldwork. In fact, as some of the accounts presented above suggest,
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these people branded as ‘Tutsi’ during the fieldwork had been generally
accepted as part of the local Hutu community until the anti-Tutsi campaign was
radicalised in the early 1990s and consequently all the residents suspected of
Tutsi ancestry became the target of violent attacks.
These observations confirm the ‘contextually configured’ nature of ethnic
identities in Rwanda (Newbury and Newbury 1999, 294). As discussed in
Chapter 4, the social distinction conveyed by the terms ‘Hutu’ and ‘Tutsi’ not only
varied between regions during the same period of the Rwandan history but also
have evolved over time in response to changing social relations and political
contexts (ibid 312-6, 319 n4).105 In the light of this informed understanding of
ethnicity in Rwanda, the dichotomous construction of ‘the Hutu’ vs. ‘the Tutsi’ is
nothing but an erroneous representation of Rwandan society.
7. Conclusion
The conclusion of this chapter is twofold. First, the local population in both Gitera
and Kiberama was deeply divided over the question of victimhood: Who can
legitimately lay claim to victimhood caused by violent events in the past years?
The complex local histories of political violence, genocide and civil war
discussed above created a complex web of individuals and families with a
profound sense of victimhood, who, during the fieldwork, laid competing claims
to it. Second, despite the conflicting claims advanced by the adversarial groups
in each community, many local residents in both communities appeared to have
one fundamental assumption in common: that is, the roots of the violent conflict
that have been affecting their lives is the antagonistic relationship between two
ethnic groups, ‘the Tutsi’ and ‘the Hutu’. In other words, they appeared to
105 See also Eltringham (2004, 13)
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understand their experience of ethno-political violence through the interpretive
filter of ethnicity, attributing the cause of violence to the hostile relationship
between the two ethnic groups.
The assumption of ‘the Hutu’ vs. ‘the Tutsi’ dichotomy appears to have
taken root deeply in the minds of many people in the two communities. This is an
indication of how profoundly the ‘corporate view of ethnicity’ still haunted
ordinary people in these rural communities (and probably elsewhere in the
country) at the time of fieldwork in 2002. However, despite its seemingly strong
influence on local people’s perceptions, the dichotomous construction did not
match empirical social realities observed during the fieldwork. Diverse and
complex people’s experiences of political violence described in this chapter
cannot be reduced to the simplistic, dichotomous construction of ‘the Hutu’ vs.
‘the Tutsi’ conflict. Moreover, the existence of diverse and often competing views
on social distinction between the categories of Hutu and Tutsi underlines the
‘contextually configured’ nature of these identities (Newbury and Newbury 1999,
294), thereby casting serious doubts on the validity of the framework with rigid,
clear-cut boundaries between the two categories.
The pervasiveness of this construction confirmed during the fieldwork
indicates part of the grim reality of post-genocide Rwanda where many people
still uphold the ideological underpinning of the 1994 genocide. Undoubtedly, it is
an illusive and highly problematic construction. Nevertheless, we cannot
underestimate its impact on people’s perceptions and possibly their attitudes and
behaviours towards the other at the grassroots level. This implies that we should
not neglect but problematise it in our analysis of the issue of victimhood and
those of justice and reconciliation in Rwanda.
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CHAPTER SIX
EXPLORING THE GRASSROOTS CONCEPTIONS
OF JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION
1. Introduction
This chapter examines various views of justice and reconciliation expressed by
different categories of grassroots informants in the two fieldwork communities. It
addresses three primary questions. The first question is: what do they demand
of ‘justice’ or consider as their priority needs for justice – things which must be
addressed for them to be able to say ‘Justice has been done’? In addressing this
particular question, the chapter examines basic conceptions of justice underlying
people’s specific concerns for justice, particularly in the domain of rectificatory
justice. The second question concerns the conception of reconciliation. What
does ‘reconciliation’ primarily mean to the people at the grassroots? After
identifying key aspects of ubwiyunge, the Rwandan concept of reconciliation,
this particular section focuses on primary parties involved in the process of
reconciliation and examines people’s perceptions about interpersonal and
collective dimensions of reconciliation. As the third and final question, the
chapter assesses people’s perceptions about the relationship between justice
and reconciliation. This section focuses on contested views expressed about the
ability of the justice system through gacaca courts to facilitate the process of
reconciliation with the hope that people’s understanding about the two concepts
may be clearly understood.
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2. Identifying Key Elements of People’s Desire for Justice
What sort of things did the people of Gitera and Kiberama prioritise as their
primary desire for justice with regard to the past wrongs committed in and
around their hills? In what ways did they expect their justice-related desire to be
addressed through the gacaca system? These are the central questions
addressed in this section. A primary concern here is not to discuss people’s
definitions of justice. Rather, it is to identify types of specific responses to past
wrongs, particularly in the domain of rectificatory justice, which were deemed
crucial in the eyes of the grassroots informants with varied experiences of the
genocide and other types of political violence in the past decades.
The previous chapter highlighted a sharp divide between the people
officially recognised as survivors of genocide1 and the vast majority of Hutu
residents who identified themselves primarily as the collective victims of the
alleged RPF/A atrocities.2 The two sides of the divide in each sector asserted
sharply conflicting narratives of victimhood. The divide along the same lines was
also evident over the questions of justice indicated above. The division at issue
here cannot be reduced to the familiar formula of the Hutu/Tutsi duality, although
many of the grassroots informants portrayed it that way. Rather, it is primarily
between the people whose present identity is largely defined by their experience
of having been victimized in the genocide and the people whose identity is
defined by their perception of having been victimized, individually or collectively,
at the hands of the RPF/A. The former group is not exclusively Tutsi. Neither is
the identity of the latter shared by all Hutus. It should also be noted that this was
1 Tutsis who were inside Rwanda during the genocide in the case of Gitera and persons with
ethnically mixed background (Tutsi wives of Hutu husbands or persons of mixed parentage,
particularly Hutu husband – Tutsi wife union) in the case of Kiberama.
2 Excluding some, not all, of the survivors of massacres/itsembatsemba in the case of Gitera and
the Hutu survivors of genocide/itsembabwoko (persons of mixed parentage with Hutu father and
Tutsi mother union) and their immediate families in the case of Kiberama.
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not the only division among the people of the fieldwork communities; there were
other divisions, for example, between the Hutu survivors of massacres
(itsembatsemba) by genocide perpetrators and the rest of the local Hutu
population (Gitera and Kiberama) as well as between the relatively small
minority of Hutus who were considered by others as co-opted into the RPF
regime and the vast majority of the local Hutu population.3 However, the
ethno-political divide between the two sides (genocide survivors/non-genocide
survivors) underlined above was the most remarkable rift among the people of
the two communities, which deserves the closest attention in our analysis of
justice and reconciliation in post-genocide Rwanda.
The following part of this section examines closely the local people’s views
about what responses are required to rectify the past wrongs, focusing on
retribution and reparation - two basic forms of justice which emerged as being
critical for understanding grassroots views about responses in the domain of
rectificatory justice. As Lambourne (2002) found in her study, issues in the
domain of rectificatory justice are associated with issues of longer-term
socio-economic or distributive justice in Rwanda. However, analysis in this
3 Gourevitch (1998, 235) points out various internal divisions within ‘Hutus’ and ‘Tutsis’
respectively as follows:
There were Hutus with good records, and suspect Hutus, Hutus in exile and displaced
Hutus, Hutus who wanted to work with the RPF, and anti-Power Hutus who were also
anti-RPF, and of course all the old frictions between Hutus of the north and those of the
south remained. As for Tutsis, there were all the exiled backgrounds and languages, and
survivors and returnees regarding each other with mutual suspicion; there were RPF Tutsis,
non-RPF Tutsis, and anti-RPF Tutsis; there were urbanities and cattle keepers, whose
concerns as survivors or returnees had almost nothing in common.
Most of his observations appeared to be still relevant at the time of fieldwork in various parts of
Rwanda, particularly urban or semi-urban areas as well as rural-based resettlement areas called
imidugudu which Rwandans with various backgrounds inhabited together. However, with regard
to Gitera and Kiberama, most of the divisions he underlines appeared to be either absent or less
prominent. Also see Lambourne (2004, 16) who observes various divisions, ‘not only between
Hutu and Tutsi, but also within each population: between the Hutus who killed and those who
didn’t; between Hutu extremists and moderates; between Tutsi who lived in Rwanda their whole
lives and those who returned after the genocide; between Francophones and Anglophones; and
so on’ and Prunier (1995, 324-5) who describes significant differences in experience and views
not only between Tutsi genocide survivors and Tutsi returnees but between Tutsi returnees from
different countries of exile.
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chapter focuses on various responses with the aim of rectifying the past wrongs.
In order to highlight the existing contestation over issues of justice in the two
communities, views advanced by the opposing sides will be juxtaposed in each
of the subsections to follow.
2.1. Retribution
Views of Genocide Survivors
Several genocide survivors interviewed in the two communities expressed a
strong desire to see the perpetrators of genocide punished as severely as
possible. Responding to a question about genocide survivors’ expectations of
the gacaca system, Emmanuel, a genocide survivor who was then in the
leadership of IBUKA – the nationwide umbrella organisation of genocide
survivors’ associations – at the provincial level (Gitarama) said:
Imagine that a gang broke into your house and killed your parents, brothers
and sisters. You are the only one who survived in your family, although both
of your arms were chopped off by the gang. Then, what do you expect from
justice?4
He then criticised the government’s decision to only impose, in his view,
‘extremely lenient penalties’ on genocide perpetrators. Underlying his resentful
reaction to the question seems to be a strong feeling shared by a significant
section of the local genocide survivors: the perpetrators of genocide must get
their just desserts – suffer as great as the amount of suffering they inflicted on
their victims.
Like Emmanuel, those genocide survivors who expressed a strong
retributive desire often complained that the government was too soft on
genocide perpetrators and the level of punishment laid down for them in its laws
4 Interview in Gitarama town, 22 May 2002.
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concerning genocide justice is far below the level they believe to be fair, given
the gravity of the crimes committed. ‘We feel it’s a joke’, said Diane, a genocide
survivor working for a district office of Gitarama town.5 She also indicated her
serious concern that the gacaca courts to be established across the country
might end up granting de facto amnesty to numerous perpetrators who would
continue to disguise themselves as powerless bystanders in/during the genocide.
Although some genocide survivors appeared to be more keen on getting
compensation than on imposing coercive punishment on perpetrators, there
appeared to be a broad consensus among the local genocide survivors that
much harsher punishment of genocide perpetrators is necessary to
counterbalance the horrendous crimes they committed during the genocide.
Views of Hutu Residents
Many of the local Hutu informants in both sectors expressed a need for
punishing those responsible for three particular types of violations which,
according to their claims, inflicted tremendous suffering on the local Hutu
population: namely, as indicated above, the RPF/A killings in the aftermath of the
genocide and during the Insurgency in the late 1990s, the arbitrary arrest and
unlawful detention of Hutu civilians by the RPF regime; and the false
accusations levelled by genocide survivors as well as Tutsi returnees against
innocent Hutus who became subject to the unlawful detentions.
Whether people would be allowed to bring these issues of injustice before
gacaca courts was a major question raised by Hutu trainees during the training
for gacaca judges in Gitera.6 In response to the question, the trainer explicitly
conveyed rather a disappointing message for those who raised the question:
5 Interview in Gitarama town, 14 Nov 2002.
6 Observation of training for lay judges of gacaca courts, Gitera, 1-2 May 2002.
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gacaca courts do not deal with any other issues than those directly related to the
genocide, no matter how important they seem to be; and such allegations must
be brought to ordinary courts. As a consequence, most of the Hutu trainees
interviewed after the training session expressed their disillusionment with the
government’s gacaca proposal by the end of the first day of the training.
The Hutu informants in both communities appeared to be pessimistic about
the possibility of bringing concerned perpetrators to justice through the formal
justice system, as suggested by the government. As one participant of the focus
group interview with lay judges of gacaca courts in Kiberama said, ‘first, it’s very
difficult to identify those soldiers responsible for the killings […] and second, it’s
equally difficult to accuse the government before its regular court’.7 Under these
circumstances, the thirst for retributive justice appears to remain strong within
the Hutu population.
2.2. Reparation
As discussed in Chapter 3, this thesis uses the term ‘reparation’ as a
comprehensive notion that encompasses a range of concepts and measures
which are primarily concerned with repairing the damage – not only physical and
economic but also emotional or psychological - incurred by the victims of past
violations. Some of the informants commented that many of the injuries and
losses they suffered can be neither repaired nor compensated. Nevertheless,
the great majority of the grassroots informants showed keen interest in various
reparative measures – material, social and symbolic forms of reparation for
redressing the injuries resulting from past violations.
7 Focus group with lay judges of gacaca courts, Kiberama, 1 June 2002.
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2.2.1. Material Forms of Reparation
The most frequently mentioned by the informants was a material or economic
form of reparation. Survivors of violent atrocities more often than not live in dire
poverty, not least because of the deprivation and destruction they suffered in the
past. Based on their experience of conducting trauma healing workshops in
Rwanda, Staub and Pearlman (2001, 219-20) observe that it is difficult, if not
impossible, for such survivors of atrocities to have a sense of justice unless they
experience an improvement in their economic well-being. The same appeared to
be true for most of the grassroots informants on both sides of the divide.
Views of Genocide Survivors
As noted earlier, a national programme for assisting needy genocide survivors
was launched in June 1998 – mainly in the areas of education, health, housing,
and support for income generation activities – after the establishment of an
assistance fund for the most needy genocide survivors called the FARG (Fonds
pour l’Assistance aux Rescapés du Génocide) in January 1998.8 Even though
many of the families of genocide survivors in Gitera and Kiberama were
benefiting from the FARG in one way or another – mainly school fees,
educational and other materials for children and medical expenses for family
members9 - most of the local genocide survivors interviewed expressed
discontent due to its inadequacy. A few genocide survivors even expressed
resentment as they ascribed the low level of assistance at the grassroots to
rampant corruption among those responsible for allocating the funds at higher
8 Law N° 02/98 of 22/01/1998. For a brief description of the assistance programme through the
FARG, see Vandeginste (2003b, 264-5).
9 In both Gitera and Kiberama, the assistance from the FARG was limited to these two areas,
although leaders of the local survivors said that there was a plan for constructing or repairing
houses for the most needy families.
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levels.10
Deeply unsatisfied with the assistance through the FARG, Pascal, the
president of the genocide survivors’ association in Kiberama, expressed a high
expectation for monetary compensation as a primary outcome of the gacaca
trials:
Nothing can bring my mother back […] Keeping them in jail doesn’t help.
But our house was destroyed and burnt with all the properties. We must get
those things back. But we can’t rebuild our house and recover the
properties unless we get compensation. So I’ll go to gacaca for getting
them back.11
While many genocide survivors said they would lay claim to compensation as
the gacaca process proceeds, some of them expressed a concern that it would
fall far short of people’s expectations, not least due to financial difficulties faced
by the government.
Anastasie, a genocide survivor in Gitera, on the other hand, asserted that
genocide perpetrators must be subjected to physical work as a form of redress,
rather than the payment of compensation, which in her view was unrealistic,
given the economically deprived status of most Hutu families of those accused of
genocide. She observed:
Keeping them in prison doesn’t help me at all. They should come out and
work. […] They should rebuild the houses of those they wronged and
cultivate their land too.12
As these statements suggest, most, if not all, of the local genocide survivors
were still trying desperately to recover from the destruction of 1994 genocide
and emphasised the importance of material reparation (through monetary
10 Vandeginste (2003b, 264-5) also reports that the frustration of genocide survivors because of
the misappropriation of funds, which he ascribes to grossly inadequate management capacity of
the FARG characterised with, for example, ‘the failure to implement an independent audit of its
expenses’.
11 Interview in Kiberama, 6 June 2002.
12 Interview in Gitera, 19 May 2002.
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compensation or physical work as a form of redress). Some of them, like the two
individuals above, expressed clearly that material reparations must take
precedence over the imprisonment of perpetrators except for the organisers of
the genocide or those known as the most notorious killers. However, these
informants did not describe reparation and retribution as alternative forms of
justice; rather, they and many other informants described reparation and
retribution as an integral part of rectificatory justice.
Views of Hutu Residents
Many of the local Hutu informants commented on the need for material
reparations, particularly those concerned with two groups of Hutu victims: those
who lost their families by violence other than the genocide (especially victims of
the alleged RPF/A violence) and innocent prisoners who have been unlawfully
detained for several years or subsequently acquitted or released as their cases
were dismissed.13 With regard to the first group, the Hutu informants in both
communities repeatedly complained that there was far less assistance available
for Hutus in vulnerable situations, especially orphans and widows who lost their
families in various events of violence in the past, compared with that available for
genocide survivors through FARG.14 The fieldwork confirmed that in both Gitera
and Kiberama, dozens of local Hutu families were benefiting from so-called
13 The government has announced that there will be no compensation for these Rwandan
citizens who have suffered illegal detention for years. On this issue, Vandeginste (2003b, 266)
notes:
[T]here is a great risk of the unfair treatment of several different groups of victims, all of
whom are – at least in theory – entitled to reparations. For example, no provision has been
made for persons who have been illegally detained for several years in generally
unacceptable conditions and who have subsequently been acquitted or released because
their trials were dismissed.
14 Studies conducted by the NURC also indicate that a large section of the population has
negative feelings about the distinction the government makes in social assistance between
genocide survivors and other victims of violence (2000, 8-9; 2002a, 16-7).
219
‘MINALOC fund’15– a fund for social assistance administered by the Ministry of
Local Government and Social Affairs.16 However, according to Eric, a Hutu
survivor of massacres (itsembatsemba) in Gitera, the assistance package
provided by FARG for genocide survivors of school age was far more
comprehensive than the MINALOC’s assistance for other children in vulnerable
situations (e.g. orphans, children in households headed by minors, children in
households headed by widows).17 Eric maintained that the discriminatory
treatment of children affected by violent conflicts was detrimental to the process
of reconciliation, not only becoming a source of frustration and resentment within
the Hutu population in general but also ‘creating a serious division in future
generations’.18
The issue of reparation for innocent Hutu victims of unlawful detention was
also raised repeatedly by the Hutu informants as they pointed out some of the
shortcomings of the gacaca system. As noted above, many of them expressed a
deep disappointment about the government’s lack of intention to allow gacaca
courts to deal with these great injustices committed against their relatives and/or
friends. These informants suggested two main reparative responses to rectify
the injustices suffered by innocent Hutu prisoners. First, they demanded
compensation from the government, whom they considered ultimately
responsible for unlawful detention. Second, they stressed the importance of
public shaming of, and compensation by, those individuals who levelled false
15 MINALOC is the abbreviation of Ministère de l’Administration Locale et des Affaires Sociales.
16 Types of the social assistance for these groups included food distribution and payment of
school fees. According to the information from the conseiller of Gitera sector and a district official
in charge of FARG, for the year 2002/2003, 23 genocide survivors of school age (all Tutsis) were
receiving assistance in education from the FARG while 42 children from other vulnerable families
(all Hutus) were under the education assistance provided by the MINALOC.
17 The former provides not only school fees but also other materials such as uniforms,
notebooks, blankets and mattresses, whereas the latter only provides school fees. Moreover, the
former allows eligible children to go to a private school with much higher tuition while the latter
only provides fees of a government school.
18 Interview in Gitera, 23 Nov 2002.
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accusations against Hutu residents. Marie, a Hutu woman whose parents had
been detained as genocide suspects, said that those responsible for false
accusations must be ‘punished not by putting them into prison but by obliging
them to pay compensation’ after public confession about their wrongdoing.19
2.2.2. Establishing the Truth
Many of the grassroots informants on both sides of the divide repeatedly raised
issues related to truth while discussing their views of gacaca trials as well as
their perceptions of various wrongs committed in the past. They almost
unanimously expressed the need for establishing the truth as an essential part of
responses to the past wrongs but were deeply divided in what truth they wanted
to be revealed and established.
Views of Genocide Survivors
The genocide survivors interviewed voiced considerable concern for the
establishment of the truth about the genocide (itsembabwoko) through which
their sense of victimhood (and their identify itself) appeared to be largely defined.
Many of them showed indifference to the revelation of truth about the violations
other than the genocide (itsembabwoko), which included massacres
(itsembatsemba) – violent attacks and killings of Hutu dissidents by genocide
perpetrators. In fact, as already indicated above, none of the local genocide
survivors complained about the exclusive focus of gacaca trials on the
genocide-related crimes committed under the auspices of the former regime. As
discussed in the previous chapter, this tendency appeared to be closely
connected with the pervasive problem of collective guilt assigned to all Hutus for
their presumed implication in the genocide.
19 Interview in Gitera, 17 May 2002.
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The local genocide survivors repeatedly stressed the need to know exactly
who played what role in the genocide so that all the perpetrators and
accomplices of genocide could be held accountable for their deeds.20 Their
interest in knowing who played what roles in the genocide appeared to be
closely connected with their retributive urge discussed earlier. Nadine, a
genocide survivor in Gitera, pointed out the importance of understanding who did
not participate in the genocide.21 With virtually no truth established about the
genocide, many of the local genocide survivors (especially those in Gitera)
appeared to remain deeply suspicious about the complicity of the vast majority of
the local Hutu population in the genocide. Even the integrity of those Hutus who
had harboured Tutsis was questioned by some of the local genocide survivors.
Several times during the fieldwork, genocide survivors talked about ‘Hutus who
had two faces’ – Hutus who had harboured Tutsis in their houses and yet been
implicated in the killings of other Tutsis somewhere else during the genocide.
‘Gacaca will set us free from all the suspicions we have’, said Jean, a genocide
survivor with a mixed ethnic background in Kiberama, indicating his hope that
the truth to be established through gacaca trials would help dispel a lingering
suspicion in his community.22
Another issue the local genocide survivors repeatedly raised was the need
to establish facts about the injuries and losses they had suffered because of the
genocide. This specific concern for truth appeared to be based, at least partly, on
their desires to get compensation as discussed above. Many of them were found
20 As indicated in the previous chapter, the genocide survivors in the two sectors had general
knowledge about who was killed in the genocide, even though they did not know exactly when,
where, by whom and how some of their loved ones were killed. Except the specific cases of three
convicts from Kiberama, virtually no truth had been established about the perpetrators directly
involved in the killings and attacking, let alone greater numbers of accomplices who had played
less violent roles such as manning roadblocks and informing the killers of the whereabouts of
those in hiding.
21 Interview in Gitera, 24 May 2002.
22 Interview in Kiberama, 4 June 2002.
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to have been informed that gacaca courts would be instrumental in establishing
this particular aspect of the truth, which would be the basis for their
compensation claims in the future.
Views of Hutu Residents
The vast majority of the local Hutu informants expressed their truth-related
needs from a totally different perspective to the one of the genocide survivors.
The most fundamental difference was that many of them called for the disclosure
of the truth about the alleged RPF/A violations and individuals directly victimized
through them – the issues to which the local genocide survivors were generally
indifferent. They were particularly concerned with what happened to several
Hutu residents who had ‘disappeared’ after being taken away by RPF/A soldiers
in the aftermath of the genocide (Gitera) or during the period of Hutu Insurgency
(Kiberama). Many of the local Hutu informants appeared to have maintained a
hope, however slight it might be, that some truth could be revealed through
gacaca trials. But they soon came to apprehend the government’s firm intention
to restrict the scope of gacaca trials to genocide-related crimes.
This does not mean, however, that they lost all their interest in ‘the truth’
which might be revealed through gacaca trials. An elderly woman, a mother of
Fabien, a prisoner who had confessed and pleaded guilty to participating in the
genocide said:
Until now we haven’t been on good terms with our neighbours. We look at
each other with mistrust, but when the truth is known, we’ll visit one another
without fear and suspicion.23
Several other Hutu informants also suggested that with regard to the truth about
the genocide, their primary concern rested with the vindication of innocent Hutus
23 Interview in Gitera, 24 May 2002.
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who had been wrongly suspected and accused of genocide-related crimes. In
other words, many of them appeared to be keen to know the truth about those
who did not participate in the genocide established, while being less enthusiastic
about establishing the truth about who did. These Hutu informants, including the
conseiller of Kiberama, claimed that many Hutu prisoners who were presumed to
be guilty of genocide would surely be vindicated as long as the truth is revealed
through the gacaca process.24
As indicated above, most of the grassroots informants on both sides of the
divide appeared to consider establishing the truth not as an end in itself but as
the basis for the various forms of justice they are seeking, including the
prosecution and punishment of perpetrators, compensation and other material
reparations, vindication of the wrongly accused and recovery of social trust.
2.2.3. Acknowledgment of Wrongs and Injuries
The grassroots informants on both sides of the divide also expressed the need
for establishing the truth as to both the wrongs and injuries. Underlying both of
these expressed needs seems to be their unfulfilled desire for obtaining
acknowledgment of the wrongs committed against them and the injuries inflicted
on their own side. As Minow (1998, 93-4) observed, while making a demand for
specific redress such as monetary compensation, restitution of property or public
apologies, victims of violence are also ‘engaged in obtaining acknowledgement
of the violations and acceptance of responsibility for wrongdoing as much as
they press for a specific remedy’. While the need for acknowledgment was more
often than not implicit in such expressed demands for various reparative
measures, some of the informants voiced it explicitly on several occasions.
24 Interview with Saveri in Kiberama, 30 May 2002.
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Views of Genocide Survivors
Local genocide survivors often raised the issue of acknowledgement in
connection with the issues of forgiveness and reconciliation. As will be discussed
in detail below, despite the existence of some disagreement about various
issues of forgiveness,25 the local genocide survivors appeared to be in
agreement on the necessity of genocide perpetrators acknowledging their
wrongdoing and accepting responsibility for it, if they can ever consider the
possibility of forgiving them.26 Talking about three former Kiberama residents
who had been convicted of the murder of his mother during the genocide, Pascal
said:
First, they must admit what they did, then I would consider forgiving them.
[...] It is difficult to forgive those who haven’t admitted their crimes.27
The genocide survivors were certainly concerned with acknowledgment of the
wrongdoing by perpetrators of the genocide directly involved in killings and other
horrendous acts of violence, as well as by those who masterminded and
orchestrated the genocide. However, for them, the issue of acknowledgement
was not restricted to the most conspicuous crimes and their perpetrators. Rather,
they pointed to the necessity of revealing and acknowledging a much wider
scope of wrongdoing committed by greater numbers of Hutus who were
complicit in the genocide in one way or another.
As discussed in the previous chapter, evidence collected during the
fieldwork points to varying degrees of complicity of the local population in the two
communities – from manning roadblocks set up for apprehending ‘Tutsis’ fleeing
25 For example, whether forgiving the perpetrators of genocide is possible and desirable, who
should and should not be forgiven, pre-conditions for forgiveness, the role of the gacaca justice
for forgiveness and reconciliation.
26 Staub and Pearlman (2001, 217-8) also observed in Rwanda that the acknowledgement of
wrongs by perpetrators had a significant role in the process of forgiving by victims.
27 Interview in Kiberama, 7 June 2002.
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from their homes to aiding killers in notifying them where ‘Tutsis’ were hiding to
simply remaining silent in the face of mass killings during the genocide. In the
view of local genocide survivors, except for a tiny minority of Hutus who risked
their lives in opposing the genocide, the entire Hutu community cannot escape
either criminal or moral responsibility for the genocide. Thus, from their
perspective, acknowledgement of the wrongs committed in the past must be
understood in broad terms so that not only criminal but also moral responsibility
of those involved in the wrongdoing, as well as its individual and collective
dimensions are addressed.
Bosco condemned pervasive denial of complicity in the genocide among
the local Hutu population. He also expressed resentment at a large number of
the local Hutus who had been boycotting ceremonial activities for
commemorating the genocide, including the dignified reburial of genocide
victims. He pointed out, however, that a growing number of the accused Hutus
are coming to confess their guilt in prison and expressed his hope that a public
confession by such a repentant perpetrator before the gacaca courts might
break the silence maintained by the local Hutus on their complicity.
With regard to the alleged violations by the RPF/A, as discussed in detail in
the previous chapter, the genocide survivors in the two communities dismissed
all the related allegations made by the local Hutu informants, and thus the
acknowledgement of the alleged violations appeared not be an issue from their
perspective.
Views of Hutu Residents
Many of the local Hutu informants (except Hutu genocide survivors with mixed
ethnic background and some of the Hutu survivors of massacres
(itsembatsemba) and local government representatives) expressed their
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resentment at the total lack of public acknowledgement of the wrongs and
injuries so many Hutus suffered. Claude, a former Hutu rebel who had been
reintegrated into his home community after having been ‘re-educated’ in a
solidarity camp organised by the NURC in 2001 claimed:
All Rwandans lost families. Interahamwe killed many but Inkotanyi also did
the same. Why do they ask us to remember only those killed during the
genocide? They say gacaca will only deal with the cases of genocide. But
what about other numerous cases? [...] The problem is one side is
considered innocent while the other side is considered guilty.28
The local Hutus’ criticism was directed not only at the RPF-led government but
also at the local genocide survivors whom they accused of being complicit in the
alleged RPF/A violations by wrongly accusing innocent Hutus and maintaining
silence about atrocities committed by its soldiers. In Gitera, portraying the history
of political violence in Rwanda as one of mutual victimization between ‘the Tutsi’
and ‘the Hutu’, several Hutu informants claimed that suffering on ‘both sides’
must be equally acknowledged in public. A Hutu woman in Gitera, a mother of a
genocide prisoner, said that nobody could speak freely about Hutu victims of the
RPF atrocities for fear of being arrested by government authorities. She also
condemned the local genocide survivors for ‘only talking about their suffering
and forgetting about ours’.29
Even greater resentment at this matter was expressed in Kiberama where,
as described in the previous chapter, the vast majority of Hutu informants
portrayed themselves as the innocent victims of the RPF/A atrocities and totally
negated the injuries suffered by the local genocide survivors. For example, after
attesting the brutal civilian killings by RPA soldiers which, according to her
allegations, were perpetrated in her neighbourhood, Esther criticised the
28 Interview in Kiberama, 6 June 2002.
29 Interview with Goretti, Gitera, 14 Nov 02.
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government for ‘remembering only victims of genocide’.30 She went on to
suggest even abandoning the national mourning week for commemorating
genocide victims because, in her view, it completely ignores other categories of
Hutu victims.31
3. Exploring the Grassroots Conception of Reconciliation
The fieldwork revealed that the grassroots informants in the two communities
shared a basic conception of reconciliation based on the Kinyarwanda concept
of ubwiyunge. Let us start exploring their conception of reconciliation by
discussing what ubwiyunge means.
3.1. Meaning of Reconciliation
The concept of ubwiyunge may be best described through the metaphor of the
healing process of a fractured bone.32 When a bone is broken, its fractured parts
have to be put together. What is required for healing is kunga, ‘to reunite’
separated parts into one complete bone just as it was before. For this to be done
properly, there needs to be a doctor for putting them together or ‘reuniting’
(kunga) them. Ubwiyunge or ‘reconciliation’ presupposes a broken relationship
which needs to be restored by ‘reuniting’ (kunga) two (or more) parties who, due
to a certain problem such as a quarrel, dispute, or violation(s) by one party to the
other or each other, have been separated from each other through emotions like
30 Interview in Kiberama, 31 May 2002.
31 The government has been condemning some sections of the population who demonstrate this
kind of deep-seated discontent over the one-sided acknowledgement in post-genocide Rwanda.
One evaluation document of the NURC (2002a, 14) reports on the presence of people ‘who have
not understood that the 1994 atrocities are a common tragedy for all Rwandans’ and therefore
are ‘not keen to participate in the re-burial ceremonies of genocide victims and in different
activities organised during the national mourning week’.
32 I owe much of the idea discussed in this paragraph to three Rwandans interviewed: Antoine
Rutayisire, the vice president of NURC (Kigali, 30 Sep 2002); Anastase Sabamungu, AEE
associate (Gitarama, 28 Sep 2001); and Alexis, one of my research assistants (Gitarama, 2 June
2004).
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enmity, mistrust and fear. The process of ubwiyunge often requires umwunzi – a
‘mediator’ who helps the parties ‘to reconcile’ (kwiyunga) with each other. The
concept of ubwiyunge, therefore, may be defined as ‘the healing of broken
relationships’ between the parties in conflict.33 Grassroots informants who were
asked about their ideas of reconciliation generally described the concept along
these lines.
3.1.1. A Communitarian Conception of Reconciliation
Several grassroots informants suggested that the Rwandan concept of
reconciliation is embodied in the practice of traditional gacaca – the
community-based system of dispute resolution. Participants of focus group
discussions both in Gitera and Kiberama agreed that such a traditional gacaca
gathering allows conflicting parties to ‘come together through the assistance of
mediators and sit down for discussing problems between them’.34 The
participants outlined the process of reconciliation through the traditional gacaca
as a community-based process which involves the whole community, not only
individual disputants (e.g. victim and perpetrator or disputants over land issues)
but also immediate and extended families as well as elders of the community
playing the role of mediators.35 One worker of Christina NGO running a healing
and reconciliation ministry in Rwanda also underlined the collective dimension of
this process:
A dispute between individuals is understood as a threat to neighbourly
33 Interview with Sabamungu, Gitarama, 28 Sep 2001.
34 Focus group with lay judges of gacaca courts, Kiberama, 1 June 2002.
35 According to Gatwa, the mediator must be a person of integrity with the following
characteristics:
[H]is/her life must be marked with abnegation and truth searching. She/he must be known
by all as a living example of virtues, patient and discrete when dealing with sensitive issues
or people. She/he must be capable of incarnating and interpreting the suffering of the
victims, but at the same time be able to listen to and interpret the motives of the guilty so as
to accompany both parties in the re-establishment of new and harmonious relationships.
(1998, 243)
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relationships between the concerned families and, in turn, to the harmony
of the entire community. So, elders from the concerned community
intervene in the situation for resolving problems so that people in the whole
community may continue to live in peace.36
The Rwandan conception of reconciliation, then, can be understood as a
communitarian conception of reconciliation as opposed to the one based on
individualism. Braithwaite (1989, 84-6) considers a communitarian tendency to
be part of the fundamental social conditions conducive to his model of
restorative justice through ‘reintegrative shaming’.37 Describing a communitarian
society as one which ‘combines a dense network of individual interdependencies
with strong cultural commitments to mutuality of obligation’ (85), Braithwaite
summarises three elements of communitarianism as follows:
(1) densely enmeshed interdependency, where the interdependencies are
characterised by (2) mutual obligation and trust, and (3) are interpreted as a
matter of group loyalty rather than individual convenience. (86)
To assess whether the Rwandan society still retains these communitarian
characters even after the genocide is beyond the scope of this study. However,
fieldwork findings suggest that people’s views about reconciliation was/is shaped
by the traditional, cultural values discussed here.
3.1.2. A Forgiveness-Centred Conception of Reconciliation
While different informants showed different attitudes towards the practicalities of
reconciliation, when they used the word ubwiyunge, what they appeared to have
in mind was very close to the forgiveness-centred conception of reconciliation
discussed in Chapter 2. Bosco explained:
Reconciliation is coming slowly and gradually, not all at once. People have
to confess what they did and ask for forgiveness, and those who are asked
36 Interview at Gitarama town, 28 Sep 2001.
37 The theory of reintegrative shaming will be further discussed in Chapter 7.
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to forgive need to contemplate it carefully before offering it.38
As indicated in this statement, for Bosco, the transaction of remorse/apology and
forgiveness is at the centre of the process of reconciliation. Bosco was just one
of many grassroots informants who stressed the importance of the interactive
process of seeking and offering forgiveness in the process of reconciliation. In
Kiberama, the participants of the focus group emphasised the importance of
‘sharing food and drink together’ in the process of reconciliation as a sign of
mutual acceptance and friendship based on the interactive process of gusaba
imbabazi - begging for mercy/forgiveness and gutanga imbabazi – giving
mercy/forgiveness.39
This general tendency to put forgiveness at the heart of their conception of
reconciliation may be ascribed, at least to some extent, to the profound influence
of Christianity in Rwanda, particularly in rural areas where almost every resident
belongs to the Christian Church, Catholic or one of the Protestant
denominations.40 The vast majority of the grassroots informants identified
themselves as Christians. The primacy of forgiveness in reconciliation was often
expressed as a primary religious principle which must be respected by all
believers. Anastase, a Hutu church leader in Kiberama, declared:
For reconciliation, every Rwandan must confess their sins before God.
Then, he must go to his neighbours he harmed to ask for their forgiveness
so that they can start living in peace again. […] As a Christian, I say this: we
are obliged to forgive our neighbours and forget what happened.41
Lambourne (2002, 437) reported that her predominantly Tutsi informants
38 Interview in Gitera, 13 Nov 2002.
39 Focus group with lay judges of gacaca courts, Kiberama, 1 June 2002.
40 Lambourne (2002, 439) notes that in Rwanda ‘ideas about reconciliation are likely to be more
similar to the traditional Western concept of reconciliation’ because of strong influence of
Christianity on the Rwandan society. On the other hand, Staub and Pearlman (2001, 212) point
out the possible influence of the government which has been promoting confessions and
apologies by perpetrators in prison in exchange for reduced sentences.
41 Interview with Anastase, Kiberama, 30 May 2002.
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were divided between those who emphasised the need for forgiveness-centred
reconciliation and those who rejected it. She observed: ‘[M]any Rwandans,
especially the Tutsi who have become disillusioned with the church, have also
abandoned the importance of forgiveness as a Christian concept’. As further
discussed below, in the case of Gitera and Kiberama, people’s attitudes toward
the issue of forgiveness varied significantly. Nevertheless, irrespective of their
personal position about the issue of forgiveness, most of the informants
appeared to share the assumption that the process of reconciliation cannot be
completed without mutual acceptance based on forgiveness.
3.2. Reconciliation with Whom?
As discussed above, the concept of reconciliation as understood by the
grassroots informants presumes broken or strained relationship(s) between
people. Whose relationships then need to be healed or restored? According to
views expressed by the grassroots informants, reconciliation as the healing of
relationships has both interpersonal and collective dimensions. The following will
focus on several aspects of reconciliation in each dimension which were actually
mentioned by the informants during the interviews, focus groups or
observations.
3.2.1. Interpersonal Reconciliation
Many of the grassroots informants expressed their views on reconciliation at the
interpersonal level one way or another, even though their perspectives and
attitudes towards it varied significantly. Particularly, they mentioned the following
three aspects of interpersonal reconciliation: 1) perpetrators and survivors of the
genocide; 2) innocent prisoners and people who wrongly accused them; and 3)
genocide perpetrators and members of their families.
232
Perpetrators and Survivors of the Genocide
The most frequently mentioned aspect of reconciliation at this level was one
between perpetrators and survivors of the genocide. The conseiller of Kiberama
sector, a Hutu, stated that reconciliation must be achieved ‘between those who
lost their families and those who killed them during the genocide’.42 Fabien, a
genocide prisoner, said that he and his fellow confessed prisoners had strong
desire to meet the surviving members of the families they harmed in order to ask
for their forgiveness face to face.43 His mother living in Gitera also touched on
the same aspect of interpersonal reconciliation as she expressed her
expectations of the gacaca trials: ‘Those who have confessed their crimes will
meet their victims through gacaca and reconciliation will follow’.44
In contrast to many of the confessed prisoners who expressed their desire
to reconcile with their surviving victims, most of the local genocide survivors did
not talk much about interpersonal reconciliation with genocide perpetrators who
were directly involved in attacking them and killing their families. Nadine, a Tutsi
genocide survivor in Gitera, expressed her feelings about the issue as follows:
Reconciliation is difficult. [long pause] Although people may live in the same
neighbourhood, we can’t call those killers ‘friends’. […] It’s just seven years
of imprisonment. It’s impossible to call them ‘friends’.45
As suggested in this statement, reconciliation with perpetrators of horrible
violence appeared to remain inconceivable for many of the local genocide
survivors. However, as already indicated above, at least a few of them, including
Bosco, showed a more positive attitude toward the possibilities of reconciliation
with genocide perpetrators with the condition that they would confess their
42 Interview with Saveri, Kiberama, 30 May 2002.
43 Interview at Gitarama Central Prison, 21 May 2002.
44 Interview in Gitera, 24 May 2002.
45 Interview in Gitera, 24 May 2002.
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crimes and ask for forgiveness. Bosco had taken remarkable steps towards
reconciliation with Fabien. He had personally communicated his appreciation of
Fabien’s confession and encouraged him to tell the whole truth before the
gacaca court to be set up in Gitera.
Innocent Prisoners and Their Accusers
Another aspect of interpersonal reconciliation mentioned by the grassroots
informants was one between Hutu prisoners wrongly accused of genocide and
those who made accusations against them. A participant of one focus group in
Gitera poignantly made the following remark:
I know my parents will be released once the gacaca courts start their work.
But how can reconciliation be possible between them and the woman who
falsely accused them?’46
The speaker was Marie, a Hutu woman quoted earlier as saying that both of her
parents had been detained as genocide suspects solely because of false
accusations made by a female Tutsi survivor. She went on to insist that the
woman must first confess her wrongdoing in public, apologise to the parents of
Marie, and be obliged to pay compensation before any possibility of
reconciliation is considered.
On the other hand, Rose, a genocide prisoner from Gitera who claimed that
she was a victim of false accusation, suggested that there would be no special
actions required for her to get along with those Tutsi genocide survivors who had
falsely accused her of taking part in the genocide. She said ‘I’ll be all right with
those people as long as I’m released from here’.47 Asked whether she would
charge those individuals with giving false testimonies, she said she would rather
forget what happened to her during and after the genocide so that she would not
46 Focus group of lay judges of gacaca courts, Gitera, 17 May 2002
47 Interview at Gitarama Central Prison, 23 May 2002.
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get into trouble any more.
Other Categories of Wrongdoers and Victims
There are also other aspects of interpersonal reconciliation relevant to the
people in Gitera and Kiberama, given that there were other types of broken
interpersonal relationships which resulted from the past violations, particularly
those other than the genocide. While, as described earlier in this chapter, many
Hutu informants insisted that soldiers involved in the alleged RPF/A violations
against the local Hutu population be brought to justice, only a few of them raised
these issues in relation to reconciliation at the interpersonal level (i.e.
reconciliation between RPF/A soldiers and families of their victims). In fact, since
no substantial effort had been made – on the part of the Rwandan judiciary as
well as the ICTR - to hold responsible individuals accountable, the vast majority
of the Hutu victims had absolutely no idea about whom they were supposed to
be reconciled with at the interpersonal level.
Genocide Perpetrators and Their Families
Some of the grassroots informants pointed out the need for mending broken
relationships between genocide perpetrators and their own families. Asked
about the first thing he would want to say before the gacaca court to be set up on
his own hill, Fabien said he would ‘ask for forgiveness from the survivors, and
then from my mother’, implying his perception that he had wronged not only his
victims and their families but also his mother through his terrible misconduct.48
His mother also said: ‘They (genocide perpetrators) must ask for forgiveness
from their own parents and from those they harmed’.49 She then described how
she and other members of her family were put into serious trouble (e.g. being
48 Interview at Gitarama Central Prison, 21 May 2002.
49 Interview in Gitera, 24 May 2002.
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censured as a family of genocide perpetrators, being suspected as accomplices)
because of Fabien’s involvement in the genocide. Thus, forgiveness and
reconciliation are, in some cases, also relevant to the perpetrator of genocide
and the members of his/her own family who did not condone his/her criminal act.
3.2.2. Reconciliation at the Collective Level
Many grassroots informants identified the following two levels as particularly
important: 1) reconciliation between the family of the wrongdoer and that of the
victim; and 2) reconciliation between ethnic groups, especially Bahutu and
Batutsi.
Family of the Wrongdoers and That of Their Victims
For people in Rwanda, like those in many other societies in Africa and elsewhere,
ties of kinship among members of immediate and extended families or lineage
are very strong and of vital importance for their social and economic lives.
According to participants of one focus group of community mediators in Gitera,
members of the same lineage still practice what they called umuryango gacaca
or ‘lineage gacaca’ led by its respected members for settling disputes between
its members or smaller units of kinship called inzu (pl. amazu). While describing
supreme authority exercised by the lineage-based dispute resolution system,
one of the focus group participants said that he fears its resolution much more
than any sentence of the regular court because the former invokes the sense of
profound obligation among those involved in the process.50 It was in this social
and cultural context that several grassroots informants suggested that various
violations committed in the past not only seriously damaged the relationships
between individual wrongdoers and their victims, but also created enmity
50 Focus group with community mediators in Gitera, 18 May 2002.
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between/within the families/lineages of both sides.51 Some of them also
suggested that families of wrongdoers shared moral responsibilities for the
wrongs its members had committed against others. According to Fabien’s
perception, the violent crime he committed not only destroyed the relationship
between him and his victims but also seriously damaged the one between the
families/lineages of both sides. Therefore, he expressed his hope that the
gacaca process would entail the situation where ‘[t]here will be no enmity in the
minds of both sides, the families of victims and the families of prisoners’.52
Similarly, many grassroots informants appeared to perceive the challenge of
reconciliation between innocent prisoners and their accusers to have not only
individual but also family aspects.
Ethnic Groups
The previous chapter demonstrated that many informants in the two fieldwork
communities subscribed to the ‘corporate view of ethnicity’ which wrongly
projected Hutu, Tutsi and Twa as internally homogeneous and yet mutually
exclusive groups – ‘the Hutu’, ‘the Tutsi’ and ‘the Twa’. Accordingly, many of
them ascribed the series of violent events in the past to the hostile relationship
between the two rival ‘ethnic groups’. It became apparent during the fieldwork
that many of the grassroots informants with different backgrounds also perceived
the issues of reconciliation largely in these terms.
The ways the Tutsi informants (who were all genocide survivors except one
‘returnee’ from the Congo) and the great majority of Hutu informants described
reconciliation between the two groups were remarkably different, reflecting the
51 Enmity also within each family/lineage because genocidal killings took place also within the
same family, by one or more members against other members of the same family. See AR (1995,
1001-2).
52 Interview at Gitarama Central Prison, 21 May 2002.
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distinctive ways they perceived the history of ethno-political violence in Rwanda
and the nature of their suffering in it. The perspective of Tutsi informants was
captured in the following statement made by Bosco:
Years have passed since the genocide was perpetrated. And now there are
people who say there was no genocide in Rwanda. […] Because of such
people, there has always been a tension between Bahutu and Batutsi. I
hope the gacaca courts can reduce the tension by revealing the truth,
inducing the perpetrators to confess their crimes and ask survivors for their
forgiveness.53
When Bosco acknowledged the need for improving the relationship between
Bahutu and Batutsi, he did so specifically from the Tutsi perspective where the
history of ethno-political violence in Rwanda as the background to Hutu – Tutsi
reconciliation is reduced to one-way victimization by Hutus against Tutsis.
According to the narrative shared by many Tutsi informants, it is Hutus who have
to ask Tutsis for their forgiveness, and then Tutsis would decide whether they
would offer it or not.
In contrast, many of the local Hutu informants advanced a totally different
narrative of Hutu – Tutsi reconciliation, which was vividly expressed by Rose:
We prisoners understand that Bahutu killed Batutsi and Batutsi killed
Bahutu for revenge. So we believe reconciliation is possible if the two
parties accept that people were killed in both sides and therefore forgive
one another.54
As indicated in this statement, underlying the Hutu narrative was the notion of
mutual victimization between Bahutu and Batutsi discussed in the previous
chapter. Because both Bahutu and Batutsi committed wrongs in harming each
other in the past, according to the common Hutu narrative, the process of
reconciliation must be based on acknowledgement of suffering on both sides
53 Interview in Gitera, 17 May 2002.
54 Interview at Gitarama Central Prison, 23 May 2002.
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and mutual forgiveness.
4. Reconciliation through Gacaca Trials?
One of the catchphrases of gacaca justice adopted by the government was (and
still is) ubutabera bwunga or ‘reconciliatory justice’. This notion that justice
through gacaca courts will bring about reconciliation in Rwanda has been
increasingly stressed in the government’s official discourse of justice and
reconciliation in the past several years. How was the potential of the gacaca
system for reconciling the Rwandan people perceived at the grassroots? To what
extent were they convinced that gacaca trials would contribute to the process of
reconciliation? The remaining part of this section discusses three major
positions/attitudes the grassroots informants demonstrated with regard to the
prospects for reconciliation through gacaca trials.
4.1. Endorsing the Notion of Reconciliatory Justice
Many grassroots informants across various categories endorsed the notion that
the gacaca system is reconciliatory justice.55 The strongest endorsement came
from the group of genocide prisoners. The overwhelming majority of the
interviewed prisoners from the two communities, including both those who had
confessed their involvement in the genocide and those who had been
maintaining their innocence – expressed a strikingly optimistic view of the
gacaca system in terms of its prospect for reconciling the people of Rwanda.
Cyprien, a genocide prisoner from Gitera, claimed:
Gacaca will bring a change to many things. People in all the hills will testify
what happened. As a result, innocent prisoners will be released,
55 The categories of these informants included: survivors of genocide (Tutsi and Hutu with mixed
ethnic background), survivors of massacres (Hutu), genocide prisoners (Hutu), families of these
prisoners (Hutu), and an old caseload returnee (Tutsi).
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perpetrators will ask for forgiveness, and they will be forgiven, because they
merely followed the instruction of the government. Then, the people will
help them reconcile with families of their victims […] 56
Some of the genocide prisoners, particularly those who claimed that they
had made confessions based on religious conviction, tended to describe gacaca
courts as a venue where the interactive process of seeking and offering
forgiveness would take place between themselves and genocide survivors
harmed by their wrongdoings. Olivier, a confessed prisoner from Kiberama said:
Before the gacaca court, I’ll address my confession and apology to
survivors. If they accept it, we’ll live together peacefully.
Fabien, a confessed genocide prisoner from Gitera, indicated his expectations of
the gacaca process with regard to forgiveness to be offered by genocide
survivors:
We’ve asked for forgiveness in our confessions. We know that God has
forgiven us as church leaders taught us. But we cannot be sure if we’ve
been forgiven by those people unless we meet them at gacaca courts.
We’ve taken the initiative to confess and requested forgiveness. What
remains is their forgiveness […]57
Many of the Hutu families of genocide prisoners expressed their support for
the gacaca process, not least because it was perceived as the only hope for their
relatives in jail to be tried and released in the foreseeable future. Some of them
also stated their belief in the gacaca system’s ability to bring about reconciliation
at different levels. The elderly mother of Fabien said:
Gacaca will reconcile people. Those who have confessed will meet victims
and then reconciliation will be achieved.58
The grassroots informants who predicted such a highly positive outcome of
56 Interview at Gitarama Central Prison, 23 May 2002.
57 Interview at Gitarama Central Prison, 12 Nov 2002.
58 Interview in Gitera, 24 May 2002.
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gacaca trials in terms of reconciliation were not limited to genocide prisoners and
their families. Among 14 genocide survivors interviewed, five of them put forward
a highly positive expectation of gacaca trials, claiming that it would - in the words
of Pierre ‘correct the wrongs done in the past and reconcile people’.59 According
to a typical construction of gacaca trials pronounced by these genocide survivors,
truth and justice (in the forms of retribution and reparation) attained through
gacaca trials would be the foundation of future reconciliation of divided
communities in Rwanda. Pierre stated that through gacaca trials, ‘[k]illers will be
punished, things destroyed and looted will be compensated, and then nobody
will remain angry with them’.
Despite the differences in their backgrounds and standpoints, the above
informants portrayed gacaca trials more or less in accordance with the official
line of the government: that is, through involving all the people on the local hills
across the country, gacaca courts are capable of judging untried genocide cases
much faster than the ordinary courts, revealing the truth about what happened
during the genocide, punishing perpetrators and releasing innocent prisoners,
setting all the Rwandans free from lingering suspicions against each other, and
finally leading them to take the path of reconciliation. In short, they asserted that
gacaca trials could/would be the best possible way to unite and reconcile the
people of Rwanda.
In fact, several informants first described their views of gacaca trials
completely in accordance with the official line but later revealed their personal
perspectives which totally contradicted their earlier optimistic description. When
some of these informants advanced the highly positive prospect for
reconciliation though gacaca trials, more often than not, it sounded far from
59 Interview in Gitera, 24 May 2002.
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convincing. While such optimism may be a reflection of genuine desires for
justice and reconciliation among many of the informants, the highly optimistic
and almost exactly same views some of them expressed were suspiciously
similar to the official description of gacaca justice.
4.2. Objections by Genocide Survivors
In both Gitera and Kiberama, several genocide survivors indicated either
scepticism about or resentment at the optimistic portrayal of gacaca trials
advanced by the government and endorsed by a significant section of the
grassroots informants, particularly genocide prisoners. These genocide
survivors did not oppose the government’s gacaca initiative itself, but rejected
some of the claims about it. Alice, a survivor and a lay judge of the sector-level
gacaca court in Kiberama, observed:
What’s said about gacaca on radio sounds to me too optimistic. It’s easier
to say than do. [...] If people speak the truth, it might achieve something, but
I don’t think most people would tell the truth.60
Pascal elaborated on why he and many other genocide survivors could not
expect much truth-telling from the gacaca process.61 First, he stressed that it
would be naive to expect the great majority of the local population to tell the truth
because many of them had been involved in various acts of genocide, even
though only a few were in jail. Second, he observed that it would be extremely
difficult for local genocide survivors to accuse those perpetrators ‘walking freely’
on local hills because, given their small minority status, it would put their lives at
risk. Third, he also dismissed the fairness and impartiality of gacaca courts to be
set up in the locality on the basis that the overwhelming majority of judges were
‘non-survivors’ whom he did not trust. ‘There are only three real inyangamugayo
60 Interview in Kiberama, 7 Dec 2002.
61 Interview in Kiberama, 4 June 2002.
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(‘the people of integrity’ elected as gacaca judges) in the local gacaca courts’, he
claimed.
Several local genocide survivors not only demonstrated scepticism about
the optimistic portrayal of gacaca trials in general but also disputed the notion of
its reconciling capacity. Serge, a genocide survivor in Gitera said: ‘The gacaca
courts can do nothing about it [reconciliation] because it can’t plant forgiveness
into people’s hearts’.62 He expressed his resentment at the very fact that
through the confession and guilty plea provision of the Gacaca Law,63 genocide
perpetrators could be granted a remarkable reduction in their penalties in
exchange for their confession and apology, even against the will of genocide
survivors. In his view, this can never entail authentic forgiveness and
reconciliation. He asserted:
Forgiveness must come from the hearts of people, but in practice the
government has already decided to grant it to those wrongdoers by
releasing them [in exchange for confession]. [...] Hatreds will remain in the
people’s hearts.
Many of the local genocide survivors, including Serge, did not deny the
need for improved community relationships, particularly between the families of
genocide survivors and those of genocide prisoners who had been wrongly
accused and imprisoned for several years. As indicated above, a few of them
suggested that there would be a time for forgiving even genocide perpetrators in
the future. However, many of them appeared to be bitterly resentful at one
assumption underlying the optimistic prospect for reconciliation through gacaca
trials: that is, they are expected, if not obliged, to accept apologies of confessed
perpetrators of the genocide and forgive them for the sake of national unity and
62 Interview in Gitera, 24 May 2004.
63 As described in the next chapter, this provision was originally included in the 1996 Genocide
Law and later carried over to the 2001 Gacaca Law and its amendments that were made in
subsequent years.
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reconciliation. As indicated above, such expectations were clearly discernable in
some of the statements made by the genocide prisoners.
4.3. Objections by Hutu Residents
As discussed earlier in this chapter, the most serious objection to gacaca justice
was lodged by local Hutu residents who identified themselves as (either direct or
indirect) victims of the alleged RPF/A violence. The basis of their objection was
that the overall framework of post-genocide justice, gacaca trials included as
central part of it, is one-sided victor’s justice due to its exclusive focus on the
crimes committed under the auspices of the former genocidal regime, while
overlooking the crimes perpetrated by the RPF/RPA. It was only these Hutu
critics who took issue with the framework or scope of gacaca trials itself. As
indicated above, some of the local genocide survivors criticised some aspects of
the proposed gacaca system; however, they never questioned its general
framework as their Hutu counterparts did.
During the focus group with the gacaca judges in Kiberama, a Hutu man,
after claiming that he had lost at least ten relatives at the hands of RPA soldiers
during the Insurgency, declared that he could simply not envision any prospect
for national reconciliation unless those soldiers responsible for killing his
relatives would also be brought to justice. During the same focus group
discussion, another participant - a Hutu woman who testified to the
‘disappearances’ of two of her sons after being arrested by RPA soldiers
grumbled: ‘Where is reconciliation in gacaca?’64 From the perspective of these
Hutu informants with a profound sense of victimhood, gacaca trials cannot be
the basis of reconciliation unless they are transformed into an even-handed
64 Focus group with lay judges of gacaca courts, Kiberama, 1 June 2002.
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mechanism of dispute resolution whereby the people are provided with
opportunities for acknowledging the wrongs committed as well as the injuries
and losses suffered by ‘both sides’ and offering forgiveness to each other rather
than from one side to the other.
5. Agreement and Disagreement with regard to Justice and Reconciliation
This section presents a summary of both what the grassroots informants
generally agreed about and what they disagreed about with regard to their
conceptions of justice and reconciliation. The framework of the three
contingencies of the psychology of justice discussed in Chapter 3 will guide our
analysis in this section.
5.1. What the People Agreed about
The grassroots informants on both sides of the divide more or less agreed on
three things. First, with regard to ‘justice as what’ or distributive justice, both
retribution and reparation were identified as crucial components of rectificatory
justice for serious violations which affected their lives. This finding is consistent
with a finding of the field research by Lambourne (2002) that both retribution and
reparation were central to people’s conceptions of justice in post-genocide
Rwanda. The grassroots informants on both sides of the divide generally
recognised the importance of retribution in terms of punishment of wrongdoers
and reparation in terms of compensation, establishment of truth and
acknowledgement of wrongs and injuries suffered by victims.
Second, the grassroots informants seemed to share widely the cultural
assumption that justice and reconciliation are closely inter-related concepts. In
this view, the process of seeking the above-mentioned retributive and reparative
outcomes was considered to be integral to the process of restoring relationships
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ruptured by the wrongs committed by one party against the other or against each
other. From this viewpoint, ‘justice as what’ encompassed not only retribution
and reparation but also restoration.
Third, with regard to ‘justice as how’, the community-based and
participatory process of dispute resolution was widely considered to be a
preferable form of procedural justice in order to seek the outcomes of retribution,
reparation and restoration. People’s views about how justice and reconciliation
should be pursued were significantly shaped by communitarian cultural values.
Accordingly, they supported the involvement of the whole community in a
collective endeavour to resolve disputes between its members and restore social
harmony.
5.2. What the People Disagreed about
Despite the fact that the grassroots informants on the two sides of the divide
shared basic conceptions of ‘justice as what’, ‘justice as how’ and their relation to
reconciliation, there was a deep rift between the two sides over the question of
whose victimhood is counted in the quest for post-genocide justice. In other
words, the two sides agreed on the what and how aspects of rectificatory justice
but fiercely disagreed on who should be included in the scope of justice. Their
demands for justice were so centred on the violations and injuries inflicted on
their own side that those inflicted on the other side tended to be either trivialised
or denied. While the conflicting demands for justice between the two sides may
be partly ascribed to a self-centred attitude demonstrated by each side, they also
seemed to be compounded by the problem of ethnicity-based generalisation of
guilt – the problematic tendency to blame others for being responsible for the
suffering of oneself and one’s own group according to their ethnic identity.
As discussed in Chapter 3, it is not unusual to find different sides of a
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conflict advancing competing demands for justice. For the conflict to be settled
peacefully, the conflicting parties with their competing demands must somehow
find a way to compromise so that all the concerned parties have a sense that
some justice has been done. However, in the case of Gitera and Kiberama (and
most likely many other parts of Rwanda), it seemed to be very difficult for both
sides of the divide to take the path of compromise because of the very nature of
the starkly conflicting demands for justice they advanced. On the one hand, the
vast majority of Hutu informants demanded ‘even-handed justice’ which would
address the violations and injuries inflicted on their side by primarily the RPF/A
as much as those inflicted on the side of genocide survivors. From their
perspective, the overall framework of post-genocide justice in Rwanda – and
gacaca trials as a central component of it - is notoriously one-sided victor’s
justice, focusing exclusively on the crimes committed by Hutu perpetrators under
the auspices of the former Hutu genocidal regime while turning a blind eye to the
cases of RPF/A crimes as well as some wrongdoings by Tutsi civilians. To be
sure, none of these Hutu critics of gacaca trials called for its wholesale
abandonment; many of them actually appreciated the participatory aspect of
gacaca trials in which ordinary citizens play important roles. Many Hutu
informants actually supported the idea of using grassroots courts for genocide
trials with the view that they would be possibly the only hope for their relatives in
jail to be tried (and hopefully released) in the foreseeable future.65 What they
asserted, however, is the need for broadening the scope of its jurisdiction to
consider ‘the crimes committed by both sides’ so that the sufferings of not only
Tutsis but also Hutus is acknowledged; perpetrators of not only the Tutsi
65 It should be noted that there could be some people who did not want to see even a single
gacaca trial at all on their hill because, for whatever reasons, they feared of fresh allegations
against and arrests of themselves or their relatives.
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genocide but also war crimes and human rights abuses against Hutus are
punished; and victims of all of these violent crimes are assisted equally to rebuild
their lives shattered by the violence.
On the other hand, the genocide survivors strongly objected to the idea of
‘even-handed justice’ on the ground that nothing can (and should) be equated
with the horrendous crime of genocide and the suffering it inflicted on them.66
From their perspective, any attempt to bring before gacaca courts what they
consider as incomparable types of violence together – genocidal violence
against innocent people and retributive violence against notorious killers and
their accomplices – is nothing but a grave injustice to themselves and their loved
ones massacred during the genocide. Therefore, for these genocide survivors
demanding special, if not exclusive, recognition of their form of victimhood,
post-genocide justice with its exclusive focus on genocide-related crimes (or its
limited scope of justice from the perspective of many Hutus), as it has been
pursued by the government, is the right response which justice requires.
6. Reflections on the Relationship between Justice and Reconciliation
Analysis of the fieldwork results presented above has generated the following
insights which may be useful for better understanding the relationship between
justice and reconciliation in post-genocide peacebuilding in Rwanda.
6.1. Justice as an Integral Part of Reconciliation
The first significant point about the grassroots conception of the justice -
reconciliation relationship is that justice in terms of both retribution and
66 As reported in the previous chapter, the local genocide survivors even objected to the idea of
themselves being equated with survivors of massacres (itsembatsemba) or surviving Hutu
dissidents attacked by genocide perpetrators on the ground that the nature of their suffering is
qualitatively different from that of those Hutu victims.
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reparation discussed above is seen as an integral part of the process towards
reconciliation, the healing of broken relationships between the parties separated
by emotions like enmity, mistrust and fear. The grassroots conception of justice
described above encompasses a wide range of justice-related desires of the
people severely harmed by different types of violations in the past: punishment
of wrongdoers; material/compensatory forms of redress; and symbolic or moral
forms of redress, particularly those addressing the victims’ need to know the
truth and to obtain acknowledgment of the wrongs and injuries they suffered. All
of these forms of justice were considered by many at the grassroots level as vital
requirements --- for making perpetrators accountable, for repairing physical and
economic damage inflicted on victims, for healing their emotional wounds, and
ultimately, for restoring the relationships ruptured by the wrongs committed.
This grassroots conception of justice-reconciliation relationship is indeed
similar to the integrated conception of three ‘R’s – Retribution, Reparation and
Restoration proposed in Chapter 3: that is, the conception of rectificatory justice
in which both retribution and reparation are considered as vital components of
the process of restoring social relationships ruptured by wrongdoing. As
discussed in Chapter 3, in portraying restorative justice as an alternative to
retributive justice, many proponents of restorative justice tend to reject retributive
punishment as counterproductive to the goals of establishing accountability,
repairing the material and emotional damage inflicted on victims, and restoring
social relationships ruptured by violation. Accordingly, they argue, for responses
to the wrongdoing to be conducive to restoration, they should be centred on
reparative measures as opposed to retributive ones. The identified grassroots
conception of justice-reconciliation relationship does not agree with this
retributive/restorative dichotomy and the idea that retributive punishment must
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be rejected in the process of restoration. As indicated above, although some of
the grassroots informants prioritised their reparative needs for justice over
retributive ones, no one suggested that retributive punishment would undermine
the process of restoring damaged relationships. Rather, many of them seemed
to consider retributive punishment – along with various forms of reparation – an
integral part of rectificatory justice response which is essential for restoration.
Moreover, according to the grassroots conception of justice, the boundaries
between reparation and retribution appeared to be not as clear as often
suggested, as demonstrated by the fact that several informants described
certain types of reparative measures (e.g. payment of compensation, redress
through physical work by offenders) as forms of retributive punishment to be
imposed on offenders.
6.2. Interaction between Justice, Mercy and Reconciliation
The grassroots conception considers rectificatory justice as a vital requirement
for reconciliation in restoring damaged relationships but it also recognises that
working at justice alone does not entail reconciliation. Justice is seen as – to
borrow the phrase used by Assefa (1999, 44) - ‘a necessary but not sufficient
condition for reconciliation’. As another set of vital requirements for reconciliation,
many grassroots informants pointed to the importance of forgiveness and mutual
acceptance - key elements of the component of mercy (acceptance, forgiveness,
compassion, healing, etc.) according to the Lederach’s framework discussed in
Chapter 3. As noted above, the Kinyarwanda term ubwiyunge connotes forgiving
those who committed wrongs and accepting such wrongdoers as fellow
members of the community. According to this grassroots conception of
reconciliation, to repeat the point already made above, the process of authentic
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reconciliation cannot be completed without the elements of mercy, particularly,
mutual acceptance based on forgiveness.
It can be suggested then that according to the grassroots conception of
reconciliation, the process of reconciliation embraces at its core two seemingly
competing components – justice and mercy - which may be seen as
contradictory forces and yet are essential for its progress. For many victims of
violent crimes, it is extremely difficult to contemplate forgiveness and acceptance
of their victimizers, especially when there is no visible effort being made to
address their justice-related needs and desires through a range of retributive
and/or reparative measures. To put this the other way around, the more
conceivable forgiveness and reconciliation may become for victims, the more
satisfied they are with progress in justice as they see wrongdoers held
accountable, material losses compensated, wrongs and injuries acknowledged,
all of which are important for their healing process. Addressing their needs and
desires for justice, therefore, may positively influence the healing process of
victims, thereby enhancing their ability to be generous and forgiving as well as
open to the possibility of future reconciliation. In short, progress in justice
facilitates progress in reconciliation by reinforcing the elements of mercy,
constituting a vital component of the reconciliation process.
6.3. Tensions between Restrictive Conceptions of Justice and
Reconciliation
As discussed above, the dominant grassroots conception of the
justice-reconciliation relationship considers justice as an integral part of
reconciliation. However, this does not mean that they are immune to possible
tensions and even contradictions. As discussed in Chapter 3, there are cases in
which justice and reconciliation are understood as competing goals or even
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incompatible alternatives in the context of post-violence peacebuilding,
particularly when they are restrictively projected as retributive punishment of
perpetrators and a hasty attempt to achieve negative peace by turning to a blind
eye to the atrocities committed and their consequences.
The fieldwork findings indicate strong retributive desires held by some of
the grassroots informants. As implied in the statement of one genocide survivor
quoted earlier, if one conceives of justice strictly as bringing wrongdoers to suffer
their just desserts or an amount of pain proportional to what they inflicted on their
victims (i.e. death penalty for a murderer), it is indeed difficult to envision
reconciliation, particularly when forgiving wrongdoers and accepting them back
as members of the community are seen as essential elements of reconciliation,
as was the case with the grassroots conception of reconciliation discussed
above. Seemingly standing in tension here, however, is not justice and
reconciliation per se but ‘just desserts retributivism’ (Duff 2002, 82, 96-7) – a
position which demands the infliction of pain on wrongdoers for its own sake –
on the one hand and the elements of mercy, constituting a vital component of
reconciliation on the other.
The perceived tension may further be exacerbated when forgiveness is
wrongly equated with forgetting the past, condoning wrongdoers without any
effort to hold them accountable or ‘deny[ing] legitimate emotions of anger and
resentment’ which victims feel towards them (K. Daly 2000, 41). These kinds of
problematic conceptions of forgiveness did emerge when some of the Hutu
informants stressed the need to ‘forgive and forget’ and even described
forgiveness as something expected or as an obligation of victims for the sake of
national reconciliation. As demonstrated by Little (1999, 79) and also clearly
expressed in some of the statements made by grassroots informants,
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forgiveness of the wrongdoer does not necessarily preclude his/her personal
accountability for the wrongdoing and obligation to repair the harm caused by it.
Neither does it require them to deny or suppress victims’ legitimate anger or
indignation towards the wrongdoers who caused their suffering. Arguably, it does
not even preclude retributive punishment of the wrongdoer, as several
informants suggested; such punishment may be seen as a necessary condition
for receiving forgiveness from victims and being reintegrated into the
community.67 Nonetheless, as indicated in the fieldwork data presented in this
chapter, there is a real danger that reconciliation may be conflated with
problematic misconceptions of forgiveness outlined above, and when it happens,
the pursuit of reconciliation may be hampered in the face of a serious objection
by the community of victims/survivors, especially those victims/survivors who
vigorously demand justice in the sense of vengeance.
7. Conclusion: Reconciling Conflicting Narratives as a Critical Challenge
This chapter has demonstrated that, while the people in the two fieldwork
communities shared basic cultural assumptions about justice and reconciliation,
they were deeply divided over the question of justice and reconciliation
regarding whom it would serve. How the people perceived the issues of justice
and reconciliation were closely interwoven with the conflicting ethnicized
narratives of victimhood discussed in Chapter 5. When the process of
post-violence justice and reconciliation reaches an impasse due to such sharply
conflicting, seemingly non-negotiable demands for justice advanced by
67 Building on Duff’s (1992, 71) argument for alternative punishment for restoration, Kathleen
Daly (2000, 41) contends that:
the ability of victims to be generous and forgiving and for offenders to “make amends” to
victims – elements that are desirable objectives in a restorative justice process – can only
come about during or after a process when punishment, broadly defined, occurs.
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adversarial identity groups, what can we do? Is there any promising way to help
the parties to redefine their sense of what is and is not negotiable in relation to
their demands for justice?
The findings of the grassroots study presented above do not give precise
answers to these questions. What they apparently show, however, is the great
challenge facing the quest for justice and reconciliation in post-genocide
Rwanda: the challenge of reconciling conflicting narratives of victimhood in a
way that they are dissociated from the dichotomous, essentialist construction of
ethnicity. As Kelman’s conception of reconciliation as identity change reviewed in
Chapter 3 suggests, this challenge is essentially about the transformation of
ethno-political identities that have been deeply entrenched in the minds of many
Rwandans through the decades of violent political campaign, civil war and
genocide. How has this critical challenge been tackled by the government of
Rwanda in its efforts at justice and reconciliation? Having this as one of the
central questions, now we will turn to the case study of the government’s
strategy for justice and reconciliation in post-genocide Rwanda.
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PART II I
THE QUEST FOR JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION
BY THE POST-GENOCIDE GOVERNMENT
OF RWANDA
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CHAPTER SEVEN
FROM PUNITIVE TO RECONCILIATORY JUSTICE:
UNRAVELING THE GOVERNMENT’S STRATEGY
FOR POST-GENOCIDE JUSTICE
1. Introduction
Since the end of the 1994 genocide, the government of Rwanda and the
international community have made a massive investment in the reconstruction
of the domestic judicial system and the prosecution of alleged perpetrators of the
genocide. Underlying these justice-related efforts is a view that the culture of
impunity and the absence of rule of law constituted a major cause of the
genocide and other gross human rights violations that ravaged Rwandan society
in its recent past. Three levels of judicial response to the genocide have been
underway: the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) based in
Arusha, Tanzania; national-level genocide trials through the domestic formal
justice system; and a local-level process of justice and reconciliation through
gacaca courts. All of these responses fall into the domain of rectificatory justice –
the process of correcting the wrongs committed in the past – although they are
considered as essential for preventing the recurrence of violence and advancing
the long-term process of national reconciliation.
This chapter focuses on the domestic efforts at post-genocide justice by the
Rwandan government, particularly the one through gacaca courts. Calling it
‘reconciliatory justice’, the government claims that the justice system it
developed based on a Rwandan community-based dispute resolution
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mechanism is more effective than the formal justice system, in the context of
post-genocide Rwanda, in revealing the truth, rendering justice and promoting
reconciliation. This chapter examines the evolution of the government’s
approach to post-genocide justice and its conceptual underpinning. After
sketching the background of the inception and evolution of the gacaca system as
well as its basic features, the chapter discusses key elements constituting the
government’s logic of ‘reconciliatory justice’. While the chapter highlights
potentially restorative features of the gacaca system, it reveals that gacaca’s
unique restorative potential has not been tapped in its implementation mainly
due to political constraints imposed by the government on the scope of
post-genocide justice and the lack of strategic emphasis on the concrete steps
for carrying out reintegration and reconciliation.
2. The Pursuit of Punitive Justice in the Aftermath of Genocide
After coming to power in July 1994, the transitional government of Rwanda gave
the first priority in its reconstruction effort to the apprehension and punishment of
all of those who took part in the genocide.1 Tens of thousands of people –
mostly Hutus – were arrested without formal charges and thrown into prisons
and communal detention facilities across the country based on unverified
allegations of having taking part in the genocidal massacres. By mid-1996, the
total population of genocide suspects in detention swelled to over 90,000 (AI
2004). As the mass repatriation of Hutu refugees from neighbouring countries,
particularly the former Zaire, continued after late 1996, tens more thousands
were arrested without formal charges. Consequently, the number of detainees
reached its peak of an estimated 135,000 in 1997/98 (HRW 2008a, 16). As the
1 Official website of the government of Rwanda, accessed on 31 May 2004.
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chief prosecutor himself once admitted, a significant number of the detainees
were thought to be innocent (Uvin 2001a, 182).2
The new government defended its action of mass arrests and prolonged
detentions, primarily based on two grounds. First, the government’s first priority
was to restore security in the country and for that it was imperative to apprehend,
to the extent possible, all the violent perpetrators of genocide. Second, in order
to prevent future genocide and achieve justice and reconciliation they felt that no
perpetrator should be allowed to go unpunished, and the culture of impunity had
to be eradicated once and for all (Uvin 2001a, 181).3 Firmly determined to try to
punish all perpetrators and accomplices of the genocide, the new government
had to confront a challenge which was arguably unprecedented in human
history: prosecuting tens of thousands for the crimes committed against
hundreds of thousands while building for the first time an independent, fair and
efficient justice system in the country (Schabas 1996, 531-4).4
2.1. The 1996 Genocide Law
In August 1996, as a major part of its response to the enormous challenge
described above, the Transitional National Assembly of Rwanda adopted the
Organic Law on ‘the organization of prosecutions for offences constituting the
crime of genocide or crimes against humanity’ committed between 1 October
1990 and 31 December 1994 (hereafter, the 1996 Genocide Law).5 This 1996
2 Vandeginste (2001, 235) estimated the number of innocent detainees to be over 25,000 (out of
the total of 122,000) based on the rate of acquittals for the first semester of 1999 (21 percent).
3 Also see Organic Law N° 8/96 of 30th August 1996 in Official Gazette of the Republic of
Rwanda 35 no. 17 (1 September 1996).
4 Schabas (1996, 531) noted in his 1996 article, ‘[t]he term “rebuilding” is often used to describe
the challenge facing Rwandan justice, but it is not well chosen’ because of the corrupt and
politicised nature of the justice system which existed prior to the 1994 genocide. The challenge
was not to ‘rebuild’ but to newly ‘build’ a system which truly deserved to be called a ‘justice
system’.
5 Organic Law N° 8/96 of 30th August. For more detailed description and analysis of the 1996
Genocide Law, see Schabas (1996); ICSPHRI (1997); Des Forges (1999, 749-53); and
Vandeginste (2001).
258
Genocide Law set the overall framework of post-genocide justice in Rwanda,
even though some of its provisions have been amended as the government
introduced and implemented the gacaca system. The purpose of the 1996
Genocide Law is ‘the organization of criminal proceedings’ against suspects
accused of having committed criminal offences, stipulated and sanctioned under
the penal code of Rwanda, which constitute either genocide or crimes against
humanity as defined in relevant United Nations conventions (Article 1). Those
UN conventions are: 1) Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide of 9 December 1948 (so-called ‘Genocide Convention’); 2)
Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War
of 12 August 1949 and its additional protocols; and 3) Convention on the
Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against
Humanity of 26 November 1968 (Article 1-a).
Article 2 of the Genocide Convention defines the term genocide as ‘any of
the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national,
ethnical, racial or religious group, as such’: 1) killing members of the group; 2)
causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; 3) deliberately
inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical
destruction in whole or in part; 4) imposing measures intended to prevent births
within the group; and 5) forcibly transferring children of the group to another
group. The Convention of 1968 refers to the Statute of the International Military
Court of 8 August 1945 (Article 6-c) to define crimes against humanity: ‘the
assassination, the extermination, the reduction to slavery, the deportation and
any other inhumane act committed against civil populations, (...) or the
persecutions for political, racial or religious purposes, (...) having or not
constituted a violation of the country’s domestic right where these acts were
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perpetrated, (...)’ (ICSPHRI 1997, 28).
The offences to be prosecuted under the 1996 Genocide Law were only
those committed during the period between 1 October 1990, the date the atrocity
against people identified as ‘Tutsi’ began to be intensified following the RPF
invasion, and 31 December 1994, the end of the year in which the genocide was
finally halted by the RPF and the transitional government was established
following the defeat of the genocidal regime. In order to handle exclusively these
offences, the 1996 legislation stipulated the establishment of Specialized
Chambers within the existing Tribunals of First Instance and the military courts
(Articles 19-20).
The 1996 Genocide Law classified offenders of genocide-related crimes
into four categories according to the level of culpability (Article 2): 1) ‘the
planners, organizers, instigators, supervisors and leaders’ of the genocide,
persons in position of authority at administrative, political, military and religious
institutions, ‘notorious murderers’ and ‘persons who committed acts of sexual
torture’; 2) all others who were implicated in murder or assaults causing death; 3)
those who were implicated in assaults which did not cause death; and 4) those
who committed offences against property. Underlying this classification system
was the government’s intention to ‘separate the main organizers of the genocide
from criminals with lesser degrees of responsibility’ (Schabas 1996, 530).6
Coupled with the classification of offenders was the Confession and Guilty Plea
Procedure (Articles 4-13) – a ‘unique scheme aimed at encouraging offenders to
6 During a conference entitled ‘South Africa-Rwanda Dialogue’ held at Cape Town in 2001,
Gerald Gahima, then General Prosecutor at the Supreme Court of Rwanda, said:
... we also decided that we would find ways of dealing with accountability for the genocide
in ways that promoted stabilisation of our society, promoted the rule of law and would help
heal our society. This is how we came up with the 1996 law which identifies the most
culpable, the leadership, in category one and subjects them to the strictest application of
the law, while identifying others who could receive lenient treatment, particularly if they
pleaded guilty and joined the confession programme that we are promoting.
(in Villa-Vicencio and Savage 2001, 99-100)
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confess in exchange for substantially reduced sentences’ (ibid). For offenders to
benefit from considerable reductions in sentences, they had to provide, in their
confessions, a full description of the offences they committed, evidence to be
used for prosecuting other suspects, and an apology.
The 1996 Genocide Law also made reference to general procedures for
civil actions. Articles 27-32 stipulated that convicts classified in Category 1 were
‘held jointly and severally liable for all damages caused in the country by their
acts of criminal participation’, whereas those classified in Categories 2, 3 or 4
were only liable for damages resulting from their own criminal acts (Article 30).
The law also stipulated that civil damages could be awarded even to victims not
yet identified (Article 30), which were to be deposited into a Victims
Compensation Fund whose establishment and management would be
determined in a separate law (Article 32).
2.2. Genocide Trials through the Formal Justice System
Trials of genocide suspects began in December 1996 through the Specialized
Chambers created within the formal justice system as stipulated in the Genocide
Law. The international community provided the transitional government with
considerable assistance for (re)constructing the justice system and building its
capacity to deal with numerous caseloads of genocide-related crimes (Uvin
2001a). Some of these early trials were reported to be flawed, with problems
such as the absence or inadequacy of legal assistance for defendants,
intimidation or harassment of defence lawyers and witnesses, the lack of
impartiality and independence of judicial personnel, and restrictions on the rights
of appeal.
By June 2003, a total of 8,820 suspects of genocide-related crimes had
been tried through Rwanda’s formal justice system, although some 80,000
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suspects were still in detention at the 19 prisons and other detention facilities
across the country (AI 2004, 3, 7). The pace of trials was a remarkable
achievement for a government with limited resources, particularly compared with
the highly disappointing results of the ICTR:7 ten years after its creation, millions
of dollars had been spent, but only 23 convictions and three acquittals had been
handed down by the end of 2004 (ICTR’s official website).8
Most observers agree that since 1998, with the increased availability of
defence lawyers and the enhanced competence of judges, the fairness of
genocide trials within Rwanda significantly improved (Vandeginste 2001, 235;
Uvin and Mironko 2003, 225; AI 2004, 7). The rate of acquittals nearly tripled,
from 8.9 percent in 1997 to 24.8 percent in 2002 (as of the end of June), while
the rate of those sentenced to death decreased dramatically, from 30.8 percent
to 3.4 percent during the same period (AI 2002, 17).
Despite this remarkable improvement, however, outside observers such as
Amnesty International stated in the early 2000s that Rwanda’s formal justice
system was falling short of fair trial standards and that therefore a need still
remained for more far-reaching reforms.9 What also became apparent by the
late 1990s was that the formal justice system alone would not be able to reduce
the large backlog of genocide-related cases within a reasonable period of time.
7 The ICTR was created by the UN Security Council’s Resolution 955 of 8 November 1994 ‘to
contribute to the process of national reconciliation in Rwanda and to the maintenance of peace’.
Its mandate is to prosecute individuals responsible for genocide and other serious violations of
international humanitarian law committed in Rwanda and neighbouring states between 1
January 1994 and 31 December 1994 (ICTR’s official website, accessed on 15 August 2009).
After taking two years to establish offices in Hague, Arusha and Kigali as well as another year to
address management and funding problems, the Tribunal finally began its first trial in January
1997 (AI 2004, 5; Peskin 2008, 157).
8 Accessed on 24 February 2005.
9 Major problems included: 1) the unlawful detention of the large number of genocide suspects in
overcrowded prisons and detention facilities; 2) government officials’ interference with court
decisions, in some cases leading to re-arrests of individuals after their acquittals; 3) the absence
or inadequacy of legal assistance for defendants; 4) continuing intimidation of defence lawyers
and witnesses; 5) the limited competence, impartiality and independence of judicial personnel;
and 6) the widespread corruption throughout the entire justice system (AI 2004, 7; Vandeginste
2001, 235-6; and Uvin and Mironko 2003, 225).
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In December 1999, it was estimated that over 100 years would be required to
judge the more than 130,000 cases remaining if the rate of judgments per year
(slightly over 1,300 in 1999) remained constant. In other words, there would be
no chance for the vast majority of genocide survivors and those accused of
genocide-related crimes (including thousands of supposedly innocent people) to
see justice carried out in their lifetime.10 Thus, the government was compelled to
search for an alternative way of dealing with the overwhelming need for justice
created by the genocide.11
3. Reconciliatory Justice through the Gacaca System
It was against the above background that the government adopted a new
strategy of post-genocide justice centred on the gacaca system, a ‘system of
participative justice’ modelled after a traditional community-based mechanism of
dispute resolution called gacaca - literally, ‘a patch of grass’ on which communal
discussion is usually held. The official website of National Service of Gacaca
Courts (NSGC) indicates five major objectives in setting up the gacaca system.
They are to: 1) ‘reveal the truth about what happened’ in connection with the
genocide; 2) ‘speed up the genocide trials’; 3) ‘eradicate the culture of impunity’;
4) ‘reconcile the Rwandans and reinforce their unity’; and 5) ‘prove that the
Rwandan society has the capacity to settle its own problems through a system of
justice based on the Rwandan custom’.12
10 AI (2004, 4) reported: ‘Preventable disease, malnutrition and the debilitating effects of
overcrowding resulted in a reported 11,000 deaths between 1994 and 2001’ in Rwanda’s prisons
and other detention facilities.
11 See ‘Context of historical background of Gacaca Courts’, the official website of NSGC
<http://www.inkiko-gacaca.gov.rw/>, accessed on 22 Dec 2004.
12 ‘The objectives of the Gacaca Courts’, available at the official website of NSGC accessed on
22 Dec 2004.
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3.1. The Evolution of the Gacaca System
Traditional gacaca, which dates back to pre-colonial Rwanda, takes the form of
an informal meeting involving local elders as its conveners and members of
concerned families or of the local hill as participants, although it tends to be
dominated by adult males (Reyntjens and Vandeginste 2001, 129). It is
convened whenever deemed necessary as a dispute arises between members
of the family/community or as social norms are violated. Gacaca usually deals
with civil disputes over land use, inheritance, marital affairs, property damage,
loans, etc., although it may also be used to settle disputes resulting from criminal
offences, mostly but not exclusively minor ones such as theft (ibid). Its primary
goal is ‘to restore harmony and social order in a given society, and to
reincorporate the person who was the source of the disorder’ rather than
establishing his/her guilt in accordance with the state law (Vandeginste 2001,
239). Accordingly, the elders facilitate communal discussion to identify a
reparative sanction (for example, an amount of compensation) acceptable to all
the parties involved in the gacaca process. Even though the culpability of
wrongdoers is recognised on an individual basis, members of the group or family
to which they belong are collectively held responsible for reparations (Karekezi
2001, 32). Gacaca in this traditional form continued to be widely practiced at the
local level after the introduction of a Western justice system by colonial
authorities, although it became more formalised, particularly under the
post-independence government, in its relation with administrative and judicial
structures of the state (Reyntjens and Vandeginste, ibid; Karekezi, ibid;
Reyntjens 1990, 39 cited in Karekezi, et al. 2004, 73-4).13
13 In post-genocide Rwanda, traditional gacaca has been reportedly revived at various levels of
society, partly due to the malfunctioning of the formal justice system, even though, according to
Reyntjens and Vandeginste (2001, 130), ‘its nature has also been fundamentally altered because
of new circumstances, such as those related to the new composition of the local population after
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After a series of discussions held in 1998, the transitional government
decided to build a new system for post-genocide justice based on the traditional
gacaca mechanism.14 A draft law proposed by an ad hoc National Gacaca
Commission was first discussed in a consultative meeting and then circulated
among government bodies, various sectors of society, and international donors
and agencies working in Rwanda. On 12 October 2000, after much debate and
redrafting, the Transitional National Assembly adopted the Organic Law for
establishing ‘gacaca jurisdictions’, for trying all but the first category suspects
accused of genocide and other crimes against humanity committed between 1
October 1990 and 31 December 1994.15 The law went into effect on 15 March
2001.
After a campaign of mass sensitisation, a nationwide election took place in
October 2001 to choose lay judges called inyangamugayo. Initial training was
provided for these judges over a period of six weeks in April and May 2002. Each
group of lay judges, most of whom had no legal background, received intensive
instruction for six days in total before the official inauguration of gacaca courts in
June 2002.16 There were concerns about the legal competence of the lay judges
due to the limited training provided initially. To address these legitimate concerns,
refresher courses were organised in subsequent phases and booklets for simple
explanations of gacaca procedures, and relevant laws were supplied as
reference books to gacaca courts.
The Rwandan government took a gradual approach to the development of
the genocide’. See also Karekezi (2001, 33-4) for various examples of reactivated practice of
gacaca in post-genocide Rwanda.
14 The description in this paragraph is based on Karekezi (2001, 30-7); Karekezi, et al (2004,
71); AI (2002, 20-1); and Uvin (2003a, 116-7). For detailed information about issues discussed
during the preparation of the Gacaca Law, see Karekezi (2001, 30-7).
15 Organic Law N° 40/2000 of 26/01/2001
16 See African Rights (2003) for a very informative report of the training process and views of the
gacaca courts system expressed by lay judges and their instructors.
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the gacaca system so that its original design and modalities might be modified
based on lessons learnt during the small scale implementation. Accordingly, on
19 June 2002, following the official inauguration ceremony, the pilot programme
began with 80 cell-level gacaca courts dispersed among 12 sectors,
representing one sector from each of the country’s 12 provinces. In November,
gacaca was expanded to all cells within 106 sectors chosen from throughout the
country.17 During the two-year pilot period, 751 gacaca courts became
operational and conducted pre-trial investigative hearings (FH 2004).
As the pilot phase came to an end, the Rwandan parliament adopted an
amended Gacaca Law18 (hereafter the 2004 Gacaca Law or the 2004 Law) on
19 June 2004, in order to clarify some ambiguous aspects of the 2001 Gacaca
Law and to make the gacaca system less cumbersome before putting it into
operation nationwide. As the first very significant amendment, Article 1 of the
2004 Law excluded war crimes, as defined in the UN Convention of 26
November 1968, from the jurisdiction of gacaca courts. Even when the gacaca
courts were organised for the first time through the 2001 Law, the government
made it clear that war crime cases allegedly committed by the RPF forces would
not be tried by the gacaca courts, despite the fact that many Rwandans indicated
their desire to bring related cases to the gacaca courts. This amendment in 2004,
therefore, can be seen as a measure to make the government’s position on this
issue legally indisputable.
The 2004 Gacaca Law stipulated the establishment of the gacaca appeal
court at the sector level instead of the district level as stipulated in the 2001
Gacaca Law, thereby maintaining gacaca court structures only at the cell and
17 Rwanda’s administrative breakdown at the time was 12 provinces, 106 districts, 1,545
sectors, and 9,013 cells.
18 Organic Law N° 16/2004 of 19/06/2004
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sector levels (Article 4). The number of lay judges per gacaca court was reduced
from 19 to 9 (Article 13). An amendment was also made to the classification of
offenders established in the 1996 Genocide Law (and adopted in the 2001
Gacaca Law). Category 2 and Category 3 offenders of genocide-related crimes
in the preceding laws merged into one category, consequently leaving only three
categories of genocide offenders (Article 51).19 Another important provision in
the 2004 Gacaca Law was the provision of specific penalties for people seeking
to pressure or threaten witnesses and/or lay judges (Article 30).
On 15 January 2005, the government announced the nationwide expansion
of the gacaca system to all cells and sectors in the country. By the end of March
2005, gacaca courts in most cells throughout the country began pre-trial
hearings for data collection to accomplish primarily two tasks: to establish lists of
victims and perpetrators with regard to all genocide-related crimes that took
place in the locality and to classify the identified perpetrators according to the
categories stipulated by the 2004 Gacaca Law. The nationwide pre-trial hearings
through over 9,000 cell-level gacaca courts yielded an outcome which
astonished many observers: the number of people accused of genocide-related
crimes swelled to over 800,000. According to the information released by the
NSGC, after the completion of the nationwide pre-trial hearing process on 31
May 2006, the total number of genocide suspects reached 818,564 (NSGC 2008,
9), which was about one tenth of the country’s total population.20
19 Category 1 - individuals who played a critical role in the genocide as its ‘planners, organisers,
imitators, supervisors and ringleaders’, individuals who were in positions of authority at
administrative, political, military, semi-military (militia) and religious bodies, notorious murderers,
and those who committed torture, rape or sexual torture or ‘dehumanising acts on the dead
body’; Category 2 - individuals who killed or injured others as well as those who aided such
offences irrespective of their intention to kill; and Category 3 - individuals who were implicated
only in offences against property.
20 These suspects were composed of 77,269 (9.4%) for Category 1, 432,557 (51.8%) for
Category 2 and 308,738 (38.8%) for Category 3 (NSGC 2008, 9). These people the gacaca
courts identified as genocide suspects included 44,204 persons who were outside Rwanda and
87,063 persons who were dead (Ingelaere 2008, 42).
267
On 15 July 2006, the nationwide trial phase was finally launched with 9,013
cell-level gacaca courts, 1,545 sector-level gacaca courts and the same number
of gacaca appeal courts also placed at the sector level. The gacaca trial became
a part of Rwandans’ regular weekly schedule on practically every hill in the
country. This nationwide trial phase coincided with several significant reforms of
the gacaca system through the promulgation of the new Organic Law (hereafter
the 2007 Gacaca Law or the 2007 Law).21 The 2007 Gacaca Law narrowed
down the scope of Category 1 by putting some of its subcategories22 into
Category 2, thereby expanding the mandate of the sector-level gacaca courts to
judge a number of the defendants previously classified as Category 1. In
addition to the expansion of gacaca courts’ mandate, the 2007 Gacaca Law
made penalties stipulated for Category 2 offenders generally more lenient (with
more weight given to Community Service than to imprisonment), compared with
those stipulated in the 2004 Gacaca Law. In this regard, a major change
introduced by the 2007 Gacaca Law was a provision for suspending part of the
sentence given to Category 2 offenders who resorted to the confession
procedure (Article 14).23
While the 2007 Law significantly expanded the mandate of gacaca courts,
thereby increasing their number of cases, it also added a provision for each
gacaca court to have more than one bench, thereby opening the way to
accelerate judicial proceedings (Article 1). Accordingly, by July 2007, 1,803
benches were newly formed to augment the existing 1,545 benches in the
sector-level gacaca courts, and 412 new benches were added to the 1,545
21 Organic Law N° 10/2007 of 01/03/2007
22 Offenders who were ‘well known murderer[s]’, who ‘committed acts of torture’ and who
‘committed dehumanising acts on the dead body’
23 Those who confessed before being included on the list of the accused had their sentence
reduced by one third; those who confessed after their inclusion in the list had their sentence
suspended by one sixth.
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benches that had been operational in the appeal courts (ASF 2007, 11). As a
result, the total number of the gacaca courts at the sector level increased from
3,090 to 5,305. NSGC measure to accelerate gacaca trials was harshly criticised
by IBUKA, the umbrella organisation of genocide survivors’ associations, as a
step which sacrificed the quality of justice for the sake of speed.24 Legal reform
NGOs observing the gacaca process also expressed concern that gacaca
acceleration ‘hinders the effective participation of the population in the process’
by making it difficult to follow multiple hearings taking place simultaneously (ASF
2007, 52).
The speed of trials recorded during the period of 18 months after the
commencement of the nationwide trial phase was remarkable. During the period
between 15 July 2006 and 31 December 2007, the gacaca courts of cell, sector
and appeal as a whole pronounced judgments for 1,059,298 genocide-related
cases out of the 1,127,706 files received. Over 94% of all the cases were
completed.25 In other words, trials of most defendants classified under Category
2 and Category 3 – people accused of taking part in fatal or nonfatal genocidal
assaults as grassroots participants and people accused of causing property
damage--had been completed by the end of 2007.
Later in 2007, the government revealed another proposal for reforms:
expanding the mandate of sector-level gacaca courts to try the great majority of
Category 1 defendants, excluding those considered planners or organisers of
the genocide and those implicated in the genocide while they were in leadership
positions above the prefecture level (NT 2007a). This proposal for using the
24 In an interview with Hirondelle News Agency, Dieudonné Kayitare, head of the legal
department within IBUKA, reportedly said, ‘All concerns are with the official end of the gacaca
courts scheduled for 31 December. All seem more concerned by the speed than the quality of the
judgments’ (FH 2007d).
25 Information obtained from the NSGC on 12 March 2008. The number of files continued to
grow even after the pre-trial data collection period ended due to new testimonies during the trial
proceedings.
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gacaca courts to try Category 1 defendants met a furious reaction from IBUKA,
which criticised the government for ‘trivializ[ing] the crimes of genocide’, in its
extraordinary congress of 7 December 2007 (FH 2007f). IBUKA’s criticism was
also directed to other reforms which came into force through the 2007 Law,
particularly those which entailed increased leniency of penalties and the
acceleration of trials.26
Despite IBUKA’s protest, the government’s proposal was put into effect on
19 May 2008 through the promulgation of the new Organic Law (hereafter the
2008 Gacaca Law or the 2008 Law)27 for modifying and complementing the
previous laws concerning gacaca courts. This 2008 Gacaca Law broadened the
mandate of the sector-level gacaca courts to judge over 9,000 Category 1
defendants (NSGC 2008, 11), leaving approximately hundreds of Category 1
defendants accused of the most serious genocide-related offences to the
ordinary courts or military courts in Rwanda.28 The 2008 Law also made other
important modifications and new provisions. First, ‘life imprisonment with special
provisions’ (which practically means life imprisonment in solitary confinement)29
became the maximum sentence for genocide-related crimes (Article 17). This
change reflected the government’s decision to abolish capital punishment as of
July 2007. Second, the 2008 Law made Community Service (known locally as
TIG from the French term Travaux d’Intérêt Général) a primary form of penalty
26 The official statement adopted in IBUKA’s extraordinary congress is full of harsh criticisms
against the amendments of the Gacaca Law:
[T]he various amendments of the law on the gacacas consecrated the impunity of alleged
authors of the genocide, altered justice and trivialized the crimes of genocide. Rather than
reconciling society, the trials stimulate hatred between the witnesses and the defendants,
cause shame and anxiety and remove any confidence in justice in them; the speed of the
process encroaches on the quality of the judgments. (FH 2007f)
27 Organic Law N° 13/2008 of 19/05/2008
28 Neither the NSGC nor the Office of General Prosecutor has been able to provide a specific
figure of these Category 1 defendants who will be tried by ordinary or military courts after the
gacaca process is completed (as of 15 August 2009). Denis Bikesha, NSGC’s Director of
Training, Mobilisation and Sensitisation, estimated the number to be not more than several
hundred. (Interview in Kigali, 14 August 2009)
29 See HRW 2009a.
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for convicts who opted to confess their offences (Article 21).30 Third, in
connection with the expansion of gacaca courts’ mandate to judge those
accused of committing rape or sexual torture, one of the subcategories of
Category 1 offenders, the 2008 Law introduced judicial procedures with regard
to these offences in order to reduce the risks of violating victims’ privacy and
anonymity and of undermining their mental health through trials (Article 6).
3.2. Basic Features of the Gacaca System
The following sections will describe basic features of the gacaca system, taking
into consideration all reforms made as of 15 August 2009.31
3.2.1. Three Levels of the Gacaca Courts and Categories of the Accused
Since the 2004 Gacaca Law came into force, three levels of gacaca courts have
been operational: the Gacaca Cell Court, established at the cell level, as well as
the Gacaca Sector Court and the Gacaca Appeal Court, both established at the
sector level. Table 2 below shows categories of defendants accused of
genocide-related crimes, correlated with the courts responsible for trying
defendants as stipulated by the 2008 Gacaca Law (Articles 1 and 9). Defendants
accused of playing the roles of planners or organisers of the genocide or of
committing or encouraging others to commit genocide-related crimes while in
positions of authority at the national or prefecture level (Subcategories 1 and 2 of
Category 1) are tried by ordinary or military courts. These defendants are
considered to carry the heaviest culpability in the genocide.
30 Section 3.3.3. discusses Community Service in details.
31 The Organic Law on Gacaca Courts was last modified and complemented by the 2008
Gacaca Law adopted on 19 May 2008.
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Table 2 Categories of those accused of the crime of genocide and other
crimes against humanity in Rwanda and the court used for their trial
Category Sub-category Description Court
1 Planners or organisers of the genocide or crimes againsthumanity as well as their accomplices.
2
Persons who committed or encouraged others to
commit crimes of genocide or crimes against humanity,
together with their accomplices, while they were in
positions of authority at the national or the prefecture level
in public administration, political parties, army,
gendarmerie, religious denominations or militias.
Ordinary or
military
courts
3
Persons who incited, supervised or played the role of
ringleaders of the genocide or crimes against humanity as
well as their accomplices.
4
Persons who committed or encouraged others to commit
crimes of genocide or crimes against humanity, together
with their accomplices, while they were in positions of
authority at the sub-prefecture and commune levels in
public administration, political parties, army, gendarmerie,
communal police, religious denominations or militias.
1
5 Persons who committed the offence of rape or sexualtorture, as well as their accomplices.
1 Notorious murderers who demonstrated excessive cruelty,as well as their accomplices.
2 Persons who committed torture, as well as theiraccomplices.
3 Persons who committed dehumanising acts on the deadbody, as well as their accomplices.
4 Persons who killed or attacked others resulting in death,as well as their accomplices.
5 Persons who injured or attacked others with the intentionto kill, as well as their accomplices.
2
6 Persons who committed assault or aided others in assaultwithout the intention to kill, as well as their accomplices.
Gacaca
Sector
Court
3 Persons who only committed offences against property.32 Gacaca CellCourt
Source: produced by the author based on Articles 1 and 9 of the Organic Law N° 13/2008
of 19/05/2008
The Gacaca Cell Court is mandated to try defendants classified into
32 Offenders under this category are not prosecuted if they have reached a settlement with
victims on reparations (Article 51 of the 2004 Gacaca Law).
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Category 3, a category for those accused of offences against property, while the
Gacaca Sector Court is in charge of trying all defendants accused as grassroots
participants of genocidal killing and destruction or as those occupying positions
of authority at levels lower than that of prefecture during the genocide. The
Sector Court is also responsible for handling appeals of any Cell Court
judgments. The Gacaca Appeal Court is mandated to examine appeals of
judgments passed by the Gacaca Sector Court.
One thing to be underlined with regard to the categorisation of offenders is
that ‘accomplices’ -- defined as individuals who have ‘by any means’, provided
assistance to actual perpetrators of the offences stipulated in the 2004 Gacaca
Law (Article 53) -- are placed in the same category as the actual perpetrators.
For example, a person who told genocidal militias the whereabouts of Tutsis
hiding in her/his hill before those Tutsis were hunted down and killed may be
convicted as a criminal in the same category as the actual killers. Similarly, a
person who was at a roadblock where killings took place may be placed in the
same category as the one of the people who slaughtered many victims, even if
he/she was there under duress and refrained from participating in the acts of
killing (Waldorf 2006, 431).
As noted earlier in Section 3.1, since the first Gacaca Law came into force
in March 2001, there have been two major amendments in 2004 and 2007 to the
categories of defendants accused of genocide-related crimes, thereby
broadening the mandate of gacaca courts.33 Then, the 2008 Law further
broadened their mandate, allowing Gacaca Sector Courts to try defendants
33 First, with the adoption of the 2004 Law, Category 2 and Category 3 under the 2001 Law
(adopted from the 1996 Genocide Law) merged into one category, consequently widening the
scope of Category 2 and leaving only three categories in total. (Until then, Subcategory 6 of
Category 2 under the latest 2008 Law had constituted Category 3 by itself.) Second, the scope of
Category 2 was further broadened through an amendment made by the 2007 Law which brought
some of those previously classified as Category 1 (Subcategories 3, 4 and 6 of Category 1 under
the 2004 Law) under Category 2 (Subcategories 1, 2 and 3 of Category 2 under the 2008 Law).
273
falling into Subcategories 3, 4 and 5 of Category 1 in addition to those of
Category 2 (See Table 2). As a result, with regard to the types of offenders to be
tried under their jurisdictions, the role of gacaca courts in post-genocide justice
has become much greater than was originally envisaged under the 2001 Gacaca
Law.
3.2.2. Structure of the Gacaca Court and its Judicial Procedure
A gacaca court consists of the General Assembly (the entire adult population of
the cell or sector) and the Bench,34 which is made up of members called
inyangamugayo (a Kinyarwanda term which literally means ‘persons of integrity’)
who are elected from among the members of the General Assembly based on
their high moral standards. As noted, the number of the lay judges constituting
the Bench was originally 19 according to the 2001 Law but was reduced to nine
(with five substitutes) by the 2004 Law (Article 8) and finally to seven (with two
substitutes) by the 2007 Law (Article 1). No specific educational or professional
qualifications are required for the lay judges of gacaca courts at any level, apart
from the literacy in Kinyarwanda required for those serving as presidents,
vice-presidents and secretaries of the courts.35 Rather, the gacaca system
excludes certain groups of elites -- namely magistrates, politicians, government’s
officials and members of military or police forces -- from being judges (Article 15
of the 2004 Law). This restriction is a remarkable departure from the formal
justice system dominated by legal professionals. The ordinary members of the
34 Formally called ‘Seat’ before the amendment in March 2007
35 Criteria for candidates of inyangamugayo stipulated in the Organic Law include: 1) having
never been implicated in the genocide; 2) being free from ‘the spirit of sectarianism’; 3) having
never been convicted of a criminal offence requiring six months or more in prison; 4) living with
high moral standards including trustworthiness and honesty; 5) being ‘characterised by a spirit of
speech sharing’; and 5) being ‘free from genocide ideology’. ‘Ideology of genocide’ is defined as
‘behaviour, a way of speaking, written documents and any other actions meant to wipe out
human beings on the basis of their ethnic group, origin, nationality, region, colour of skin,
physical traits, sex, language, religion or political opinions’ (Article 3 of the 2007 Law).
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local population are expected to play critical roles in the gacaca system as
judges, jurors, witnesses, and administrative officials of the court.
Gacaca proceedings begin at the Gacaca Cell Court, the lowest structure in
the gacaca system. The main duties of the Gacaca Cell Court are: 1) collect
information about the offences committed; 2) classify defendants into one of the
three categories according to the nature of their offences; and 3) put on trial and
judge cases for the defendants classified into Category 3 (Articles 33 and 34 of
the 2004 Law). In order to accomplish these duties, the Bench of the Gacaca
Cell Court first proceeded with a pre-trial investigative/data collection phase with
the participation of the General Assembly. The major task during this phase was
to compile a list of all victims known to the local population (i.e. residents killed
inside or outside the cell, non-residents killed inside the cell, and
residents/non-residents who survived), victims’ damaged property, and accused
perpetrators of genocide-related crimes committed against the victims identified
(Articles 33 and 34 of the 2004 Law).36 Then, files of accused perpetrators
classified into Category 2 and Category 1 were forwarded to the Gacaca Sector
Court and the Office of Public Prosecutions, respectively.37
During the trial phase (which started on 15 July 2006 and is not yet
completed as of 15 August 2009), the Bench of the gacaca court at different
levels reviews case files, summons defendants and witnesses, and conducts
public hearings about cases in which not only summoned defendants and
witnesses but also any interested person from the General Assembly is allowed
to testify (Articles 64-68 of the 2004 Law). In a public hearing of gacaca trials,
36 Article 34 of the 2004 Law defines a ‘victim’ to be listed as ‘anybody killed, hunted to be killed
but survived, suffered acts of torture against his or her sexual parts, suffered rape, injured or
victim of any other form of harassment, plundered, and whose house and property were
destroyed because of his or her ethnic background or opinion against the genocide ideology’.
37 Some of the Category 1 files were later forwarded to Gacaca Sector Courts due to the
amendments in 2007 and 2008 Laws.
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defendants are confronted by their accusers and the rest of the community
constituting the General Assembly. Testimonies and counter-testimonies are
provided before the Bench deliberates and hands down verdicts. Also,
defendants who want to confess and express words of repentance and apology
are allowed to do so before the gacaca court in the presence of the General
Assembly and possibly before victims (if they are still alive) and their families
(Articles 54-63). Appeals against verdicts are examined by gacaca courts at the
higher level (Articles 34-37).
3.2.3. Penalties
Table 3 below indicates the summary of penalties to offenders who were over 18
years old at the time of the offence.38 The severity of penalty is determined by
law according to two main parameters: the category (and subcategory) to which
convicts belong and whether or not and when they opted for the confession
procedure (discussed in detail below). The severest penalty for offenders falling
within Category 1 is life imprisonment, although it can be reduced to 20 to 24
years of imprisonment if offenders opt for the confession procedure before they
are convicted. The maximum penalty for those who belong to Category 2 is 30
years or life imprisonment. A notable difference between Category 1 and
Category 2 offenders is that by opting for the confession procedure, the latter
may have portions of their sentences suspended and other portions commuted
to Community Service.39 Both Category 1 and Category 2 offenders are liable to
deprivation of their civic rights permanently or for the duration of the sentence
38 Persons convicted of genocide-related crimes who were 14 years or more but less than 18
years of age at the time the offence was committed get more lenient penalties that those
imposed on persons over 18 years of age (Article 20 of the 2008 Law).
39 In fact, as indicated in Table 3, offenders classified into Subcategory 6 of Category 2 may
have portions of the sentence suspended and other portions commuted to Community Service
even if they do not opt for the confession and guilty plea procedure.
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(Article 15 of the 2007 Law).40
Table 3 Penalties for persons convicted of genocide-related crimes
Category Sub-category Penalty
No Confession
or
Confession Rejected
Confession After the
Inclusion to the List of
the Accused
Confession Before the
Inclusion to the List of
the Accused
1
2
3
4
1
5
Life imprisonment
25 to 30 years of
imprisonment.
No commutation to
Community Service
(CS)
20 to 24 years of
imprisonment.
No commutation to
Community Service
(CS)
1
2
3
30 years or
life imprisonment
25 to 29 years of
imprisonment, but:
a) 1/3 of the sentence
in custody;
b) 1/6 of it suspended;
c) 1/2 of it commuted
to CS.
20 to 24 years of
imprisonment, but :
a) 1/6 of the sentence
in custody;
b) 1/3 of it suspended;
c) 1/2 of it commuted
to CS.
4
5
15 to 19 years of
imprisonment
12 to 14 years of
imprisonment, but:
a) 1/3 of the sentence
in custody;
b) 1/6 of it suspended;
c) 1/2 of it commuted
to CS.
8 to 11 years of
imprisonment, but:
a) 1/6 of the sentence
in custody;
b) 1/3 of it suspended;
c) 1/2 of it commuted
to CS.
2
6
5 to 7 years of
imprisonment, but:
a) 1/3 of the sentence
in custody;
b) 1/6 of it suspended;
c) 1/2 of it commuted
to CS.
3 to 4 years of
imprisonment, but:
a) 1/3 of the sentence
in custody;
b) 1/6 of it suspended;
c) 1/2 of it commuted
to CS.
1 to 2 years of
imprisonment, but:
a) 1/6 of the sentence
in custody;
b) 1/3 of it suspended;
c) 1/2 of it commuted
to CS.
3
Civil reparation in case no amicable settlement reached.
Provisions for confessions, guilty pleas, repentance and apologies not
applicable.
Source: produced by the author based mainly on Article 17 of Organic Law N° 13/2008
of 19/05/2008, Article 14 of Organic Law N° 10/2007 of 01/03/2007 and Article
75 of Organic Law N° 16/2004 of 19/6/2004.
40 Types of civil rights to be deprived from persons convicted of genocide-related crimes are the
rights to be elected; to occupy leadership positions in different institutions; to serve in the army,
police and other security organs; and to be a teacher, medical professional, or member of the
judiciary (Article 15 of the 2007 Law).
277
Category 3 offenders – those committed offences only against property – are
obliged to make civil reparation in the forms of restitution of the looted property
and/or compensation for the damaged property through monetary payment or
through work by the offenders themselves (Articles 75 and 95 of the 2004 Law).
As noted earlier, penalties for offenders convicted of genocide-related
crimes have been made increasingly lenient in key changes through the
amendments of 2004, 2007 and 2008. First, in response to the abolition of the
death penalty legislated in July 2007,41 the maximum penalty for offenders of
genocide-related crimes was reduced to life imprisonment through the
amendment made in the 2008 Law.42 Second, prison terms stipulated for a
variety of categories have been significantly reduced.43 Third, through an
amendment made in the 2007 Law, Category 2 offenders opting for the
confession procedure can benefit from a provision suspending part of the
custodial sentence: 1/6 of the sentence for those who confessed after their
names had been included on the list of the accused and 1/3 of the sentence for
those who confessed before their inclusion on the list of the accused (Article 14).
Fourth, the 2008 Law introduced an important provision directing expanded use
of Community Service as a primary form of penalty for convicts of
genocide-related crimes, particularly Category 2 offenders who are sentenced to
both custodial and Community Service sentences. Confessed Category 2
convicts are allowed not only to start with Community Service but also to have
their custodial sentences commuted completely to Community Service if they
show evidence of good conduct (Article 21).
41 Law N° 31/2007 of 25/07/2007
42 More precisely, after the death penalty was abolished in July 2007, the harshest penalty which
can be imposed on Category 1 convicts is lifetime solitary confinement (HRW 2009a).
43 For example, the prison term for offenders who killed or attacked others resulting in death
(Subcategory 4 of Category 2 in the 2008 Law) and did not use the confession procedure was 25
years to life imprisonment in the 2001 Law (Article 69-a). This was first reduced to 25 to 30 years
in the 2004 Law (Article 73-1) and then to 15 to 19 years in the 2007 Law (Article 14).
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3.3. Potentially Restorative Features of the Gacaca System
Since its inception, the Rwandan government has been describing the gacaca
system as a means to ubutabera bwunga or ‘reconciliatory justice’. Accordingly,
it is often presented as a restorative model of transitional justice based on an
informal dispute resolution mechanism. This portrayal of the gacaca system
simply as a form of informal restorative justice is misleading. Rather, it is, as
Karekezi and her colleagues call it, a ‘hybrid’ model of transitional justice
drawing its characteristics from two distinctive justice models: the formal
retributive justice system, focused on the punishment of the offender, and the
informal restorative justice system, embodied in the traditional gacaca
mechanism, whose primary goals are to repair the damages caused by the
offence and to restore harmonious social relations within the local community
(Karekezi et al. 2004, 73-5).44 Unlike the traditional gacaca gathering based
primarily on people’s own initiative, the gacaca court is a state institution
sanctioned by state law and closely supervised by a governmental coordinating
body (Vandeginste 2001, 243-5; Karekezi et al. 2004, 74). Other attributes the
gacaca system of post-genocide justice shares with the formal justice system
include punitive sanctions for the offender, competence to judge serious
offences, and many rules defined by the law, including those for enhancing the
impartiality of the gacaca court (Karekezi, et al. ibid). On the other hand, the
current gacaca system also draws some important attributes from the traditional
gacaca mechanism: namely, its grassroots nature; its focus on social restoration
through reparative sanctions; the participation of the local population; the
relatively simple operating procedures; the critical role of social pressure in the
entire process; and the absence of legal professionals (ibid). It is this latter set of
44 Kirkby (2006, 108) also describes the gacaca system in a similar line as ‘a novel experiment
straddling restorative and retributive justice’.
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attributes that represents a remarkable shift in the Rwandan government’s
approach to post-genocide justice: from a primarily retributive, prosecutorial
approach through ordinary courts toward an approach seeking to address
diligently restorative/reparative dimensions of justice through community-based
gacaca courts.
The following sections discuss potentially restorative features of the gacaca
system, termed potentially because whether the system becomes truly
restorative and reconciliatory will depend much on the political and social
contexts surrounding it and on whether its reconciliatory potential is tapped
effectively in its actual implementation.
3.3.1. Community-Based Participatory Justice
The gacaca system, in theory, sets itself apart from the formal justice system by
its community-based participatory character: ordinary members of the hill seek
consensus over the truth about what happened during the genocide and over the
penalty imposed on the offender, through open communal deliberations about
evidence presented. On the eve of the inauguration of gacaca courts, President
Paul Kagame emphasised that the community-based nature of the gacaca
system is critical for enhancing people’s sense of ownership over judicial
procedures. He said:
They feel that they own the process, they feel that they have been given a
forum to speak out. Once they feel they own the process, then it helps them
accept the outcomes of the trials. [...] Information and facts will be
presented and debated, and that way they are bound to accept the
outcomes. (Kagame 2001)
Kagame contrasted the participatory gacaca-based justice with the formal justice
system dominated by legal professionals. Outcomes of the latter, he said, would
be less acceptable to the population who ‘felt excluded because only a handful
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of people sit and hear the cases, with little contribution from them’.
A great majority of government officials interviewed for this study also
stressed gacaca’s participatory character as a main reason for its ability to
promote reconciliation. A senior official of the NURC observed:
Gacaca as a community-based form of justice where majority of the people
have a chance to participate more than any other forms of justice that one
can think of. Because this gacaca is not too technical, victims and offenders
and their respective families can have a large part to play [...] giving every
person his due.45
From a theoretical perspective, there are two especially important reasons
why active participation of the local population is so essential for the success of
gacaca-based justice. First, the gacaca system is designed to attain procedural
justice not through the observance of norms and procedures known as due
process but through broad and active participation of members of the local
population – victims, offenders, their families and other local residents - in telling
the truth and deliberating together about evidence provided. Thus, broad-based
active public participation is a critical condition for the gacaca system to ensure
fair procedures and yield fair and legitimate judgments.
Second, the potential of the gacaca process for promoting healing and
reconciliation depends much on the quality of people’s participation in
truth-telling exercises such as public confessions, testimonies and deliberations.
Gacaca’s potential to promote healing and reconciliation lies in its ‘capacity to
facilitate restorative justice via meaningful engagement between parties
previously in conflict, in the form of communal dialogue and cooperation’ (Clark
2008, 300).
Attributing the reconciliatory potential of the gacaca system primarily to its
45 Interview in Kigali, 11 Dec 2002.
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community-based participatory nature, Drumbl (2000, 2002), in his early writings,
portrayed the gacaca system as a promising restorative approach to
post-genocide justice. Central to Drumbl’s argument was the theory of
‘reintegrative shaming’ advanced by Braithwaite. Reintegrative shaming, in the
words of Braithwaite (1989, 55), ‘means that expressions of community
disapproval, which may range from mild rebuke to degradation ceremonies, are
followed by gestures of reacceptance into the community of law-abiding
citizens’.46 According to Braithwaite’s theory, shame, when it is cultivated in a
reintegrative rather than ‘disintegrative’ or ‘stigmatizing’ way (ibid), can play a
crucial role in deterring people from (re)committing crimes. First, shame can
enhance fear of losing ‘social approval of significant others’ and second, coupled
with repentance, shame can ‘build consciences which internally deter criminal
behaviour even in the absence of any external shaming associated with an
offence’ (75). According to Braithwaite, there are two fundamental social
conditions that are conducive to reintegrative shaming: ‘Individuals are more
susceptible to shaming when they are enmeshed in multiple relationships of
interdependency; societies shame more effectively when they are
communitarian’ (14).47
Braithwaite argues that in such a communitarian interdependent society,
‘sanctions imposed by relatives, friends or a personally relevant collectivity have
more effect on criminal behaviour than sanctions imposed by a remote legal
authority’ (69). Drumbl (2000, 1260-63) discussed Rwandan society as perfectly
46 Braithwaite (1989, 55) makes an important distinction between reintegrative shaming and
‘disintegrative’ or ‘stigmatizing’ shaming which ‘divides the community by creating a class of
outcasts’.
47 Braithwaite defines communitarianism as ‘a condition of societies’ in which ‘individuals are
densely enmeshed in interdependencies which have the special qualities of mutual help’ (1989,
100) and interdependency as ‘a condition of individuals’ representing ‘the extent to which
individuals participate in networks wherein they are dependent on others to achieve value
ends….’(84).
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matching Braithwaite’s conditions of communitarianism and interdependence
and suggested that ‘localized reintegrative shaming’ would likely be promoted
through community-based participatory gacaca trials.
3.3.2. Confession and Guilty Plea Procedure
As noted above, a provision for reducing sentences in exchange for confession
and a guilty plea was first adopted in the 1996 Genocide Law. The Procedure of
Confession, Guilty Plea, Repentance and Asking for Forgiveness under the 2008
Gacaca Law (hereafter the Confession Procedure)48 retains the same
objectives: encouraging the accused to accept responsibility for wrongdoing and
uncovering all information relevant to the establishment of the truth about the
genocide. For the accused to benefit from reductions in their sentences, they
must provide a full description of their offences, all evidence useful for
prosecuting their co-offenders and accomplices, and apologies for their offences
(Article 54 of the 2004 Law). The law requires them to apologise publicly in the
presence of the General Assembly, their victims (if they are still alive) and their
victims’ families (Article 54-63).
Reductions in sentences which offenders may receive through opting for
the Confession Procedure are remarkable, as indicated in Table 3 above.
Defendants falling within Category 1 or Category 2 may have recourse to the
procedure either before or after their names are included in the list of the
accused. Reductions in sentences are much greater for those who confess and
plead guilty before the inclusion of their names to the list than for those who do
so after inclusion. Furthermore, as noted earlier, with regard to Category 2
offenders who opt for the procedure, half of the custodial sentence is commuted
48 Formerly called the ‘Procedure of Confessions, Guilty Plea, Repentance and Apologies’ under
the 2004 Gacaca Law.
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to Community Service (discussed below) and a part of the custodial sentence is
suspended. This great benefit from choosing to confess and plead guilty must
have been an attractive course of action for many defendants, such as those
who had been under pre-trial detention for a number of years.
To illustrate the possible benefit of opting for the Confession Procedure, let
us consider a specific case of one offender convicted of committing or
attempting murders (Subcategory 4 of Category 2). By opting for the procedure,
the individual’s sentence would be reduced from 15 to 19 years to 12 to 14 years
if he confesses after his name is listed as an accused and to 8 to 11 years if he
confesses before his name is listed. Let us suppose that the offender confessed
after the inclusion of his name to the list of the accused (for example, confessing
after the gacaca trial begins but before the verdict is delivered). In this case, the
maximum sentence he may get is a 14-year prison term. Considering the
suspension of 1/6 of the sentence and commutation to 1/2 of the sentence, his
penalty would be the combination of Community Service for 7 years and
imprisonment for 4 years and 8 months. Let us also suppose that he has already
been detained for 10 years or more, as with many suspects who were arrested
either in the immediate aftermath of the genocide or after return from exile in the
late 1990s. Then, because the period of pre-trial detention is counted as a prison
term to be served by the convict, the sentence he still has to serve would be a
maximum of 1 year and 8 months of Community Service.
A senior public prosecutor explained that underlying the procedure for
encouraging the offender’s confession is ‘the spirit of forgiveness and
reconciliation’ embraced by the government. He said:
We should initiate the spirit of forgiveness and reconciliation. If, for example,
we adopted an eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth, it means we, who live
in the whole Rwanda, would be blind and toothless. [...] So the government
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is sending preachers and teachers of gacaca [to tell the people] how it will
operate, telling them the benefits and advantages those prisoners have in
the confession procedure because punishments have been reduced
definitely.49
A legal counsellor working for the coordination of gacaca courts at the national
level told me that lenient punishments imposed on confessed genocide
perpetrators would facilitate their reintegration because the government would
have them understand that ‘they are treated generously for the sake of national
reconciliation’.50 A provincial-level coordinator of gacaca courts said that
confessions and apologies by offenders would help their surviving victims start
contemplating forgiveness.51
3.3.3. Community Service as an Alternative Penalty to Imprisonment
As explained above, closely linked to the Confession Procedure is the
implementation of ‘Community Service as Alternative Penalty to Imprisonment’.
Locally known as TIG (Travaux d’Intérêt Général), Community Service is a form
of penalty for offenders who opted for the Confession Procedure under
Subcategories 1 to 6 of Category 2 as well as for offenders who made no
confession or whose confession was rejected under Subcategory 6 of Category
2. As noted earlier, the use of Community Service was expanded by Article 21 in
the 2008 Gacaca Law, which allows these offenders to start their sentences from
Community Service rather than as custodial sentences.
Community Service as an alternative penalty to imprisonment is not a new
idea in criminal justice. It has been incorporated into the penal codes of several
Western and Asian countries during the last three decades, and recently several
49 Interview in Kigali, 18 Nov 2002.
50 Interview in Kigali, 14 June 2002.
51 Interview in Gisenyi town, 7 May 2002.
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African countries have adopted it as well (PRI 2007, 5).52 What is remarkable
about Rwanda’s introduction of Community Service is that, unlike other countries
applying it only to minor offences, it is applied to such serious offences as the
crime of genocide and other crimes against humanity (6). The Presidential Order
of 7 March 2005 defines Community Service as ‘the obligation on the individual
convicted of genocide or other crimes against humanity to perform, while under
house arrest, unpaid work of public interest as an alternative penalty to
imprisonment’.53 According to the Presidential Order, the work of Community
Service is basically ‘carried out at the rate of three days a week’, although the
working days dedicated to community service may be ‘consolidated into a
shorter period depending on the nature of the workload to be carried out’, as in
the case of tigistes, convicts participating in Community Service/TIG, who are
organised into ‘solidarity camps’.54
The idea to give offenders who have confessed and pleaded guilty an
option to commute half of their custodial sentence first came into force through
the 2001 Gacaca Law (Article 75) to help achieve gacaca’s objectives of fighting
impunity, repairing the social fabric and promoting reconciliation among
Rwandans (PRI 2002a, 13-4). The NSGC (2008), in a booklet published in
October 2008, states:
The penalties provided by Gacaca Courts are intended to rehabilitate and
integrate the guilty persons into the society and enable them to collaborate
with others in the reconstruction of the country through community service.
As discussed later in this chapter, whether Community Service can serve its
52 In Africa, the promotion of Community Service as an alternative penalty to imprisonment first
began in Zimbabwe in 1994 (PRI 2007, 4). In Rwanda, Community Service has not been
incorporated into its penal code to date (as of 15 August 2009). However, the country is moving
that direction by merging the National Prisons Service and the TIG Secretariat to form the
Rwandan Correctional Services (NT 2009a, 2009f).
53 Article 2 of Presidential Order N° 10/01 of 07/03/2005
54 Article 7 of Presidential Order N° 50/01 of 16/10/2005
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intended objectives of reintegrating genocide perpetrators and promoting
reconciliation in the society will depend much on how it is actually implemented.
A senior official of the Ministry of Justice stated that these objectives would be
achieved by linking the work of Community Service to the idea of reparation by
its participants. He said,
[…] if you destroy somebody’s house, surely we can say, ‘You are going to
construct it’ and then he will go ahead and construct it. […] This community
work scheme, serving the sentence in, for example, constructing roads or
repairing the houses he destroyed will bring the unity within the society and
surely at the end of the day we shall have a healed society. He has
constructed my house, why can’t we share drink? […] The whole thing is in
the line of reconstructing and healing the society.55
Clark (2008, 315) also speaks of the potential of Community Service to create
valuable opportunities for ‘perpetrators and survivors working side by side’ to
sustain engagement for ‘rebuild[ing] broken bonds’ after the end of gacaca
proceedings.
3.3.4. Procedure for Claiming Material Reparation
As noted earlier, the government expressed its commitment to the provision of
financial compensation for victims of genocide and other crimes against
humanity when it adopted the 1996 Genocide Law. The gacaca system is
designed to address the same concern through its procedure for material
reparation. Gacaca proceedings stipulated in the 2004 Gacaca Law involve the
identification of all damages suffered by each victim. With regard to damage of
property, each of the Gacaca Cell Courts makes an inventory of damaged
property and determines the means and period for reparation by each of the
concerned convicts (Article 68). With regard to bodily harm, loss of relatives and
55 Interview in Kigali, 03 Dec 2002.
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non-property damage, the Gacaca Cell Court compiles a list of all victims
(deceased and survivors) and the inventory of violations suffered by each of
them (Article 66). The Gacaca Sector Court or Appeal Court then passes
judgments, including statements about the identity of the victims and all the
damages they suffered (Articles 67 and 69). These statements form the basis of
genocide survivors’ compensation claims to be forwarded to a Compensation
Fund, which is said to be established by a separate indemnification law, although
the law has neither been legislated nor enacted to date (as of 15 August 2009).
In 2001, the former Minister of Justice Jean de Dieu Mucyo stressed the
importance of compensating genocide victims as part of a larger effort to
promote reconciliation:
To establish social harmony, it is not enough to try alleged authors of
genocide. It is also necessary to compensate victims for the harm they
suffered. [...] The guilty individuals do not have sufficient assets to match
the damage suffered. For this reason, a reparations fund is being created to
collect funds for compensating genocide victims. These funds will be
distributed proportionally among the victims on the basis of the harm they
suffered, as established by the gacaca courts or common law courts. In this
way, each victim can receive at least some compensation, which is one
pillar of reconciliation. (Villa-Vicencio and Savage 2001, 52)
Understanding its obligation under international law to make adequate
reparation for victims of human rights violations (Vandeginste 2003b, 250), the
Rwandan government expressed a commitment to the creation of a
Compensation Fund for genocide victims as an important requirement for justice
and reconciliation. Underlying the government policy for the Compensation Fund
as well as other measures of reparation was, as clearly indicated in Mucyo’s
statement above, the understanding that repairing the damage suffered by the
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victims is critical for advancing the process of reconciliation.56
According to the reparation procedure of the gacaca system, victims’
concerns for material reparation are addressed in two different ways. First, once
convicted, offenders of genocide-related crimes are liable to provide civil
reparation for the damage caused to victims’ property. As Clark (2008, 315)
points out, ‘[c]oncrete acts of reparation, supporting reconciliatory statements
made during gacaca hearings, are important for convincing survivors of the
sincerity of perpetrators’ remorse and desire to rebuild relationships damaged by
violence’. Second, gacaca-based justice is designed to establish the grounds for
victims’ entitlement to state compensation for material and moral damages
suffered. Vandeginste (2003b, 259-60) points out that the reparation procedure
embedded in the gacaca system has an advantageous aspect for many victims
who survived the genocide: it opens the way for them to a legal entitlement to
financial compensation from the Compensation Fund, irrespective of the criminal
conviction of the offender. For the victim to obtain compensation from the Fund,
‘the perpetrator of the crime would not necessarily be charged or even identified
in the process’ (260). As noted in Chapter 6, the reparative measures embedded
in the gacaca system have not only material but also symbolic significance to the
lives of survivors.
4. Human Rights and Political Concerns about Gacaca-Based Justice
Much of the early debate about gacaca justice was dominated by so called due
process concerns from legal and human rights perspectives. Major procedural
problems that some international jurists and human rights organisations have
56 See Vandeginste (2003b) and Rombouts and Vandeginste (2005) for the legal and
institutional framework of reparation programmes in Rwanda concerning the victims of genocide,
crimes against humanity, and war crimes.
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identified include the absence or inadequacy of defence council, limited appeal
rights, high risk of encouraging false confessions by defendants, and no
protection for witnesses, judges and other participants in judicial proceedings,
the lack of competence, independence and impartiality of judges, and likelihood
of significant inconsistencies in sentences handed down by different gacaca
courts across the country (Sarkin 2001, 161-6; AI 2002; 34-40; E. Daly 2002,
382; Longman 2006, 212-9).
4.1. Responding to Due Process Concerns
The Rwandan government argues that various safeguards are embedded in the
gacaca system against some of the potential procedural problems (See Harrell
2003, 89-90), although it admits the need ‘to keep working on the elements
within the system that may be undesirable’ (Kagame 2001). While admitting
some flaws in the system, the Rwandan government and some observers
maintained that requiring the gacaca system to strictly adhere to international
legal standards cannot be a solution to the challenge of dealing with massive
numbers of genocide-related caseloads in a reasonable timeframe. Such an
attempt, notes Uvin (2003a, 119), would ‘end up reinventing the same formal
justice system’ which has not only failed to meet the challenge but also resulted
in serious human rights violations of those accused of genocide, denying ‘the
basic right to a speedy trial, reasonable detention times and decent conditions of
detention’ as well as the right to proper defence council. He then goes on to
suggest the need to accept the reality that ‘in the aftermath of mass violence, full,
formal justice and complete adherence to human rights standards may be
unattainable’ (ibid).
Central to this debate is the question of whether it is possible or even
desirable to require a transitional justice mechanism like the gacaca system to
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strictly adhere to international norms of fair trials, particularly when it must deal
with massive numbers of offenders involved in mass atrocities. This is
essentially a question of procedural justice – the fairness and legitimacy of
procedures through which justice is attained.57 Many of those observers
questioning the legality of gacaca system seem to presume that procedural
justice can be attained primarily through strict observance of those norms
stipulated in international criminal and human rights laws. This specific
conception of procedural justice is probably the most dominant conception under
criminal justice systems based on the Western legal tradition. However,
according to the perspective of restorative justice approach, procedural justice
may be best attained through active participation of stake holders including
victims, offenders, and their communities.58 From the perspective of restorative
justice, trials through gacaca courts may be considered as fairer than those
through the formal justice system because of its emphasis on broad-based
community participation. Uvin maintains that ‘the practice of gacaca may well
produce fair trials, but in an original, locally appropriate form’ through ‘the play of
argument and counter-argument and of witness and counter-witness by the
community’ (ibid). Drumbl (2002, 13), questioning the importance of strictly
adhering to Western notions of ‘rule of law’ in the context of post-genocide
Rwanda, argues that priority should be given rather to ‘developing institutions
most likely to promote peace and justice in a manner compatible with local
histories and values’.
While the lack of due process has been a primary concern about
gacaca-based justice among international jurists and human rights activists,
many international donors and human rights organisations opted to ‘cautiously
57 See Section 4.2 of Chapter 3.
58 See Section 4.4 of Chapter 3.
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support the process’ not least because it is the only foreseeable alternative for
addressing the question of justice and reconciliation in Rwanda (Uvin 2003a,
120).59
4.2. One-Sided Victor’s Justice Revisited
The previous chapter reported the problem of one-sided victor’s justice as
perceived by the vast majority of Hutu informants interviewed for this study.
These interviewees rejected the government’s notion of reconciliatory justice
through the gacaca system as mere rhetoric, arguing that it focuses exclusively
on crimes committed by Hutus while ignoring crimes committed by the RPF and
the RPA (the new national army created after the RPF took power in July 1994)
as well as crimes of Tutsi civilians. This criticism is considered by many
observers as the most controversial aspect of the whole venture of Rwandan
post-genocide justice, the gacaca process included (AI 2002, 2004; HRW 2002a,
2002b, 2008a, 2008b; Corey and Joireman 2004, 87-8; Zorbas 2004, 41;
Tiemessen 2004, 65; Kirkby 2006, 116; Longman and Rutagengwa 2004, 167;
Reyntjens and Vandeginste 2005, 111-2; Longman 2006, 221; Waldorf 2006,
431; Drumbl 2007, 96-7). As discussed earlier in this chapter, the government’s
effort at post-genocide justice has been largely restricted to the genocide-related
crimes promoted by the extremists of the former Hutu regime.
As the gacaca system unfolded, the government made its position very
clear: if there is any unresolved case that falls outside the jurisdiction of the
gacaca court, people must take it to an ordinary court. The former Minister of
Justice Mucyo was quoted as saying:
59 For example, Human Rights Watch states in its 2002 World Report: ‘Despite the absence of
some basic guarantees of due process, the innovative system offered the only hope of trial within
the foreseeable future for the tens of thousands now suffering inhumane conditions in prisons
and communal lockups’.
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Gacaca courts were established to try genocide. [...] Gacaca law is very
clear. It deals with genocide between 1990 and 1994. Anything outside that
is for ordinary and military courts. […] We are not saying that people
should dump their complaints. We’re simply calling for people to direct their
complaints to the right jurisdictions. (FH 2002)
In fact, under the 2001 Gacaca Law, war crimes were included in the jurisdiction
of gacaca courts, which led some observers to believe that gross human rights
violations committed during the same period by members of the RPF could also
be tried under gacaca jurisdiction (Corey and Joireman 2004, 86; Tiemessen
2004, 70). However, as noted earlier, the government later rigidified its position
through the amendment made in the 2004 Gacaca Law that eliminated the
provision of trying war crimes through gacaca courts.
Underlying many people’s preference for gacaca courts rather than ordinary
courts to bring their judicial complaints was a lack of trust in the formal judicial
system. During a focus group interview with lay judges of a gacaca court in
Kiberama, the participants said they could not even think of taking their
complaints to ordinary courts even though they insisted many Hutu civilians were
killed by the RPA during the Hutu Insurgency of 1997-99. One of them said, ‘How
can we take those serious accusations to the very people who committed
them?’60 In the early 2000s, Drumbl (2002, 16) wrote that justice was perceived
as politicised and that this perception was ‘aggravated by the actual politicisation
of the Rwandan courts and judiciary’.61 Even today, a lack of judicial
independence is still perceived by many as a serious problem in the Rwandan
judicial system (HRW 2008a).
In the early stage of the pilot phase as well as during the period devoted to
60 Focus group with lay judges of gacaca courts, Kiberama, 1 June 2002.
61 As evidence of this politicisation, Drumbl (2002, 16) gave these specific examples: ‘in 1999,
the RPF government suspended the president of the appeals court, leading to his resignation,
and also suspended or removed five other leading magistrates’; and in July 1999, ‘the entire
Supreme Court was replaced, after the judges were removed or pressured to resign’.
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training lay judges of gacaca courts, many gacaca judges raised issues of
atrocities committed by RPF soldiers or Tutsi civilians and expressed great
disappointment as they came to understand the government’s position (AR 2003,
23-6). Authorities suppressed such public expressions by stating that the
government would not tolerate allegations ‘irrelevant’ to the objectives of gacaca
courts. Since the law repressing the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity
and war crimes was promulgated in September 2003,62 it became virtually
impossible for the people to openly discuss such issues, because the law can be
used to prosecute and subjugate any person to imprisonment for 10 to 20 years
if his act or speech is interpreted by authorities as an expression intended to
minimise, justify or condone the genocide.63 Furthermore, the 2004 Gacaca Law
added a provision to authorise the president of the gacaca court to keep ‘trouble
makers’ in detention for maximum 48 hours (Article 71).
President Kagame and other high ranking officials have repeatedly stated
that any crime committed by members of the RPF or the national army of the
RPF-led post-genocide government has been diligently dealt with by military
tribunals. In fact, Rwandan military courts have records of convicting several
RPF soldiers accused of human rights abuses; in January 1998, two soldiers
were even executed for killing civilians (Eltringham 2004, 108). However, when it
comes to prosecution of war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by
the RPF forces, the record is dismal.64 On 24 October 2008, the military court of
Kigali acquitted two senior army officials and handed down an eight-year prison
62 Law N° 33 bis/2003 of 06/09/2003
63 To quote exact wording of the Article 4 of the law, ‘any person who will have publicly shown, by
his or her words, writings, images, or by another means, that he or she has negated the
genocide committed, rudely minimised it or attempted to justify or approve its grounds, or any
person who will have hidden or destroyed its evidence’ is liable to 10 to 20 years of
imprisonment.
64 For the record before the October 2008 judgment described, see the summary of available
evidence provided by Eltringham (2004, 109).
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sentence to two of their subordinates for their roles in the murder of 15 civilians,
including a child and 13 clergy of the Catholic Church, in June 1994 (FH 2008e).
Apart from this case, Human Rights Watch (2008b) has recently asserted, the
government of Rwanda has ’prosecuted no soldiers for violations of international
humanitarian laws’.65 Human rights violations committed by the RPF forces and
the national army of the RPF-led government before, during and after the
genocide remain a taboo subject in post-genocide Rwanda.
The government emphasises the need for clear distinctions between the
genocide orchestrated by the former regime and war crimes committed by
individual members of the RPF forces. It argues that the genocide -- the most
horrendous crime imaginable in which over one million defenceless civilians,
including women, children, and the elderly, were systematically slaughtered --
cannot be equated with the killings resulting from either military offensives
against the genocidal forces or revenge attacks carried out on an individual
basis by some RPF soldiers.66 The RPF killings tend to be portrayed as violence
that was either ‘necessary’ intervention for stopping the genocide or
‘understandable’ acts of vengeance by soldiers who lost their loved ones in the
genocidal massacres of 1994. This government’s position was reiterated in an
interview with Fatuma Ndangiza, Executive Secretary of the NURC:
Of course, in the process of stopping the genocide, people, especially the
killers, were also killed because there was no way you could stop someone
who has a machete without fighting him, and in that process they died.
There could even have been other cases whereby people were killed in
revenge. Maybe it’s a soldier who reached his home and found that the
whole family had been killed. So just the personal instinct would be to say,
65 Also see AI (2004, 8) and Reyntjens (2004, 197-205).
66 On 13 June 2002, in his speech at the inauguration of Gacaca Courts, President Kagame
reiterated the government’s position on this issue by describing the people killed by the RPF
forces as either militia members fighting along with the FAR or as civilians used as a human
shield by the FAR (Kagame 2002).
295
‘Okay, let me also revenge’. […] It wasn’t the RPF who told them to go and
kill.67
Nonetheless, the current government cannot escape criticism for grossly
minimising the magnitude of the atrocities for which it bears responsibility. The
government’s narrative of RPF violence discussed above is in stark conflict with
the counter-narrative advanced by human rights groups such as Amnesty
International (1994) and Human Rights Watch (Des Forges 1999, 734) and by
other informed observers (Lemarchand 2008, 70-1; Prunier 2009, 11-22). These
groups and individuals assert that civilian killings by the RPF were perpetrated
far more extensively and systematically in 1994 than the government has
admitted.68 The government’s narrative is also contested by the narrative of
Hutu residents that emerged from the grassroots study for this thesis. Thus the
conclusion here is that the framework of post-genocide justice in Rwanda over
the last 15 years is not far from what Govier (2006, 126) calls a ‘one just
victorious model’ in which a single victorious party who won a war for the cause it
believes is perfectly just ‘investigate(s) wrongdoing by the losers, penalize(s)
individual perpetrators belonging to that group, and compensate(s) innocent
victims on its own side’.
5. Gacaca’s Contribution to Justice and Reconciliation
Fifteen years after the 1994 genocide and eight years after the first Gacaca Law
came into force, the government of Rwanda has declared that the entire gacaca
process will be completed by the end of 2009. At this moment it is difficult to
evaluate the results of gacaca trials or their political, social and economic
ramifications. What follows is a preliminary assessment of the gacaca process
67 Interview by this author in Kigali, 12 Dec 2002.
68 See Section 4 of Chapter 4.
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with particular focus on its reconciliatory aspects.
5.1. Establishing Individual Criminal Accountability
Has the gacaca process rendered retributive justice to Rwandan people as far
as genocide-related crimes are concerned? Given the complex dynamics
involved in the gacaca process and competing perceptions of issues of justice
within the Rwandan population, there is probably no straightforward answer to
this question. The pursuit of retributive justice through gacaca courts has faced a
number of problems. Numerous attempts to manipulate the course of justice
have been reported, including charges of bribery against lay judges and
witnesses,69 murders and other violent attacks against witnesses and lay
judges70 and false testimonies by defendants.71 In addition, a range of legal,
human rights, logistical and political concerns have been expressed by various
observers.72
A significant proportion of genocide survivors are reported to have
misgivings about amendments to the Gacaca Law in recent years. Particular
concerns include the increasing leniency of sentences for genocide offenders,
the large number of offenders previously classified under Category 1 who have
been reclassified into Category 2, the exemption of many offenders (who opted
to confess and apologise) from custodial sentence if they perform well in
Community Service, and the large majority of Category 1 defendants who are
being tried by gacaca courts (AR/REDRESS 2008; FH 2007d, 2007f).
Furthermore, the measures taken by the government to accelerate gacaca trials,
particularly since July 2007, have reportedly caused a great deal of indignation
69 See NT 2006a, 2006b, 2006d; AR/REDRESS 2008, 47-9; FH 2007c, 2007e.
70 See NT 2006c, 2006e; FH 2007c, 2007e.
71 See AI 2002, 39; PRI 2002a, 26, 2003a, 8-10.
72 See AI 2002, 2004; AR 2003; AR/REDRESS 2008; ASF 2005, 2006, 2007; HRW 2008a; PRI
2002a, 2002b, 2003a, 2003b, 2004a, 2004b, 2005, 2006, 2007; Longman 2006.
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and a sense of powerlessness among genocide survivors, who complain that
they can no longer properly follow trials as multiple hearings which concern them
are taking place simultaneously (AR/REDRESS 2008, 52; FH 2007d).73 These
genocide survivors who have misgivings about the gacaca process put into
question the quality of retributive justice it has rendered. Even worse, some of
them have come to paint the gacaca process as being driven by the complicity of
the dominant Hutu population whose goal is to acquit as many defendants as
possible (AR/REDRESS, 39-49). On the other hand, there are others who claim
that ‘Even many innocent people have been punished just because they are
Hutus’.74
Despite all this, however, the significance of the following fact cannot be
overstated: through the gacaca system, the government has managed to hold
the vast majority of genocide perpetrators accountable in a relatively short period
of time. The Rwandan government considers the greatest achievement of the
gacaca process to be the ‘establishment of criminal responsibility on an
individual basis’.75 For the period of two years and five months between July
2006 (the time gacaca trials were launched nationwide) and November 2008,
gacaca courts pronounced 1,129,906 judgments: 6,879 for Category 1 cases;
513,883 for Category 2 cases; and 609,144 for Category 3 cases.76 According
73 One genocide survivor interviewed in the African Rights/REDRESS study described what he
sees as ‘rushed justice’ by the government’s attempt to speed up the gacaca trials as follows:
The government spent a long time thinking about speeding up the trials, but not about their
quality. In July of 2007 additional courts were created to further speed up the trials. Where
there had been only one court, two or more were added. The courts sat on the same day
and at the same time even though the same witnesses were required for every one of
these trials. ….. In some trials where survivors were not able to participate, the judges
used the opportunity to acquit the defendants. (AR/REDRESS 2008, 52).
74 Conversation with Alexis (research assistant/resident of Gitera), Kigali, 3 February 2009.
75 Interview with Domitilla Mukantaganzwa, Executive Secretary of the NSGC, Kigali, 20 Jan
2009.
76 The figures with regard to Category 2 and Category 3 defendants are based on the
information as of 30 September 2008 (NSGC 2008, 10) while the figure with regard to Category
1 is based on the information as of 30 November 2008 which was obtained from the NSGC on 8
January 2009.
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to the recent NSGC official announcement (24 July 2009), having completed
over 1.5 million genocide cases, the gacaca courts are now focusing on a ‘small
number’ of trials, particularly those on appeal and revision, toward the goal of
complete closure by the end of the year.77
It is not clear at this moment exactly how many defendants have been
judged through the trials of over 1.5 million cases because, according to one
official of the NSGC in charge of data management, a significant percentage of
defendants were involved in more than one case judged by different gacaca
courts in different areas.78 Another NSGC official told me that many cases of
offences against property which were amicably settled and then reported to the
gacaca courts are also included in these 1.5 million cases.79 However,
considering that 818,564 persons had been accused of having committed
genocide by the end of the pre-trial investigation phase in May 2006 (NSGC
2008, 9) and that there have been many more persons newly accused since that
time, it is reasonable to estimate that the total number of persons prosecuted
and judged has swelled to over one million. This means around one tenth of the
current population of approximately 10 million have been tried for
genocide-related crimes by the gacaca courts. This is about one fifth of
Rwanda’s adult population today.80 More astonishingly, this number is about half
of the population group currently living in Rwanda who were old enough to
engage criminal responsibility at the time of the genocide – over 14 years
77 Reported in Focus on Africa Programme of BBC World Service, broadcast 17:00-17:45 GMT
(19:00-19:45 Rwandan local time), 24 July 2009.
78 Conversation in Kigali, 8 January 2009.
79 Interview at NSGC office, Kigali, 14 August 2009.
80 The result of the 2002 national census on population distribution by different age groups
suggests that the group of people over 18 years of age accounted for 52% of the total population
of over 8 million. If we apply the same population distribution to the current total population of
over 10 million, the current adult population can be roughly estimated to be over 5 million. Then,
one million people who have been tried by the gacaca courts account for about one fifth of
Rwanda’s adult population today.
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according to the 2004 Gacaca Law (Article 79).81
The NSGC says it will not make information public regarding the content of
recent judgments pronounced by gacaca courts until it completes compilation of
all gacaca trial results.82 Thus, as of today (15 August 2009), there is no
available up-to-date information about conviction/acquittal ratios for the three
categories of offenders. However, according to the data obtained from the NSGC
concerning the trials from 15 July 2006 to 31 December 2007, the defendants
acquitted by different levels of gacaca courts are approximately 10 percent
(53,899 acquittals out of 557,607 judgments) by Gacaca Cell Courts, 27 percent
(117,744 acquittals out of 434,827 judgments) by Gacaca Sector Courts and 30
percent (19,943 acquittals out of 66,864 judgments) by Gacaca Appeal Courts.
This means that, roughly speaking, about 30 percent of Category 2 defendants
and 10 percent of Category 3 defendants were acquitted through gacaca trials
during the specific period.83 This conviction/acquittal ratio of 70/30 for Category
2 defendants (with relatively but not extremely high rate of acquittal)84 does not
support either of the extreme claims attacking the impartiality of gacaca courts:
that they pronounced judgments totally in favour of accusers to maximise the
rate of conviction or that they pronounced totally in favour of the accused to
81 This is the group of people whose age is currently over 29 years. Based on the same 2002
census data, the proportion of these people can be estimated as approximately 44% of the
current total population. However, it should be noted that these people include several hundreds
of thousands of ‘old caseload refugees’ (Tutsi returnees from abroad) who were not in the
country in 1994. [In the years following the genocide, around 700,000 former Tutsi refugees
came back, or came for the first time, to Rwanda (Prunier 2008, 5).] Thus, the statistics suggest
that well over half of the current residents of Rwanda who were over 14 years old and in Rwanda
at the time of the genocide have been tried through the gacaca system.
82 Interview with Denis Bikesha, NSGC’s Director of Training, Sensitisation and Mobilisation,
NSGC, Kigali, 14 Aug 2009.
83 Since Category 1 defendants were tried by gacaca courts only after the 2008 Gacaca Law
was adopted, the NSGC’s data concerning the period of 15 July 2006 to 31 December 2007
does not include cases of Category 1 defendants. Thus, until NSGC provides more data, there is
no available information about the conviction/acquittal ratio with regard to Category 1 cases.
84 This relatively high percentage of acquittals has been collaborated by the findings of Takeuchi,
a researcher from JICA Research Institute who analysed the results of gacaca trials in two rural
sectors in November 2007 and January 2009. Takeuchi checked handwritten records of the
gacaca courts in the respective sectors (Conversation in Kigali, 13 Jan 2009).
300
maximise the rate of acquittals. Rather, the ratio seems to support a moderate
assessment of gacaca trials -- that is, gacaca courts deliberated judgments
based on testimonies of not only those who accused defendants but also of
those who defended them.
Thirteen years ago, Schabas (1996) wrote that Rwanda must search for
‘solutions to impossible problems’ in the face of enormous challenges to rebuild
its justice system and prosecute the then 87,000 detainees accused of
genocide-related crimes. Who could imagine then that over one million
defendants would be judged 13 years later, more than eleven times the original
number, which was considered by many observers impossible to prosecute even
in a highly developed country with plenty of resources? Rwanda’s experience
with gacaca courts has proven that it is not unthinkable to try hundreds of
thousands of people accused of their involvement in mass violence, even in a
post-violent conflict environment. To meet that challenge, Rwanda needed to
develop the gacaca system, a system which relies on massive popular
participation in judicial proceedings, without which, as Domitilla Mukantaganzwa,
the NSGC’s Executive Secretary, put it, ‘there would have been no hope for
survivors and perpetrators to see justice in their life time’.85
5.2. Establishing the Truth about the Genocide
The whole truth about the genocide will never be known, given the scale and
complexity of violence that involved hundreds of thousands of offenders and
hundreds of thousands of victims. The government is determined to document
the truth that has emerged from the gacaca process by establishing a special
archive, although no one knows for sure how long it will take to analyse and
compile millions of testimonies that have been collected by over 12,000 gacaca
85 Interview in Kigali, 20 Jan 2009
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courts across the country. As discussed in the previous chapter, many survivors
of the genocide have been seeking the truth about the genocide for answers to
many lingering questions. What happened to my loved ones? Where were they
buried? Who killed them? Who was and was not involved in genocidal killings in
my community? Are there people truly repentant about what they did to us, or
would they still harm us if the political environment changed? The list of
questions is probably endless and many questions will never be answered.
While it is difficult to know precisely to what extent genocide survivors have
found answers to their questions through gacaca proceedings, the African
Rights/REDRESS report highlights ‘learning a painful but necessary truth’ as a
major success of the gacaca process, according to genocide survivors’
comments (2008, 30-2).86 One genocide survivor quoted in the report says:
‘Survivors discovered a lot, horrible things needless to say, but things that were
useful to know and relevant to the deaths of their friends and relatives’ (31). The
truth that emerged out of the gacaca process has helped many survivors
achieve a sort of closure, particularly those who learned where bodies of their
loved ones had been dumped, which in turn allowed them to rebury those loved
ones in dignity. According to the NSGC, the information about approximately 90
percent of the corpses that have been reburied in dignity emerged from
testimonies made during gacaca proceedings.87
Many genocide survivors have held dignified reburials for their loved ones;
other survivors have been desperately searching for any piece of information
which could help them find the bodies of their loved ones. Thus, in this thesis,
there is no intention to minimise the importance of the truth that has been
86 For this research, African Rights/REDRESS interviewed 97 survivors representing all the
provinces of Rwanda.
87 Interview with Mukantaganzwa, Kigali, 20 Jan 2009.
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revealed through the gacaca process. Yet, there are also elements of the truth
about the 1994 genocide which seem to remain largely hidden or unrecognised.
They are about Hutu victims of massacres (itsembatsemba), much of whose
suffering has remained unacknowledged, despite some limited yet
commendable efforts by organisations such as African Rights and by individual
researchers to pay tribute to those ‘heroes’ who sacrificed or risked their lives for
protecting Tutsis during the genocide.88
5.3. Untapped Reconciliatory Potential of the Gacaca System
To what extent has the gacaca process contributed to reconciliation of Rwandan
people who were divided by the genocide and by other forms of political
violence? In the interview conducted in January 2009, Mukantaganzwa,
Executive Secretary of the NSGC, stressed the great contribution the gacaca
process has made to reconciliation among Rwandans:
It has made a great contribution to stability and reconciliation in the country.
It provided a space for dialogue, for victims and perpetrators to meet,
apologise and forgive. […] It also provided a space for distinguishing the
guilty from the innocent [and] a space for survivors to get the truth to know
what happened to their loved ones, which made it possible for survivors to
bury them in dignity. […] And it delivered justice in time. If gacaca had not
been implemented, there would have been no hope for survivors and
perpetrators to see justice in their life time.89
As clearly indicated in this statement, the government maintains that its gacaca
endeavour has achieved the goals of truth, justice and reconciliation according
to its logic of ‘reconciliatory justice’ discussed above. Despite the government’s
claim, no independent study has yet been done to answer the question that
88 See AR 2002; Rutazibwa and Rutayisire 2008. Hutu victims of the 1994 genocide recorded in
these books seem to be limited to those who are known undoubtedly as ‘heroes’ or ‘righteous
people’ for their courageous acts of hiding or protecting Tutsis.
89 Interview in Kigali, 20 Jan 2009.
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opens this section. In assessing gacaca’s reconciliatory impact, one is
confronted by two major obstacles. First is the extensive and diverse nature of
political and social dynamics surrounding the gacaca process, which took place
in literally all the hills across the country, comprised of varied historical
backgrounds and demographic characteristics. Political and social dynamics
surrounding the gacaca process can be very different; for example, in some
areas much of the violence was instigated by the former Hutu regime while in
other regions atrocities were also committed by the RPF forces and the
RPF-dominated national army of the transitional government. Second, the social
and economic impact of the gacaca process cannot be captured in a brief
amount of time; it will probably be experienced for years or even decades to
come.
It is naive to assume that the gacaca process should have only positive
impact on reconciliation by restoring relationships between individuals, families
and identity groups who were divided by a series of violent events in the past.
Gacaca could have also had negative impact by possibly creating renewed
animosity. For example, genocide survivors who lodged new accusations and
those who were accused yet finally acquitted, or perpetrators and their family
members or former friends who were obliged to testify against them by gacaca
courts, might all now have worsened relationships with their neighbours after
participating in the gacaca process. In short, gacaca has possibly restored
relationships among some and damaged those of others who have to live
together in the same community. The total sum of all these effects on social
relationships is difficult to capture, particularly after only a short amount of time.
Taking these caveats into consideration, the remainder of this section will
take note of some evidence which suggests that the gacaca system has not fully
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realised its reconciliatory potential to date, with particular focus on the features
discussed above as potentially restorative.
5.3.1. People’s Detachment from the Gacaca Process
As discussed above, the government’s logic of ‘reconciliatory justice’ considers
active public participation as a critical condition for the gacaca system to achieve
its intended results of truth, justice and reconciliation. As noted above, various
observers also agree on the importance of this public participation. However,
reports produced by independent observers cast serious doubt on the quality of
public participation during gacaca proceedings. In the early stage of the gacaca
process, the government’s measure to stifle people’s free expression of their
narratives was met with a widespread act of sabotage by a significant proportion
of the population. During the pilot phase of 2002 – 2004, gacaca courts in
different districts faced a serious problem of being unable to reach the quorum
required for convening the General Assembly, due to insufficient participation.90
The reasons for the low attendance in gacaca’s public hearings varied.
They included conflict with essential farming activities or other duties, fear of
being arrested upon revealing any knowledge about past events, fear of
reprisals for accusing others, a general sense of insecurity, loss of interest in the
gacaca process after learning that cases of their dead relatives were not taken
into consideration, and so forth. Although one reason cannot be singled out as
its greatest contributor, many reports attribute the low attendance to the fear of
being accused as a participant in the genocide and to the profound
disillusionment felt by those who found that gacaca courts would not address
their acute concerns, particularly cases of victims killed by the RPF forces.91
90 See AI 2002, 2004; AR 2003; ASF 2002, 2005; PRI 2002b, 2003b, 2004a.
91 A 2002 report of Amnesty International (2002, 28) gives an account of a decline observed in
the level of participation once Hutu members of the community realised the limited mandate
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Waldorf (2006, 429) writes, ‘Hutu have little incentive to participate in gacaca
because they fear being accused as either perpetrators or bystanders and
because they have no opportunity to discuss crimes committed by the RPF
forces’.
In response, the government introduced counter-measures -- such as shop
closings, verbal warnings, fines, and house visits by local administrative officials
and members of the Local Defence Force -- for boosting attendance at gacaca’s
public hearings.92 Thanks to these measures and to a sensitization campaign to
enhance community mobilisation in the gacaca effort, the problem of insufficient
popular participation subsided in later phases. As Mukantaganzwa said in a
recent interview, the population came to ‘know it’s their day in which they have to
talk, they have to discuss […]’.93 However, even after the number of attendants
increased in subsequent phases, many observers reported the lack of active
engagement in gacaca hearings by the great majority of attendants. A gacaca
monitoring report of Avocats Sans Frontières (ASF) for the period of October
2005 – September 2006 states:
Although more and more people attend the Gacaca hearings they are still
apprehensive about providing or contributing any information that would
help establish the facts of the offence. It would appear that many people
come to watch the hearings as “spectators” and prefer to observe the trial in
silence. (2006, 31)
The accounts presented above show a serious dilemma faced by the
government in its pursuit of politically controversial justice (due to the one-sided
character of the pursuit) through the ‘participatory’ gacaca system. Coercive
given to the gacaca courts:
Many gacaca participants expressed dissatisfaction that RPF abuses during the genocide
do not fall within the competence of the Gacaca Jurisdictions. This reason alone led to a
significant drop in the attendance and participation of community members in the pilot
project cells’ gacaca sessions.
92 See AR 2003, 46; PRI 2003b, 8; ASF 2005, 9-10.
93 Interview in Kigali, 20 Jan 2009.
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measures seem to have been effective enough to secure the quorum of 100
attendants required for convening the gacaca hearing, and an even more
impressive turnout has been observed in subsequent phases. With increased
government control over the local gacaca courts as well as restrictions on free
speech and open debate, the proceedings of most gacaca courts have
seemingly taken place largely undisturbed. However, monitoring reports of
independent observers, as well as personal observations of several gacaca
proceedings, overwhelmingly suggest that despite the increased attendance in
later phases, many Rwandan citizens who do not identify themselves as
victims94 of the former genocidal regime have opted for minimum involvement in
gacaca proceedings (e.g. checking whether their relatives are accused and
watching the hearings as ‘spectators’), thereby detaching themselves from the
process of establishing truth and rendering justice in the broader Rwandan
society. Recently, even a significant proportion of genocide survivors are
reported to ‘have given up on Gacaca’ due to disappointment or anger over the
number of amendments made to the gacaca system against their wishes as well
as frustration over the acceleration of trials, criticised by many as ‘justice
sacrificed in favour of speed’ (AR/REDRESS 2008, 49-53).
5.3.2. Truthfulness of Offenders’ Confessions and Apologies Questioned
The Confession and Guilty Plea Procedure is another potentially restorative
feature of the gacaca system highlighted above. In theory, the procedure serves
double objectives of not only generating information useful for criminal
investigation but also inducing offenders to acknowledge and ask for forgiveness
94 The term ‘victims’ here is used in a broad sense to encompass the following three categories
of victims of violence: ‘primary victims’ who have been directly harmed physically or
psychologically; ‘secondary victims’, family and friends of primary victims who have been harmed
indirectly as a result of the injuries or loss of a loved one; and ‘tertiary victims’, a community or
society that has collectively suffered injuries primarily in psychological terms because of violence
inflicted on its members. See related discussion in Section 4.3.2 of Chapter 2.
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for the wrongs they committed.
Initially, detainees accused of involvement in the genocide were slow to
respond to the call for confessions, not least because they were deeply
suspicious about the real intention of the government authorities (PRI 2002a,
28).95 However, as the campaign for encouraging confessions was intensified
and the gacaca courts in the pilot sectors became operational,96 the rate of
confessed detainees nearly tripled from 13 percent to 32 percent between
December 2001 and December 2002 (PRI 2002a, 26; 2003a, 5). The release of
approximately 21,000 detainees following the Presidential Decree on 1 January
2003 further prompted thousands of others to seek recourse through the
procedure in the following months. Consequently, by the end of 2004 the number
of confessed detainees grew to 60,000, or 75 percent of the approximately
80,000 suspects held in prisons and other detention facilities at that time (IRIN
2005).
The government succeeded in inducing more confessions; however, many
detainees seem to have made erroneous confessions. Many of those who opted
to confess and plead guilty, according to Penal Reform International (PRI),
showed a tendency to ascribe much of the blame to other offenders – especially
those who had died or fled to other countries or those who remained free in the
local hills evading arrest – while portraying themselves as one of many
accomplices who played a minimal role in the killings or attacks (2002a, 26;
95 According to PRI (2002a), other possible reasons for the low confession rate recorded before
the end of 2001 include: 1) lack of awareness about the procedure, especially among female
detainees; 2) hope that their guilt would not be established; 3) innocence; 4) observation that
detainees who had already confessed did not enjoy benefits as promised; 5) fear of harassment
that might result from accusing their co-offenders and accomplices; and 6) intimidation by other
detainees toward confessed detainees and their families outside prison.
96 A senior Ministry of Justice official identified the following four components of the campaign for
promoting confessions: 1) informing detainees of the advantages of confessing and pleading
guilty; 2) organising gacaca hearings by detainees inside prison; 3) using a mobile team of
confessed detainees who encourage those detained in other prisons to follow their example; and
4) promoting religious activities for detainees in which repentance and confession are promoted
(Kigali, 3 Dec 2002).
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2003a, 8). Confessed detainees who were interviewed for this study in three
different prisons in Rwanda (Kigali, Gitarama and Gisenyi) in 2002 spoke
eloquently about criminal acts of their accomplices while claiming that they were
coerced to take part in igitero (attack group) but did not commit any violent act
themselves. Another serious concern is that the vigorous confession campaign
coupled with the powerful incentive of sentence reduction may have led even
innocent individuals to incriminate themselves for crimes they never committed
(AI 2002, 39; E. Daly 2002, 382).97 Self-incrimination seems to have been a
tempting course of action for many detainees who awaited trial for many years
because confession would bring about an immediate release with no additional
punishment or at worst, merely a few years of Community Service.
Genocide survivors interviewed for the African Rights/REDRESS report
assert that they often see well-known offenders in their communities taking the
guilt of others on themselves in exchange for financial or social reward. One of
them says:
I deplore the obvious collusion between killers from the same village who
agree, among themselves, that the one who was known to be a murderer
will admit to the murders he committed, and also to those committed by
others, if they ask him to and if they reward him financially or socially. If you
look into this, you will see that it is a well-known phenomenon. (2008, 40)
Gacaca courts seem to have rejected a significant number of false confessions,
and those who made such confessions have been sent back to jail. However,
such incidents seem to have led many genocide survivors to become more
suspicious about the truthfulness of confessions and apologies made during and
outside gacaca proceedings.
97 AI (2002, 39) has reported detainees claiming ‘to have confessed to the crime of genocide
simply because of their prolonged detention and limited prospects of having their cases tried in a
court of law’.
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Another problem observed concerns the attitude and behaviour of
confessed offenders. Chapter 6 reported an arrogant attitude about forgiveness
among confessed offenders interviewed at three different prisons in Rwanda.
Some of these offenders gave the impression that they were entitled to
forgiveness, expressing their expectation that survivors of genocide would
accept their confessions and apologies and grant them forgiveness in return.
Some of them claimed that they had confessed for the sake of national unity and
reconciliation and that now it was survivors’ turn to respond for the same noble
objective. However, many of the survivors interviewed in the two fieldwork
communities expressed resentment regarding this assumption about confession
and forgiveness. Klaas de Jonge, an anthropologist who led PRI’s gacaca
research team for several years, also observed: ‘The accused think because
they ask for forgiveness, they are entitled to forgiveness. You hear these people
confessing as if they are describing a movie. There’s absolutely no compassion’
(quoted in Waldorf 2006, 428). Certainly, all of the public confessions made by
genocide offenders have not indicated this problematic tendency.
Personal observations made from 2005-2009 through the healing and
reconciliation programme of one NGO in Rwanda have included sincere,
remorseful confessions of genocide offenders that were well-received by
genocide survivors, including those who were directly harmed by the offenders.
However, such confessions seem to have been rare rather than common in the
settings of gacaca trials. Although there is no data available to assess the overall
quality of public confession and apology made by genocide offenders during
numerous gacaca hearings, the reports cited above and personal observations
of several gacaca hearings suggest that offenders’ confessions were frequently,
rather than rarely, perceived by survivors as insincere or even untruthful. This
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perception seems to have augmented ‘the bitterness of survivors, particularly
when coupled with the public expectation that survivors should offer forgiveness’
(Waldorf 2009, 429).
Moreover, the confession procedure used by judicial authorities seems to
have entailed challenging consequences regarding relationships within the local
hills and families of confessed offenders. As mentioned above, for confessions
to be accepted, genocide offenders had to not only provide a full description of
the offence they had committed but also incriminate their co-offenders and all the
people they recognised as accomplices of the genocide. While it seems many
offenders attempted to save family members, friends or fellow inmates by
distorting their confessions (PRI 2002, 26; AR/REDRESS 2008, 39-43), there
seem to be some who incriminated others in their confessions, which has
inevitably created tension. Ironically, the very procedure which may be
considered crucial for reconciliation between victims and offenders of the
genocide may have caused serious damage to social relationships between
offenders and their family members, friends or neighbours, many of whom have
no place to live other than the same hill.98
5.3.3. Community Service Detached from Reintegration and Reconciliation
According to the National Executive Secretariat of Community Service
(Secrétariat Exécutif du Comité National de TIG or SETIG in short),99 a total of
94,318 genocide offenders received Community Service or TIG sentences by
the end of 2008. In January 2009, out of these 94,318 convicts, only 2,394
(2.5%) of them had completed their TIG sentences; 36,781 (39%) of them were
98 The same concern is pertinent to the legal obligation to testify before the gacaca courts.
According to the Gacaca Law, anybody who fails to testify on what the person has seen or knows
concerning the genocide is subject to prosecution and a custodial sentence for a maximum of six
months (Article 29 of the 2004 Gacaca Law). African Rights (2003, 39) notes that the provision
‘might undermine the perception that the process is based on trust and mutual respect’.
99 Statistics presented in this section were all obtained from the SETIG on 6 Jan 2009.
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engaged in Community Service across the country, and 43,367 (46%) were
waiting for work to be assigned. The SETIG had not yet received the files of the
remaining 11,776 convicts from the NSGC. The length of Community Service
sentence given to the tigistes varied from less than a month to 25 – 30 years. For
over 80 percent of them, it was between one and ten years: 27.7 percent falling
in the group serving 1 – 3 years; 45.1 percent in the group serving 3 – 6 years;
and 7.5 percent in the group serving 6-10 years. These statistics suggest that
the scale of the present operation of Community Service needs to be
dramatically expanded, in order to allocate specific work to those convicts who
are standing by, and that it will have to continue with tens of thousands of
convicts for years to come.
Having tens of thousands of convicts engage in different kinds of work all
over the country for a number of years is a huge task for a small country like
Rwanda. Whether the Community Service programme will be developed into
one which taps its restorative potential remains to be seen. However, the way it
has been implemented so far is not geared to facilitate the reintegration of
offenders into their communities or their reconciliation with those whom they
harmed during the genocide. For nearly four years since it was launched as a
pilot programme in September 2005, the implementation of Community Service
has been following two different models: a camp model and a neighbourhood
model. The camp model refers to Community Service in the form of camps
called ingando, or solidarity camps, each of which accommodates between a
few and several hundred tigistes. From these camps, tigistes commute to
relatively close sites six days a week to engage mainly in public work such as
construction of roads, terraces and other soil conservation structures, as well as,
to a limited extent, construction of houses for the needy, especially genocide
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survivors.100 Apart from districts in the Province of Kigali City, most of the
districts in other provinces only have a few camps, which means that the great
majority of the tigistes accommodated in each camp are from different
communities and thus work in communities that are not their own (even those
very far from their province). As of 30 December 2008, among the 94,318 people
sentenced to Community Service, 26,165 of them were accommodated in 63
camps across the country. On the other hand, the neighbourhood model is the
form of Community Service conducted by tigistes who are allowed to live with
their family and engage in work such as house construction and cultivation of
crops in their locality, for three days a week. As of 30 December 2008, a total of
10,616 were reported to engage in Community Service following this model.
Although the Presidential Order governing the present Community Service
programme allows both of these models to be implemented,101 the SETIG has
been increasingly inclined to make the camp model a predominant, if not an
exclusive, mode of implementing Community Service in years to come. In an
interview conducted in January 2009, Anastase Nabahire, Associate Executive
Secretary of the SETIG, explained this preference by pointing out five major
advantages of the camp model over the neighbourhood one: 1) it is more
conducive to close supervision of convicts; 2) it has proven to be more
productive in terms of output by convicts; 3) because convicts stay in a camp
after working hours and during weekends, it is more conducive to providing civic
education useful for convicts’ reintegration into society; 4) it is more conducive to
training convicts in various skills while they are in a camp; and 5) by having
convicts work six days a week, it allows them to complete sentences twice as
fast as the neighbourhood model, which requires work only three days a
100 Information obtained from the SETIG, 6 Jan 2009.
101 Article 7 of the Presidential Order N° 50/01 of 16/10/2005
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week.102 Asked about a challenge or difficulty faced by the camp-based
Community Service programme, he spoke only about high costs, which include
setting up and maintaining camp facilities, payments for camp supervisors and
security personnel, uniforms, tools, drugs and meals. In fact, the Community
Service programme as a whole has been seriously under-funded and it would
seem very difficult to dramatically expand and maintain the camp-based
Community Service programme unless its financial situation is significantly
improved.103
Thus, despite its stated objectives of reintegrating genocide offenders,
repairing social fabric and advancing reconciliation, the government’s
Community Service programme as implemented mainly through the
camp-based model continues to keep tigistes away from their families and from
other members of their community, including genocide survivors. It also lacks a
strategic emphasis on using Community Service for reparative acts by tigistes
that are directly beneficial to genocide survivors and their families. Kirkby (2006,
114) argues that ‘separating community service from the reconciliation it is
meant to promote’ is a major flaw in the way the government’s Community
Service programme is planned. By using the convicted in works for the benefit of
the general public, says Kirkby, ‘community service ceases to symbolize a
repairing of civic trust through relations between perpetrators and victims, and
instead becomes little more than a state-controlled labour pool’. PRI, an
international NGO which has been campaigning for the promotion of Community
Service in Rwanda, communicated essentially the same concern to the SETIG
on various occasions. In its gacaca research report focusing on Community
102 Interview in Kigali, 27 Jan 2009.
103 According to Nabahire, while the SETIG’s budget for 2009 is approximately two billion
Rwandese francs (equivalent of USD 3.3 million), the government has approved only 368 million
Rwandese francs (equivalent of USD 670,000) for the first six months of the year. The SETIG’s
total expenditure for 2008 was approximately 2 billion Rwandese Francs.
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Service, the NGO put forth a recommendation to expand the use of
‘Neighbourhood Community Service’ as a means to facilitate both social
reintegration of genocide offenders and community reconciliation (PRI, 2007,
11):
It seems to us fundamental that this system be favoured, that the TIG be
carried out, as often as possible, by the convicts close to their own hill,
which would enable them to be in contact with their family and, above all, to
interact with the survivors. This concept is of value as it could allow a
gradual rapprochement with the community and perhaps the return to some
form of trust. [....] [T]he camp option should only be imposed for short
periods of time. It would, in any case, seem advisable to continue the
search for creative solutions and to further reflect on the various ways in
which to implement Neighbourhood Community Service so that Community
Service can best contribute to the overall aim of reconciliation.
This recommendation seems to have had no significant effect on the thinking of
policy makers in the SETIG and other concerned government bodies. Asked
about his view about using Community Service as an opportunity for offenders to
make reparations by doing something directly beneficial to their victims,
Nabahire insisted that the two things should not be mixed up because ‘the work
of Community Service is meant to serve the interest of general public, not private
individuals’.104 He also said that linking Community Service with the process of
reparation may create a problematic impression that convicts who are
predominantly Hutu are obliged to work for the interests of genocide survivors
who are predominantly Tutsi, which connotes the practice of obligatory labour
that noble Tutsi patrons in the past imposed on their Hutu clients. While such an
impression must certainly be avoided, there must be creative ways of
implementing the Community Service programme, ways in which convicts
themselves can see the restorative value of their work that is appreciated by
104 Interview in Kigali, 28 Jan 2009.
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survivors as truly beneficial for rebuilding their lives. As it stands now (15 August
2009), however, there is no indication that the government is seriously searching
for ways of implementing Community Service that fully tap its restorative and
reconciliatory potential.
5.3.4. Disillusion with Compensation Programme
Despite well intended provisions in the gacaca system for promoting genocide
survivors’ entitlement to material reparations, the community of genocide
survivors in Rwanda is reported to be severely frustrated by the fact that ‘the
promises of reparation’ have not materialised to date (AR/REDRESS 2008,
100-5). The lack of financial or material means for the payment of compensation
on the part of convicts and the non-enforcement of civil orders for reparation on
the part of government authorities are major problems faced by genocide
survivors (101-2). One genocide survivor speaks of her frustrating experience as
follows:
Every time I turn to the administrative authorities to have these judgments
enforced, the executive secretary often promises me that the property of
those convicted will be coming to auction soon. We wait, but in vain. (101)
Although there is no data available regarding to what extent gacaca’s
reparation orders have been carried out, there seem to be significant regional
variations in its implementation. According to Takeuchi, who conducted research
on the results of Gacaca trials in two rural sectors, one in Umutara of Eastern
Province and the other in Butare of Southern Province, he confirmed that many
more Category 3 offenders had paid compensation for the damage they caused
to properties of local genocide survivors in Umutara than in Butare. A primary
reason why more people in Umutara managed to pay compensation than those
in Butare is that the average land holding is much bigger in Umutara, so the
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people there could afford to sell a portion of their land to make the money for
compensation payment, whereas the people in Butare could not.105 Thus,
particularly in regions where the average land holding of local farmers is too
small, genocide survivors face great difficulties in their pursuit of seeking
compensation from impoverished Category 3 convicts.
Also, genocide survivors have been disillusioned by the lack of any
progress in setting up the state-funded Compensation Fund. The Rwandan
cabinet debated a draft law on the creation, organisation and functioning of the
compensation fund in August 2002 (AI 2004, 10). The law has never been
finalised, not least because it involves some sensitive and difficult issues such
as the criteria for beneficiaries of the fund as well as the sources of the fund
itself.106 Questioned whether the government has abandoned the idea of the
state-funded Compensation Fund, the same high-level official of the NSGC
replied ‘Almost’.107 The official demonstrated a diminished commitment to
state-funded compensation for genocide survivors:
The genocide was perpetrated by the state of génocidaires. The state now
is the one who stopped the genocide and in fact it is us who are left with its
consequences. [That] the state has to pay compensation for moral
damages means that it must come from tax payers, including survivors.
Resources for that from the state are from you and me. So it is very difficult
to conceive the payment of compensation to all the survivors, given limited
resources the state has. We may continue discussion but it will depend on
external resources from those who bear responsibility for the genocide.
During the period commemorating the fifteenth anniversary of the genocide
(April – July 2009), there was neither public debate nor official announcement
105 Conversation with Shinichi Takeuchi (JICA Research Institute), Kigali, 13 Jan 2009.
106 See Rombouts and Vandeginste (2005) for details about the draft law. The issue of who
deserves compensation is closely linked with a highly contested issue of who can legitimately
claim victimhood, which was discussed in Chapters 5 and 6.
107 Interview in Kigali, 20 Jan 2009.
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concerning the long-promised Compensation Fund.108 Fifteen years after the
genocide, the genocide survivors’ hope for this compensation has been
shattered.
5.4. Discrepancy between Reconciliatory Justice in Theory and in Practice
According to the theory of ‘reconciliatory justice’ espoused by the government,
the gacaca system is designed to facilitate the restoration of the social
relationships damaged by the genocide by addressing not only retributive but
also reparative and restorative dimensions of justice for the people and the
community involved. It establishes the truth as the basis for rebuilding trust; it
generates the judgment acceptable to all through participatory deliberations; it
helps the offenders make amends and reintegrate themselves into the
community; and it heals both material and psychological damages suffered by
the victims through various means of material and symbolic reparation.
In the early phase of its development, the gacaca system attracted a great
deal of attention from scholars and observers due to these potentially restorative
characteristics (Drumbl 2000, 2002; Cobban 2002; Harrell 2003; Tiemessen
2004; Wierzynska 2004; Kirkby 2006). In his articles advocating a contextualized
approach to transitional justice in the aftermath of mass violence, Drumbl (2000,
2002) argued that post-genocide Rwanda requires a rectificatory justice
approach that is characterised by restorative justice initiatives seeking
atonement and reparation by as well as reintegration of offenders, rather than an
108 Instead, on 15 April 2009, the new law on ‘the establishment of the fund for the support and
assistance to the survivors of the Tutsi genocide and other crimes against humanity’ came into
force (Law N° 69/2008 of 30/12/2008). The fund created by this law is not a ‘compensation fund’
but, as its title indicates, an ‘assistance fund’ for the most needy survivors -- such as orphans,
widows, elderly people, people whose houses were destroyed, people with disabilities and those
infected with HIV/AIDS (Article 26). In essence, through the creation of this fund, the government
scrapped the FARG, an assistance fund for the needy genocide survivors, which had existed
since 1998 but whose mismanagement had caused a nationwide corruption scandal in recent
months (NT 2009b, 2009c, 2009e).
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approach emphasising retributive criminal trials to determine guilt and impose
punishment on offenders. In his early writings, the gacaca system was described
as an appropriate restorative justice response with a high potential for
contributing to reintegration and reconciliation (2000, 1264-5; 2002, 13).
As discussed earlier, central to Drumbl’s conception of restorative justice is
the theory of reintegrative shaming advanced by Braithwaite. Applying
Braithwaite’s theory to the context of post-genocide Rwanda, Drumbl (2000,
1260-3) stressed the crucial role of reintegrative shaming for encouraging
atonement of offenders, prompting their acknowledgment of their responsibility
for their acts during the genocide, and facilitating their reintegration. The
community-based shaming process discussed by Drumbl may involve ‘shared
conversations, public discussion, and debate over what actually happened’ as
well as the telling of many victims’ personal stories, which ‘may trigger the
internalization in the offender of an understanding, as well as an
acknowledgement, of the evil that was inflicted’ (1262). He vividly described the
potentially transforming power of community-based reintegrative shaming as
follows (2002, 11):
When aggressors can see the hurt for themselves instead of denying it in
the splendid insularity of prison, can hear the words of survivors, can look at
mass graves instead of jail walls, and can be surrounded by reburial
ceremonies, perhaps then their consciences will become troubled. […]
Humanizing this pain can help break even broad levels of social complicity.
Drumbl (2000, 1262) suggested that ‘the humanization of the pain’ through
a series of community-based shaming efforts may eventually produce positive
conditions that are conducive to the prevention of future violence and the
advancement of reconciliation as it promotes ‘internalized accountability’,
strengthens the cohesion of community and plays a vital role of moral education
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for younger generations. Drumbl considered the gacaca system potentially
highly effective in establishing accountability for the genocide and promoting
reconciliation within ‘the fragmented communities’ of post-genocide Rwanda: by
facilitating ‘localized reintegrative shaming’ through its communal hearings and
deliberations; by applying restorative sanctions such as ‘community service,
apologies, rituals and public shaming’; by addressing victims’ needs for
compensation; and by generating a historical narrative based on specific
experiences at the grassroots level (1264-5). Drumbl’s discussion indicates that
the gacaca design has great appeal for those who seek a restorative alternative
to the dominant model of post-violence rectificatory justice through retributive
criminal prosecution and trial (1266).109
The enthusiastic views of those who had high expectations for the gacaca
system as a restorative alternative to the dominant retributive model of
transitional justice have been gradually replaced by increasingly cautious
opinions as the actual gacaca process unfolded (Tiemessen 2004; Corey and
Joireman 2004; Kirkby 2006; Waldorf 2006; Cobban 2007; Drumbl 2007). While
acknowledging the remarkable restorative characteristics in the gacaca system,
Tiemessen (2004, 64) underlined the politicisation of the gacaca process as
rendering ‘a state-imposed model of justice that threatens the community based
principles of restorative justice’. Tiemessen went on to argue that gacaca’s
restorative potential was made even more elusive by the exclusion of RPF
atrocities from its jurisdiction, which, she maintained, would not only undermine
the legitimacy of gacaca courts but also exacerbate already existing social
divisions along ethnic lines.
Based on the analysis of empirical data collected during gacaca’s pilot
109 Following more or less the same line as Drumbl, Harrell (2003) championed the gacaca
system as a form of ‘the communitarian restorative model of transitional justice’.
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phase, Waldorf (2006) has identified four weaknesses in the practice of gacaca
justice: 1) the lack of participation based on people’s free will; 2) no provision of
compensation to victims; 3) no provision of accountability for RPF abuses; and
4) the imposition of collective guilt on Hutus. The first three points have been
previously discussed in this thesis. Regarding the fourth point, Waldorf (2006,
431) underscores particularly two problems with regard to the broad scope of
genocide perpetrators under the Gacaca Law. The first problem concerns the
inclusion of property offences in the crime of genocide. He criticises this
inclusion as a decision that is ‘legally dubious’, ‘trivializes genocide’, and ‘risks
criminalizing many Hutu who engaged in opportunistic looting’ (ibid). The second
problem he points out is ‘a broad interpretation of accomplice liability.’ As noted
earlier, ‘accomplices’ -- defined as individuals who, ‘by any means’, provided
assistance to commit genocidal killings or attacks -- are placed in the same
category as the actual perpetrators of the offences. ‘Given large-scale
participation in roadblocks and patrols during the genocide’, Waldorf maintains,
‘a broad interpretation of accomplice liability could lead to mass inculpation’
(ibid). These two problems inherent to the gacaca system, Waldorf argues,
‘would overwhelm an already taxed judicial and prison system and undermine
ongoing efforts at peaceful coexistence’ (431-2). The danger of which Waldorf
warns seems to have now become a reality, as the data presented earlier clearly
indicate that the gacaca process will end up convicting a large proportion of the
Hutu population for genocide-related crimes.
Returning to Drumbl, he has recently toned down his early enthusiasm for
the restorative potential of the gacaca system:
I believe gacaca had the potential to constitute a truly revolutionary
approach to accountability for mass violence, but as time passes it is not
fully actualizing this potential. It could have been a locus for the
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revitalization of indigenous, local, and restorative mechanisms to stimulate
a deeper accountability dynamic. However, attempts to diversify the
accountability paradigm in Rwanda through popular measures such as
gacaca, although partly successful, underachieve their restorative, cathartic,
and reconciliatory potential. (2007, 93)
Drumbl (2007, 94-7) attributes the underachievement of gacaca’s restorative
potential to three primary reasons. First, he identifies international pressures on
the Rwandan government to address due process concerns as one reason that
the gacaca system lost its restorative characteristics. Because of the persistent
pressure by international human rights groups and donors, he claims, the
government was obliged to make the proposed gacaca system increasingly akin
to criminal trials of the formal justice system. Second, he highlights internal
pressure by the Rwandan government to ‘centralize and bureaucratize’ the
gacaca system to serve its own political objectives, which deprived local
communities of autonomy in and control over gacaca proceedings, thereby
diminishing popular ownership of the process of supposedly community-owned
justice.110 With regard to this second factor, Drumbl points out the government’s
motives to use ‘gacaca as a tool of social control’ and to silence any criticism of it
(95). Third, apart from these external and internal pressures, argues Drumbl, it is
a ‘reality that the gacaca system was not initially designed to prosecute
perpetrators of extreme evil, and the prospect of provisionally releasing,
shaming, and rehabilitating murderers is daunting’ (94).
As discussed above, gacaca-based ‘reconciliatory justice’ in theory
provides Rwandan people with time and space for telling their own narratives
truthfully, listening to those of others attentively and having shared conversations
and debates over what happened in the past, thereby reconciling their conflicting
110 Drumbl suggests that the state’s control over the gacaca process for genocide trials became
apparent after the adoption of the 2004 Gacaca Law. Others might find it apparent in the way the
gacaca system was defined by the 2001 Gacaca Law.
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narratives. In theory, millions of gacaca hearings create an environment on hills
across the country that is conducive to localized integrative shaming, which
Drumbl thought necessary for prompting atonement and acknowledgment by
those carrying different degrees of responsibility for past atrocities. In theory,
reparative measures embedded in the gacaca system respond to profound
reparative needs of victims and in turn help their recovery. But to what extent
have these theoretical effects taken place in practice? The accounts presented
in this chapter point to a major discrepancy between gacaca-based
‘reconciliatory justice’ in theory and in practice.
6. Conclusion
The government’s approach to rectificatory justice was once described as
‘justice without reconciliation’ because of its policy of maximum accountability for
the genocide committed under the auspices of the former regime. Although it is
inaccurate to say that the government did not pay attention to the need for
reconciliation and to the reparative and restorative dimensions of justice when it
set out its post-genocide justice effort,111 its initial priority was clearly given to
retributive justice with highly punitive characteristics.
Even after the RPF-led government adopted ‘reconciliation’ as a part of its
policy objective in the late 1990s, in the official discourse an emphasis was put
on justice largely in the sense of retribution rather than reconciliation. A typical
usage of the term in those years was, for example, ‘there can be no
reconciliation with victims unless there has been justice’ (Sarkin 2001, 154).
Justice had to be carried out first, before there could be a possibility of
111 Government’s concern for reparative and restorative dimensions of justice seems to be
reflected in certain aspects of the 1996 Genocide Law - the provision for confessions and guilty
pleas by offenders, the provision of material compensation for victims, and the categorisation of
offenders by the degree of responsibility, based on the intention to treat ‘foot soldiers’ of the
genocide much more leniently than their leaders.
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reconciliation. In subsequent years, the government’s discourse on justice and
reconciliation changed remarkably as the gacaca process was brought to the
forefront of Rwanda’s post-genocide justice effort. According to this discourse,
the government pursues ‘reconciliatory justice’, which actively seeks healing and
reconciliation.
Thus the Rwandan government has significantly shifted its conception of
justice and of justice’s relation to reconciliation over the years. There are three
particular aspects of the conceptual shift, using the analytical framework of the
psychology of justice discussed in Chapter 3. The first two aspects of the shift
are concerned with ‘justice as what’, or distributive outcomes of justice, while the
third aspect emphasises ‘justice as how’, or the procedures followed to
determine outcomes. First, the government has significantly broadened its
conception of justice over the years, from a relatively restrictive concept that is
focused on retribution to a much broader idea that encompasses retributive,
reparative and restorative dimensions of justice. With the introduction of the
gacaca system, the government adopted the language of restorative justice, as
examined above. The government’s description of the gacaca process puts a
strong emphasis on its reparative and restorative functions. Although the
government has not abandoned its retributive urge to punish genocide offenders,
particularly those who were in leadership positions at the time of the genocide, it
is nonetheless a very significant change in the way the government addresses
the challenge of rectificatory justice in post-genocide Rwanda.
Second, the government’s conception of justice has shifted from a static to
a dynamic one in its relation to reconciliation. As noted above, for some years
immediately after the genocide, a typical phrase with which the government
described the relationship between justice and reconciliation was, ‘No
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reconciliation before justice!’ Justice was seen as a precondition for
reconciliation – something which must be achieved considerably, if not
completely, before an effort at reconciliation could be initiated. This notion of
justice as a precondition of reconciliation may sound plausible to many,
particularly the victims who have difficulty conceiving of the possibility of
reconciliation before their desire for justice has been fulfilled. As argued in
Chapter 3, however, insisting on this ‘first justice, then reconciliation’ approach in
a static sense would be the same as claiming that there is no possibility of
reconciliation, given that no complete justice can materialise under most
circumstances, not only in retributive but also in reparative terms. Thus,
underlying the government’s move to adopt the policy of ‘reconciliatory justice’
was a significant shift from the static conception of justice to the dynamic one –
justice as an evolving process toward the interconnected goals of retribution,
reparation and restoration.
Third, there was a significant shift in the government’s conception of justice
in terms of ‘justice as how’, or procedural justice. Since the gacaca system
became considered the centrepiece of Rwanda’s post-genocide justice effort,
the government’s approach to procedural justice has shifted from one totally
dependent on the formal justice system, with highly adversarial procedures
dominated by legal professionals, to one centred on the gacaca system, built on
the informal dispute resolution mechanism in which ordinary community
members play critical roles in deliberative procedures. As noted earlier, in the
face of the fierce criticism relating to due process concerns, the government
defended its endeavour with the gacaca system by arguing that in the unique
social, political and cultural context of post-genocide Rwanda, procedural justice
can be best attained through community-based, participatory proceedings based
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on Rwandan tradition.
These three aspects of the conceptual shift constitute a positive and highly
remarkable departure, from the earlier conventional retributive approach in the
direction of an innovative restorative approach to justice. In contrast to these
positive changes in the dimensions of what and how, however, the government
has been persistent in its policy with regard to another crucial dimension of the
psychology of justice: ‘justice as who’, or the scope of justice. As discussed
above, the RPF-led government has persistently maintained its policy to exclude
(minimally estimated) tens of thousands of victims of the atrocities committed by
the RPF/RPA from the scope of post-genocide justice. According to this
one-sided framework of post-genocide justice consistently maintained for the
last 15 years, crimes that must be fully accounted for in a transparent manner
are only those genocide-related crimes committed under the auspices of the
former Hutu regime, not those ‘insignificant’ acts of ‘excess’ by individual RPF
soldiers. Those who deserve material and moral reparations are only those who
fell at the hands of génocidaires, not those who died from other kinds of violence,
such as the RPF atrocities before, during and after the genocide.
Despite the positive changes noted in terms of the what and how
dimensions of rectificatory justice, the question of who has been completely left
out of the government’s search for an innovative transitional justice approach.
This persistent failure to address the crucial question of who has overshadowed
the government’s effort at justice and reconciliation. The disparity between the
work by domestic justice systems as well as the ICTR112 to prosecute genocide
suspects and the failure to pursue accountability for the RPF atrocities has
112 See Peskin (2008) and Del Ponte and Sidetic (2009) for detailed accounts of how ICTR’s
attempted indictment of the alleged RPF atrocities has been obstructed by relentless political
manoeuvres of the Rwandan government.
326
created a sense of grave injustice among the vast majority of Hutus, as
documented in preceding chapters. This sense of injustice has been a primary
factor in thwarting gacaca’s unique potential to serve as a community-based
forum for reconciling starkly conflicting narratives of victimhood in post-genocide
Rwandan society. Against the wishes of many Hutus, there has been extremely
limited space for them to tell their narratives if those narratives do not concern
the genocide. As noted above, this seems to have prompted many of them
(apart from confessed offenders) to detach themselves from gacaca’s
truth-telling exercises, which, in turn, has frustrated genocide survivors who
desperately sought the truth and the acknowledgement of the irreparable wrongs
committed against them and their loved ones. Many of these genocide survivors
chose to tell their stories despite numerous acts of intimidation, harassment and
even assassination intended to silence them. Surrounded by many silent
‘spectators’ and those in denial about local Hutus’ complicity in the genocide, a
significant proportion of genocide survivors seem to have been left with
bitterness, anger and disillusionment.
These observations cannot be generalised to gacaca proceedings all over
the country. However, the range of evidence presented above strongly suggests
that, at least in areas where past atrocities are not limited to those concerning
the genocide, a social environment which has characterised many of the gacaca
courts has not been conducive to ‘reconciliatory justice’ through localized
integrative shaming. Rather, the environment has been characterised by a great
deal of denial, frustration, bitterness and fear. Consequently, the government’s
endeavour to provide ‘reconciliatory justice’ falls short of meeting the important
challenge of reconciling sharply conflicting narratives of victimhood in Rwanda
today.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
UNDER THE BANNER OF UNITY AND RECONCILIATION:
RECONCILIATION AND THE POLITICS OF
NATIONAL IDENTITY BUILDING
1. Introduction
As it is commemorating the fifteenth anniversary of the genocide, Rwanda
aspires to project itself as a united and reconciled nation before the world.
‘Fifteen years after the genocide’, proclaims the Rwandan government, ‘[A] new
Rwanda has grown, putting forward unity and reconciliation, not division [...] Like
a new dawn it provides hope’ (Official website of the National Commission for
Fight Against Genocide)1 In today’s Rwanda, ‘unity and reconciliation’ is
presented not only as an aspiration of Rwandan people who experienced
unspeakable horrors of violence in the recent past but also as their obligation.
Antoine Rutayisire, Vice-President of the National Unity and Reconciliation
Commission (NURC) and himself a genocide survivor, declares:
Reconciliation is not just one of the many other options for us Rwandese, it
is rather a non-negotiable obligation. An obligation to give ourselves hope
for our old age; an obligation to leave to our children a better Rwanda to
grow and live in. (Official website of the NURC)2
This chapter examines a range of efforts that the RPF-led post-genocide
government has undertaken under the banner of ‘National Unity and
Reconciliation’. First, the chapter examines conceptions of reconciliation
1 Accessed on 14 March 2009.
2 Accessed on 14 March 2009.
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underlying the government’s efforts. The chapter then reviews government’s
efforts to forge a unified national identity that is considered the basis of national
unity and reconciliation in post-genocide Rwanda.
The government’s focus on national identity building can be seen as its
primary response to the great challenge of dissolving the divisive, racialised
ethnic identities that it considers the root cause of the Rwandan genocide. The
chapter highlights, however, that this identity building seems to be seriously
compromised by the government’s one-sided framework in which issues of
reconciliation that arose out of crimes other than those committed by the former
genocidal regime are ignored and the voices of many victims concerned with
those violations are silenced. This inconsistent pursuit of justice and
reconciliation often correlates with the ethnic identities the government seeks to
obliterate, contradicting its proclamation of national unity based on a new
Rwandan identity.
2. Unravelling the Government’s Strategy for National Unity and
Reconciliation
The government’s official effort at national unity and reconciliation began much
later than its effort at post-genocide justice that was discussed in the previous
chapter. The NURC was established by a parliamentary law in March 1999 as a
special commission with the mandate to promote national unity and
reconciliation.3
According to Article 178 of the 2003 Constitution, the NURC’s mandate
encompasses: 1) organise the national programme for the promotion of national
unity and reconciliation; 2) develop measures to overcome divisions and to
restore and reinforce unity and reconciliation among Rwandans; 3) educate and
3 Law N°03/99 of 12/03/1999. This was first modified by the Law N°34/2002 of 14/11/2002 and
then more recently by the Law N°35/2008 of 08/08/2008.
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mobilise the population on related themes; 4) conduct research and promote
public debates; and 5) play the role of watchdog against ‘any kind of
discrimination, intolerance or xenophobia’.
The NURC has organised a series of ‘nation-wide grassroots consultations’
since its formation in 1999 for eliciting ideas about unity and reconciliation from
different sections of the population and for jointly evaluating progress made
toward the goal of a unified and reconciled Rwanda. These numerous meetings
have culminated in several National Summits held in Kigali in October 2000,
October 2002, April 2004 and December 2006 (NURC’s official website).4
Chaired by the President of Rwanda and attended by a cross section of
Rwandans as well as representatives of the international community, the summit
‘has become a prominent and more or less permanent national event’ which
‘reviews progress and achievements in regard to unity and reconciliation and
adopts recommendations in relation to people’s wishes’.
Apart from these high profile official gatherings, the commission has been
devoting itself to three programme areas: namely, civic education, conflict
management5 and support to community initiatives (See Appendix 4 for the
description of NURC’s key programme areas).
2.1. Multiple Conceptions of Reconciliation
What is the meaning of ‘reconciliation’ as it is used in reports, planning
documents and the website of the NURC, and as it is described by officials in
interviews? None of the official documents obtained from the NURC defines the
term ‘reconciliation’ clearly with regard to the specific context of Rwandan
4 Accessed on 14 March 2009.
5 This was earlier called ‘conflict mediation’.
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society.6 There are multiple conceptions of reconciliation featured in the
government’s official discourse. They include conceptions applicable to different
levels of society: national, community and interpersonal.
2.1.1. Reconciliation as Creating an Inclusive Nation State
Asked about the NURC’s definition of reconciliation, Executive Secretary
Fatuma Ndangiza stressed the difficulty of coming up with a single definition of
reconciliation because it has many different meanings to different people who
suffered from various forms of violence in the history of Rwanda. Then she
described the central challenge to national reconciliation in Rwanda as follows:
Certainly, in short, I can say that with national reconciliation, the
government has the challenge of creating a framework that brings together
all Rwandans, ensuring the unity of Rwandans, and also ensuring access to
and control over various opportunities within the country for all Rwandans.
And then of course, as the government creates this framework, Rwandans
who have problems [with their past] can reconcile. Maybe it could be at
individual level, it could be at community level, at different levels of society.7
The conception of national reconciliation underlying the view expressed by
Ndangiza seems akin to the structure-oriented conception of reconciliation,
which, as discussed in Chapter 2, focuses on the building of structures and
institutions as the foundation of an inclusive state in which all citizens are treated
with equal rights, thereby fostering a strong sense of common citizenship. As
discussed in Chapter 2, this structure-oriented conception contrasts with a
relationship-oriented conception, which emphasises the restoration of
relationships through emotional and attitudinal changes of conflicting parties.
Another senior official of the NURC also stressed that what matters is not a
6 For example, in NURC’s study on ‘The Role of Women in Reconciliation and Peace Building in
Rwanda’, reconciliation is defined as ‘a process through which a society moves from a divided
past to a shared future’ (2005, 22). This definition seems vague and not particularly useful for
understanding specific challenges of reconciliation in Rwandan society.
7 Interview in Kigali, 12 Dec 2002.
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friendly relationship between former adversaries or people with different
backgrounds but the creation of a social, economic and political environment in
which all Rwandans are entitled to equal rights:
It’s totally all right even if people don’t like each other. […] What I think
important is to respect rights of each individual, be it a Hutu or a Tutsi or
anybody. Irrespective of his background, he must have rights to work, live,
be educated and so forth.8
This structure-oriented conception of reconciliation seems to underlie important
ingredients of the government’s programme for national unity and reconciliation,
such as the rule of law, democratisation, human rights and civic education. The
work of the NURC in recent years is generally geared to create a political and
socio-economic context at the national level that is conducive to reconciliation at
community and interpersonal levels.9 Unlike relationship-oriented reconciliation,
what matters for the structure-oriented conception upheld by the government is
not the restoration of relationships between groups or individuals but the
fostering of a new positive relationship between the individual citizen and the
nation.
2.1.2. Reconciliation as National Identity Building
As a key ingredient of the above structure-oriented vision of reconciliation, the
government makes the challenge of national identity building a high priority. As
will be discussed later in this chapter, since coming to power in July 1994, the
current PRF government has promoted a historical narrative asserting that there
was strong unity among Rwandans before colonization. This narrative further
claims that because of the racial ideology imposed by White colonisers,
Rwandans became divided into so-called ‘ethnic groups’ of Hutu, Tutsi and Twa
8 Interview in Kigali, 14 June 2002.
9 See Appendix 4.
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which had previously been only occupational categories, and that this externally
imposed division is the root cause of the Rwandan genocide. Based on this
particular reading of Rwandan conflict, what is required today for national unity
and reconciliation is rejecting and replacing the divisive ethnic identities with a
single, unified identity for all Rwandans, ubunyarwanda (Rwanda 1999, 2006).
Ndangiza stressed the importance of inculcating a strong sense of national
identity among Rwandans in the process of unity and reconciliation. After
discussing various distinctions and even discord existing among groups of
Rwandans with different backgrounds, she stated:
They are living together as Rwandans for the first time. But in their mind,
some of them still regard themselves maybe as Ugandans because they
lived in Uganda for a long time. Others could see themselves as Congolese.
Others see themselves as survivors […] So we have to help Rwandans
realise that they are all Rwandans before anything else […] Tutsi, Hutu,
Congolese, Ugandan, Francophone, Anglophone. What is important is that
first of all, our identity is Rwandan, wherever you come from, whenever you
left [the country].10
In the official discourse, the word ‘reconciliation’ is more often than not uttered
together with the word ‘unity’ as a phrase: ‘unity and reconciliation’ (ubumwe
n’ubwiyunge).11 The two words are combined in this particular order: ‘unity and
reconciliation’; ‘unity’ always precedes ‘reconciliation’ when they are used
together. This slogan of ‘unity and reconciliation’ seems to indicate an important
presumption underlying the government’s nation building effort: there was strong
unity for Rwandans in pre-colonial Rwanda and it is this ‘Rwandan-ness’ which
binds all the people with different backgrounds together, even survivors and
perpetrators of the genocide. In short, the ‘restoration’ of pre-colonial unity based
10 Interview in Kigali, 12 Dec 2002.
11 Ubumwe (unity) and Ubwiyunge (reconciliation) linked by a conjunction na = Ubumwe
n’ubwiyunge (unity and reconciliation)
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on the Rwandan identity is a key element of the government’s conception of
national reconciliation.
2.1.3. Reconciliation as Repairing Relationships
Neither the NURC nor any other government organ has specifically articulated
its conception of reconciliation that is applicable to the community or
interpersonal level. However, reconciliation at this lower level of society is
generally understood in line with the Rwandan conception of ubwiyunge
discussed in Chapter 6: the healing of broken relationships between the parties
who have been separated from each other by enmity and/or mistrust. For
example, the following statement in the NURC’s official website can be seen as
a reflection of this relationship-oriented conception:
So far the growth of several community- based reconciliation associations --
involving survivors, perpetrators, and people with family members in prison
-- is an indicator that reconciliation is taking place at the community level.12
Survivors and perpetrators of the genocide are generally considered to be
adversarial parties whose relationships were severely damaged by the genocidal
violence committed by the latter against the former. Stating that their working
together in the same association is an indicator of reconciliation demonstrates
the relationship-oriented conception of reconciliation, which focuses on the
restoration of interpersonal or inter-group relationships damaged by violations or
conflicts.
The government’s effort at ‘reconciliatory justice’ through gacaca courts
also presumes essentially the same relationship-oriented conception of
ubwiyunge. As discussed in the previous chapter, the gacaca system is
designed to facilitate restoration of the social relationships damaged by the
12 Accessed on 14 March 2009.
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genocide, by addressing reparative and restorative dimensions of justice for the
people and the community involved. What is considered as central to the
process of ‘reconciliatory justice’ is a transaction of apology and forgiveness
between the perpetrator and the survivor of genocide. A strong emphasis on this
forgiveness-centred conception of reconciliation in the gacaca process is clearly
evidenced by the inclusion of the Confession, Guilty Plea, Repentance and
Asking for Forgiveness Procedure in the present gacaca law.13
Acknowledgement of wrongdoings by the perpetrator and sincere pardon by the
victim, based on perpetrators’ remorse, are presumed in this particular
procedure as conditions for reconciliation. Victims are expected to offer
forgiveness to these repentant perpetrators for reconciliation to be achieved.
2.2. Reconciliation for Whom?
The official discourse of national unity and reconciliation avoids specifically
discussing who needs to be reconciled with whom in today’s Rwanda. In
interviews of several government officials, there were two typical answers to this
question. The first answer was an expression referring to all Rwandans, such as
‘Rwandans from all walks of life’. The second answer was one which rejected or
downplayed the Hutu – Tutsi dimension of reconciliation. Representing the
NURC, Ndangiza also responded to the question of who in reconciliation in line
with these typical answers. Speaking of her own experience as a child of a Tutsi
refugee who was forced to flee Rwanda in 1959, she stressed that the challenge
of reconciliation is concerned with ‘all Rwandans’:
When we talk about reconciliation in Rwanda, we are not stressing it for
ninety-four event. We go back. Pre-colonial era to the present day. […] For
example, in 1959, my father was forced to flee the country against his will. I
13 Articles 12 -16 of Organic Law N° 13/2008 of 19/05/2008
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grew up in a refugee camp in another country. I was denied the right to
come back to my country. […] Now that I’m back, I could have hatred about
the whole regime that chased my father away or the people who stayed in
the country, the people who might have taken away my father’s property. So
maybe I need reconciliation with the people I find in Rwanda. […] So there
needs to be reconciliation between us, Rwandans of different
backgrounds.14
After stressing the need for reconciliation for ‘all Rwandans’, Ndangiza
moved on to utter another typical answer to the question of who in reconciliation
in Rwandan society:
When you talk about reconciliation in Rwanda, what often comes to your
mind is the Hutu and the Tutsi. But it’s beyond that because personally I
don’t have a grudge on any Hutu, but I have a grudge on the past of this
country, the past that denied me the right to live in my country. So it
depends on what you feel is the barrier to reconciliation from any
perspective.
Several other government officials interviewed also downplayed or rejected the
Hutu/Tutsi dimension of reconciliation in their responses to the question of who.
2.3. One-Sided Framework of Reconciliation
As the statements of the two commentators stressed, reconciliation is a
challenge for all Rwandans, given that none of them are free from the legacy of
violent conflict. The importance of recognising the complexities of reconciliation
in Rwandan society cannot be overemphasised. It is certainly much broader and
more complex than relationship-building between the perpetrator and the
survivor of genocide or between Hutus and Tutsis. Also, in post-genocide
Rwanda, the question of who remains highly contentious in unity and
reconciliation efforts as much as in the justice-related efforts discussed in the
previous chapter. Addressing the issue of whose relationships need to be
14 Interview in Kigali, 12 Dec 2002.
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mended at the interpersonal or community levels would necessitate difficult and
painful interpersonal confrontations between former enemies or between
perpetrators and victims. It would also require all the parties involved to agree on
specific aspects of the past, those concerning the sufferings of not only one side
but both or all sides.
Despite the government’s slogan of ‘reconciliation for all Rwandans’, the
gacaca process and other community-level reconciliation initiatives promoted by
the government only look at the issues of reconciliation that arose out of the
genocide and other atrocities committed by the former Hutu regimes. Here we
can see a close parallel between the government’s efforts at post-genocide
justice and those of unity and reconciliation for the last 15 years. The previous
chapter highlighted the fact that issues of human rights abuses committed by the
RPF/RPA, the national army of the post-genocide government, are mostly
neglected in the government’s efforts at post-genocide justice. Similarly, such
issues are rarely mentioned as those relevant to national or community
reconciliation in official documents or addresses; when they are mentioned, it is
in the context of rejecting them as irrelevant or denouncing the people who
raised them.
There are two cases to illustrate this point. The first case concerns the
issue of remembering non-genocide victims who were killed by atrocities
committed by members of the RPF. One evaluation report of the NURC (2004b,
14) comments on ‘some people’ who ‘do not make any difference between
genocide and other crimes committed during the war in which […] civilians were
forcefully involved and killed’. The report declares that the present government is
‘determined to remember and to bury in dignity’ only the victims who were
brutally murdered in the atrocities committed by the previous governments, even
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though ‘this does not mean that whoever has lost his/her relative during the war
cannot bury him/her in dignity’ (ibid). The second case in point concerns the
issue of state compensation to so-called innocent prisoners of genocide, the
people who have been found innocent after prolonged detentions. Despite the
fact that these people did seriously suffer from their detentions without formal
charges for many years after the genocide, their suffering has never been
officially acknowledged as something which deserves a measure of reparation
such as financial compensation and public apology by the Rwandan state. When
asked about the government’s view on state compensation for innocent
Rwandans’ prolonged detentions, a high-level official of the National Service of
Gacaca Courts (NSGC) rejected even the possibility of considering it:
It’s really impossible. Since we don’t have compensation for victims [of
genocide], how can we give it to those people who are not victims? They
would have died in prison if gacaca had not taken place.15
The official’s reaction seems to show a negative attitude of the government
toward the issue of reparative measures, such as compensation and apology for
innocent genocide prisoners, and toward the possibility of commemoration for
so-called victims of the war. In post-genocide Rwanda, there are few people who
dare to raise these issues in public. This is because, as will be discussed in
detail shortly, making such a speech can be done only at the risk of criminal
prosecution, as it can be interpreted by government authorities as a speech to
spread ‘divisionism’ or ‘rudely minimise’ the genocide and the suffering of its
victims.
There is an apparent contradiction between the two kinds of reconciliation
promoted by the government for the different levels of society: the vision of
national reconciliation is essentially about the creation of an inclusive society for
15 Interview in Kigali, 20 Jan 2009.
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all Rwandans, while the kind of reconciliation implicit in the gacaca process
assumes a crude dichotomy between two sides divided by the genocidal
violence, those on the side of perpetrators and those on the side of victims. What
is presumed to be required for reconciliation in the latter situation is perpetrator
side’s acknowledgment of its wrongdoing, request for forgiveness, and provision
of reparations, with the victim’s side offering forgiveness in response. However,
issues of reconciliation which are of profound importance for those classified
under the perpetrator side, whatever crucial implications those issues may have
for reconciliation at the community and national levels, are totally obliterated in
the official discourse on national unity and reconciliation (e.g. reconciliation
between the victims of RPF crimes and those accountable for them or between
innocent genocide prisoners who were wrongly incarcerated and the Rwandan
state which is responsible for their situation). If we accept that the history of
ethno-political violence in Rwanda cannot be reduced to simply that of genocide
and that social relations in Rwanda are not simply those of victim versus
perpetrator, the slogan of ‘reconciliation for all Rwandans’ is no more than empty
rhetoric until the current framework applied to reconciliation is broadened in
scope and complexity.
3. Reconciliation and the Politics of National Identity Building
The government’s structure-oriented conception of national reconciliation
stresses national identity building as its central component. As suggested in this
chapter’s introduction, this strong emphasis on forging a national identity can be
seen as the government’s central response to the paramount problem of the
Hutu/Tutsi divide that is based on racialised ethnic identities. The following
sections will sketch out four interconnected themes underlying the government’s
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national identity building endeavour. In the view of the government, all four
themes are essential ingredients of its project to replace the ‘divisive’ ethnic
identities with a unified national identity for all Rwandans.
3.1. Instilling the Official Historical Narrative
The official historical narrative promoted by the Rwandan government has been
outlined by several authors, including Des Forges (1999), Eltringham and Van
Hoyweghen (2000), Pottier (2002), Eltringham (2004), Longman and
Rutagengwa (2004) and Hintjens (2008a, 2008b).16 The narrative is often
articulated in public addresses by President Kagame himself. In a 2005 speech
on the theme of national reconciliation, Kagame maintained:
The truth is that the Bahutu, Batutsi, and Batwa form one ethnic group – the
Banyarwanda, sharing the same language, culture, [and] history, and they
have always lived in the same geographical location. […] Although the
Bahutu, Batutsi, and Batwa entities existed, they were not primary identities
[…] In fact, the Rwandan identity reference was the clan first. Then,
depending on their social status and their proximity to the monarchy and
ruling clan, they could be identified as Bahutu, Batutsi, or Batwa. But the
Belgian colonial administration chose to create artificial divisions among
Rwandans that reflected their own bitter divisions in their country, and that
would obviously facilitate colonial exploitation and subjugation.
This particular portion of Kagame’s speech contains three key elements of the
official historical narrative: 1) there was unity among Rwandans in the
pre-colonial era who shared the same language, culture, history and territory; 2)
distinctions between the categories of people called Hutu, Tutsi and Twa were
not a primary identity for Rwandans; 3) it was White colonisers who created the
myth of ethnicity and imposed ‘artificial divisions’ on Rwandan society as part of
their divide and rule policy.
16 Also see The Unity of Rwandans (Rwanda 1999) for the official version of the Rwanda history
discussing pre-colonial unity among Rwandans.
340
The next portion of Kagame’s speech reveals other important elements of
the official historical narrative, asserting the link between the divisive colonial
legacy and the 1994 genocide:
Successive post-colonial governments politicised these Eurocentric
perceptions and ended up rupturing the social cohesion of the Rwandan
society. They promoted an ideology that entrenched differences, created
institutions that marginalized and discriminated against one section of
Rwandan society, the Batutsi, and rewarded injustices and human rights
abuses committed against them. […] So, from a divisive colonial legacy and
subsequent chronic bad governance, Rwanda was plunged in 1994 into a
genocide, which goes down in the annals of human history as the most
brutal, and the fastest.
Here, two particular conditions are blamed as responsible for the genocide: ‘a
divisive colonial legacy’ and ‘subsequent chronic bad governance’ of the
post-colonial governments, with the latter characterised by discrimination and
injustices against Tutsis. In this part of the speech, another key element of the
official historical narrative is also stressed: that is, in the history of Rwanda, there
is ‘a single, coherent and consistently victimized group’ (Eltringham and Van
Hoyweghen 2000, 226), identified in the President’s own words above as ‘the
Batutsi’. After the attacks against Tutsis in 1959, argues the official narrative,
‘almost in a regular manner, killings of the Batutsi became a habit’ (Official
website of the government of the Republic of Rwanda).17 The political upheaval
in 1959 is presented as the beginning of the Tutsi genocide. Based on this
particular reading of Rwandan history, the government asserts that, for the
pre-existing unity among Rwandans to be restored, it is imperative to inculcate
‘undistorted’ Rwandan history into the minds of Rwandans.
Longman and Rutagengwa (2004) maintain that while the official narrative
17 History section of the official website of the government of Rwanda <http://www.gov.rw/>,
accessed on 12 March 2009.
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is widely supported by a small but powerful minority of former Tutsi refugees who
have returned to Rwanda since the end of genocide, it is not in harmony with
how many other Rwandans understand Rwandan history. In the academic world,
most scholars support the government’s view that social categories of Hutu,
Tutsi and Twa were rigidified and racialised during the colonial period through
the divisive policies of the Belgian administration (Prunier 1995; Newbury 1988;
Taylor 1999; Newbury and Newbury 1999; Mamdani 2001; Eltringham 2004;
Vansina 2004; Straus 2006; Hintjens 2008a). However, most of these scholars
also reject the notion of pre-colonial harmony among Rwandans as it is
portrayed in the official narrative, pointing out the existence of pre-colonial ethnic
cleavages and even the use of ethnic differentiation by the Tutsi monarchy to
rule the population (Newbury 1988; Vansina 2004). Rwandan scholars living in
Rwanda generally support the view of the RPF regime (Shyaka 2005;
Byanafashe 1997 quoted in Longman and Rutagengwa 2004, 164-5).
Despite the contested nature of the official historical narrative, the
government has been promoting it as the only acceptable version of the
country’s history which must be taught to ‘re-educate’ the population and correct
‘their false perception of their national history’ (NURC 2003a, 26). NURC’s
programme of solidarity camps, or ingando, for demobilised soldiers, released
genocide prisoners, students, teachers and community-level leaders has been
instrumental in disseminating a simplistic and yet politically correct version of
Rwandan history as the basis of national unity and reconciliation (PRI 2004a;
Mgbako 2005).18 Although the government downplays unresolved divisions
18 Mgbako (2005, 218) quotes a former solidarity camp participant as saying:
At ingando, they taught us … the idea of ethnicity within Rwanda was a colonial concoction
…. The colonialists brought these ideas so that they could strengthen their politics….I
knew that we spoke the same language and had the same culture so I didn’t understand
when people spoke of different ethnic groups in Rwanda. What difference does it make if
you have a thin nose or a flat nose? …[A]fter ingando I identify only as Rwandan.
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along ethnic lines in Rwandan society, eliminating what it considers the myth of
ethnicity remains one of its key objectives in order to replace ‘divisive’ ethnic
identities created by colonisers with a single unifying identity of ubunyarwanda.
3.2. Establishing Good Governance
Good governance based on the rule of law is another key theme in the official
discourse on national unity and reconciliation, and as indicated earlier, it is also a
key component of the government’s structure-oriented conception of national
reconciliation. The importance of establishing good governance is part of the
government’s effort to address the root causes of the genocide: the divisive
colonial legacy and the bad governance of the post-colonial era. It is ‘bad
governance’ that ‘created conditions conducive to the rise of the premises of the
ideology of genocide’ such as ‘injustice, inequalities and identity-based violence,
etc’ (Rwanda 2006, 219). Hence, establishing good governance in
post-genocide Rwanda is a major objective of the present government, which
defines itself as a government fighting against genocide and for national unity
and reconciliation. The new Constitution adopted in the referendum of 26 May
2003 declares in its Preamble as well as in Article 9 that the state of Rwanda
commits itself to good governance based on the rule of law and pluralistic
democracy.
3.2.1. The Rule of Law
The government argues that the rule of law constitutes a fundamental principle
of its governance. At least two aspects of the rule of law are emphasised: the
separation of powers and the freedoms, rights and duties that are enshrined by
the law for all citizens of the country. Article 60 of the Constitution stipulates the
separation of three powers, namely the legislative, executive and judicial powers.
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The Article states: ‘The three branches are separate and independent from one
another but are all complementary’. Articles 10 to 51 stipulate fundamental
human rights (Articles 10 – 44)19 and ‘the rights and duties of the citizen’ (Articles
45 – 51).20 Throughout these Articles, the Constitution repeatedly emphasises
the fundamental ethos of new Rwandan society that all Rwandans are ‘free and
equal in rights and duties’ before the law (Articles 11 and 16). Accordingly, claims
a 2006 Parliamentary Report entitled Genocide Ideology and Strategies for Its
Eradication, the present government has taken a radical departure in its
governance from the previous governments which were characterised by the
negation of human rights to the extent of committing genocide against their own
citizens and by ‘the concentration of powers in the Executive in a truly dictatorial
context’ (Rwanda 2006, 222-3).
The Constitution states clearly that the individual’s rights and freedoms
stipulated in the above-mentioned Articles are protected by the judiciary ‘in
accordance with procedures determined by law’ (Article 44). In addition to the
judiciary that is defined as ‘the guardian of rights and freedoms of the public’
(ibid), the government has established two ‘independent’ national organs for
protecting and promoting human rights and for fighting against injustice,
corruption and other forms of power abuse. The first organ is the National
19 Rights listed include the right to life, the right to education, the right to physical and mental
integrity, the right to fight against arbitrary arrest and detention, the right to marriage between a
man and a woman based on free will, the right to move, the right to asylum, the right to private
property, freedom of thought, opinion, conscience and religion, freedom of the press, freedom of
speech, freedom of association and assembly, the right to free choice to employment, and
various rights guaranteed for workers.
20 Citizens’ rights and duties include the following: ‘the right to participate in the government’; ‘the
right of equal access to public service’; ‘the duty to relate to other persons without discrimination
and to maintain relations conducive to safeguarding, promoting and reinforcing mutual respect,
solidarity and tolerance’; ‘the duty to participate, through work, in the development of the country,
to safeguard peace, democracy, social justice and equality and to participate in the defence of
the motherland’; ‘the duty to respect the Constitution, other laws and regulations of the country’;
‘the right to defy orders received from his or her superior authority’ if the orders constitute
violations of human rights and public freedoms; the right to ‘a healthy and satisfying environment’
as well as ‘the duty to protect, safeguard and promote the environment’; and ‘the right to
activities that promote national culture’.
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Commission for Human Rights (NCHR). Established in March 1999,21 the
NCHR has been given a mandate to: raise human rights awareness of the
population; examine human rights violations committed by state institutions and
their officials; and investigate them and lodge complaints with competent courts
(Article 177 of the Constitution). The second special organ which concerns the
protection of citizens’ rights as well as the fight against injustices such as the
violations of those rights is the Office of the Ombudsman. The Office was
established in 2004 after its mandate of ‘preventing and fighting against injustice,
corruption and other related offences in public and private administration’ was
stipulated in the Constitution.
There are concerns over some aspects of these government measures to
champion the rule of law and human rights in post-genocide Rwanda. The first
set of concerns is about restrictions imposed on freedoms and rights in the name
of national unity. As indicated above, the new Constitution guarantees freedoms
as well as equality in rights and duties before the law. While guaranteeing the
freedoms of its citizens, the Constitution gives the state the role of determining
the scope of these freedoms according to the laws it adopts.22 Particularly
important to our discussion here are restrictions imposed in the name of national
unity or the fight against divisions. In Article 33, a statement which guarantees
freedoms of thought, conscience, religion and more is conditioned by another
21 Law N˚ 04/99 of 12/03/1999
22 See the statements attached to the Articles on some fundamental freedoms guaranteed by
the Constitution:
・ ‘Freedom of thought, opinion, conscience, religion, worship and the public manifestation
thereof is guaranteed by the State in accordance with conditions determined by law.’
(Article 33)
・ ‘Freedom of the press and freedom of information are recognized and guaranteed by the
State. […] The conditions for exercising such freedoms are determined by law’ (Article
34)
・ ‘Freedom of associations is guaranteed and shall not require prior authorization. Such
freedom shall be exercised under conditions determined by law’. (Article 35)
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statement which stipulates that propagation of ethnic, regional or racial
discrimination, or any other form of division, is punishable by law. The
government considers it imperative to strictly control types of freedom (e.g.
freedom of speech, freedom of press, etc.) which can be abused to fuel conflict
and divide the population, based on the country’s experiences of the early 1990s
which culminated in the genocide (Rwanda 2006, 232). This is certainly a
legitimate concern from the viewpoint of preventing the recurrence of violent
conflict. However, as will be discussed in detail shortly, the problem is that what
constitutes ‘division’ or ‘discrimination’ is left ill-defined in relevant laws and thus
open to arbitrary interpretation by authorities.
The second set of concerns is about the reality of separation of powers as
well as the independence of ‘independent national institutions’ such as the
NCHR and the National Electoral Commission (NEC). There are signs
suggesting that the executive power enjoys supremacy over both the legislative
and judicial powers, thereby undermining separation of powers in Rwanda (IRDP
2005, 55-64). The executive power vested in the President of the Republic and
the Cabinet has supremacy over the legislative power vested in the Parliament
by the lack of full autonomy of the NEC from the executive power (59). Thus the
executive power influences the structure of the Parliament despite the fact that
the Parliament has the mandate to oversee executive action (Article 62 of the
Constitution). Moreover, with regard to deliberation and passing laws, there is a
concern that the Parliament has more or less been content with its
predominantly passive role of ‘approv[ing] the bills prepared by the executive
power’ (IRDP 2005, 61),23 even though the parliamentary committees ‘have
bugun to question ministers and other executive branch officers more
23 IRDP (2005, 60) points out that ‘[o]f all the laws adopted by the members of Parliament from
1994 up to 2003, the members of Parliament have never suggested any’.
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energetically’ in recent years (Freedom House 2009).
The executive power also maintains a grip on the structure of the judiciary
by exercising significant influence over the appointment process for the
President, Vice-President, and magistrates of the Supreme Court.24
Furthermore, the government interference with the judicial system has been
discussed repeatedly by human rights bodies (AI 2004; HRW 2005; HRW
2008a). Human Rights Watch, in its 2008 report on Rwanda’s progress in judicial
reform, described many cases which illustrate that ‘the judiciary remains largely
subordinate to the executive branch and even to elite unofficial actors who enjoy
both economic and partisan political power’ (2008a, 44).
The NCHR, although it is an organ which is in theory independent from the
government, is accused by critics of being ‘essentially government-steered’,
incapable of operating ‘independently’ (Reyntjens and Vandeginste 2005, 121)
and even of being ‘compliant, going along with the strategy of criminalizing
Kagame’s political opponents’ (Hintjens 2008a, 19). For example, in December
2002, the government did not reappoint the NCHR’s first president, a
‘well-respected human rights defender’ who had led a human rights NGO in
Belgium, because the commission’s 2002 report ‘had been too critical of some
government officials and military officers’ (Front Line 2005, 36). After a new
president was appointed in 2003, the NCHR became less critical about human
rights records of government organs but increasingly vocal in denouncing
political opposition and some civil society actors as those inciting ‘divisionism’.
3.2.2. Consensual Democracy
As mentioned above, the state of Rwanda upholds multi-party democracy as one
24 It is the President of the Republic who proposes the names of candidates for the positions of
Supreme Court President, Vice-President and other magistrates who are then elected by the
Senate (Articles 147 and 148).
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of its fundamental principles, as articulated in the 2003 Constitution (Preamble,
Articles 9 and 52). The 2006 Parliamentary Report proclaims, ‘Democracy is the
only political system where good governance is possible and is implemented’
(Rwanda 2006, 226). The Constitution guarantees the involvement of Rwandan
citizens in the election of their legislative and executive leaders. With regard to
legislative leaders, 53 out of 80 members of the Chamber of Deputies, or lower
house, are elected by popular vote, while 24 women are elected by
representatives of local governments and women’s organisations, and three
members are elected by youth and disability organisations (Articles 76 and 77).
All of them serve five-year terms. The Senate, or lower house, consists of 26
members for an eight-year term, 12 of whom are elected by local councils, eight
appointed by the President, four chosen by a forum of political organisations and
two chosen by universities (Article 82). With regard to executive leaders, the
President of the Republic is elected by popular vote for a seven-year term
(eligible for a second term), while ‘[t]he members of the Cabinet are selected
from political organizations on the basis of their seats in the Chamber of
Deputies’ although competent non-politicians may be appointed to positions in
the Cabinet (Articles 100, 101, 116). ‘All of these provisions’, claims the
government, ‘are perfectly in line with the promotion of political representation in
compliance with the requirements of democracy’ (Rwanda 2006, 228).
Kagame (2005) has stated clearly that the form of democracy which
Rwanda must embrace is different from what he has called ‘[t]he winner-takes-all
kind of Western democracy’. Western democracy, he has said, ‘was not judged
to be an appropriate model in our situation where all facets of our society need to
have a stake in governance, and certainly not in the wake of a bitter and violent
conflict’. Accordingly, the government maintains that the political system it
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champions under the post-genocide Constitution is underpinned by its
determination ‘to avoid, as much as possible, monopolisation of power by one
political organisation’ and ‘to associate other political forces in the management
of the country’ (Rwanda 2006, 228). This government’s vision of ‘consensual
democracy’ is demonstrated in several provisions in the Constitution; for
example, one provision prohibits any single political party from occupying more
than half of the existing positions in the Cabinet (Article 116), and another
requires all the political organisations officially recognised in the country to
‘organize themselves in a consultative forum’ (Article 56), currently chaired by
the RPF Secretary General.25 Furthermore, the Constitution stresses that
political organisations must not ‘destabilise national unity’ for them to be allowed
to operate in the country (Article 52).
Given the legacy of violent power struggle between political parties on the
eve of independence and during the crisis in the early 1990s, the government’s
concern that excessive political competition could lead to violent conflict is
legitimate. However, excessive emphasis on notions such as consensus, unity
and harmony can serve as a good excuse for those in power to impose
restrictions on activities of other political parties and even on freedoms of speech
and association. The European Union’s observer mission for the 26 May 2003
referendum on the new Constitution expressed concern that ‘the restrictions in
the constitution…limit the freedoms of expression and association, as well as
party political activities’ and that ‘the restrictions of the activities of parties on the
ground have frozen the political game and reinforced the position of the RPF’
(quoted in Reyntjens 2004, 185). The avoidance of competition between political
25 The forum is expected to be responsible for: 1) ‘facilitating exchange of ideas by political
organizations on major issues facing the country’; 2) ‘consolidating national unity’; 3) ‘advising on
national policy’; 4) ‘acting as mediators in conflicts arising between political organizations’; and 5)
‘assisting in resolving internal conflicts within a political organization upon request by that
organization’ (Article 56).
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parties in the name of national unity seems to have helped the ruling RPF
consolidate and perpetuate its dominance over Rwandan politics.
3.3. Fighting against ‘Divisionism’ and ‘Genocide Ideology’
The government has taken a range of measures to eradicate various forms of
discrimination, ‘divisions’ and what it calls ‘genocide ideology’ from Rwandan soil.
One of the first actions the post-genocide transitional government officially took
was to remove ethnic identity as well as region of origin from people’s identity
cards so that this information is ‘no longer used as a tool for allowing special
favours or discrimination’ (NURC 2002a, 13). The infamous quota system for
education according to ethnic identity and region was also abolished so that
admission to schools is now determined solely based on the merits of pupils (11).
Since 2002, the government has introduced several pieces of legislation to
criminalise speeches and acts that are deemed to promote discrimination,
‘divisionism’ and ‘genocide ideology’.
3.3.1. Laws on Divisionism and Genocide Ideology
In December 2001, Rwanda adopted a law for punishing any speech or action
interpreted as promoting discrimination or sectarianism (now called
‘divisionism’).26 Under this law, persons found guilty of ‘sectarianism’ are liable
to a maximum five years imprisonment and to the loss of their civil rights, while
associations, political parties or NGOs condemned for the same charge may be
either suspended and fined or dissolved. Ndangiza, NURC’s Executive
Secretary, explained the purpose of the anti-discrimination law as part of the
government’s effort at attaining equality, unity and reconciliation among
Rwandans:
26 Law N˚ 47/2001 of 18/12/2001
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There shouldn’t be any form of discrimination. Recently, we’ve advocated
for the enactment of [a] law on discrimination because […] as much as we
educate people about reconciliation and unity, it’s important to have a law in
place so that perpetrators of discrimination can be punished.27
During the interview in December 2002, Ndangiza suggested that then
upcoming 2003 elections were clearly in sight as the background to the
government’s adoption of this law. She said that the law would play a vital role in
suppressing any political force that promotes ‘divisionism’. ‘Nobody should come
up with an ideology that divides people. […] We will tell the people, “Look, if you
promote any form of discrimination, this law will punish you!”’.
In the 2003 Constitution, ‘fighting the ideology of genocide and all its
manifestations’ and ‘eradication of ethnic, regional and other divisions and
promotion of national unity’ are stated as the first two of six ‘fundamental
principles’ guiding the state of Rwanda (Article 9). Accordingly, the Constitution
stipulates that ‘revisionism’, ‘negationism’ and ‘trivialisation of genocide’ as well
as ‘propagation of ethnic, regional, racial discrimination or any other forms of
division’ are punishable by law (Articles 13 and 33). A law promulgated in
November 2003 regarding ‘repressing the crime of genocide, crimes against
humanity and war crimes’28 stipulates that persons convicted of having publicly
‘negated the genocide committed, rudely minimised it or attempted to justify or
approve its grounds’ or for having ‘hidden or destroyed its evidence’ are liable to
imprisonment for 10 to 20 years (Article 4).
While fighting against discrimination and acts or speeches that incite others
to genocide is a commendable effort, there is also a serious downside to the
measures the government has adopted toward that goal. One major problem is
that because ill-defined terms such as ‘divisionism’ and ‘genocide ideology’ are
27 Interview in Kigali, 12 Dec 2002
28 Law N˚ 33 bis/2003 of 06/09/2003
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open to various interpretations, related charges can be and actually have been
used by the ruling RPF party to disqualify political opponents, eliminate internal
dissidents and suppress criticisms against its actions and policies (Reyntjens
2004; Zorbas 2004; HRW 2008a).
The term ‘sectarianism’ (now replaced by ‘divisionism’) is defined vaguely in
the 2001 anti-discrimination law as ‘the use of any speech, written statement of
action that divides people, that is likely to spark conflicts among people, or that
causes an uprising which might degenerate into strife among people based on
discrimination’ (Article 1). The term ‘genocide ideology’ has been a part of
everyday language in Rwanda for several years; in public meetings and in the
media, government officials and politicians as well as clergy have been
denouncing various actions as manifestations of ‘genocide ideology’ (HRW
2008a). Its legal definition was finally promulgated in October 2008 with the
publication of the law on ‘the punishment of the crime of genocide ideology’.29 In
Article 3 of this law, characteristics of the crime of genocide ideology are
described as follows:
The crime of genocide ideology is characterized in any behaviour
manifested by facts aimed at dehumanizing a person or a group of persons
with the same characteristics in the following manner:
1. threatening, intimidating, degrading through defamatory speeches,
documents or actions which aim at propounding wickedness or
inciting to hatred;
2. marginalising, laughing at one’s misfortune, defaming, mocking,
boasting, despising, degrading, creating confusion aiming at
negating the genocide which occurred, stirring up ill feelings,
taking revenge, altering testimony or evidence for the genocide
which occurred;
3. killing, planning to kill or attempting to kill someone for purposes of
29 N˚ 18/2008 of 23/06/2008. The law was adopted by the parliament in June 2008 and
promulgated in October 2008 through its publication in the Official Gazette of the Republic of
Rwanda.
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furthering genocide ideology.
Rwandan authorities are reported to be expecting this law to serve a similar
function as that of laws prohibiting Holocaust denial elsewhere in the world.
However, according to Human Rights Watch (2008a, 42), ‘it is written in far
broader terms than even laws banning incitement to racial hatred, and can cover
a very wide range of speech that is unquestionably protected by international
convention’. Consequently, the human rights body warns, ‘the public faces the
very real danger that any political criticism of the government will be construed
as fomenting genocide’ (HRW 2009b).
3.3.2. The Crusade against Divisionism and Genocide Ideology
In the past several years, allegations of ‘divisionism’ or ‘genocide ideology’ have
been directed at political opponents, human rights activists and journalists who
have criticised policies or conduct of the regime.30 The first major allegation of
‘divisionism’ was directed at Pasteur Bizimungu, a prominent Hutu member of
the RPF and President of Rwanda from 1994 to 2000, as well as his allies after
the launch of the opposition party PDR-Ubuyanja in 2001 (ICG 2002). The party
was banned and at least 25 of its leaders and supporters, including Bizimungu,
were arrested and accused of promoting divisions among Rwandans,
undermining national security, and engaging in unlawful political activities (12,
30-1).31 In June 2004, after nearly one and a half years in detention, Bizimungu
was tried and condemned to a fifteen-year prison sentence for ‘embezzling state
funds, disseminating literature to incite public violence and forming a militia
30 See ICG 2002; HRW 2003, 2004, 2008a; AI 2005; Reyntjens 2004; Front Line 2005; Waldorf
2007; Hintjens 2008a.
31 International Crisis Group (2002, 31) commented in its November 2002 report that:
[…] the real problem lies in the issue of electoral competition. The PDR is recruiting as
many Hutus as Tutsis and its leader, who served the RPF leaders for years, is also
capable of building an extended support base among Hutus. Thus, he would have been
a serious challenge running against Paul Kagame in the upcoming presidential
elections.
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group that threatened state security’ (IRIN 2004).32 His associates were also
condemned to lengthy prison sentences.
The crusade against ‘divisionism’ and ‘genocide ideology’ was intensified
during the period leading up to the 2003 presidential and parliamentary elections.
In March 2003, a parliamentary commission urged the government to abolish the
Mouvement Démocratique Républicain (MDR) in its report condemning the
political party, then largely seen as the only contender strong enough to
challenge the RPF dominance in the upcoming election. The report claimed
MDR was promoting ‘genocide ideology’ and creating divisions in Rwandan
society (HRW 2003, 4-7). Specific charges of ‘genocide ideology’ made against
leaders and supporters of the MDR included minimising the genocide, claiming
that the RPF atrocities also constituted a genocide, and opposing compensation
to genocide survivors as well as dignified reburials of bodies of genocide victims
(6). Furthermore, in the same report, the parliamentary commission accused the
MDR of opposing government programmes such as administrative
decentralisation, genocide trials through gacaca courts, and instalment of the
Local Defence Force (a local militia organised by the government). These
accusations created an impression that criticising or simply not supporting
government policies would constitute ‘divisionism’ (ibid).
This particular wave of the anti-divisionism/genocide ideology campaign in
2003 included not only the dismantling of the MDR but also a number of arrests,
‘disappearances’ and flights of supporters before the elections. The ban on the
MDR forced former Prime Minister Faustin Twagiramungu, the only serious
opposition contender to challenge Kagame’s presidency, to stand as an
independent candidate. During his severely restricted election campaign with ‘no
32 Bizimungu was released from jail in April 2008 after receiving a presidential pardon three
years into his sentence (FH 2007b).
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airtime, no money, and no posters’ (Prunier 2009, 295), Twagiramungu was
repeatedly accused by government leaders and organs, including the NURC and
the NCHR, of ‘promoting ethnic divisions and denying the genocide’ despite the
fact that he was among those Hutu politicians who were targeted during the
genocide (Front Line 2005, 16). During the campaign of parliamentary election
that same year, the accusation of ‘divisionism’ was also made against the Liberal
Party, the party whose political constituency is largely from genocide survivors,
for ‘focusing on survivors’ concerns’ (17).
In the middle of the 2003 election period, Uvin (2003b, 1) issued the
following statement that was directed to the international donor community in
Rwanda:
As predicted, what Rwanda is currently going through is not a process of
democratization as much as a formal election painted on top of an
increasingly totalitarian state. The closing off of all political space, the
maintenance of a climate of fear, the intimidations and disappearances of
potentially critical voices, the banning of the sole opposition party with some
possible popular grounding, the attacks on key civil society organizations
and the further muzzling of the press – all point to the undeniable fact that
there is, in 2003, no free choice in Rwanda. As a matter of fact, this year of
so-called democratization has seen an actual reduction in political space.
The EU election observer mission stated in its final report that ‘[t]he accusations
of separatism and divisionism, grave accusations within the Rwandan context,
had a tendency to be utilized as an argument to limit political opponent’s
freedom of speech during the electoral campaigns’ (quoted in Front Line 2005,
18). Consequently, the end of the transition period was marked by an outright
electoral victory of incumbent President Kagame, with 95 percent of the vote,
and a renewed domination of the RPF over parliamentary seats. Reyntjens
(2004, 186) commented as follows:
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The RPF and a few small parties on its ticket gained about 74 percent of the
vote, while the Social Democratic Party (PSD) won about 12 percent and
the Liberal Party (PL) about 10 percent. As the latter two supported the
RPF’s candidate at the presidential poll, all the elected candidates form part
of one and the same alliance. In addition, most of the MPs indirectly elected
by organizations of women, youth and the disabled are members or
sympathizers of the RPF. Rwanda has thus returned to a situation of de
facto one-party rule.
After the internal political opposition was crushed, a broad array of civil
society organisations found themselves to be major targets at which allegations
of ‘divisionism’ and ‘genocide ideology’ were directed in the following years. In its
June 2004 report, another parliamentary commission created for investigating
killings of genocide survivors and other cases of ‘genocide ideology’ reported
hundreds of cases of violence, threats and harassment against genocide
survivors. The report called not only for measures to suppress these abhorrent
violations against genocide survivors but also for the dissolution of five civil
society organisations and the arrest of their leaders. The organisations included
LIPRODHOR (Ligue pour la Promotion et la Défense des Droits de l’Homme),
which was known as the only independent Rwandan human rights organisation
(Front Line 2005, 21). With little or no verification, the report also made
sweeping accusations of ‘sowing division within the Rwandan population’
against some international NGOs (INGOs) that were known for promoting
rights-based development in collaboration with their local partners (21, 84-90).33
Consequently, the work of these local and international NGOs was severely
curtailed. LIPRODHOR lost not only its staff who went into exile after being
33 The organisations named were CARE, TRÓCAIRE, 11.11.11 and Norwegian People’s Aid.
See Front Line (2005, 84-90) for descriptions of these INGOs. One of the allegations levelled
against these INGOs reads:
These organisations give financing (or aid) based on a criterion of ethnic divisionism but
also they are characterized by collaboration with small groups … of Rwandans who fight
the programme of unity and reconciliation for Rwandans [and] who decide that other
associations cannot receive financing from these [international] NGOs.
(quoted in Front Line 2005, 84).
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named in the report but also its independence as its leadership was replaced by
persons ‘reportedly hand-picked by the government’ (50). The INGOs named in
the report were forced to halt or substantially reduce their rights-based
development programmes, and some of the local associations named in the
report were dissolved, suspended or forced to curtail their activities (41-3, 57-66).
The commission also charged a wide range of Christian churches, journalists
running an independent newspaper (Umuseso), and international radio stations
(BBC, Voice of America, Radio France Internationale) with either harbouring or
spreading ‘genocide ideology’.34
The crusade against ‘genocide ideology’ continued in 2008, the year of
parliamentary and local government elections, this time focusing on related
allegations in schools. A parliamentary commission established for investigating
‘genocide ideology’ in Rwanda’s education sector reported in December 2007
that it had observed ‘genocide ideology’ in 84 of the 637 schools in Rwanda (FH
2008a). Specific manifestations of ‘genocide ideology’ the commission identified
included the circulation of anonymous letters denigrating or threatening Tutsi
students or inciting violence against them and the preparation of lists of Tutsi
students to be killed. In the face of sweeping criticism for its leaving the
‘genocide ideology’ unchecked in Rwandan schools, the Ministry of Education
was compelled to take stringent measures to uproot it.35 In January, following
the release of the report, dozens of teachers were fired for ‘conveying genocide
ideology’ to their students (FH 2008b). The ministry announced that student
34 Bishops of the Catholic Church in Rwanda, the largest Christian denomination in the country,
issued a public response to the parliamentary commission’s report. In the response, the Bishops
described the report as a ‘hastily prepared’ one which ‘could serve as a pretext to spread
rumours, [and] pre-judge people’ and insisted that ‘No one has the right to attribute to another
person, identified by name, a genocidal ideology without having certain and irrefutable
proof’’(quoted in Front Line 2005, 27).
35 The New Times, the newspaper affiliated with the government, reported that ‘lawmakers, at
one time, insinuated that Mujawamariya [the Minister of Education] could herself be harbouring
genocide ideology’ because of her inaction in response to the accusations (NT 2007b).
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behaviours would be monitored daily by school committees (Mukombozi 2008)
and that the 2008 law on ‘the punishment of the crime of genocide ideology’
would be taught in all the schools (FH 2008b). During the period of annual
genocide commemoration in April 2008, all primary and secondary school
teachers across the country were enrolled in solidarity camps to receive training
in fighting against ‘genocide ideology’.
The crusade against ‘divisionism’ and ‘genocide ideology’ in recent years
has created an atmosphere of fear in Rwandan society as ‘[r]umors abound that
the current government is encouraging Rwandans to turn in their neighbours and
their colleagues who might be seen as harboring such ideology’ (Freedman, et al.
2008, 665). Today, Rwandans know that publicly making the assertion of a social
identity other than the officially sanctioned ubunyarwanda identity (e.g. tied to
religious, ethnic, or other characteristics) will risk an accusation of at the least
not putting ‘Rwandan citizenship first’, or at the worst embracing ‘genocide
ideology’. Making a reference to terms such as Hutu, Tutsi and Twa in public is
not tolerated by government authorities unless doing it serves officially
sanctioned purposes such as dismissing them as divisive forms of identities,
‘deny[ing] their salience’ (Hintjens 2008a, 12), or emphasising Tutsis’ victimhood
in post-colonial Rwanda in accordance with the official historical narrative
discussed above. Individuals who openly disagree with or criticise what the
government says or does under the banner of unity and reconciliation – for
example, genocide commemoration events, the gacaca process of justice and
reconciliation or monthly community work called umuganda – find themselves a
target of public censure for embracing ‘divisionism’ or ‘genocide ideology’, which
may result in criminal prosecution.36
36 During a 2008 official genocide commemoration ceremony in the town of Nyamata, the
district’s vice-mayor claimed in her speech that the government was well aware that the
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3.4. Remembering the Violent Past of Rwanda
Violent events in Rwanda’s recent past are still fresh in people’s memories. The
starkly conflicting narratives of victimhood identified in this study -- the narratives
advanced by Tutsi genocide survivors and those presented by Hutus who
identify themselves as collective victims of RPF atrocities -- suggest that people
remember the same violent periods differently according to their varied
experiences with regard to each of the violent events. Memories give a sense of
meaning to people’s lives and shape their individual and collective identities;
however, peoples’ identities determine, to a significant extent, things to be
stressed and things to be obscured or obliterated in their memories. Given this
intimate link between memory and identity, it is not at all surprising to see the
Rwandan government making a range of strenuous efforts to direct the ways in
which the Rwandan people remember the past.
3.4.1. Efforts to Remember the Genocide
The government’s effort to shape the collective memory of Rwanda’s violent past
focuses on the 1994 genocide. As already discussed, the history of tragic
political violence in Rwanda cannot be reduced to the genocide, nor can the
narratives of victims in Rwanda’s violent past be reduced to those of genocide
victims. Thus, the content of official remembrance is a highly contentious issue
in Rwanda. The government justifies the focus on the genocide and its victims in
official remembrances with multiple lines of argument. First, even though
different individuals and groups may have different memories of the nation’s
genocide ideology was embraced by some sections of the local population. To substantiate the
claim, she gave an example of local people who refused to provide free labour for exhuming
corpses of genocide victims based on the information identified by the local gacaca court
(Author’s personal observation during the ceremony).
It is quite possible for people to show uncooperative behaviour in response to a government’s
instruction to work without payment, even if their opposition has nothing to do with genocide
ideology. However, such behaviour in Rwanda can bring accusations of demonstrating that
ideology.
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violent past, there must be a single ‘official remembrance’ structured for the sake
of national unity and reconciliation. In the process of producing a ‘harmonised’
official remembrance of the past, ‘the diversity of memories is sacrificed on the
altar of national reconciliation’ (Rwanda 2006, 197). Second, such an official
remembrance organised by the Rwandan state must be centred on the genocide
and its victims to avoid the trivialisation of genocide, remembering that genocide
is not just a crime against its victims but also against the whole of humanity (201).
In short, the Rwandan government effectively claims that for the people of
Rwanda to be reconciled, there must be a single ‘unified’ way of remembering
the nation’s violent past that aligns with the official narrative centred on ‘the
history of genocide against Tutsis’.
The RPF-led transitional government formed in July 1994 soon began to
‘perpetuate remembrance’ of the genocide (214). In 1995, an investigative team
was formed to make an inventory of the sites of genocidal massacres around the
country. Thousands of the sites identified through the investigation have been
preserved as memorial sites (215). Some of the sites, including church buildings
in which killings took place, were left with human remains as a ‘memory marker’
of the horrendous acts perpetrated there and at many other places in the country
during the 100 days of genocide (Smith and Rittner 2004, 182). Whether the
remains of victims should be left exposed at the memorial sites so that nobody
can deny what happened there or should rather be buried in a dignified manner
has been a controversial issue, with little agreement even among genocide
survivors (ibid). Several associations of genocide survivors reportedly spoke
against the government’s policy of displaying the remains of their families, with
opposition based on religious and cultural grounds (Rombouts 2004). Many of
the sites still display skulls, bones or corpses of victims ‘as material proof’ of the
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horrendous crimes that were committed during the genocide.
The national mourning week has been instrumental in shaping the
collective memory of the Rwandan population. The week of 7-13 April is officially
designated for commemorating the genocide and its victims as well as for
showing solidarity with survivors in mourning. During the week, various
commemorative events are organised at different administrative levels
throughout the country, and national television and radio broadcasts feature
special programmes on the genocide. At the national level, one genocide
memorial site is chosen for each year’s commemoration ceremony, which is led
by the President and attended by high ranking government leaders and
dignitaries representing religious institutions, embassies and international
organisations. The ceremony, which is broadcast on national television and radio,
is marked by official addresses of the President and other national leaders, such
as one from the Rwandan Defence Forces, and testimonies of genocide
survivors in addition to a burial of victims’ bodies that have been exhumed from
massacre sites in surrounding areas. It seems that annual genocide
commemorations fulfil multiple objectives for the government: articulating the
need for strong national unity based on a Rwandan identity cutting across
various social divisions; acknowledging the suffering of victims and comforting
survivors; confirming the imperative of bringing perpetrators to justice;
reasserting the legitimacy of the RPF government as the force which halted the
genocide; and reminding various parties constituting the international community
of their guilt for inaction or complicity in the genocide.
The creation of the National Commission for the Fight Against Genocide
(NCFG) is considered by the government as a major achievement with regard to
remembrance (Rwanda 2006, 214). Four years after its general mandate was
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stipulated in the 2003 Constitution (Article 179), the commission was established
by law in 2007. Responsibilities given to the commission include those directly
related to the remembrance of the genocide: establish a national research and
documentation centre on genocide; organise activities to commemorate the
1994 genocide; and develop and put in place strategies for fighting against
genocide and its ideology as well as any attempt to distort, deny or trivialise the
1994 genocide (Article 4).37 As indicated in these specific responsibilities, the
government seems determined to continue sanctioning how the genocide is
remembered by present and future generations. The previous chapter
mentioned that as the gacaca process is approaching completion, the
government is preparing for a special archive of the information generated
through gacaca trials. This is another government’s effort at preserving the
memories of the genocide.
3.4.2. Competing Conceptions of Genocide
As indicated above, the government’s focus on the genocide and its victims in
the official remembrance of Rwanda’s past is evident. However, exactly what is
to be remembered with regard to the genocide has been far less clear in the
government’s discourse. During the fieldwork in 2002, there was a significant
degree of confusion among Rwandan people as to what criminal acts constituted
the genocide. Are they primarily the killings of Tutsis – the prime target of the
Hutu extremists’ plan for extermination? Or do they include the killings of Hutus
or Twas who also fell at the hands of génocidaires? The observed confusion
about the scope of criminal acts constituting the genocide can be partly
attributed to the fact that the use of ethnic labels has been avoided in the official
37 Law Nº 09/2007 of 16/02/2007
362
political discourse of post-genocide Rwanda, apart from the specific contexts
discussed earlier.
To investigate the scope of criminal acts accepted in the government’s
discourse on genocide, research for this study examined both the Kinyarwanda
and the English versions of the post-genocide legal documents in which the term
‘genocide’ appears. Table 4 shows that how a Kinyarwanda term used to refer to
‘genocide’ has changed over the years. Careful review of these documents
yielded important insights about competing conceptions of genocide and the
politics behind the Rwandan terminology of genocide.
Table 4 Changes in the term referring to genocide in Kinyarwanda texts of
post-genocide legal documents in Rwanda
No. No. and date of
promulgation
Title of the law Term used to refer
to ‘genocide’ in
Kinyarwanda text
of the law
1 08/96 of
30/08/1996
Organic law on the organization of
prosecutions for offences constituting the
crime of genocide or crimes against
humanity committed since 1 October 1990
itsembabwoko
n’itsembatsemba
2 02/98 of
22/01/1998
Law establishing a national assistance fund
for needy victims of genocide and
massacres committed in Rwanda between
October 1, 1990 and December 31, 1994
same as above
3 40/2000 of
26/01/2001
Organic law setting up “GACACA
Jurisdictions” and organizing prosecutions
for offences constituting the crime of
genocide or crimes against humanity
committed between October 1, 1990 and
December 31, 1994
same as above
4 33/2001 of
22/06/2001
Organic law modifying and completing
Organic law n°40/2000 of 26/01/2001 (the
3rd law in this table)
same as above
5 26/2001 of
10/12/2001
Presidential order relating to the substitution
of the penalty of imprisonment for
community service
same as above
6 The Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda,
adopted in the Referendum of 26 May 2003
Jenoside
7 33 bis/2003 of
06/09/2003
Law repressing the crime of genocide,
crimes against humanity and war crimes
same as above
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8 16/2004 of
19/06/2004
Organic law establishing the organisation,
competence and functioning of Gacaca
Courts charged with prosecuting and trying
the perpetrators of the crime of genocide
and other crimes against humanity
committed between October 1, 1990 and
December 31, 1994
same as above
9 10/01 of
07/03/2005
Presidential order determining the
modalities of implementation of community
service as alternative penalty to
imprisonment
same as above
10 50/01 of
16/10/2005
Presidential order modifying and
complementing Presidential Order n° 10/01
of 07/03/2005 determining the modalities for
the implementation of community service as
alternative penalty to imprisonment
same as above
11 09/2007 of
16/02/2007
Law on the attributions, organisation and
functioning of the National Commission for
the Fight Against Genocide
same as above
12 10/2007 of
01/03/200
Organic law modifying and complementing
Organic law n°16/2004 of 19/06/2004 (the
8th law in this table)
same as above
13 13/2008 of
19/05/2008
Organic law modifying and complementing
Organic law n°16/2004 of 19/06/2004 (the
8th law in this table) for the second time
same as above
14 18/2008 of
23/06/2008
Law relating to the punishment of the crime
of genocide ideology
same as above
15 Amendment of 13/08/2008 of the
Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda of 4
June 2003 as amended to date
jenoside yakorewe
Abatutsi
16 56/2008 of
10/09/2008
Law governing memorial sites and
cemeteries of victims of the genocide
against the Tutsi in Rwanda
same as above
17 69/2008 of
30/12/2008
Law relating to the establishment of the
Fund for the support and assistance to the
survivors of the Tutsi genocide and other
crimes against humanity committed
between 1 October 1990 and 31 December
1994, and determining its organisation,
powers and functioning
same as above
Source: produced by the author based on the legal documents reviewed for this study.
Full titles of the documents are provided in the bibliography.
In the 1996 Genocide Law (the first law in the above list), the government
adopted one Kinyarwanda phrase to signify the horrendous acts of violence
during the 1994 genocide: itsembabwoko n’itsembatsemba, which was
translated either as a single word, ‘genocide’, or as a phrase, ‘genocide and
massacres’. The term itsembabwoko n’itsembatsemba is in fact a phrase
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composed of two separate words, itsembabwoko and itsembatsemba, linked by
a conjunction na (and). As discussed in Chapter 5, the compound word of
itsemba (wiping out or decimating) and ubwoko (a group or category) or
itsembabwoko literally means ‘to decimate an ethnic group’. This specific
Kinyarwanda notion is in fact in accordance with the notion of genocide adopted
by the Genocide Convention – the acts of violence ‘committed with intent to
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such’
– which remains the internationally accepted legal definition today.38 On the
other hand, as an emphatic form of itsemba, the term itsembatsemba conveys
the meaning of ‘massacres carried out repeatedly’ or ‘extensive massacres’.
Interpreted in relation to Rwanda’s recent past, the former is a specific term
referring to a Tutsi genocide (itsemba-Batutsi) while the latter refers to
‘massacres’ carried out in conjunction with that genocide to kill so-called ‘Hutu
moderates’ who opposed it.
In spite of these official Kinyarwanda terms referring to the genocidal
violence, there have been different ways of referring to what happened in the
country in 1994. Longman and Rutagengwa (2004) reported, based on their
research conducted in 2001 - 2002, clear divisions along ethnic lines in the ways
their respondents explained the genocide. Observations were that most Tutsi
respondents, especially Tutsi survivors, referred to itsembabwoko, a phrase
used by Hutus only secondarily, while Hutu respondents ‘were most likely to
refer to intambara, the war, ubwicanyi, the killings, or more vaguely ibyabaye,
the happenings, or amahano, horror or tragedy’ (170). Hutu respondents also
used the term itsembatsemba to imply massacres of Hutus, although Tutsis,
38 While the definition adopted in the Genocide Convention remains the internationally accepted
legal definition, there are complex debates about various definitions of genocide and exactly
which crimes of mass violence in history qualify as genocide (Schabas 2000; Alvarez 2001).
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whether genocide survivors or repatriated refugees, rarely mentioned it.
In all of the early legislation and presidential orders of post-genocide
Rwanda reviewed for this study – specifically, items 1) to 5) listed above - these
two Kinyarwanda words are consistently used in combination, itsembabwoko
n’itsembatsemba. This particular way of using the terms demonstrates an
important aspect of the official discourse on the Rwandan genocide in the early
years after 1994: itsembabwoko (genocide) of Tutsi and itsembatsemba
(massacres) of Hutu dissidents are presented as closely interconnected crimes,
constituting the crime of genocide that was carefully planned and executed by
the extremist faction of the former regime. In fact, the crimes were inseparable
because it was impossible for perpetrators to carry out the former without the
latter. According to this comprehensive conception of the Rwandan genocide,
the killings of Tutsis and those of Hutus dissidents are equally prosecutable as
genocide-related crimes.
The government’s use of the phrase itsembabwoko n’itsembatsemba for
several years following the 1994 genocide, however, does not mean that the two
distinct yet closely interconnected kinds of violence recognised in it have carried
the same weight in the official discourse on the genocide. For example, different
categories of victims have been acknowledged in different ways in the public
addresses of government personnel. One thing noted in personal observations
is that the concept of itsembatsemba/massacres of Hutu dissidents (and the
existence of their victims) was rarely pronounced by itself; rather, when used, it
was mentioned in association with the former term (itsembabwoko). In contrast,
the notion of narrowly defined genocide, itsembabwoko, was often articulated by
government leaders, such as when they objected to the ICTR’s attempt to seek
accountability for war crimes committed by the RPF and when they justified the
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government’s special focus on genocide-related crimes committed by the former
regime. As ‘the gravest and the greatest of the crimes against humanity’
(Destexhe 1995, 75-6), the notion of narrowly defined genocide was and still is
emphasised (even though the Kinyarwanda word itsembabwoko is not used
anymore) in the official discourse as a means to fight any criticism of the RPF
government for its limited efforts to prosecute and punish human rights violations
committed by its own members.
These Kinyarwanda words of genocide, however, ceased to be mentioned
in any official document or address after they were officially replaced by a single
term, jenoside, in the new Constitution adopted in 2003. In fact, all of the
post-2003 legal documents reviewed for this study – specifically, items 6) to 14)
listed above – consistently use the term jenoside in their Kinyarwanda versions.
Additionally, in recent years the government has been placing a de facto ban on
the use of itsembabwoko n’itsembatsemba, on the basis that it does not properly
represent the concept of genocide as defined in the Genocide Convention. For
example, the official instruction issued by the Ministry of Youth, Culture and
Sport for genocide commemoration activities of April 2007 included among its
ten specific instructions to ensure that jenoside was used rather than
itsembabwoko n’itsembatsemba.39 When some individuals participating in 2006
and 2007 commemoration meetings organised by one NGO used itsembabwoko
n’itsembatsemba or itsembabwoko in public, they were corrected by other
participants to use jenoside.40 By the commemoration period of 2008, public
uses of the term itsembabwoko n’itsembatsemba were rare to nonexistent,
suggesting that by this time most Rwandans were aware of the government’s
instruction on this matter. Interestingly, however, during the same period in 2008,
39 The document on file with author.
40 Observation notes on file with author.
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BBC Kinyarwanda service was still using itsembabwoko n’itsembatsemba as the
term referring to the mass violence of 1994.41 This suggests that the BBC
Kinyarwanda service, broadcast from London for Rwandan listeners, was
beyond the reach of the Rwandan government’s censorship at that time.42
The political ramifications of this shift in the Kinyarwanda terminology of
genocide are important. The shift seems to signify the government’s increasing
intent to stress the narrow conception of genocide in its discourse on the mass
atrocities of 1994. In this particular conception, the Rwandan genocide was one
committed with a single objective of exterminating the country’s Tutsi minority.
Since 2008, the annual commemoration of the genocide has been officially
described as that of ‘the genocide against the Tutsi’ or ‘jenoside yakorewe
Abatutsi.43 An amendment made to the Constitution in August 2008 (item 15 on
the above list) replaced ‘genocide’/‘jenoside’ in the original text of the
Constitution with ‘genocide against the Tutsi’/‘jenoside yakorewe Abatutsi’
throughout the amended text of the Constitution. All of the laws and decrees
adopted since that time (including items 16 and 17 on the above list) use this
particular phrase when they refer to the 1994 genocide. The media in Rwanda
also uses this language, with the exception of the BBC Kinyarwanda broadcast
mentioned above.44
Stressing the notion of Tutsi genocide in the official description of the 1994
genocide seems to have two critical implications for official remembrance of
Rwanda’s violent past and for justice and reconciliation processes in
post-genocide Rwanda. First, this emphasis obscures the fact that tens of
thousands of Hutus and Twas were also victimized at the hands of the same
41 Notes on file with author.
42 The following section (3.4.3.) reports a more recent incident in which the Rwandan
government pressurised the BBC to change its editorial line in the Kinyarwanda programme.
43 This can be confirmed, for example, on the official website of the NCFG.
44 Confirmed on 6 April 2009.
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genocidal forces. This deletion risks not only obscuring the victimhood of these
Rwandans but also neglecting their families’ desire to commemorate their loved
ones in public. Second, focusing exclusively on the Tutsis killed in the genocide
evokes the sense of collective Hutu guilt discussed in Chapter 5. In the current
Rwandan context where over one million Hutus have been prosecuted (with
probably a majority of those convicted) for genocide-related crimes, singling out
the victimhood of Tutsis in the description of the 1994 genocide as ‘the genocide
against the Tutsi’ cannot help but reinforce the dichotomy between Tutsis as
victims and Hutus as perpetrators.
There seem to be at least three possible explanations for this shift in the
terminology and description of the genocide, which is highly significant but which
goes largely unnoticed by external observers. First, the government probably
came to see a danger that the comprehensive notion of itsembabwoko
n’itsembatsemba could cause a real problem in its pursuit of post-genocide
justice. For example, several grassroots informants in 2002 interviews described
itsembabwoko and itsembatsemba as ‘massacres of Tutsis’ and ‘massacres of
Hutus’ respectively, which suggests that many of them understood the distinction
between the two notions in ethnic terms, rather than the distinction between the
acts of violence which are qualified as genocide in its strict sense and the acts
which are not. For the government, this particular interpretation of the
terminology could have been a cause for serious concern. Interpreted in ethnic
terms, the notion of itsembatsemba could be, and seems to have been, used to
invoke the sense within the Hutu population that not only massacres of Hutu
dissidents by the genocidal forces but also RPF atrocities against Hutus could
be accounted for through gacaca justice.
Second, the shift seems to make sense when it is seen in the context of
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increased ‘Tutsization’ of political power in post-genocide Rwanda (Mamdani
2001, 271; Reyntjens 2004, 187-90). This term refers to the growing
concentration of power in the hands of a small number of Tutsis, particularly
those who repatriated from Uganda. When the transitional government was
formed after the military victory of the RPF, there was a great deal of power
sharing among the opposition groups to the former genocidal regime. These
were the parties who had signed the 1993 Arusha Peace Accords, most
prominently the RPF and the MDR, a party with a broad Hutu constituency led by
Twagiramungu, who became the first Prime Minister of the post-genocide
transitional government (Reyntjens 2004, 178). Official posts of the transitional
government were divided among these coalition partners. However, the spirit of
power-sharing rapidly died down as those considered by the RPF leadership to
be ‘threats’ were eliminated from positions of power. In August 1995, Prime
Minister Twagiramungu, Interior Minister Seth Sendashonga (‘one of the rare
RPF Hutu’), and Justice Minister Alphonse Nkubito resigned (180).
Twagiramungu, Sendashonga, and many others including ‘government ministers,
senior judges, high-ranking civil servants, diplomats, army officers, journalists,
leaders of civil society and even players in the national soccer team’ went into
exile. Once they were outside Rwanda, these individuals accused the RPF
regime of ‘concentration and abuse of power, outrages by the army and
intelligence services, massive violations of human rights, insecurity and
intimidation, [and] discrimination against the Hutu and even against Tutsi
genocide survivors‘ (ibid).
In early 2000, other prominent politicians resigned, including Prime Minister
Pierre Célestin Rwigema, a member of the MDR who replaced Twagiramungu,
and President Bizimungu, another Hutu member of the RPF (180-1). As
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discussed earlier, Bizimungu was later arrested after making an announcement
of his plan to launch a new party. Then, on the eve of the 2003 presidential and
parliamentary elections, the MDR was banned, based on the allegation of
spreading ‘divisionism’, which some observers considered the RPF’s plot to
eliminate a potential threat to its outright victory in the upcoming elections (HRW
2003, 6; Reyntjens 2004, 184-5; Prunier 2009, 295).45 As described earlier, the
RPF won an overwhelming majority with its presidential and parliamentary
candidates.
In this context, with the increased marginalisation of Hutu elites from the
political landscape of post-genocide Rwanda, it is not difficult to imagine that the
call for justice with regard to massacres of ‘moderate Hutus’ diminished over the
years. After all, many of those Hutus killed at the hands of genocide perpetrators
were former colleagues, friends or relatives of the Hutu members of the coalition
government who had once had at least some say in the government’s policy
making process.46 However, political space for these Hutus who could possibly
represent the voice of Hutu ‘survivors’ of the mass violence in 1994 had been
closed off by the spring of 2003 with the abolition of the MDR through the
crusade against ‘divisionism’.
Third, the shift can be seen as part of an apparent RPF strategy to
instrumentalise the genocide in order to legitimise the consolidation of Tutsi
power (Lemarchand 2008, 72 citing Vidal 2001). As discussed above, singling
45 Reyntjens (2004, 184) explains the politics behind the ban on the MDR as follows:
[W]ith the constitutional referendum and the presidential and parliamentary elections in
view, the regime crossed the Rubicon in the spring of 2003 and ceased attempting to hide
its authoritarian drift. Despite its total physical and psychological control over the political
landscape, its hold on the instruments of local, provincial and national management, and
its constitutional engineering, the RPF did not appear confident and set out to close off the
last political spaces of dissent.
46 The 1996 Genocide Law was promulgated in the name of then-President Pasteur Bizimungu,
the representative of the Transitional National Assembly, with then-Prime Minister Pierre Célestin
Rwigema as a co-signatory.
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out the victimhood of the country’s Tutsi minority in the description of the 1994
can serve the purpose of augmenting the sense of collective guilt among the
country’s Hutu majority. This can, in turn, be instrumental in suppressing both the
allegations concerning RPF/A atrocities against Hutus and the expression of
growing discontent with the current regime.
For the RPF regime, stifling the allegations about its past crimes through
the instrumentalisation of genocide seems to have become an important political
imperative with its survival at stake, not least because the regime has come
under increasing attack for its alleged war crimes in recent years. In November
2006, a French judge issued international arrest warrants for nine leading
members of the RPF on accusations of complicity in the downing of
Habyarimana’s plane on 6 April 1994 through which all of those on board,
including the French crew, were killed (HRW 2008, 92). He also requested that
the ICTR issue a warrant for President Kagame’s arrest (AI 2007). In February
2008, a Spanish judge indicted 40 senior members of the RPF for alleged mass
killings of Hutu civilians in Rwanda and refugee camps in Congo as well as the
murder of seven Spanish citizens in one of the refugee camps (BBC 2008). The
Rwandan government responded to these judicial challenges by breaking off its
diplomatic relations with France and urging the international community to
disregard the arrest warrants. It also called for sanctions against the French and
Spanish judges for ‘spread[ing] false information on [the] Tutsi genocide in
Rwanda’ (FH 2008d).
Whatever motive is behind its decision to change the way the Rwandan
genocide is represented, the RPF regime now seems to be less concerned with
the problem of marginalising non-Tutsi victims and is rather reinforcing the
perception of collective Hutu guilt, even though such policies are detrimental to
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the process of national and community level reconciliation.
3.4.3. Selectivity in Remembrance and the Moral Hierarchy of Victimhood
The question of who are and are not genocide victims or survivors remains
deeply controversial in post-genocide Rwandan society (Rombouts and
Vandeginste 2005). A study conducted by the parliament in May 2005 confirmed
widespread confusion over the issue, finding that 62.9 percent of the total 1,636
survey respondents identified not only Tutsis but also those Hutus who were
killed because they were ‘opposed to divisive ideology’ as victims of the
genocide, whereas 31.9 percent of them said only Tutsis were entitled to the
status of genocide victims (Rwanda 2006, 198).
Even though there is no legally binding official definition of a genocide
victim in Rwanda, the following definition used in a 2002 Ministry for Local
Government and Social Affairs (MINALOC)47 study counting the victims of the
genocide seems to indicate an important aspect of the government’s position on
the issue. A final report of the study defines genocide victims as ‘all persons
which have been killed in the period between 10/1/1990 and 12/31/1994
because they are Tutsi or they can be associated by lineage with a Tutsi, or they
are friends with a Tutsi or have a particular affinity with one, or they exhibit
political thoughts and/or belong to a political party contrary to the ideology of the
divisionist politics before 1994’ (Rwanda 2002, 15, italics by this author).48 The
2006 Parliamentary Report on genocide ideology states that the same definition
is applied to the official remembrance of the genocide (Rwanda 2006, 197).49
47 The ministry is currently called the Ministry of Local Government, Good Governance,
Community Development and Social Affairs.
48 The report states that this definition is adopted from one stipulated in ‘the law number 8/96’.
Although the report seems to refer to the Organic Law N° 8/96 of 30 August 1996 on ‘the
organization of prosecutions for offences constituting the crime of genocide or crimes against
humanity committed since 1 October 1990’, there is no definition of genocide victim in the law.
49 This report refers to the same Organic Law N° 8/96 of 30 August 1996 as the source of the
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Thus, the official remembrance of the genocide concerns, at least in theory, not
only Tutsi victims of genocide in a strict sense of the term as the destruction of a
particular group but also victims with other identities (Hutu and Twa) who were
killed because of their association with Tutsis or because they opposed the
extremists’ project of exterminating Tutsis.
The examination of the related legal documents as well as the two study
reports mentioned above suggests that the RPF-led post-genocide government,
at least in its early years, sought to strike a balance between two important
concerns. The first of its concerns was to avoid ‘lumping together’ Tutsi victims of
itsembabwoko, or genocide in a strict sense of the term as the destruction of a
specific group of people, and non-Tutsi victims of itsembatsemba, or massacres
committed against those considered as dissidents. It was important to separate
the types of violence because, according to the government’s claim, ‘[c]onfusion
on remembrance would lead to the negation or trivialisation of genocide’ (200).
The second concern was to not exclude the latter category of victims, in order to
counteract a perception widely held among the Hutu population that the
government calling itself ‘the Government of National Unity’ only cared about the
victimhood of Tutsis. In fact, even though it is a widely held perception in
Rwanda, such a sweeping claim that there is no acknowledgement of non-Tutsi
victims in official remembrance of the genocide is incorrect.50 The
definition.
50 For example, Vidal stated:
The commemoration explicitly deny the status of victim to those Hutu who, even though
they did not kill, were massacred so as to create a climate of terror. How can one speak of
reconciliation when the exposure of skeletons has as its only purpose to remind the Tutsi
that their own people were killed by Hutu? This is tantamount to keeping the latter in a
permanent position of culpability. (Vidal 2001 quoted in Lemarchand 2008, 72)
Another incorrect statement, which is seen even within scholarly circles, is that the term ‘survivor’
is applied only to Tutsis in Rwanda (Mamdani 2001, 267). There is a widespread perception that
the identification of survivor is limited to Tutsis who were in the country at the time of genocide
and that the victimhood of many non-Tutsi ‘survivors’ of genocidal violence is not recognised in
post-genocide Rwanda. However, as clearly indicated in Chapter 4, there are people recognised
as genocide survivors even though they are not Tutsi (e.g. Hutu widows of Tutsis killed, children
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above-mentioned Parliamentary Report declares: ‘Certainly, during the genocide,
the victims were not only Tutsi but also Hutus who were against the divisive
ideology […] Those who died because of their opposition to that ideology are
indeed victims of genocide’ (Rwanda 2006, 197). In recent years, the
government has made its recognition of ’moderate Hutus’ massacred during the
genocide more visible than before through holding official ceremonies for the
politicians killed during the genocide, most notably the Hutu Prime Minister of the
time, Agathe Uwilingiyimana (FH 2007a, 2008c).
That said, however, the examination in Section 3.4.2 of how the 1994
genocide has been presented in the official discourse revealed ‘an implied moral
hierarchy’ (Pottier 2002, 126) between different categories of genocide victims:
victims who were killed because of their Tutsi identity (‘those killed because of
who they were’) are given a greater moral significance than those who were
killed because of their political views and/or actions. Moreover, with regard to the
categories of victims who were killed outside the scope of the genocide before,
during and after that time period, the government clearly rejects the possibility of
official remembrance on the grounds that the present Rwandan state is only
responsible for commemorating the victims of the crimes committed by the state,
not by other parties, and that expanding the scope of official remembrance would
‘lead to the negation or trivialisation of genocide’ (Rwanda 2006, 200). According
to this government policy, then, the victimhood of those who were killed outside
the scope of genocide (e.g. victims of RPF crimes) has even less significance
than the second category of genocide victims with non-Tutsi identities. As
Rombouts and Vandeginste (2005, 339) report, ‘[v]ictims of RPF crimes
experience that they are ranked completely at the bottom of the ladder’ because
of mixed parentage with Hutu husband – Tutsi wife union, etc).
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their victimhood receives no recognition, and even worse, ‘it is deliberately
refused on many occasions’.
The controversy surrounding the hierarchy of victimhood is not usually
discussed in public. However, it has recently surfaced in a highly volatile way. On
25 April 2009, the BBC’s Kinyarwanda service broadcast the programme ‘Imvo
n’Imvano’ (‘The Source of a Problem’) on the theme of forgiveness in
post-genocide Rwanda. It included a telephone interview with former Prime
Minister Twagiramungu, now residing in Belgium, who criticised ‘the
government’s attempt to have the country’s entire Hutu population apologize for
the genocide, since not all Hutu people had killed Tutsi or otherwise participated
in the genocide’ (HRW 2009c). The programme also aired another highly
controversial comment by a Rwandan of mixed-ethnic background living in the
country. The man, after claiming that the bodies of Rwandans which were found
floating in the waters of Lake Victoria during the genocide were those of Hutu
victims killed by the RPF forces, questioned why the government had prohibited
their relatives from mourning for their loved ones (HRW 2009c; RSF 2009).51
In response, the government imposed a temporary ban on the BBC’s
Kinyarwanda service, despite the fact that Rwanda was preparing to host a
regional symposium celebrating ‘World Press Freedom Day’ the following week
(Karuhanga 2009). The government reportedly accused the BBC of airing
‘blatant denial of the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi of Rwanda’ in its
programme, thereby demonstrating ‘total disregard for Rwanda’s unity and
reconciliation efforts’ (ibid). Two months later, the government finally lifted the
ban, with Information Minister Louise Mushikiwabo stating that the BBC had
agreed to make changes on its editorial line in compliance with the government’s
51 Content of the programme was cross-checked with Alexis, the research assistant who had
listened to it. Phone conversation with Alexis, 27 April 2009.
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demand that it never again commit genocide denial in its programmes
(Ndikubwayezu 2009).
4. Conclusion
This chapter reviewed a range of unity and reconciliation efforts of the RPF-led
government over the last 15 years. The review revealed fundamental
contradictions within the government’s efforts at reconciliation and national
identity building, which largely emanate from the one-sided framework applied to
the process of reconciliation. In this one-sided vision of reconciliation, issues
which are of profound importance for those classified under the perpetrator’s
side are ignored as the complex history of political violence and social relations
in Rwanda is often reduced to genocide and victim versus perpetrator. Thus,
when based on this simplistic and distorted version of history, efforts such as
‘reconciliatory’ gacaca justice and official remembrance of the genocide are at
odds with the government’s stated goal of unifying and reconciling Rwandans as
one nation.
Although the reviewed unity and reconciliation efforts are all considered by
the government as essential elements for replacing divisive, racialised ethnic
identities with a single unified Rwandan identity, they suffer from serious tension
within themselves, rooted in the same problem of one-sidedness. Most of the
efforts reviewed are generally geared to stress commonalities of Rwandans as
members of one nation. The official historical narrative puts a strong emphasis
on the historical, social and cultural heritage shared by Rwandans which cuts
across ethnic lines. The efforts at establishing good governance as well as
eradicating discrimination and ‘divisionism’ are essentially for building social and
political institutions which guarantee equal rights, freedoms and access to
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opportunities and resources for all Rwandans without any discrimination. Thus,
this set of efforts constitutes a strategy for forging a strong sense of Rwandan
citizenship. However, this government’s strategy is severely counteracted by
another set of efforts which essentially divide Rwandans into different categories
according to their experience with the country’s violent past.
As noted above, the government’s focus on the genocide and its emphasis
on the primacy of Tutsis’ victimhood are clearly observed in its efforts to shape
the collective memory of Rwandans, particularly in its efforts to sanction the
ways the genocide is commemorated. In order to avoid the trivialisation of
genocide and the suffering of its victims, it is important to make distinctions
between victims of genocide who were killed because of their Tutsi identity
(victims of genocide in a strict sense of the term as the destruction of a particular
group in whole or in part) on the one hand and victims of massacres who were
killed because of their political views and/or actions as the genocide was
committed. However, the moral hierarchy of victimhood attached to the current
distinctions is not conducive, to say the least, to the efforts to forge an inclusive
national identity cutting across ethnic fault lines; rather, this hierarchy sharply
contradicts the notion of common Rwandan-ness the government has been
trying to inculcate in the collective consciousness of the Rwandan people. The
problem is worsened because many perceive that the hierarchy is structured
simply along ethnic lines, although, as repeatedly highlighted in this thesis, the
reality is much more complicated than that.
The government’s increasing emphasis on the primacy of Tutsis’ victimhood
in its presentation of the 1994 genocide has now created a situation very close to
the one mentioned above as an incorrect description of reality. In other words,
unknown numbers of non-Tutsi victims of the more comprehensively defined
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genocide are severely marginalised, if not completely ignored, in the public
discourse, and ‘survivors’ of related crimes as well as their families are
effectively silenced in the process of pursuing justice and reconciliation. The
increased marginalisation of these citizens could have enormous negative
impact on the whole project of national identity building, for it may provide
sections of the Rwandan population still subscribing to the essentialist view of
ethnicity yet another reason to reinforce that view.
Intensive fieldwork for this study in 2002 and ongoing experience as an
NGO peace worker in Rwanda for the last four years have confirmed that
Rwandans whose narratives are marginalised or silenced in the official
discourse still have a strong desire to share their painful experiences with others,
with the hope that somebody will acknowledge their sufferings too. Telling one’s
own story is indeed a fundamental need for the victim of violence. As discussed
in the previous chapter, in the early years of gacaca’s development, many hoped
that the ‘participatory’ gacaca process would finally give them such an
opportunity to tell their own stories. However, that hope has been completely
shattered for those whose narratives are not in conformity with the official one.
Instead of facilitating the emergence of a space for openly debating and then
reconciling conflicting narratives in Rwandan society, the RPF regime chose the
path of imposing its own narrative on the entire population and criminalising by
law those who openly contest that narrative. Preserving the genocide as ‘the
defining moment of Rwandan history’ and presenting itself as the guardian
against possible genocide (Hintjens 2008a, 32), the regime seems determined to
carry on the battle to ‘remove from the soil of Rwanda any trace of conditions
that could possibly lead to a repeat of the genocide’ (Mamdani 2001, 271).
Unfortunately, past records of Rwanda’s fight against ‘divisionism’ and
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‘genocide ideology’ examined above show that it has been intermingled with the
RPF’s political manoeuvres to consolidate its power. Mamdani (2001, 271)
suggests that these two agendas are essentially inseparable in the minds of the
Tutsi-dominated RPF leadership who, in his analysis, are firmly convinced that
concentration of power in the hands of Tutsis is ‘the precondition of the Tutsi
survival’ and that for this reason, ‘the pursuit of power with impunity’ is morally
justified. The RPF leadership are exposed to a great temptation to use what
Reyntjens calls ‘genocide credit’ (2004, 199) whenever it is deemed useful for
achieving their political objectives. In fact, this credit has proven to be a very
effective means of not only silencing or eliminating dissidents inside Rwanda but
also curtailing criticism from outside observers with regard to the regime’s poor
human rights record and authoritarian governance (Reyntjens 2004, 199-200;
Hintjens 2008, 89; Lemarchand 2008, 73).
This picture may seem overly daunting and pessimistic. But if a public
expression of one’s sense of victimhood is perceived as creating divisions or
trivialising or even negating the genocide, acts constituting a criminal offence in
today’s Rwanda, it will be extremely difficult for Rwandans with varied
experiences to reconcile their conflicting narratives of victimhood and to
reformulate their social identities into ones that celebrate differences yet also
celebrate their unity as Rwandans.
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PART IV
SYNTHESIS AND CONCLUSION
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CHAPTER NINE
LESSONS FROM RWANDA’s EXPERIENCE
1. Introduction
This thesis makes a modest contribution to the clarification of the complex
relationship between justice and reconciliation in societies which are deeply
divided by the legacy of collective political violence. Each of the terms
encapsulates a variety of meanings and complex processes, making it difficult
for scholars and practitioners alike to attain a terminological consensus. As
Bloomfield (2006, 4) puts it, ‘the absence of any agreed use of the vocabulary’ is
still apparent today not only among scholars but also among government and
non-government actors who are concerned with post-violence peacebuilding. In
addition, there are actual political differences here, as illustrated through the
case study of Rwanda. What lessons can we draw from Rwanda’s experience in
its quest for justice and reconciliation examined in the case study?
This chapter first synthesises the main case study findings presented in the
four preceding chapters (Chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8). Then, the final sections of the
chapter present lessons from Rwanda’s experience, mainly with regard to
conceptual understandings of post-violence justice and reconciliation.
2. Justice and Reconciliation Challenge in Rwanda
The case study adopted a bottom-up approach, first explaining the challenge at
the grassroots level, and then moving to the analysis of related government
policies and efforts. After presenting key findings of the grassroots study in two
rural communities, Chapter 5 examined the sense of victimhood held by
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grassroots informants who had varied experiences of the genocide and other
types of political violence. This examination revealed a complex web of
individuals and families with a profound sense of victimhood that resulted from
the complex local history of political violence. They were sharply divided into two
identity groups over the question of who can legitimately lay claim to victimhood:
genocide survivors (Tutsis as well as Hutus with mixed ethnic background)
versus Hutu residents who considered themselves as collective victims of RPF/A
atrocities. Both groups appeared to perceive the history of political violence in
ethnic terms as attributable to the historically hostile relationships between ‘the
Hutu’ and ‘the Tutsi’, two internally homogeneous and yet mutually exclusive
corporate groups. These findings indicated that this problematic, dichotomous
construction of Rwandan society based on an essentialist, racialised view of
ethnicity was profoundly internalised by different sections of the local population
at the time of fieldwork in 2002. Chapter 6 explored the grassroots conceptions
of justice and reconciliation based on the analysis of the views expressed during
the fieldwork and also examined the divide along the same ethno-political lines
over their sharply conflicting views on what constituted the past wrongs and
whose needs of justice and reconciliation should be considered. However, they
shared basic conceptions of justice and reconciliation by identifying both
retribution and reparation as important ingredients in the process towards
restoration of relationships damaged by past wrongs.
The second part of the case study reviewed a range of major justice and
reconciliation efforts by the Rwandan government. Chapter 7 focused on the
shift from a punitive to a reconciliatory approach to post-genocide justice with a
particular focus on the evolution of gacaca-based reconciliatory justice. While
confirming the unique restorative and reconciliatory potential of the gacaca
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system, Chapter 7 also discussed the huge discrepancy between gacaca-based
reconciliatory justice in theory and in practice. The chapter demonstrated that an
overall one-sided framework of post-genocide justice is a primary factor in
thwarting gacaca’s reconciliatory potential. Chapter 8 examined four categories
of the government’s unity and reconciliation efforts focusing on the overarching
theme of national identity building. This is the government’s primary response to
the paramount challenge of dismantling the racialised and politicised ethnic
identities that it considers the root cause of the Rwandan genocide. However,
the examination of the conceptual underpinnings of these efforts and the political
dynamics surrounding them revealed fundamental tensions within the
government’s endeavour to forge an inclusive national identity cutting across
various social divisions, including those along ethnic lines.
The following is a synthesis of the main case study findings:
2.1. An Innovative Approach Grounded in Rwandan Conceptions
The government’s gacaca-based reconciliatory justice endeavour has involved
Rwandans in every hill across the country since its nationwide phase was
launched in January 2005. In this sense, it is a national-level process of justice
and reconciliation. However, this thesis discusses it primarily as an effort to
advance reconciliation at the level of the local community whose members
became deeply divided by the genocidal violence in 1994. As the discussion in
Chapter 7 has clearly indicated, the gacaca system created by the Rwandan
government is designed to seek a ‘thick’ form of reconciliation that is akin to a
relationship-oriented reconciliation with an emphasis on notions such as
repentance and forgiveness (Chapter 2). As discussed, under the gacaca
system, offenders are urged to confess and repent their wrongdoing and ask for
forgiveness from victims, their community and the nation of Rwanda in public in
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exchange for significantly reduced sentences. Victims, on the other hand, are
expected to ‘forgive’ the offenders (at least many of them feel that way) by
accepting willingly or reluctantly the reduction of punishment imposed on their
victimizers and their return to the community sooner or later. Accordingly, the
gacaca system seeks, at least in theory, the restoration of intra-communal
relationships between members of the same community who were divided into
the victim group and the offender group by the 1994 genocide, and this inevitably
involves emotional encounters between the two groups.
Chapter 7 highlighted the remarkably restorative features of the gacaca
system, even though some of those features have never been fully put in force.
In theory, the gacaca-based reconciliatory justice approach is effective in
realising the restoration of social relationships damaged by the genocidal
violence as it addresses not only retributive but also reparative and restorative
needs of the people and the community involved. It should be stressed, though,
that the gacaca system retains retributive punishment of offenders as its primary
function. Thus, it is a comprehensive approach to post-violence transitional
justice which addresses not only retributive but also restorative dimensions of
rectificatory justice.
One main argument in this thesis is that there is remarkable congruence
between the conception of justice underlying the gacaca system (Chapter 7) and
the grassroots conception of justice identified in this study (Chapter 6),
particularly in terms of two important dimensions of psychology of justice –
‘justice as what’ or distributive justice and ‘justice as how’ or procedural justice.
With regard to ‘justice as what’, both sets of conceptions understand justice in a
broad term as a process towards the outcomes of retribution, reparation and
restoration as defined in Chapter 3. With regard to ‘justice as how’, both of them
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give much emphasis to informal, community-based procedures in which ordinary
people play critical roles in deliberative processes to administer justice. It can be
said therefore, with regard to the what and how dimensions of justice, that the
government’s approach to transitional justice is grounded in the people’s
conceptions of justice and its relation to reconciliation. We may also appreciate
the Rwandan gacaca approach as an innovative both/and model of transitional
justice based on an integrated response to the needs of retribution, reparation
and restoration, thereby seeking to transcend tensions between justice and
reconciliation which may be deeply felt in the aftermath of violence.
2.2. A Pragmatic Structure-Oriented Approach to National Reconciliation
Unlike gacaca’s conception of reconciliation as the healing of relationships
damaged by genocidal violence, the conception underlying the unity and
reconciliation efforts at the national level focuses on the building of structures
and institutions required for maintaining durable peace after violent conflicts. The
assumption underlying this structure-oriented reconciliation is that, as Chapman
(2002, 5) puts it, it is possible ‘to develop a strong sense of national identity, the
affirmation of times based on a common citizenship, and/or a shared
commitment to the legitimacy of political institutions’ without transforming former
enemies into friends.
The unity and reconciliation efforts examined in Chapter 8 focus on the
overarching theme of forging an inclusive national identity cutting across various
divisions created in decades of ethno-political violence. Most of the
government’s efforts reviewed in the chapter are generally geared to stress
commonalities shared by Rwandans. The efforts to instil the official historical
narrative are centred on the notion of Rwandan-ness and a common historical,
social and cultural heritage shared by Banyarwanda, the people of Rwanda. The
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efforts to establish good governance based on the rule of law are essentially
about the building of the foundation of an inclusive society in which all citizens
are treated equally and fairly based on their rights and duties given by the state.
The efforts to fight against discrimination, ‘divisionism’ and ‘genocide ideology’
are based on the determination to prevent any individual or organised group
from dividing the people of Rwanda. In short, these efforts constitute a strategy
for forging a strong sense of Rwandan citizenship and enhancing people’s
loyalty to the state of Rwanda.
As noted in Chapter 8, this government’s structure-oriented approach can
be seen as a pragmatic approach to national reconciliation, particularly in the
aftermath of mass violence such as genocide. When memories of brutal killings,
tortures and rapes are still fresh, many people are likely to find it unbearable to
confront relational (interpersonal or inter-group) aspects of reconciliation in
specific terms. Under such difficult circumstances, it seems commendable to
stress commonalities shared by members of the society and put forth a
forward-looking, structure-oriented vision of national reconciliation. It can be
necessary, at least for some time, to obscure possibly divisive relational aspects
of reconciliation in public discourse. In the light of these theoretical and
contextual understandings about the challenge of reconciliation faced by the
Rwandan people, the government’s approach examined above is arguably a
pragmatic approach to post-genocide reconciliation.
2.3. Constraints on the Rwanda’s Quest for Justice and Reconciliation
Despite the positive characteristics highlighted above, the Rwandan
government’s efforts at justice and reconciliation have serious limitations. In this
section, let us recap this thesis’s main arguments about constraints imposed
upon Rwanda’s quest for justice and reconciliation.
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2.3.1. The Gap between Theory and Practice of Reconciliatory Justice
Gacaca-based reconciliatory justice in theory provides the people with valuable
time and space for telling their own narratives truthfully, listening to those of
others attentively, and having shared conversations and debates over what
happened in the past, reconciling their conflicting narratives. In theory, numerous
gacaca hearings create an environment on the hills across Rwanda that are
conducive to the ‘localized integrative shaming’ necessary for prompting
atonement and acknowledgment by those carrying different degrees of
responsibility for past atrocities. In theory, reparative measures embedded in the
gacaca system (i.e. apologies and material reparations by offenders and
state-funded compensation) respond to the profound reparative needs of victims
and in turn, help their recovery from the damage caused by the genocide.
The government claims that its gacaca endeavour has already achieved its
threefold-goal of truth, justice and reconciliation more or less according to the
theory above, even though no study has established gacaca’s reconciliatory
impact on Rwandan society. Although establishing its long-term impact is
certainly beyond the scope of this study, the body of evidence presented in
Chapter 7 strongly suggests that the government’s gacaca endeavour has not
realised much of its unique restorative potential. The chapter highlighted four
major sets of evidence which support this argument.
First, the gacaca process in reality has failed to draw active public
participation which was considered a critical condition for its success. While
there were a number of reasons for the lack of active participation, Chapter 7
demonstrated that many Rwandans who did not identify themselves as victims
of the former genocidal regime opted for minimum involvement in gacaca
proceedings.
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Second, problematic tendencies have been observed in those offenders
who opted for the Confession and Guilty Plea Procedure to get their sentences
dramatically reduced, including: the tendency to ascribe much of the blame to
other offenders; the tendency to self-incriminate by those who have already
been under long-term detention with the expectation of seeing an immediate
release with no additional punishment; and the tendency among well-known
offenders to take the guilt of others on themselves in exchange for financial or
social reward. Incidences related to these problematic tendencies among
confessed perpetrators seem to have led many genocide survivors to become
suspicious about the truthfulness of confessions and apologies made during or
outside the gacaca proceedings.
Third, the Community Service programme so far has been detached from
its originally intended objectives of reintegrating genocide offenders and
promoting reconciliation at the community level. Despite its great potential to
provide offenders with the opportunity to engage in concrete acts of reparation
for individuals and families they harmed during the genocide, as it stands now,
there is no indication that the government is seriously searching for creative
ways of implementing Community Service to fully tap its restorative potential.
Fourth, there is an increasing disillusionment with the failed promises of
compensation among genocide survivors. As discussed, the government seems
to have abandoned the idea of establishing the state-sponsored Compensation
Fund which was once considered to be a key restorative element of the gacaca
system. Furthermore, the community of genocide survivors has been frustrated
by the lack of enforcement of reparation orders issued by gacaca courts.
These sets of evidence show us that there is a significant discrepancy
between gacaca-based reconciliatory justice in theory and in practice. What it
389
has actually achieved in reality does not appear to match what it was supposed
to achieve in theory in terms of its reparative and restorative objectives
discussed above.
2.3.2. The One-Sided Framework of Justice and Reconciliation
The government’s gacaca endeavour was found to be deeply controversial in
terms of ‘justice as who’ or whose needs of justice should be regarded as
warranting consideration. Chapter 6 reported that the local residents of Gitera
and Kiberama were sharply divided over this very question of who between the
two sides: genocide survivors who supported gacaca’s exclusive focus on
genocide-related crimes on the one hand and the vast majority of Hutu residents
who called for the inclusion of crimes committed by the RPF/A forces against
Hutus.
Chapter 7 demonstrated that the most controversial aspect of the gacaca
process is that it is implemented within an overall one-sided framework of
post-genocide justice, the framework in which categories of victims other than
the one of genocide victims are excluded from the scope of justice. As noted,
there was a strong tendency on each side to deny or downplay the victimhood of
the other, thereby negating the other’s legitimacy to demand justice. In the face
of this starkly conflicting situation, the government chose to include the former
but exclude the latter from the scope of post-genocide justice. This apparent
failure to address the critical dimension of ‘justice as who’ is a primary factor
which has thwarted gacaca’s potential to serve as a community-based forum for
reconciling sharply conflicting narratives of victimhood in Rwanda.
The enthusiasm about ‘people’s gacaca courts’ among Hutus diminished at
an early stage of gacaca’s pilot phase after government authorities sent a clear
message that they would not tolerate any deviation from the narrowly defined
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jurisdiction of gacaca courts to try only ‘genocide-related’ crimes. In subsequent
phases, oppositional voices of those who desired to raise issues of RPF/A
crimes and other violent crimes committed outside the scope of genocide in front
of gacaca courts were effectively silenced. Accordingly, against the wishes of
many people, it has become apparent that there is extremely limited space for
them to tell their narratives if they are not directly concerned with the genocide.
Also, numerous reports of intimidation and assassination to silence potential
witnesses as well as cases of corruption suggest that genocide survivors, mostly
but not exclusively Tutsis, have been put under enormous pressure not to tell
their full stories which would implicate many more people in the genocide.
Genocide survivors who chose to speak out felt very frustrated by the rest of the
local population who chose otherwise, thereby failing to acknowledge the
wrongs committed against and the sufferings borne by the victims/survivors of
genocide. These suggest that the social environment which characterised many
of the gacaca courts is one of denial, frustration, bitterness and fear, which is
certainly not conducive to the localized integrative shaming crucial for inducing
atonement and acknowledgment by those carrying different degrees of
responsibility for past atrocities.
We saw in Chapter 8 that basically the same one-sided framework is
applied to the array of unity and reconciliation efforts reviewed in this study.
Despite the tendency to obscure the who (or relational) dimension of
reconciliation in the government’s official discourse, the kind of reconciliation
implicitly promoted through the gacaca process at the community level is one in
which offenders of genocide-related crimes acknowledge their wrongdoing, seek
forgiveness from victims’ families/survivors and make reparation as a condition
of their reintegration into the local community. This particular vision of community
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reconciliation can be only plausible for communities where the past victimization
is limited to one of genocidal violence committed under the auspices of the
former regime. This study clearly established that the vision was not perceived
as plausible by the great majority of local residents in the two fieldwork
communities. The accounts of the RPF’s war crimes documented in other
sources1 strongly suggest that the residents of the two communities are not the
only exceptions.
To be sure, the government’s insistence on not conflating the RPF’s abuses
with the crime of genocide by the former regime has merit too. In order to avoid
‘the risk of mutually offsetting levels of blameworthiness’ (Drumbl 2002, 20, n15),
it is quite important not to blur the distinction between the genocide in 1994 and
the killings by the RPF forces in Rwanda before, during and after 1994. Based
on my cumulative experience of conducting an intensive fieldwork in 2002,
working as a peace worker for a local NGO and interacting daily with Rwandans
with different backgrounds for nearly four years since October 2005, it seems
imperative that, with regard to killings perpetrated inside the territory of Rwanda,
the term ‘genocide’ must be restricted to the mass killings committed under the
auspices of the former regime, on the grounds that they were executed with
intent to exterminate all the Tutsis and anyone who was perceived to stand in
their way, whereas the RPF killings did not have the same genocidal character.
The risk of ‘mutually offsetting levels of blameworthiness’ is real, considering that
the so-called ‘double-genocide thesis’, the claim that Hutus were massacred in a
‘counter-genocide’ by the RPF as Tutsis were killed by the Hutu Power regime, is
an important element of political discourse among the community of Hutu
oppositions in exile,2 which was also confirmed inside Rwanda during the
1 See Section 4 of Chapter 4 and Section 4 of Chapter 7
2 See for example, James Gasana, the former Minister of Defence (1992-93) who has been in
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fieldwork. It is therefore important to exercise utmost care in not equating the
RPF crimes with the genocide committed by the former regime.
Nevertheless, through failing to account for human rights violations
committed by the members of the RPF in a transparent manner and neglecting
profound needs of acknowledgement and other forms of reparation for the
victims of those violations and their families, the one-sided justice and
reconciliation reinforced the perception among many Hutus that the justice and
reconciliation the current government pursues is merely one in Tutsi terms
where only Hutus are punished and required to atone for the crimes they
committed. It is crucial to understand that this one-sided framework appears to
have created a situation where many genocide survivors, mostly Tutsis but also
those with mixed ethnic background, have become deeply frustrated because it
has further strengthened many Hutus’ denial about different degrees of
responsibility, not only criminal but also moral in nature, for the crime of
genocide.
2.3.3. Tension within the National Unity and Reconciliation Efforts
Most of the unity and reconciliation efforts examined in Chapter 8 are geared to
stress commonalities as Banyarwanda, the people sharing historical, social and
cultural heritage and as citizens of the Republic of Rwanda. Their overarching
purpose is to forge a unified national identity cutting across all the existing
divisions and develop a strong sense of Rwandan citizenship, thereby
enhancing people’s loyalty to the state of Rwanda. As discussed above, these
efforts can be seen as constituting a pragmatic, structure-oriented approach to
national reconciliation in the aftermath of mass collective violence such as the
exile, claims that: ‘It is estimated that between 1.5 and 2 million Rwandans were killed in the
Tutsi genocide and in the Hutu counter genocide that the international community is not yet
willing to investigate’ (1997, 108, n1).
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Rwandan genocide. Seemingly excessive emphasis on notions like consensus,
unity and harmony in government policies may be also interpreted as a vigilant
measure of precaution to prevent the recurrence of violent political conflict in the
future.
However, this set of governmental efforts to advance national reconciliation
through emphasising unity, harmony and common Rwandan-ness is severely
counterbalanced by another set of efforts which the government says is
indispensable for national reconciliation: that is, remembering the nation’s violent
past and its victims through a ‘harmonised’ official remembrance (Rwanda 2006,
197). As various accounts presented in this thesis clearly show, what can be a
‘harmonised’ way of remembering the past is a highly contentious issue in
Rwanda. However, the RPF-led government has been exclusively focusing on
what it considers to be the history of the Rwandan genocide and its victims.
The way the genocide itself is commemorated has significantly changed
over the last 15 years in a negative way from the view point of national
reconciliation; the primacy of Tutsis’ victimhood has been increasingly
emphasised in the official remembrance at the expense of remembrance for
those victims with other identities who were killed by so-called massacres. At
least for some years following the genocide, the government attempted to strike
a difficult balance between two important concerns: asserting the primacy of
Tutsis’ victimhood in the genocide and counteracting a popular perception that
the government cares about only Tutsis’ victimhood. There is a certain level of
legitimacy in this policy for making distinctions between the category of victims
who were killed because of their ethnic identity and that of victims who were
killed due to other reasons － for avoiding the trivialisation of genocide and the
special characteristics of the suffering inflicted on victims of genocide in the strict
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sense of the term. This thesis noted, however, that the moral hierarchy of
victimhood implied in these distinctions is not conducive to efforts to forge an
inclusive national identity cutting across ethnic lines, as it sharply contradicts the
notion of common Rwandan-ness, the notion which underpins the national
identity for all Rwandans.
The government’s increasing emphasis on the primacy of Tutsis’ victimhood
in its presentation of the 1994 genocide has entailed the increased
marginalisation of non-Tutsi victims and has augmented the collective guilt
imposed on the entire Hutu population. This inevitably reinforces the public
perception that the hierarchy of victimhood and the victim/perpetrator dichotomy
are structured along ethnic lines, thereby giving sections of the Rwandan
population subscribing to the essentialist construction of ‘the Hutu’ vs. ‘the Tutsi’
yet another reason to reinforce their racialised ethnic identities.
3. Lessons from Rwanda’s Experience
Main lessons from the case study are presented under three headings
corresponding to the key conceptual issues discussed in Chapters 2 and 3.
3.1. Justice and Reconciliation as Complex, Interactive Processes
The case study of Rwanda confirmed the validity of the proposed conceptual
framework of justice and reconciliation discussed in Chapter 3 mainly in two
distinctive ways. First, it clearly shows the interconnectedness of multi-level,
multi-dimensional challenges of post-violence justice and reconciliation. At the
national level, the government’s efforts consist of two interconnected challenges:
the challenge of creating an inclusive nation state with structures and institutions
that champion the rule of law and consensual democracy, and the challenge of
fostering a strong sense of loyalty to the nation state by forging a unified national
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identity cutting across social divisions. At the community and interpersonal levels,
the government focuses on the restoration of relationships damaged by the
genocidal violence through gacaca-based reconciliatory justice. This process of
reconciliatory justice represents an integrated response to the retributive,
reparative and restorative needs of the community and its individual members
affected by violent crimes committed during the genocide. The case study also
indicated significant tension between the forward-looking effort to forge a
national identity and the backward-looking effort to deal with issues of past
violations. All of these point to the importance of paying due attention to the
interconnected nature of various justice and reconciliation processes at different
levels of society and trying to minimise tensions and maximise synergies
between them.
Second, Rwanda’s experience points to the importance of understanding
justice and reconciliation as a dynamic, interactive process. As pointed out
above, the conceptions of justice and reconciliation underlying related policies of
the Rwandan government have changed significantly over the years. Justice and
reconciliation were once considered to be incompatible alternatives, but later,
with the introduction of the gacaca system, these two policy objectives were put
forth as not only compatible but also mutually reinforcing. Underlying the
government’s move to adopt the policy of reconciliatory justice was a significant
shift from a static conception of justice (justice as a pre-condition of
reconciliation) to a dynamic one – justice as an evolving process towards the
interconnected goals of retribution, reparation and restoration. This does not
mean that there is no more tension within the justice and reconciliation process
promoted by the government. However, the shift in the government’s approach
from punitive to reconciliatory justice seems to have alleviated the tension to a
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great extent. These observations confirm the need for a conceptual framework
which pays due attention to the changing nature of and the dynamic interactions
between the justice and reconciliation processes.
3.2. Possibilities of Transcending the Dichotomies
Chapter 3 discussed the layers of dichotomies surrounding the challenge of
post-violence justice and reconciliation, namely: the peace/justice dichotomy;
the retributive justice/ restorative justice dichotomy; and the
punishment/forgiveness dichotomy. This study presented the Rwanda’s
approach to reconciliatory justice as one which points to the possibility of
transcending the dichotomies. According to Rwanda’s experience, these layers
of dichotomies can be possibly overcome by putting forth a both/and approach to
justice and reconciliation even in a society which experienced mass violence
such as genocide. Let us recap briefly below how these dichotomies were
addressed in the Rwandan approach to reconciliatory justice.
In the years following the genocide, the government’s thinking on justice
and reconciliation was a ‘first justice, then reconciliation’ approach with the
presumption that ‘the pursuit of justice and the quest for peace are in
fundamental tension and that the former must be fulfilled before the latter can be
undertaken’ (Amstutz 2004, 104). However, this dichotomous thinking that
considered justice as a pre-condition to peace and reconciliation in a strict sense
faded out from the late 1990s as the government prepared for the introduction of
the gacaca system. Grounded in the grassroots conception of justice and
reconciliation, gacaca-based reconciliatory justice sought to address people’s
needs and desires for retribution and reparation as an integral part of the
rectificatory justice process towards the restoration of damaged relationships.
This shows the practical possibility of pursuing justice which is beyond the
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retributive/restorative dichotomy. Furthermore, Rwanda’s experience also
demonstrates that forgiveness and punishment are not necessarily incompatible
alternatives in the context of a post-violence society. For several years following
the genocide, with fresh memories of unspeakable atrocities, forgiveness was a
taboo word inasmuch as it was equated with impunity or ‘forgive and forget’. In
subsequent years, however, the gacaca process promoted the notion of
forgiveness for those perpetrators who confessed and repented their
wrongdoings. But this did not mean that those ‘forgiven’ were exempted from
punishment. Rather, their punishment was significantly reduced. In other words,
the Rwandan gacaca system took a both/and approach with regard to the issue
of punishment and forgiveness.
3.3. The Question of Who and the Challenge of Identity Change
This study confirmed the following observations with regard to ‘justice as who’ or
the issue of who is included or excluded from the scope of justice. First, as
Opotow (2002) argues, who is a crucial dimension of justice which deserves due
attention in formulating policies of post-violence justice, particularly because, as
Opotow warns, the way choices are made about who is often very vague and
murky. Second, as the conflicting narratives of victimhood presented in Chapter
5 clearly indicate, in the aftermath of violent conflict, this who can be at the heart
of a dispute between adversarial groups all laying claim to victimhood and
demanding justice for their own side. Third, when these groups in dispute
consider themselves as collective victims of the enemy group, post-violence
justice faces a serious dilemma. Because adversarial identity groups have a
common tendency to minimise or negate the victimhood of the other, the notion
of even-handed justice is likely to enrage one or more groups.
A case in point is the conflicting demands for justice promoted on both sides
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of the ethno-political divide. On the one hand, the vast majority of Hutu residents
in the two fieldwork communities denounced what they perceived as one-sided
victor’s justice dictated by the interests of Tutsis, and demanded justice not only
for the victims of genocide who are primarily Tutsis but also for Hutu victims of
RPF/A crimes. On the other hand, the genocide survivors firmly rejected the
notion of even-handed justice, insisting that their particular form of victimhood
should not be equated with other forms of victimhood. What the former
considered as a legitimate demand for justice was perceived by the latter as
nothing but a grave injustice to themselves and their loved ones who perished
during the genocide. What made these conflicting demands seemingly
irreconcilable was that they were so intimately interwoven with their deep sense
of collective victimhood --- the core of their identities --- caused by their enemy
group.
In this study, reconciliation of ‘ethnicized’ conflicting narratives clearly
emerged as a key challenge in the quest for justice and reconciliation in
post-genocide Rwanda. What lessons can we learn from Rwanda’s experience,
which may be applied to other post-violence societies, particularly those which
experienced identity-based violent conflicts? One important lesson is the great
relevance of Kelman’s conception of reconciliation as identity change to the
conceptual understanding and practice of post-violence justice and reconciliation
during or after identity-based conflicts. As discussed in Chapter 2, Kelman
(2004) argues that reconciliation is best understood as a process through which
the collective identities of parties to conflict and their narratives are ‘negotiated’
so that their identities/narratives are dissociated from the negation of the other or,
in this particular case, the other’s victimhood, which constitutes a key element of
each party’s own identity/narrative. He maintains that such identity change may
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be facilitated by helping the parties to engage in the process of negotiating ‘the
conditions for reconciliation, which turn on such issues as truth, justice, and
responsibility’ (121). Then, the process of rectificatory justice, if it is structured for
that end, can play a critical role in advancing reconciliation, providing conflicting
parties with the time and space to listen to and reconcile each other’s narratives.
As a community-based forum for truth-telling and deliberative justice
proceedings rooted in Rwandan cultural tradition, the gacaca process of
reconciliatory justice has a unique potential for facilitating the process of
reconciling the conflicting narratives of victimhood in Rwandan society. However,
because it is overshadowed by the overall framework of one-sided
post-genocide justice, gacaca’s reconciliatory potential has never been fully
realised. Quite contrary to what Kelman’s theory of reconciliation suggests, the
RPF-led government chose to address the challenge of identity change through
a completely different strategy: imposing a single official narrative on the whole
population. Whether this strategy will succeed at the end in shaping the
collective memory of Rwandans and their identities remains to be seen. But one
thing which is very clear by now is that, as documented in Chapter 8, the
strategy necessitated the regime to take coercive measures, in the name of
national unity, to silence those who desired to advance counter-narratives, and
in so doing, it violated the very values it claims to champion, such as human
rights and democracy.
Telling one’s own story is a fundamental need for the victim of violence. In
the early years of its development, many Rwandans hoped that the gacaca
process would give them an opportunity to tell their own stories. However, that
glimmer of hope shattered completely for those whose narratives were not in
conformity with the official one. Instead of facilitating the emergence of space for
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sincere truth-telling and open dialogue, the RPF regime chose the path of
imposing its own narrative on the entire population and criminalising those who
voice counter-narratives, again in the name of unity and reconciliation and the
fight against ‘genocide ideology’. Consequently, its project for creating a united
and reconciled Rwanda has become, to say the least, a highly controversial
endeavour.
Having illustrated all this, this study shows another important lesson from
Rwanda’s experience. That is, the discourse on national unity and reconciliation
can be used to suppress the narratives of various victim groups that are
inconvenient for those in power. This makes asking the question of who even
more critical for those who are interested in assisting various efforts at justice
and reconciliation in post-violence societies.
4. Conclusion
I began this thesis with the story of Ange, a survivor of the genocide, who shared
her story of sorrow and hope when I first visited Rwanda nine years ago. Then in
the following chapters, I presented accounts of ethno-political violence in
Rwanda’s recent past, which cannot be reduced to only the genocide against
Tutsis. In so doing, did I trivialise the genocide and the unspeakable sufferings of
Ange and hundreds of thousands of other survivors who went through a
‘terrifying existential crisis’? Did I make the terrible mistake of equating the
horrendous crimes by the génocidaires with those by RPF soldiers who halted
the genocide?
I believe I did not. In this study, I have attempted to pose a difficult question:
how can we talk about what happened in Rwanda’s violent past in a way that
heals the painful and divisive memories it brings back to all Rwandans? There is
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no easy answer to this mind-boggling question. However, this thesis clearly
demonstrates the necessity to search for ways to somehow reconcile existing
conflicting narratives in the quest for justice and reconciliation.
4.1. Towards a Horizontal Differentiation of Victimhood
This thesis has discussed the so-called victim competition between different
categories of victims who advanced conflicting narratives characterised by their
insistence on the primacy of their own group’s victimhood and the minimisation
of the victimhood of the other, defined as the enemy group. This problematic
tendency is certainly not unique to Rwandan victims/survivors of genocide,
crimes against humanity, war crimes or other types of human rights violations. It
is a fairly common tendency of victims of violent crimes, particularly those
committed in the context of identity-based conflict. But what makes the
Rwanda’s case particularly complicated is that Tutsis endured not only extreme
injuries and irreparable losses in great magnitude but also an existential crisis of
their entire community being annihilated. As discussed earlier, genocide
survivors’ identity is deeply rooted in this experience of existential crisis and that
of ‘being hunted down’, and therefore, it is a great injustice to them if their
victimhood is equated with that of others who do not share those special
characteristics, be it ‘moderate Hutus’ who were massacred by the génocidaires
or those who were killed by RPF/A atrocities. On the other hand, as the accounts
presented in this thesis suggest, there are many Hutu victims of RPF/A atrocities
who are neither able nor willing to understand distinct characteristics of genocide
survivors’ suffering. As Rombouts and Vandeginste (2005, 338) point out, both
sides are ‘blinded’ to the victimhood of the other: genocide survivors by their
horrifying existential suffering and victims of RPF atrocities by the wholesale
denial of their suffering in Rwandan society today. This problematic situation is
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exacerbated by the officially sanctioned moral hierarchy of victimhood which is
perceived by many Rwandans and outside observers as being structured along
ethnic fault lines.
The victim’s tendency to insist the primacy of her/his victimhood and to
minimise the victimhood of members of the enemy group is common and
understandable, particularly when the victimization she/he suffered is that of
genocide. Do we have to accept the existing moral hierarchy of victimhood as
one of the inevitable consequences of the Rwandan genocide? Rombouts and
Vandeginste (2005, 340) say it is not the case: certainly, ‘such vertical hierarchy
is not the only way to conceive of multiple groups or categories of victims’. But
then, do we treat all victims equally without distinction, which would certainly
outrage the community of genocide survivors and probably other groups of
victims?
There must be a third way, a way to transcend the dichotomy between
classifying victims into a rigid hierarchy and treating all of them equally without
recognising their distinct characteristics. The key to the resolution of this
dilemma lies in differentiating various categories of victims horizontally rather
than vertically. Rombouts and Vandeginste explain:
This horizontal structure allows for differentiation without hierarchy. This
implies that all victim groups are recognised in their specific victim situation,
without necessarily implying that various victims are compared to one
another. Victims do not have to consider the other victim as equal to him;
nevertheless it is important that victims are able to recognise the suffering
the other victim has to go through. (340)
This horizontal differentiation of victimhood seems to provide Rwandans with an
approach which is conducive to their aspiration of building a reconciled Rwanda
for future generations. This is a difficult but crucial step in the Rwanda’s quest for
justice and reconciliation.
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4.2. Differentiating Mutuality from Moral Equivalence
The problem with the government’s narratives of the RPF/A’s conduct before,
during and after the genocide is that they demonstrate a common tendency to
justify or downplay its human rights abuses as violence that was either
‘necessary’ intervention for stopping the genocide or ‘understandable’ acts of
vengeance by individual soldiers who lost their loved ones in genocidal
massacres. Moreover, the government not only justifies or downplays them but
also shows no tolerance of the counter-narratives of those pointing out
unjustifiable acts of violence on the part of the RPF/A. At the thirteenth
commemoration of the genocide, President Kagame (2007) vehemently spoke
the following words to the nation of Rwanda and to the international community:
RPF should be the one to judge the killers and those that assisted them.
Others are trying to distort history by changing the facts of what happened,
but they know very well that they have no authority to judge RPF.
The tendency to downplay or justify one’s own acts of violence are, of
course, not unique to the RPF leadership. It is indeed quite a common tendency
demonstrated by parties to a violent political conflict who ‘usually believe that
they have struggled in defence of a just cause’ (Govier 2006, 125). Those who
believe in their just cause also have a tendency to resist suggestions that they
too may have done something morally unjustifiable in the course of their violent
struggle. This study indicated clearly that the RPF-led government and President
Kagame himself are not free from such a tendency.
What can we do then as we are confronted with this persistent tendency? A
crucial step seems to lie in differentiating ‘mutuality of acknowledgement’ from
‘moral equivalence’. According to Govier (2006, 127), mutuality of
acknowledgement requires all the parties to ‘reflect on, and if appropriate, admit
to any wrongs they have committed, […] regardless of their relative power as a
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result of the military or negotiated settlement’ and then to ‘acknowledge the
existence and needs of victims in other groups as well as the degrees of
responsibility among militants and leaders’. Even though it requires much painful
effort to negotiate competing narratives among conflicting parties, it does not
necessarily lead them to avoid making meaningful moral distinctions with regard
to legal and moral responsibilities for the wrongdoings committed by members of
their own group and those of the enemy group during the prolonged violent
conflict. Govier’s distinction between the two concepts has direct relevance to
the challenge faced by the RPF leadership, the challenge to transcend the
dichotomy between lumping the crimes together without any meaningful
distinction and turning a blind eye to those committed by its own side, no matter
how firmly they believe that their struggle was for a just cause, the liberation of
Rwanda from the dictatorial, genocidal regime.
4.3. An Unmet Challenge
After three years of nationwide implementation of the gacaca courts, the
government currently says that it will complete all the gacaca trials by the end of
2009 and then start sharing with the international community valuable lessons
learned from the experience of the Rwandan innovation of reconciliatory justice.
Rwanda’s experience of reconciliatory justice through gacaca courts and other
justice and reconciliation efforts for the last 15 years certainly provides a wealth
of useful lessons concerning conceptual understandings and practical aspects of
post-violence justice and reconciliation. The case of Rwanda represents a
unique both/and approach to post-violence justice and reconciliation. It shows
the world that even after a mass atrocity like genocide, a nation may pursue not
only justice but also reconciliation. It also shows that the layers of dichotomies
surrounding the challenge of post-violence justice and reconciliation - the
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peace/justice dichotomy, the retributive/restorative justice dichotomy and the
forgiveness/punishment dichotomy - are not necessarily irreconcilable
contradictions and are thus possibly transcendable. This thesis discussed that
underlying this government’s success in advancing an innovative both/and
approach to post-violence justice and reconciliation is a significant shift in its
conception of justice, particularly in the dimensions of ‘justice as what’ and
‘justice as how’. Rwanda’s experience shows, however, how the challenge of
addressing ‘justice as who’ in the aftermath of violent conflict which ended with
the military victory of one party can be left out from the search for an innovative
approach to post-violence justice and reconciliation. Consequently, the
government’s endeavour in the quest for justice and reconciliation falls short of
meeting the paramount challenge of reconciliation as identity change in the face
of the still powerful, dichotomous construction of ethnicity in Rwanda. Unless the
critical issue of who is tackled and an optimal degree of mutuality, not moral
equivalence, is attained, the prospects for reconciliation in post-violence
societies such as Rwanda will remain elusive.
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Appendix 1
Interviewees in the Grassroots Study
1. Gitera Sector
No Pseudonym Sex Category Ethnicity
1 Serge M SG T
2 Phanuel M SG T
3 Anastasie F SG T
4 Pierre M SG T
5 Nadine F SG T
6 Felix M SG T
7 Diane F SG T
8 Bosco M SG T
9 Theoneste M SG T
10 Emmanuel M SG T
11 Eric M SM H
12 Caliste M SM H
13 Paul M SM H
14 Juliette F SM H
15 Jean Baptiste M SM H
16 Cyprien M P H
17 Rose F P H
18 Fabien M PC H
19 Alphonse M FP H
20 Stephanie F FP H
21 Edith F FP H
22 Tito M FP H
23 Goretti F FP H
24 Sylveste M FP H
25 Justin M FP H
26 Prisca F FP H
27 Marie F FP H
28 Alexi M O H
29 Boniface M O H
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2. Kiberama Sector
No Pseudonym Sex Category Ethnicity
1 Pascal M SG M
2 Jean M SG M
3 Odette F SG M
4 Alice F SG T
5 Aimable M OR T
6 Chantal F SM H
7 Damien M P H
8 Gaspard M P H
9 Fabrice M P H
10 Olivier M P H
11 Julienne F FP H
12 Monique F FP H
13 Eliyabo M DR H
14 Claude M DR H
15 Esther F O H
16 Antoine M O H
17 Anastase M O H
18 Saveri M O H
19 Muze M O H
Note: Descriptions of the codes referring to categories and ethnicity of interviewees
are as follows:
Categories: SG (survivors of genocide); SM (survivors of ‘massacres’);
P (prisoners); FP (families of prisoners); OR (old caseload
refugees); DR (demobilised rebels); O (other).
Ethnicity: T (Tutsi); H (Hutu); M (Persons of mixed parentage).
See Section 2.2. of Chapter 5 for an explanation of these
different types of ethnicity in Rwanda.
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Appendix 2
Interviews in the Government Policy Study
Government Institution
No. of
Interviewees
Kigali head office 5
Gitarama provincial office 1NSGC
Gisenyi provincial office 1
Kigali head office 6
Gitarama provincial office 1NURC
Gisenyi provincial office 1
Ministry of Justice 1
Office of Prosecutor
General
2
SETIG 1
MINALOC 2
NCHR 1
Total 22
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Appendix 3
Responses to Two Fundamental Questions
about Inter-group Forgiveness
Those who are deeply sceptical about the notion of inter-group forgiveness often
raise two questions: whether groups can forgive and whether groups are morally
entitled to forgive. These fundamental questions about the possibility of
inter-group forgiveness are examined below, primarily based on a philosophical
account provided by Govier (2002), one of the leading scholars on forgiveness
and trust as philosophical concepts.
Can groups forgive?
‘Can groups forgive?’ is a question of whether such a seemingly personal
process as forgiveness, which involves significant changes in emotions and
attitudes, can be applied to inter-group relations. Unlike individuals, Govier and
Verwoerd maintain, groups have neither a mind or a conscience nor ‘feel such
sensations as grief and pain’ (2002, 188). Govier (2002, 87-92) provides a
insightful responses to this ‘fundamental scepticism’ about inter-group
forgiveness. She says that inter-group forgiveness ‘requires that groups can be
subjects and objects of forgiveness’ and the notion can make logical sense only
when three presuppositions are established (87). The first is whether a group
can act as a collective moral agent which is capable of performing differently
from unrelated individuals. After examining the nature of collective actions by
different groups (like a choir singing a musical work, a church congregation
running a soup kitchen and an unorganised mob storming a building), Govier
maintains that these groups are all engaged in actions which ‘do not just happen
in the absence of human deliberation, intention, and desire’ (88). Then, she
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states (ibid):
They are describable in the language of responsibility and evaluation, and
they are not the actions of individual human agents. Therefore, they are the
products of collective human agency, the actions of groups. Groups can act.
The actions of groups are performed by individual members related to each
other in various ways so that what they do can constitute group actions.
In making the case for the second presupposition, whether a group as such
can be harmed unjustly, Govier considers examples of collective victimization.
These include the Rwandan genocide, in which people were harmed because of
their group membership or social identity. Her accounts illustrate that direct harm
(mistreatment, discrimination or extreme violence) inflicted on one group
member may cause significant harm to other members of the same group as
they feel insecurity and vulnerability based on their group membership (89-90).
Govier then addresses the third presupposition: whether ‘groups can have -
and can amend - feelings, attitudes, and beliefs about various matters, including
harms they have suffered at the hands of others’ (87). To illustrate her argument,
she uses a case of a group which boycotts products produced by child labour in
Pakistan. The deliberations, decision-making and actions which generated
signed statement and the boycott clearly points to group beliefs, attitudes and
desires (91).1 Regarding this third presupposition, Govier concludes:
Groups deliberate about policies and actions, and when those deliberations
culminate in decisions, we are able to make attributions on the basis of
those decisions. Groups can also deliberate about what to believe and what
attitude to adopt. Fundamental scepticism about group forgiveness can be
answered. (92)
1 Respectively, ‘that the products were produced using child labor and boycotts are a
plausible way to change that’ (belief), ‘that child labor is unacceptable’ (attitude) and ‘that
child labor end’ (desire).
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Are groups morally entitled to forgive?
The idea that victims are the only legitimate entities to forgive is a common
assumption for many (Amstutz 2005, 81). ‘Forgiveness’, writes Bloomfield (2006,
23), ‘is something (often one of few things) that remains in the power of victims
to give or withhold’. The notion that forgiveness is a victim’s prerogative is often
expressed by those opposing the idea of amnesty or any ‘pushy’ efforts to
promote forgiveness by governments or other institutions like churches. For
example, the South African TRC was criticised by many victims of human rights
violations ‘on the ground that it had been too forgiving, had pre-empted what
should have been their exclusive right to forgive, and had wrongly put pressure
on victims to forgive’ (Govier 2002, 93). One South African, directing his criticism
to former TRC Chairman Archbishop Tutu, complained:
Black people are made to reconcile while they are not being reconciled with.
Tutu knows very well that he is not the person to forgive on behalf of victims.
(quoted in Govier, ibid)
Charles Villa-Vicencio, the former TRC’s Director of Research was known to be
against the state-sponsored commission’s involvement in efforts to promote
interpersonal forgiveness (Chapman 2001, 252). He also writes: ‘We can forgive
harm done to us’, but ‘it is not in our power to forgive harm done to others’
(quoted in Amstutz 2005, 82).
Govier (2002, 92) explains the logic of those who are sceptical about
inter-group forgiveness on the basis of victim’s prerogative to forgive:
[E]ven if it should be logically possible for groups to forgive, it would not be
morally appropriate for them to do so. Only individuals can be victims of
wrongdoing, and only victims are entitled to forgive.
While the notion that victims have a supreme moral authority in matters of
forgiveness is plausible, it needs to be qualified with regard to who victims really
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are (Amstutz 2005, 82). Govier (2002, 93) classifies victims of a serious
wrongdoing into three groups: ‘primary victims’ who have been directly harmed
physically or psychologically; ‘secondary victims’, family and friends of primary
victims who have been harmed indirectly as a result of the injuries or loss of a
loved one; and ‘tertiary victims’, a community or society that has collectively
suffered injuries primarily in psychological terms because of violence inflicted on
its members.
The case of post-genocide Rwanda illustrates Govier’s distinctions among
different categories of victims very well. The genocide primarily targeted Tutsis
and those Tutsis who were killed or injured are clearly primary victims. Family,
relatives and friends of those who were killed or injured are secondary victims
even though many are primary victims as well because they too suffered direct
physical and psychological injuries and economic losses. Finally, the entire Tutsi
community (all the people who have a sense of social identity as Tutsi), including
those who were not in the country or had not been born, constitutes a class of
tertiary victims who have a sense of collective victimhood.2 Considering that
these secondary and tertiary victims have been also harmed by violence, it is
reasonable to assume that they are also entitled to forgive those who caused
their sufferings, not on behalf of primary victims but for themselves. Accordingly,
Govier argues that ‘in the virtue of the harms done to secondary and tertiary
victims’, groups are morally entitled to grant and receive forgiveness (95).
From this presupposition, the possibility of forgiveness and reconciliation
emerges in cases of extreme violence like murder and genocide and serious
historical crimes whose primary victims are no longer alive. If only primary
victims are entitled to offer forgiveness, there is no possibility of forgiveness in
2 In many parts of Africa, traditionally, the ancestors or the dead who were killed in violent
conflicts in the past are considered to be another category of victims, having a substantial
role in forgiveness and reconciliation (Sarpong 1988). I thank Sue Cutter for this point.
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these cases because they are dead and (according to a widely held assumption
in modern western societies) the dead cannot forgive. However, if secondary
and tertiary victims (family and friends or representatives of the community to
which the victim belonged) are considered to be legitimate entities to forgive, the
victimizer or victimizer group may have the possibility of receiving at least ‘partial
forgiveness’ (Amstutz 2005, 83).
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Appendix 4
Main Programme Areas of the
National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (NURC)
1. Civic Education
A department specialising in civic education is in charge of two main
responsibilities: developing a training syllabus and materials to promote national
unity and reconciliation; and organising training at ‘all levels of Rwandan society
via workshops, seminars and discussions in the interest of unity and
reconciliation’ (NURC’s official website).3 The civic education syllabus covering
citizens’ rights and duties as well as their expected contribution to national unity
and reconciliation was integrated into the national curriculum so that all the
pupils in Rwanda are taught ‘values of peace, love, human rights, patriotism,
unity and reconciliation and their duty to become good citizens’.4
Probably the most high profile activity implemented by the NURC is known
as ingando, a solidarity camp organised for different target groups, including
students at secondary and university levels, teachers, demobilised soldiers and
combatants (ex-FAR and ex-RPF soldiers as well as ex-militia members),
community leaders and released prisoners of genocide. An ingando is organised
as a residential camp with the number of participants ranging between a few
hundreds and a thousand. It lasts for between three weeks to two months. The
number of participants and the length of each ingando vary depending on the
target group, time available, etc. Although specific activities and topics covered
during each camp vary, mainly according to the target group, there are five
3 Accessed on 14 March 2009.
4 Interview with Fatuma Ndangiza, Executive Secretary of NURC, Kigali, 12 Dec 2002.
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central themes around which training sessions are organised: ‘analysis of
Rwanda’s problem, history of Rwanda, political and socioeconomic issues in
Rwanda and Africa, rights, obligations and duties and leadership’ (ibid).
Participants in an ingando are guided to ‘correct their false perception of their
national history’, ‘build within themselves a renewed sense of Rwandan
nationality’, and ‘share their vision and perspective in solving the variety of
problems facing the country’ (NURC 2002b, 26).
2. Conflict Management
NURC’s conflict management programme has two main objectives. The first is to
monitor whether various parties in the country (e.g. government organs, public
and private institutions, political parties, community leaders, etc.) ‘respect and
observe policies and practices of national unity and reconciliation’ (NURC’s
official website).5 The second objective is to build the capacity of Rwandan
people in conflict management and peacebuilding. With regard to the first
objective, one of its key activities concerns monitoring of legislative
developments that have implications for the process of unity and reconciliation.
The commission provided professional input for legislation such as the Organic
Law for setting up gacaca courts and organising prosecution for offences
constituting genocide and other crimes against humanity (N° 40/2000 of
26/01/2001), the law penalising discrimination or sectarianism (N°47/2001 of
18/12/2001), the law suppressing the crime of genocide, crimes against
humanity and war crimes (N°33 bis/2003 of 06/09/2003) as well as the new
constitution adopted in the Referendum of 26 May 2003. The commission also
plays the role of a watchdog by monitoring and publishing reports on the conduct
5 Accessed on 14 March 2009.
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of various parties in society from the perspective of unity and reconciliation.
With regard to the second objective, the NURC has been conducting
seminars and training to build the capacity at different levels of Rwandan society
to monitor, prevent and manage conflicts. The commission supported the
National Service of Gacaca Courts (NSGC) in training lay judges of gacaca
courts to equip them with skills in conflict management and in understanding the
policies of unity and reconciliation. More recently, a great deal of the
commission’s training effort has been directed at the capacity building of Abunzi,
members of a Mediation Committee ‘elected by the population on the basis of
integrity to resolve day to day conflicts before referring them to conventional
courts’ (NURC’s official website).6 The Mediation Committee or Komite y’Abunzi
is comprised of twelve residents from the sector who do not have positions within
local government or judicial organs (Article 159 of the Constitution). It is reported
that Abunzi deal with 80 percent of local-level conflicts, thereby significantly
reducing the burden of judicial proceedings through the formal justice system
(IJR 2005, 12).
In recent years, the department in charge of conflict management has been
playing an increasingly active role in the areas of research and advocacy for the
promotion of unity and reconciliation. Research and monitoring reports published
by the NURC cover a range of issues including popular participation in the
gacaca process (NURC 2003), presidential and parliamentary elections in 2003
(NURC 2004a), women’s role in reconciliation and peacebuilding (NURC 2005a),
land property (NURC 2005b), analysis of the Rwandan conflict (Shyaka 2005),
causes of violence in post-genocide Rwanda (NURC 2008a) and social
cohesion in terms of interpersonal trust among Rwandans and their trust in the
government’s programmes (NURC 2008b).
6 Accessed on 14 March 2009.
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3. Support to Community Initiatives
The NURC’s programme for supporting community initiatives in terms of
financial grants and training originated from its realisation, though the grassroots
consultations mentioned above, that poverty is a serious impediment to unity
and reconciliation. The promotion of community-based associations through
which various categories of vulnerable people ‘work hand in hand to address
their shared needs and improve their own welfare’ became an important
strategic emphasis of the commission.7 Vulnerable groups the commission
identified included: orphans and child-heads of households; widows of genocide
and women whose husbands are imprisoned; genocide survivors in general,
those with disabilities and illness including HIV/AIDS; the elderly; and Batwa
people who are historically marginalised in Rwandan society (NURC 2001, 18).
The commission understands that poverty alleviation is not its central mandate.
Yet it believes that support to community initiatives offers a vital opportunity to
‘mainstream its central message and values of unity and reconciliation’ into the
grassroots development process as well as ‘to gather evidence about the
progress of reconciliation, areas of ongoing or emerging conflict and about best
practices to address these issues’ (ibid). After making an inventory of such
grassroots initiatives across the country, the NURC helped some associations
secure financial support from international NGOs and donor agencies. In 2006,
over 360 community-based self-help initiatives have been registered all over the
country, including over 60 associations who have received external grants
through the NURC. The NURC claims that most of these groups ‘comprise
perpetrators and survivors and their activities range from promoting
reconciliation in communities to income generating activities’ (NURC’s official
7 Interview with Ndangiza, Kigali, 12 Dec 2002.
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website).8
The NURC also has promoted the formation of unity and reconciliation
clubs in schools and higher education institutions. Students who took part in
ingando were encouraged to form such clubs in their own schools so that a
space is crated for ‘students from different backgrounds get together promote
reconciliation in places of learning’ (ibid).
8 Accessed on 14 March 2009.
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